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ABSTRACT 
The governments of various countries have continued to adopt Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
for infrastructure projects delivery due to its many advantages over the traditional procurement 
method. However, concerns have been raised by stakeholders about the viability of PPP to deliver 
Value for Money (VfM), especially for the client. These discussions have generated debates and 
arguments in policy and advisory documents within the last decade mainly in the renegotiation of 
PPP water and transport projects and their VfM implications. Poor or non-achievement of VfM 
in PPP contracts renegotiation has led to this study in PPP road projects with the overall aim of 
integrating VfM considerations into the renegotiation process of PPP road projects.   
Mixed methodology research approach is used to achieve the objectives set for the study. 
Interviews and questionnaires of professionals involved in Design-Build-Finance-Operate 
(DBFO) road projects in the UK are used in the study. The qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of the data collected revealed that technical, contractual and additional works are the categories 
of factors leading to renegotiations and have an impact on the achievement of VfM. These 
findings show that renegotiation does not necessarily have to erode the VfM benefits of PPP road 
projects for the client and lead to user’s dissatisfaction regarding quality, fees, and charges. The 
research shows that the very critical factors leading to the renegotiation of road concessions are 
changes to works standards, specifications, the scope of works, and additional works. The findings 
also indicate that design and planning measures such as clear and concise contract documents, a 
definition of detailed criteria for VfM and performance indicators, and accurate estimation of 
contract requirements amongst others are critical measures to ensure the achievement of VfM at 
the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects. Also, VfM can further be achieved for the 
renegotiations that are predominantly motivated by technical and contractual factors.  
This study developed a VfM renegotiation framework for the UK PFI (DBFO) road projects. The 
five constituents of the VfM renegotiation framework are identification and establishment of 
measures and mechanisms, the factors leading to renegotiation and their level of criticalities, 
impacts of the renegotiation on VfM criteria, the identification of renegotiation outcomes and 
their natures and the application of remedial actions (if necessary). The concept of the framework 
is premised on the importance of defining and agreeing on appropriate measures and VfM 
contractual mechanisms by both public and private stakeholders at the contract inception to guide 
future renegotiation. An assessment of the factors, impacts, and outcomes of the renegotiation is 
necessary during the stages of implementation of the PPP road projects to develop an 
understanding of the implications of the renegotiation on VfM.  
iv 
 
The knowledge of the impacts of renegotiations during implementation will inform the 
responsible stakeholder's decision on the appropriate actions required to address any observed 
deviations from the project performance indicators or value for money criteria defined at the 
inception of the contract. The public and private partners can achieve their respective VfM 
objectives while also achieving user’s satisfaction through the adoption of the proposed VfM 
renegotiation framework. There is, however, a need for the public and private partners who will 
be the primary beneficiary of the framework to be proactively involved in the use of the 
framework from contract inception to handing over of the project residual value to the client. The 
formulation of measures for renegotiation at the outset of the contract as indicated in the 
framework is essential to achieving VfM at renegotiation. Also, the client should ensure that 
flexibility is built into the agreement regarding the contract mechanisms for payment from the 
beginning, to allow either party to introduce proposals that can enhance the achievement of VfM 
at renegotiation or change negotiation. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH 
Transport infrastructure has been recognised as a significant contributor to economic growth and 
social development in academic and policy discussions (Tomova, 2008) and a crucial means of 
shaping the destiny of many nations (Adetola et al., 2011). The need for adequate and efficient 
transport infrastructure has prompted various governments of countries to devise ways and forms 
of procurement, which would ensure free and safe means of transportation in the most economical 
terms (Chowdhury, 2011, Meidute, 2011; Biau et al.; 2008). This need has led most developed 
countries and some developing nations to adopt Public Private Partnerships (PPP) during the 
delivery of transport infrastructures, particularly road projects. 
The reasons for the adoption of PPP by governments include the use of private funds for public 
infrastructure provision, financial risk transfer to the private partner and utilisation of higher 
management expertise of the private sector (Verweij, 2015; Tsamboulas et al., 2013; Chinyio 
2005). All these reasons suggest that there is need to adopt PPP to foster the effective and efficient 
delivery of infrastructure projects. The provision of transport projects to achieve economic 
efficiency means the achievement of value for money (VfM) especially for the stakeholders, 
which is the principal objective of the procuring authority in any PPP initiative (Henjewele, 2011). 
Adair et al. (2011, p. 9) opine, “the rollout of the PPP models has not met with universal approval; 
indeed, in some countries, there has been strong resistance to public-private partnerships with 
misgivings centred on the level of private sector profiteering as well as long-term obligations 
placed on the taxpayer”. This suggests that the delivery of infrastructure projects through PPP 
has not gained universal acceptance especially the acceptance of the users and members of the 
public. Also, regardless of the reasons for the adoption of PPP, particularly in the transport sector, 
which is premised on the benefits derived from its use, there have been obvious challenges that 
have hindered the successful implementation of the model especially in terms of VfM (Sarmento, 
2014; Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos, 2013; Athias and Saussier, 2007). The challenges can also 
be regarded as setbacks and constitute issues in PPP procurement. These challenges include 
incomplete contracting, project abandonment, cost and time overruns and renegotiation (Guasch 
et al., 2014; Amade, 2012; Guasch and Straub, 2009b; Estache et al., 2009). However, one of the 
main setbacks of PPP, which have severe implications, is renegotiation of the contract (Guasch et 
al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014; Estache et al., 2009; Guasch and Straub, 2009a). 
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Carrillo et al. (2008) corroborate the findings of this literature by identifying the issues that are 
associated with Private Finance Initiative (PFI). These problems include affordability gaps, 
insufficient staff resources by the public client, matters relating to design change (i.e., 
orders/variations), questions on the establishment of life-cycle costs, and concerns regarding the 
sustenance of the service level by the private sector during the operation of completed facilities. 
These implementation challenges according to the literature have overarching implications for 
the project stakeholders (Khan, 2014; Verweij, 2014; Rouhani, 2009). The main renegotiation 
question of PPP infrastructure projects is in terms of the achievement of VfM, especially for the 
client (Guasch et al.,2014; Sarmento 2014). Guasch et al. (2014, p 6) define renegotiation of PPP 
contracts as “involving a change in the original contractual terms and conditions, as opposed to 
an adjustment in the payments (or tariffs) that takes place under a mechanism defined in the 
contract.” Guasch & Straub (2009) infer that there is a renegotiation of the concession contract 
when a significant change not envisioned in the original contract lead to a change in the contract 
conditions. Thus, renegotiation constitutes a change in the risk matrix assignment of the contract, 
which could be in scope of the project, specifications, or standard of the works (Makovsek et al., 
2015).   
Evidence from the literature indicates high incidences of renegotiations in PPP water and transport 
sector projects compared to other infrastructure construction projects (Nikolaidis and 
Roumboutsos, 2013; Estache et al., 2009; Guasch and Straub, 2009). The literature has numerous 
instances of renegotiation experiences of PPP projects in the transport sector (Guasch et al., 2014; 
Sarmento, 2014; Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos, 2013; Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 
2010). These studies uncover the incidences involving renegotiations of respective modes of 
transport, outcomes of the renegotiation and its impacts on the stakeholder’s objectives. The 
studies also reveal that the outcomes of renegotiations of transportation projects have, in most 
instances resulted in governments supporting the transport concessions via subsidies to the private 
sector. This practice has, in turn, generated higher charges for road users and questions the ability 
of PPP to deliver VfM for the public sector (Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014; Acerete et al., 
2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). Hence, renegotiation in PPP projects, especially involving 
roads, has an impact on public sector objectives and users’ interest. 
Most renegotiations in the transport sector (road inclusive) have addressed the viability of the 
concession contracts to ensure a profitable return to the private sector towards the success of the 
partnership (Acerete et al., 2009). This situation supports the submissions of recent academic 
research papers that highlight PPP renegotiations within the transport sector have not achieved 
VfM for the public sector amongst other infrastructure sectors (Sarmento 2014; Guasch and 
Straub, 2009b; Hodge and Greve 2009; Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). The evidence of these pieces of  
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the literature reveals that road projects have the highest percentage of renegotiations in 
comparison to all other PPP transport projects across various countries. Take, for instance, the 
road projects renegotiation in Latin America (Guasch et al., 2014; Bitran et al., 2013; Guasch et 
al., 2008a), Portugal (Sarmento, 2014), Spain (Acerete et al., 2009), Greece (Nikolaidis and 
Roumboutsos, 2013) and USA (Gifford et al., 2014). The high frequency of PPP road projects 
renegotiations is observed to be attributable to some factors among which are: inaccurate 
evaluation of traffic levels and opportunistic behaviours etc. (Trebilcock and Rosenstock, 2015; 
Nikolaidis et al., 2013). Moreover, weak or inadequate regulatory policy, poor evaluation of bid 
and bidding errors, and submission of opportunistic bids with the intent of renegotiating the 
contract during project implementation are among the prominent factors leading to PPP road 
project renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2014; Bi and Wang 2011). 
The literature has identified that the high incidences of renegotiations in PPP road projects have 
enormous implication on the achievement of VfM (Sarmento, 2014; Bitran et al., 2013; Nikolaidis 
& Roumboutsos, 2013). These high incidences of renegotiation in PPP road projects and its 
consequences on the achievement of VfM make it imperative for integration of VfM 
considerations into a renegotiation of PPP road projects. The basis for the integration of VfM 
considerations into the renegotiations of PPP road projects is to foster successful implementation 
of road contracts towards the achievement of VfM for the stakeholders, especially the procuring 
client. 
 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Renegotiation of PPP road projects has been an important issue that has generated concerns in 
PPP procurement over the last decade. The high incidences of contract renegotiations give 
credence to these (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014; Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos, 2013; 
Acerete et al. 2010). The outcome of the respective cases of PPP infrastructure project 
renegotiation has resulted in most instances to non-achievement of VfM for the public sector 
(Sarmento, 2014). Cruz and Marques (2013a) state that contracts renegotiation usually occurs 
within few years or after the financial close and evidence in the literature reveal that the results 
do not protect the public interest.  
Engel et al. (2014a) in a recent study, also show that road projects account for 54.4% of PPP 
contracts renegotiation of the total 30% renegotiated projects. These suggest that the road projects 
have a high percentage of renegotiation in comparison to other modes of the transport sector. The 
percentage of road projects renegotiation gives credence that research into PPP road projects is 
viable. Moreover, findings of the ongoing research can be generalised for the transport sector 
adoption based on the 56% PPP road projects reaching financial close across the developing  
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world, which is worth 49% of the total investment in the transport sector (PPI Database, 2016). 
This suggests that research into PPP road projects is considered robust for transportation industry 
application.  
Recent evidence from the literature suggests that renegotiation has had significant influence in 
the transport and water sectors of some Latin American countries (Guasch and Straub, 2009). 
Sarmento (2014) substantiate this finding by revealing that more renegotiations occur in PPP 
contracts during periods of higher corruption. Guasch and Straub (2009) identify a corrupt 
environment as a leading factor to more firm-led renegotiations. Moreover, the evidence available 
from the literature indicates that inappropriate design, opportunistic bidding, renegotiations, are 
responsible for the poor PPP infrastructure projects implementation with resultant effects of 
contract delay, road projects abandonment and non-achievement of VfM (Engel et al., 2014a; 
Gifford et al., 2014; Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014; Cruz and Marques, 2013). 
The background and circumstances in the PPP project environment necessitated research 
into PPP renegotiation, especially regarding the emerging issues surrounding 
renegotiation of PPP road projects. Critical evaluation of PPP road projects renegotiation 
reveals that satisfactory outcomes are elusive to the stakeholders, mainly in the delivery 
of VfM for the public-sector client (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento 2014; Acerete et al., 
2010; Baeza & Vassallo, 2010; Estache et al., 2009). Though non-achievement of VfM 
is established in the literature regarding PPP renegotiations, little is, however, known in 
the context of the UK and some European Union countries (Makovsek et al., 2015). The 
little renegotiation knowledge is surprising, especially in the UK in consideration of the 
high adoption of PPP in the form of PFI for infrastructure projects delivery including 
roads (Akintoye, 2009; Carrillo et al., 2008; Debande, 2002). Hence, it is justifiable to 
research UK PFI renegotiations in the road sector to address the gap in PPP renegotiation 
knowledge, especially in the road sector.   
Corroboratively, experiences of other European countries like Spain and Portugal as revealed by 
the findings of the literature indicate that renegotiation has constituted one of the significant 
myriads of problems affecting the successful implementation of PPP road projects particularly 
regarding VfM (Sarmento, 2014; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). Acerete et al. (2010, p. 58-59) agree 
with these pieces of literature by stating as follows, “the use of private finance for roads can be 
viewed as a classic example of privatising the benefits and nationalising the costs.” Therefore, 
the main problem of PPP road projects renegotiations is that VfM has not been delivered to the 
respective stakeholders especially the public sector (Cruz et al., 2015; Guasch et al., 2014; 
Sarmento, 2014). Hence, the statement of the problem is as follows: how can VfM considerations  
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be integrated into the appropriate phases of PPP road projects in consideration of the high 
incidences of renegotiations? Satisfactory resolution of this problem will ensure successful 
renegotiation, which addresses the value for money question in PPP road projects renegotiation. 
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To resolve the research problem in the context of the UK, the research propositions are: 
Research Question 1: Are there incidences of renegotiations in UK PFI (DBFO) road 
projects? 
Research Question 2: What are the factors leading to the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects in the UK? 
Research Question 3: Does the renegotiation of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects impact VfM 
criteria? 
Research Question 4: What are the outcomes of the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects in the UK? 
Research Question 5: What are the measures to ensure the achievement of VfM in PFI 
(DBFO) road projects renegotiation in the UK? 
 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The research aims to integrate value for money into the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects. The objectives are: 
Objective 1: To review PPP as a procurement method for the delivery of public sector 
infrastructures including road projects. 
Objective 2: To evaluate renegotiation and VfM criteria in PPP environment, particularly in road 
projects. 
Objective 3: To investigate PFI (DBFO) road projects to identify incidences and factors leading 
to renegotiation. 
Objective 4: To ascertain the impacts of the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects on VfM 
criteria. 
Objective 5: To evaluate and assess the outcomes of the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects. 
Objective 6: To develop and validate a VfM renegotiation framework for DBFO road projects. 
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 RESEARCH PROGRAMME FLOW 
The research program flow identifies the methods of gathering data, techniques of data analysis, 
research findings and relationships among the research objectives as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Research Framework and Processes 
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 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
The water and transport sectors are prone to renegotiation in Latin America countries, which have 
records of high adoption of PPP for infrastructure projects delivery (Guasch et al., 2014; Estache 
et al., 2009). In the transportation sector, however, there is the evidence of higher percentage of 
renegotiations in road projects in comparison to other infrastructure projects of the transport sector 
(Guasch et al., 2008b). Similarly, road projects have a high degree of PPP adoption across the 
world with substantial financial investment (PPI Database, 2016).  Hence, this research focuses 
on PPP road projects based on the record of high percentages of renegotiations leading to non-
achievement of VfM for the procuring authorities across numerous countries (Guasch, 2014; 
Sarmento, 2014; Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). In the UK, there is a long history 
of DBFO adoption for the massive finance of PFI road projects (Debande, 2002). Other literatures 
corroborate this submission that DBFO is the method adopted for the provision of road projects 
in the UK (Akbiyikli, 2011; Debande, 2002). Thus, PFI is a model of PPP introduced by the UK 
government for infrastructure projects procurement to improve the level of public services 
including road projects (Carrillo et al., 2006). The high adoption of DBFO for road projects 
delivery in comparison to other modes of transport sector projects improves the feasibility and 
viability of conducting an independent study in the UK road sector.  
The several renegotiation incidences, outcomes and the beneficiary of the renegotiation process 
have been established for Latin America countries like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru (Guasch 
et al. 2014; Estache et al. 2009). Portugal, Spain, and Greece have also been indicated as having 
incidences of renegotiation (Sarmento, 2014; Moore et al. 2014; Nikolaidis and Roumbotsos, 
2013; Acerete et al. 2010; Guasch and Straub, 2009; Guasch et al., 2008). Also, the literature 
attests to the occurrence of renegotiation in varying degrees in other countries like Portugal, 
Spain, Greece and the USA (Gifford et al., 2014; Sarmento and Renneboog 2014; Nikolaidis and 
Roumbotsos, 2013; Acerete et al., 2010). However, the UK is characterised by few theoretical 
and empirical literature on PPP renegotiations especially in the road sector (Makovsek et al., 
2015; Hasselgren et al., 2014). The few literature findings regarding renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) 
road projects in the UK further justify the need for renegotiation study. Hence, this study engages 
the UK public agency and concessionaires involved in PFI (DBFO) road projects, which is the 
procurement arrangement used for transport projects, especially roads in Spain and the UK 
(Acerete et al., 2010; Shaoul et al., 2006; Debande, 2002). 
The investigation of PFI (DBFO) road projects is proposed for the pre-construction, construction 
and operation and maintenance phases, particularly after the signing of the contract and before 
the completion and handing over by the concessionaire. The basis for the choice of these 
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implementation stages are premised on the literature, which identifies the occurrence of 
renegotiation of PPP projects shortly after the financial close and through construction to 
completion and handing over of the project to the procuring authority (Sarmento, 2014). Yuan et 
al. (2009, p.256) further establish as follows, “PPPs studies are centered on broad social and 
organisation levels and provides few insights into the management of inter-organisational 
relationships and process control.” These agree with the findings of previous literature that there 
is the need for proper management and monitoring of the renegotiation process at the identified 
phases to address renegotiation issues in PPP infrastructure projects delivery (Guasch et al., 2014; 
Sarmento, 2014; Acerete et al., 2010). 
Also, the findings of literature reveal that much work needs to be done to identify ways of tackling 
the factors affecting quality, transaction cost and delivery time of PPP transport projects at the 
contract stage (Acerete et al., 2010; Acerete et al. 2009; Guasch et al., 2008). Hence, the need to 
critically look at the process of PPP arrangement at the construction and operation stages to 
develop a framework that incorporates necessary measures and mechanisms to check revenue 
leakage, cost and time overruns, which are all attributed to renegotiation of PPP road projects.  
The gap in PPP renegotiation literature of the UK and other PPP practicing countries makes it 
expedient to assess PPP road projects renegotiation experience of the UK in comparison with the 
experiences of other nations (Makovsek et al., 2015; Sarmento, 2014; Engel et al., 2014a; Acerete 
et al., 2010). Moreover, the research of the UK PFI (DBFO) road projects is justified based on 
the need to provide an original and pioneer contribution to renegotiation knowledge to address 
the current problem of VfM attributable to PPP road projects renegotiation of other PPP practising 
countries.  
 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE AND ORIGINALITY 
The research furthers the understanding of the subject of renegotiation of road projects with 
reference to VfM. Information regarding how VfM is achieved at the renegotiation of PFI road 
projects in the UK is one of the products of this research. The study further makes available results 
about the experiences of renegotiation and changes on the sampled case studies, and the wider 
UK PFI population covered quantitatively.  The VfM renegotiation framework incorporates the 
main findings of the empirical objectives.  
Previous studies have succeeded in identifying renegotiation incidences in PPP infrastructure 
projects such as transport, water, power, and electricity. These studies give the respective 
percentages of PPP infrastructure projects renegotiation on a sectoral basis in Latin American 
countries (Guasch et al., 2014; Guasch and Straub, 2009a; Guasch et al., 2008b). These studies 
have succeeded in providing the renegotiation statistics of some countries in Europe like Portugal  
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and Greece (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014; Nikolaidis et al., 2013). In the UK, however, there 
is a differing experience of PPP renegotiation, which informs the need for current research and 
possible research in the future. Hence, the reason for the conduction of this study, which provides 
empirical quantitative and qualitative data through the analysis of the findings of each of the 
objectives of this study in the context of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects.   
Most infrastructure projects including PPP have assessed success parameters such as costs, time, 
quality and user's satisfaction. This research intends to identify the measurable variables and 
criteria of VfM towards establishing their relationship with the renegotiation of PFI road projects. 
These, therefore, addresses the several considerations required towards the integration of VfM 
into the renegotiation process of PFI (DBFO) road projects. This contribution is significant as it 
establishes effective and efficient solutions for the renegotiation of PPP road concessions towards 
achieving VfM objectives for the respective stakeholders, especially the client’s objectives.  
The VfM renegotiation framework developed and validated is the main contribution to 
knowledge, which if appropriately and proactively adopted will guide renegotiation between the 
private and public stakeholders towards the achievement of VfM. Efficient use of the framework 
will assist the renegotiation of PPP road projects to ensure the VfM success for the stakeholders 
especially the public sector. The practical application of the VfM renegotiation framework will 
proactively reduce and possibly eliminate lengthy renegotiation leading to cost and time overruns, 
which all constitute adverse renegotiation outcomes and results (Sarmento 2014; Acerete et al.; 
2009). Conclusively, the public agencies and concessionaire are now able to choose appropriate 
remedial actions and measures, which will pave the way for the development of sustainable 
renegotiation strategies that ensures VfM achievement. The need for the choice of a proper rule, 
mechanism and remedial actions where necessary are among the unique contribution of this study 
and constitute significant considerations in a PPP project road environment to ensure the 
achievement of client’s VfM objectives, users’ satisfaction and private investor’s interest and 
motives. 
 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis contains nine chapters. The summary of the content of each chapter is as follows: 
Chapter 1 gives a comprehensive research introduction covering the vast areas of PPP and the 
inherent issues and problems leading to the research questions, aim, and objectives. 
Chapter 2 explains PPP adoption for general infrastructure projects delivery. Reference was 
made regarding the use of PPP for the procurement of transport sector projects and establishes a 
research gap in the field of renegotiation (especially in road projects). Also, the chapter describes  
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the types and classes of PPP road projects in the UK. There are appraisals of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects in the UK, which establishes their characteristics, stakeholders and their respective 
partners and structures. 
Chapter 3 discusses the concepts, objectives, classifications, and types of contract renegotiation. 
There are discussions regarding renegotiations in PPP, impacts and outcomes of the 
renegotiations, and factors leading to renegotiations. Measures to ensure the achievement of VfM 
at the renegotiations of PPP projects are enumerated and discussed. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the concept of value for money in PPP projects in general and establishes 
the criteria for measuring VfM in infrastructure projects concerning the transport sector projects. 
Chapter 5 outlines and describes the methodology adopted, and the criteria for the choice of the 
appropriate methodology for the research. 
Chapter 6 only presents and explains the analysed data and discusses the results of the qualitative 
case study interviews, which further confirms, contrasts and compares key issues from the 
literature perspectives. In addition, the chapter establishes the factors leading to renegotiation, the 
outcomes of the renegotiation, and the impacts of PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation on the 
several VfM criteria. There is the identification of measures adopted in the respective case studies 
to ensure the achievement of VfM at renegotiation. 
Chapter 7 further discusses the findings of the questionnaire survey based on the findings of the 
literature and case studies to tackle the research objectives 3, 4 and 5. 
Chapter 8 discusses the processes of the development and validation of the VfM renegotiation 
framework for ensuring the achievement of VfM at renegotiation. There is a full discussion on 
the importance and significance of integrating considerations of VfM into the renegotiations of 
PPP road projects. The chapter further establishes a range of sustainable measures required from 
the design stage through completion to guide successful renegotiation for stakeholders (especially 
the public sector). This chapter addresses Objective 6 of the research. 
Chapter 9 is the final chapter of this thesis, which gives the key research findings based on the 
objectives identified in chapter 1. The chapter further presents the general conclusion and clearly 
mention the contribution to knowledge (both theory and practice). Chapter 9 provides 
recommendations based on research findings and suggestions were enumerated regarding areas 
requiring further investigations. 
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CHAPTER 2 AN OVERVIEW OF 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
PROJECTS 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses PPP as a procurement method for infrastructure projects delivery, 
especially road projects, and explains the procurement concept regarding the definitions, models 
and the fundamental objectives of the stakeholders as identified in Objective 1 of Chapter 1 of 
this research study. The chapter justifies the need and importance of PPP for infrastructure 
projects delivery, including roads. The discussion of the concept of PPP in this chapter furthers 
the understanding and appreciation of its adoption and application in the delivery of infrastructure 
projects, especially road projects. There is the presentation of the types and classification of road 
projects in the UK from the evaluation of their respective characteristics and categories. The 
chapter further expands and compares the available models of PPP in the UK, especially in road 
projects delivery.  The individual partnership structures used in both tolled and other road projects 
delivery including the roles and contact details of the PFI stakeholders in the UK (i.e., the 
procuring authority, SPV or concessionaire and the equity companies or financial lenders) are 
discussed. 
The chapter concludes by summarising PPP in general infrastructure project delivery with 
reference to road projects and its inherent implementation challenges, which form the premise for 
the following section of the thesis. 
 THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
Procurement means obtaining work, services or products, which could be implemented through 
various systems or methods (Love et al., 2008; Gruneberg and Hughes, 2004). There are various 
types of procurement methods available for delivering infrastructure projects in the UK and other 
parts of the world. Some of these procurement methods are: construction management, design 
and build, design and construct, a framework agreement, lane rental-competitive tender, 
management, measured term, partnering contract, schedule of rates, traditional, turnkey and lump 
sum (Davis et al., 2008). Lump sum has variants, which include firm bills of quantities (BQ), 
specifications and drawings, re-measurement – approximate, prime cost and fixed fee (Davis et 
al., 2008). However, most projects were traditionally procured in the UK and other parts of the  
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EU until the early 1990s before PPP emerged (Akintoye et al., 2003). Therefore, it can be noted 
that among all these early procurement methods, the traditional method was more used for the 
delivery of infrastructure projects before the emergence of PPP, across the world and particularly 
in the UK (Akintoye, 2009).  
Most infrastructure projects have been procured through the traditional method by the public-
sector clients because of the familiarity inherent in its use and the willingness to adopt in-house 
expertise in the delivery of such projects. However, because of the shortcomings observed in the 
adoption of the traditional procurement method for infrastructure projects delivery, which 
includes and it is not limited to cost and time overruns, there seems to be a shift by national 
governments to PPP’s (Li et al., 2005; Alhazmi and McCaffer, 2000). According to Pollock et al., 
(2007 p. 127) the shortcomings of the traditional procurement method and other methods of 
procurement are stated as follows, “PFI projects are on time and budget. HM Treasury research 
into completed PFI projects showed 88% coming in on time, early, and with no cost overruns on 
construction borne by the public sector”. Previous research has, however, shown that 70% of 
non-PFI projects were late and 73% ran over budget (Pollock et al., 2007). 
There are numerous reasons for these shifts to PPP for the procurement of infrastructure projects. 
The need to address the infrastructure gap because of budgetary constraints and the advantage of 
adopting the private sector’s higher level of efficiency and management are the primary reasons 
why PPP are taken for infrastructure projects procurement (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Other 
studies identify the need or demand of the population for public services, the government’s 
decision to achieve the projects or services within the purview of the private sector’s higher level 
of efficiency, among others (Yehoue et al., 2006). Thus, PPP are adopted by governments based 
on the identified reasons to address the constraints with respects to funding, high demand, 
workforce technicalities and complexities of PPP projects. 
The challenge of limited financial resources for development of infrastructure projects has 
brought several degrees of discussion in both theory and practice on how to procure infrastructure 
projects effectively and efficiently. Governments all over the world have continued to devise ways 
from the traditional form of procurement to the Public Private Partnership (PPP) to address the 
increasing needs of the population for public infrastructure services (Hammami et al., 2006; 
Cherry, 2005). Thus, attention has been drawn to PPPs for the delivery of infrastructure projects 
because of the advantages it offers through the bridging of infrastructure gap occasioned by 
budgetary constraints and the opportunity of adopting the private sector higher level of efficiency 
and management (Sarmento, 2014; Pollock et al., 2007; Grimsey and Lewis 2005). These main 
advantages make PPP preferred by governments of countries over the traditional procurement 
method and other methods of infrastructure procurement. 
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Li and Akintoye (2003) state the benefits of PPP to include the enhancement of government’s 
capacity to develop integrated solutions, creative and innovative approaches, reduction in the cost 
and time to implement the project, risks transfer to the private sector, attraction of sophisticated 
bidders, access to advanced skills, and experience and level of technological competence of the 
concessionaire. These benefits of PPP constitute reasons for the adoption of the procurement 
method and seem to corroborate the view of Sarmento (2014), which concludes that PPP provides 
value for money (VfM) through efficient risk transfer, innovation, higher asset utilisation and 
integrated whole life management. Corroboratively, the advantages of PPP include sound quality 
management, experience, technology, skills, innovation and a reduction in construction and 
operational costs deviations, which are considered critical variables in the measurement of the 
value of a project (Tsamboulas et al., 2013; Cheung & Chan, 2012). 
Defining PPP in detail seems difficult considering its uses and application by several authors in 
the literature, and various policy or government documents (Xiong and Zhang, 2014; 
Carmona, 2010; Akintoye et al., 2003). It is, therefore, necessary to assess selected definitions 
of PPP to foster a better understanding of the subject, and to provide a basis for the emerging 
issues. Grimsey and Lewis (2005) and Carmona (2010) describe PPP as the filler of the space 
created through the adoption of the traditional method of procurement and the use of private 
finance for infrastructure projects delivery. Koppenjan (2005) describes PPP as the planning, 
construction, and operation of infrastructural facilities through the allocation and sharing of risks, 
costs, benefits, resources, and responsibilities in a structured and cooperative form between the 
public client, and the concessionaire. These definitions show that PPP adoption spans processes 
and bridges the gap inherent in traditional procurement methods. 
Akintoye (2009 p. 124) states as follows, “PPPs can best be understood as a contractual 
agreement of shared ownership between a public agency and a private company, which involves 
the pooling together of resources and sharing of project risks and rewards, to create efficiency in 
the production and provision of public or private goods”. There is a clear agreement between this 
definition and other descriptions of PPP, which posit that the method involves collaborating and 
sharing of risks, responsibilities, resources and benefits (Sarmento, 2014). It differs significantly 
from the traditional procurement method where the public authority takes full responsibility and 
only relinquishes the residual obligations (Cartlidge, 2006). Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
which is a variant of PPP has also been recognised as a long-term procurement method that spans 
years usually 25 to 30 years and across inception, initiation, planning, controlling, operation and 
maintenance stages (Mustapha and Carrillo, 2008). The long-term nature of PPP makes its 
implementation demanding and difficult. Hence, the need for proper measures and actions that 
will facilitate the achievement of stakeholder’s objectives, especially public client objectives.  
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HM Treasury (2014) corroborates these definitions by identifying PPP as an arrangement between 
two or more entities, i.e., client, concessionaire or other stakeholders such as lenders, which 
encourages cooperative work that fosters the sharing of authority and responsibility, resources 
investment; through collaboration, shared risk-taking and mutual benefits. Xiong and Zhang 
(2014) indicate that PPP is a contractual agreement that brings a public agency and a private 
company to form a consortium of financial institutions, construction companies, and operation 
and maintenance companies to finance, build and operate a project belonging to the public client 
and to provide the corresponding service and generate revenues.  
The consideration in the provision of these services is on the condition that VfM will be the 
ultimate benefit to the government, users, and taxpayers (Akbiyikli et al., 2011). However, these 
definitions are subjective, as they do not seem appropriate or applicable in all cases except in a 
given situation of a procurement arrangement (Carmona, 2010). These suggest that the respective 
infrastructure projects may be suitable for a given system of procurements. As such, the 
definitions of PPP may be more appropriate for a specific instance of infrastructure project. It is, 
therefore, necessary to adopt some of them to unravel the meaning of PPP as it borders on the 
respective objectives, roles and the ensuing benefits coupled with expectations of all stakeholders 
concerning PPP implementation. It is also pertinent to select these definitions to provide a sound 
understanding, which gives a broad and all-encompassing view and appreciation of the direction 
of the discussion in the succeeding sections of this thesis. 
The definitions indicate that PPP requires a collaborative working between the client and the 
private concessionaire (Cheung, 2009; Kwak et al., 2009).  Kwak et al., (2009 p. 52) state that 
PPP is “a cooperative arrangement between the public and private sectors that involves the 
sharing of resources, risks, responsibilities, and rewards with others for the achievement of joint 
objectives.” The collaborative working for the provision of public goods and services is the 
responsibility of two key stakeholders (public and private sector or consortium) involved in the 
partnership. These two parties to the PPP agreement are to cooperate to ensure that services 
provided at every stage of the procurement process are of high standard, delivered within budget, 
and stipulated time. This cooperation is mainly to ensure that the defined objectives, which are 
value for money (VfM) for the public-sector client, profitable return on the private sector 
company investment and affordability of cost of the service to the users (Sarmento, 2014). 
The public client and the private sector partner usually agree to the sharing of the risks, 
responsibility, and rewards for the mutual benefits and to satisfy the interest of the users, and 
taxpayers (Sarmento, 2014). The three cogent elements are resource, risk, and benefits (RRB). 
The benefits could be VfM. The funds of both partners serve as resource or project investment, 
which is a response to the limited power of governments or public agencies to provide such  
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resources individually. This joint contribution of the funds creates room for the inherent risks to 
be shared between both partners leading to mutual benefits to the parties for the utility and 
enjoyment of users or taxpayers. These benefits could be in the form of profits to the 
concessionaire, and VfM to the public client, and satisfaction to the members of the public or end 
users (Sarmento, 2014; Debande, 2002). 
PPP is, therefore, a method of work that solely relies on the cooperative relationship between both 
public and private partners for the provision of social infrastructure services that ensures VfM for 
the public client, affordability and satisfaction to the user and profitability to the private 
concessionaire for the investment. However, efficient and effective sharing of skills, 
responsibility, resources, and risks (SRRR) is essential and required (Sarmento, 2014; Kwak et 
al., 2009). The principle of authority, responsibility, finance, risks and benefits sharing, according 
to Akintoye (2009), is to foster efficient production and provision of the services, which is one of 
the core prerequisites of the partnership. 
The continued adoption of PPP for infrastructure projects provision suggests that VfM is achieved 
for the procuring authorities. Though, there have been naggings and questions surrounding its full 
achievement during the implementation of PPP projects. Value for money (VfM), which is the 
principal objectives of the public client has been defined as the optimum achievement of the three 
E’s, i.e., economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in PPP infrastructure road projects (Muvirimi, 
2012; Henjewele et al., 2011). The deduction from the submission of these literature suggests that 
the client can only be satisfied with the PPP projects in a situation where the SPV achieve low 
cost for more significant and quality outputs at first attempts to the satisfaction of the users or 
members of the public. Hence, Value for money (VfM) implies achieving good and satisfactory 
product, service costs and quality (fitness for purpose) within the whole life of the contract 
(contract duration) to meet the requirements of members of the public or users of the infrastructure 
facility (road inclusive). Therefore, PPP project can be regarded as successful only in a situation 
where it delivers the project to the users at the budgeted cost, within the specified duration and 
quality amongst other criteria that may be defined and agreed by the primary stakeholders at the 
inception of the contract. 
The literature identifies four stakeholders’ as the beneficiaries in a given PPP project as follows: 
the public sector or government agency, the private sector or consortium, employees, and users 
or members of the public (Cheung, 2009). However, the financial lender or borrower are regarded 
as a stakeholder that gain interest through funds provided to the private sector partner (Gatti, 
2014). As a result, the lenders of financial resources are also regarded as a beneficiary in a PPP 
infrastructure project. Though, the provision of PPP infrastructures in the construction industry, 
for example, is the responsibility of two key stakeholders (public and private sector or consortium)  
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involved in the implementation of the partnership objectives (Bing et al., 2005). These two parties 
are expected to cooperate to ensure that services provided are of high standard or quality, 
delivered within budget and stipulated time. The cooperation is mainly to ensure that the 
stakeholders’ objectives, which are VfM for the public client, profit for the private sector 
company investment and affordability of cost of the service to the users, are achieved (Kwak et 
al., 2009; Mackintosh, 1992). It is, therefore, imperative based on the existing PPP literature to 
posit that PPP transactions should keep in view the respective objectives of stakeholders defined 
at the inception of the contract throughout the stages of implementation of infrastructure projects. 
 MODELS OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AND CONTRACT TYPES 
Evenhuis and Vickerman (2010) identify various types of contracts in PPP transport sector as 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-
Operate (DBFMO) and concessions, also called Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO). A cross-
examination of PPP models such as PFI reveals that each of the contract types is adopted across 
the models of PPP for the delivery of infrastructure construction projects, ranging from small to 
large construction projects across various countries (Strong and Chhun, 2014; Rebeiz, 2011). 
Other studies also support the submission of these authors that the models of PPP are diverse. HM 
Treasury (2014), for instance, provides eight models of PPP usually adopted for the delivery of 
infrastructure projects in the UK. PFI is significantly approved by the UK procuring authorities 
in the delivery of infrastructure projects including roads (Akintoye, 2009). 
Various PPP models discussed here are broadly classified into three categories according to the 
stage of the project, ownership of the facility and method of repayment respectively (Gil, 2013; 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2007b). 
 Classification of PPP Models According to Stage of Project 
In this class of PPP, the respective responsibilities of the private sector partner are diversified and 
encapsulated within the model. This classification also reflects the tasks to be performed within 
the model and the definition of the sequence of each of the operation or work. The models of PPP 
are numerous and are classified based on circumstances and peculiarities of each country (Eaton 
et al., 2007). The Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) is an essential PFI variant usually 
regarded as a concession contract, and used, especially for road projects (Debande, 2002). In this 
model, the concessionaires agree with the client and undertake to execute the infrastructure 
facility contract by DBFO using the fund at its disposal within the agreed contract period, usually 
25 to 30 years in most cases (Mustapha and Carrillo, 2008). Also, it is adopted for the PPP/PFI 
roads mainly within the UK and Spain respectively (Graham et al, 2012; Acerete et al., 2010). 
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Other models available include but not limited to Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) 
involving the design, build, and finance of a project by a private entity including the responsibility 
of executing all maintenance works as part of the contractual obligations before transferring it to 
the public body. However, the Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) involves the collective 
responsibility of the partners in the designing, building, operating and maintaining the 
infrastructure projects. However, before the transfer, the private sector partner is expected to meet 
the agreed performance standards defined at the time of forming the contract concerning the 
physical condition and capacity of the facility including operating quality of the facility 
(Koppenjan and Enserink, 2009; Siemiatycki, 2009). 
The Design- Construct- Manage- Finance (DCMF) model is similar in scope to the DBFO and 
DBOM. There is an appreciation of the applicability of the model for prison projects. The private 
entity provides most of the services under this procurement model with the execution of the 
residual duties by the public-sector partner (Graham et al., 2012). On the other hand, Design-
Build-Operate (DBO) model involves both the private and the public partners. The private sector 
builds and operates a facility on behalf of the public-sector partner, who owns and finances the 
construction of the new facility with the payment of construction cost and operating fee (Gil, 
2013). Also, Design-Build (DB) arrangement is one that allows the private party to take 
responsibility for the design and build of the project to the satisfaction of the public-sector partner 
through the transfer of cost overrun risk to the private sector representative. On concluding the 
contractual responsibilities by the private party, the public entity assumes full responsibility for 
the operation of the facility. This same situation also persists in the case of Design-Build-Maintain 
(DBM). However, a long-term maintenance arrangement necessitates that the public sector retains 
the ownership and operation of the infrastructure. 
 Classification of PPP Models According to Ownership of Facility 
Gil (2013) and Amade (2012) classify PPP models into various variants to include the following: 
Buy-Build-Operate (BBO), Operation License (OL), Finance Only (FO), Build Operate Transfer 
(BOT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), Build-Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (BROT), Build-
Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) and Rehabilitate-Own-Operate-Transfer (ROOT). Build–Own-
Operate–Transfer (BOOT) is a type of PPP contract where the private firm introduces a service 
charge throughout the implementation stage of a concession contract before the handing over of 
the facility to the government (Allard and Trabant, 2011; Arndt, 2000). Arndt (2000) state that 
governments adopt this type of contract in PPP projects to bundle the design and construction, 
finance, operations, and maintenance. PPP contract, therefore, encompasses the stage of design, 
construction, finance, operations and maintenance, which could constitute the criteria for the 
formation of the contract type. However, a Build Lease (BL) is also called Own Operate (OO) is  
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a PPP procurement method, which ensures that the private organisation acquires the land required 
for the development and operation of the facility on behalf of the government (Ki-ian, 2002).  
In Design-Build (DB), the private partner in this type of arrangement ensures that the design and 
building of the facility are based on the objective of the public partner, and there is usually the 
delivery of the service as agreed in the contract. However, the risk of cost overruns is taken by 
the private company (Rosner et al., 2009). This literature attests that there is outperformance of 
the Design-Bid-Build (DBB) by this method. Design-Build-Maintain-(DBM) arrangement 
require the private sector firm to take on the design, construction and maintenance responsibility 
of the facility. This kind of contract is a long-term maintenance arrangement where it is within 
the purview of the public partner to retain the ownership and operation of the infrastructure facility 
(Hall et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, Operations and Maintenance contracts (O & M) require the private party to be solely 
responsible for the execution of the operation and management of a public infrastructure including 
any other responsibility that may be jointly agreed at the inception of the contract (Biau et al., 
2008). Conclusively, concessions contract also regarded as DBFO represent a PPP type where 
exclusive responsibility is given to the private partner for the design, build, finance and operate 
the infrastructure project (Delmon, 2010). The procuring authority retains the perpetual right of 
ownership while the private concessionaire retains the right to own the facility throughout the 
concession period on the understanding that the service is to be transferred to the procuring 
authority at the end of the concession period as agreed in the contract. Most PFI road projects are 
on the DBFO basis (Akbiyikli et al., 2006; Debande, 2002). The first eight DBFO roads in the 
UK are an excellent example of this type of PPP contract in the model of PFI (Shaoul et al., 2006). 
In joint ventures, both the public and private entities jointly finance the infrastructure projects. 
Also, they own and carry out the operation of the facility collaboratively at the same time as 
stipulated in the contract (Amade, 2012). There can be the implementation of all these types of 
contract based on ownership given the objectives and requirements of the main parties to the PPP 
agreement especially the public entity (Kwak et al., 2009). Thus, PPP infrastructure projects could 
take any of the contract types enumerated herein depending on the client's objectives and 
requirements. 
 Classification of PPP Models According to Method of Repayment 
PPP models can also be classified according to repayment method. One of the classifications of 
PPP models identified by Song (2005) is the repayment method. This type of repayment as 
substantiated by Gil (2013) as a financially freestanding project and service sold to the public 
sector by way of reimbursement. The former entails refund of the costs of PPP via tariff from end  
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users while the latter involves the payment of a fee from the procurement authority (Gil 2013; 
Allen, 2003). Therefore, in the free-standing projects (tariff base), the private sector ensures that 
tariffs are collected from the users of services provided. However, it is the sole responsibility of 
the government to ensure that social benefits are embedded in the services of the PPP supplied by 
the private sector, which may include enhancement of road quality and ensuring road 
decongestion (Partnerships UK, 2011).  
The relevant PPP models, which are tariff base include but not limited to Build-Operate and 
Transfer (BOT), Rehabilitate- Operate-Transfer (ROT), Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO), etc. (Zatar, 2014). The models under this classification include the 
following, depending on the circumstances and peculiarities of each country. The Design-Build-
Finance-Operate (DBFO) is one of the most important models usually adopted for concession 
contracts, particularly road projects (Akbıyıklı, 2013). The model affords the private sector 
partner the opportunity of undertaking to execute the design, build and operation of the 
infrastructure facility using the finance at its disposal within the agreed contract period, usually 
25 to 30 years (Acerete et al., 2010). This model is predominantly used in the UK and Spain road 
sectors respectively (Akbiyikli, 2013; Acerete et al., 2010). The private party provides the fund 
required for the project including the financing of the debt. The responsibility also includes the 
operation of the facility throughout the concession period.  
The Design-Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF) model is similar in scope to the DBFO and 
DBOM. It is, however, mostly adopted for prison projects. The private entity provides most of 
the services under this procurement model with the extra duties executed by the public-sector 
partner. A Design-Build (DB) arrangement ensures that the design and build responsibility is 
carried out by the private partner based on the need and objective of the public partner at a fee 
specified in the contract. On concluding the contractual responsibilities by the private party, the 
public entity assumes full responsibility for the operation. Other models adopted for infrastructure 
projects procurement are Buy-Build-Operate (BBO), Operation Licence (OL), Finance Only 
(FO), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), Build-Rehabilitate-
Operate-Transfer (BROT), Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), Rehabilitate-Own-Operate-
Transfer (ROOT), Build–Own-Operate–Transfer (BOOT), Build Lease or Own Operate (BL), 
Design-Build (DB) Design-Build-Maintain(DBM), Operations and Maintenance Contracts (O 
and M) and Build-Own-Operate (BOO) (Zatar, 2014). 
Therefore, in the free-standing, projects (tariff base), the private sector ensures that tariffs are 
collected from the users of services provided. However, the government usually ensures that 
social benefits are embedded in the services of the PPP provided by the private sector, which may 
include enhancement of road quality and reducing road congestion (Eadie et al., 2013).  Suitable  
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examples of infrastructure projects executed on a tariff basis include the Queen Elizabeth II 
(Dartford) Bridge in the UK and the Incheon Airport Expressway in Korea (Gil, 2013).  
The public sector may make a fee available for the private sector services of providing 
infrastructure services for members of the public. This strategy is termed services sold to the 
public sector (via a fee-based approach), which may involve the construction of highways by the 
private sector through the DBFO approach over an agreed period, e.g., 30 years. Design-Build-
Finance-Operate (DBFO), Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL) and Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT) are 
good examples of PPP models classified as services sold to the public sector on a fee-based 
repayment type (Allen, 2003). The case of the M1-A1 motorway, which connects the UK, and 
the Daegok-Sosa Railway in Korea serve as good examples of projects executed by the public 
client through a repayment plan. 
 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT 
DELIVERY 
There are diverse sectors in any nation’s economy having distinct characteristics, natures, and 
peculiarities. These segments include transport, water, financial, agricultural, educational, 
telecommunications amongst others. In each of these sectors, PPP has been used for close to three 
decades across the world, notably the UK, since the beginning of 1990 (Akintoye, 2009; Akintoye 
and Chinyio, 2005). Strong and Chhun (2014) identify the various categories of PPP adopted in 
infrastructure projects delivery in developing countries based on the extent of involvement, the 
level of risks and responsibilities of the private sector. The four categories identified include 
concession (e.g., BOT, BOOT, etc.), divestiture or full private participation (e.g., BOO), 
management contract, greenfield projects and divestiture (e.g., BOO).  
Other notable literature has also established the various types of PPP that are used for the general 
delivery of infrastructure construction projects, ranging from small to large projects (Akbiyikli et 
al., 2011). The respective projects by type and their region of the world are shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Number of Projects by Region and Partnership Type 
Region Concession Divestiture Greenfield 
project 
Management & 
lease contract 
Total 
East Asia and Pacific 124 42 208 9 383 
Europe and Central Asia 29 19 18 10 76 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
378 8 145 35 566 
Middle East and North Africa 14 0 13 8 35 
South Asia 345 0 98 7 450 
Sub-Saharan Africa 63 3 20 16 102 
Total 953 72 502 85 1612 
Source:World Bank PPI Database (2015) 
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These different type of projects as outlined in Table 2.1 are discussed in the succeeding sections 
of this thesis.  
 Concessions 
The concession could be for a new infrastructure project or an existing infrastructure. Carmona 
(2010) divides concessions into Greenfield and Brownfield concessions. Greenfield concessions 
are concessions where the private sector agrees to build and operate a new facility for the period 
specified in a contract, while a Brownfield concession is an arrangement where the private agent 
takes over the management of a state-owned (existing) undertaking for a given period. However, 
there is a significant assumption of investment risks by the private sector. In Greenfield projects, 
the private investor does not assume significant or significant risks within the time specified 
within the contracts. The infrastructure returns to public sector control at the end of the concession 
period. These models include Build-Lease-Own (BLO); Build-Own-Transfer (BOT), Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer (BOOT); Build-Own-Operate (BOO) and Merchant Projects. Most 
infrastructure projects are Greenfield projects while the opposite of Greenfield is Brownfield. 
 Divestitures or Full Private Participation 
Divestitures also called full private participation is a method of partnership where the private 
sector entirely takes overall responsibility for the design, construction, finance, operation, and 
maintenance of the infrastructure project and bears all significant risks involved in the delivery 
of the infrastructural facility (Harris, 2003). The management of the infrastructure facility is 
vested in the private investor as described in the agreement and terms of reference signed by the 
parties. The government only bears residual obligations and responsibility under this type of PPP. 
 Management Contract 
The management contractor manages the facility on behalf and with the consent of the 
government and retains the burden of operating the emerging risk (Singh and Kalidindi, 2006). 
The lease contract involves the management of an infrastructure project by a private company 
through the payment of a fee to the procuring authority (Nikolic and Maikisch, 2006). There is 
also the sharing of most of the risk during the operation of the infrastructure facility. Summarily, 
the information provided in Table 2.1 indicates that most infrastructure projects, including 
transport projects, are on a concession basis across all regions. 
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 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS IN THE TRANSPORT 
SECTOR 
PPP has been widely adopted in the delivery of infrastructure projects (Nikolaidis et al., 2013). 
Among all infrastructure sectors, the transport sector has extensive records of PPP adoption 
especially in road projects (PPI Database, 2016). Table 2.2 gives credence to this submission. The 
reason for this may be based on the characteristics and features of the transport sector and the 
need for the movement of persons and goods from one place to another daily. This reason makes 
the infrastructure projects of this industry distinct when compared to other sectors. Markard 
(2009) corroborates the uniqueness and characteristics of the transport sector to include the 
provision of services of general interest or fundamental importance. The transport sectors have 
also been known to have different types of physical networks, the capital intensity of transport 
facilities or asset and product durability. It also features the involvement of public organisations 
in its delivery, the magnitude of regulation, systemic characteristics and resistance to change and 
the impacts of transport sector activities on the environment (Markard, 2009). 
The transport sector is the most intensive sectors in any nation’s industry as it accounts for the 
highest financial investment in most countries (Akintoye, 2009). The reason for this may be based 
on the importance of the transport sector projects to the activities of other infrastructure sectors, 
e.g., agriculture, commerce, education, health, defence amongst others. The transport sector has 
been the subject of discussion because its product is used for all segments of any nation’s 
economy (Biau et al., 2008). Amos (2004) substantiates this by acknowledging the diversity of 
the transport sector as the most varied of all infrastructure sectors. The variability of the product 
and market of the transport sector shows that it is distinct and unique from all other industries 
across the world. 
Despite the importance of the transport sector and the level of PPP procurements of its products 
(especially road projects), there are issues faced by the transport projects, i.e., roads, seaports, 
rails, and airports like any other infrastructure projects. These problems vary from country to 
country. They could border on transportation strategy, funding, implementation challenges such 
as length of agreements, conflicting objectives of the partners, non-compete clauses, and 
renegotiations, (Acerete et al., 2010). The number of projects and transport projects investment 
according to the individual subsector is as shown in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Number of Projects and Transport Projects Investment by Subsector (1990 - 2016) 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank PPI database (2016) 
The evidence of Table 2.2 is corroborated by Akintoye (2009) and Biau et al. (2008), which state 
that the road sector is the most financial intensive of all the segments in any nation’s industry, 
especially in the transport sector. This is because of the level of utilisation of its product and its 
capability of attracting and generating the highest capital outlay during implementation 
(Akintoye, 2009). The attention is based on their contribution to Gross National Product (GNP), 
coupled with the increasing need to adopt a more efficient procurement method that will provide 
VfM for all stakeholders in consideration of the massive project count and financial outlay 
involved in its execution. Road projects have high procurement rates in comparison with other 
projects of the transport sector, particularly in developing countries, and contribute immensely to 
the economic development and growth of any nation (Gor and Gitau, 2010; Biau et al., 2008).  
Great importance and attention have been given to road projects by the stakeholders, particularly 
governments (Chowdhury, 2011). Road projects had been traditionally procured in the UK until 
the early 1990 (Mackie and Smith, 2005). The advent of PPP for the delivery of infrastructure 
projects introduced a shift from the traditional procurement method (Bowerman, 2007). The UK 
has been widely acknowledged as one early user of PPP for the delivery of significant 
infrastructure road projects (Shaoul et al., 2006; Shaoul et al., 2008).  PPPs have been a primary 
delivery mechanism for the procurement of all types of infrastructure projects including road 
projects over the past years in many countries (Carrillo et al., 2008). 
A cursory view of infrastructure projects procured using PPP method reveals that the total number 
of UK infrastructure projects obtained since the inception of PFI is over 800 PPP projects, worth 
a total capital value of over £56 billion (Treasury, 2014). Road projects constitute significant 
numbers of ongoing PFI projects in the UK (HM Treasury, 2014). Estache et al., (2000) identifies 
road projects as having a history of dominance of the transport sector across the world. Research 
shows that most UK PPP projects are concentrated in England and account for the highest capital 
value (Partnership UK, 2014; Roy, 2008). This is followed by Scotland, Northern Ireland, and 
Wales respectively (Partnerships UK, 2014). Other countries such as Spain and Portugal have 
been acknowledged as having significant experience in the provision of road projects using 
private finance (Stafford et al., 2010). 
S/N Subsector Projects Reaching Financial 
Closure 
Number of Countries with 
Private Participation 
Total Investment 
 (US$ Mill.) 
Rank 
  Number % Number % Amount ($) %  
1 Roads 981 56 233 32 277,678 49 1 
2 Seaports 448 26 255 34 81,409 14 2 
3 Railroads 136 8 101 14 108,428 19 3 
4 Airports 181 10 144 20 103,679 18 4 
 Total 1,746 100 733 100 571,194 100  
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An examination of PPP procurement in road projects revealed that specific issues are impeding 
the successful implementation of road projects (Sarmento, 2014; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). It is, 
therefore, expedient to review the issues bordering on the implementation of PPP road projects to 
establish the principal areas where the successful execution has been impeded. The high project 
count and financial implication of PPP road projects makes the issue of implementing the risk 
allocated, budgeted time, quality and VfM critical for the project’s stakeholders and 
implementers. Since the transfer of risk is a government’s fundamental justification for PPPs, 
there is the need for substantial risk transfer by the governments in the case of PPP road projects 
because of the high financial implication of the investment (English, 2006).  
The implementation stages where there are paramount challenges are the contractual and post-
contractual stages of PPP arrangement (Rouhani and Niemeier, 2014). The approach to check 
PPP projects during implementation has been identified as shown in Figure 2.1 and encompass 
the sphere of politics, law and institutions, economics and finance and execution, which all 
represent individual phases within the PPP project development. There is a need for effective 
implementation of PPP road projects at these phases due to the high capital outlay as shown in 
Table 2.2. In ensuring that PPP projects are successfully implemented, there is a need to ensure 
that international best practices are adopted using innovative approach within the critical phases 
of the project to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the public client. The public sector 
usually stipulates appropriate checklist to enhance the understanding of the private sector 
regarding the political, economic and institutional drivers of the project as well as the complexities 
inherent in the execution of projects during implementation (World Bank, 2014). The checklists 
foster an understanding of the issues to be considered during the implementation of PPP 
infrastructure project as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: The Approach to PPP Checklist during the Project Implementation 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
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Figure 2.1 indicates that PPP project ownership needs to be defined regarding project program 
plan and project rational as established by the procuring authority, which could either be the 
central, state and local governments including the project stakeholder’s roles, responsibilities and 
support. The potential political deal breakers revolve around essential governments activities, 
social and environmental assessment, land acquisitions, the possibility of timely delivery and 
obtaining necessary approvals amongst other considerations. Deals regarding all these areas 
needed to be considered and concluded at this point during the implementation of PPP projects. 
Secondly, it is within the international norms that PPP infrastructure projects follow the dictates 
of a well-functioning and transparent legal and regulatory institutions, fiscal and financial 
frameworks, supportive and credible institutional processes, and the capacity and structures to 
implement them (World Bank, 2014). As shown in Figure 2.2, PPP institutional and legal 
frameworks address individual issues within the PPP processes ranging from approvals, 
procurement and regulation of the projects through construction to operation and maintenance 
stages amongst others. Hence, all legal and regulatory issues need to be considered at this point 
within the procurement process.  
Moreover, documents should be prepared to ensure that there are standard methodologies and 
guidance for technical costs, value for money (VfM) analysis, economic cost-benefit analysis, 
affordability analysis, discounting, which have established benchmarks that can be assessed in 
comparison to international norms. The use of the standard methods will proactively assist in the 
evaluation of the project performance against the international benchmarks. World Bank (2014) 
identify the need for the development of documents and templates for different phases of the 
project, which define the rights and obligations of the parties and allocate risks to the entity best 
able to manage them. Moreover, the PPP governing structure, processes for appraisal, 
management and renegotiations of PPP contract need to be defined and established as part of the 
stages of work required during implementation. Modalities for ensuring transparency and 
accountability needs to be identified through the establishment of disclosure and audit framework 
by the public procuring authorities that guides the disclosure of post procurement, procurement 
and bidding information, performance audit amongst others.  
Thirdly, considerations should be given to the economics of the proposed PPP development 
including the financing of the project as shown in Figure 2.2. The reviews should include the 
evaluation of the technical, economic, fiscal and financial sense of the proposed PPP development 
with an adequate critique of the business case and allocation of risks, which provides assurance 
that value for money will be achieved in the long term. Hence, all associated issues regarding the 
scope of the project, cost and revenues are established and accounted for within the PPP business 
case. A proper assessment of all the relevant issues including the site conditions will provide a  
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conclusion regarding the rationale for the preferred procurement option. However, within the 
project implementation stages, a rigorous assessment of the full range of project delivery options 
from traditional procurement to various PPP models need to be carried out to select the 
appropriate procurement method based on a robust assessment of VfM. 
The PPP project should ensure that there is unique approach specific to the PPP project for the 
mobilisation of the internal and external actors and capacity required for the implementation of 
the project. The modalities for adhering to timelines need to be stipulated at the execution stage 
after proper evaluation of tendering and bidding documents. All issues associated with the 
management of the contract including all post-contract performance management should be 
equally considered. The post-implementation review should be undertaken to show the 
achievement of the expected outcomes or the level of achievement of the anticipated outcomes 
and VfM to establish or identify the need for mid-course corrections or remedial actions. It within 
the purview of PPP infrastructure project phases to ensure the management of renegotiations. The 
management of renegotiations according to World Bank (2014) indicates the need for the 
following: 
• Identification of changes in the contract attributable to either the public authority or the 
private party that go beyond the provisions of the contract and that require renegotiation. 
• The establishment of the renegotiation parameters and necessary approvals in place for 
initiation of renegotiation. 
• Establish whether the project with the proposed amendments are affordable and will 
continue to provide VfM for the government. 
• Establish the progression strategy and necessary timelines in a situation where 
renegotiation fails and does not yield the expected outcome for the public client. 
Conclusively, the final stage of the PPP project is the completion of the term of the contract where 
there is usually an inspection of the asset by an independent expert to verify the asset condition 
and to ascertain whether it meets the hand-back standards or whether the assets requires 
rectification by any terms in the contract. During the completion of the duration of the PPP 
project, the public-sector client needs to ensure that termination compensation is paid out on hand 
back of the assets by the private partner as stipulated in the contract. Moreover, there should be a 
public-sector plan in place for management of the assets and continuity of services following the 
expiry of the contract including any process or plan for re-letting of the PPP contract. 
There is the need for proper implementation of PPP projects to successful completion at every 
phase within the respective spheres to ensure that the defined objectives of the client are achieved. 
Though, the aspects of PPP projects development as indicated by some literature differ slightly 
from each other (Sarmento, 2014, Carrillo et al., 2008; Koppenjan, 2005). This study, however,  
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adopts that shown in Figure 2.1 as recommended by the World Bank (2014) since it is 
internationally accepted and follows international norms and practices. Moreover, the reason for 
the adoption is because it is all-inclusive and span across the entire PPP process from inception 
to completion.  
 PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ROAD PROJECTS 
The literature has attested to the many years of PPP projects delivery through the PFI model, 
especially in the road sector (Carrillo et al., 2006; Debande, 2002). One of the road projects 
proposed in 1980 and procured through PFI (DBFO) include the M6 toll road, which was the first 
toll motorway project in the UK (Pugh and Fairburn, 2008; Shaoul and Shaoul, 2008). These road 
projects involve invitations to the concessionaires to bid for the road projects, which are owned 
by the government. The condition is that the private company selected will also execute the 
operation and maintenance of the road for an agreed period, which in most instances is 30 years 
(Stafford et al., 2010). The public agency, however, must make a periodic payment as stated in 
the shadow toll agreement by the numbers of vehicles using the road (Perez and March, 2006). In 
the case of toll roads, the road users pay for the use of the road through the payment of toll fees. 
The literature has identified that PFI method of project implementation primarily ensures VfM 
and sustainability in comparison with the traditional procurement method (Akbiyikli et al., 2011; 
Engel et al., 2010). Corroboratively, governments and other procuring authorities across the world 
have justified the adoption of PPP over the traditional method based on the higher management 
skills and expertise of the private sector including the use of private sector finance for 
infrastructure project delivery amongst others (Sarmento, 2014). Hence, the cumulative 
advantages of PPP lead to the conclusion made by the public client regarding the level of VfM 
generated in comparison with the traditional method of procurement. Other studies also confirm 
cost savings in PPP road projects (Cingolani, 2010). 
To make a cost-effective, and economic investment decision, the procuring authority evaluate 
PPP in comparison with the traditional method of procurement through the Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) at the feasibility and viability stage of project development. The PSC can be 
adopted as an evaluation method for the quantitative assessment of public sector VfM option, 
which usually serves as a financial benchmark against the PPP reference model. The public sector 
VfM option is represented as the costs of traditional procurement, which is compared with the 
PPP model to ascertain the feasibility stage of project development. This comparison is to allow 
the choice of the best option between the conventional, (i.e., traditional procurement method) and 
PPP methods of procurement regarding VfM (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Hence, there is usually 
the need to consider the cost of delivery of the project regarding the adoption of traditional  
                                                       Chapter 2 An Overview of Public Private Partnership Projects 
28 
 
 
procurement method in comparison to the cost of delivering the project by PPP to complete VfM 
analysis at the design and planning stage. In the analysis of VfM, there is the comparison of the 
PSC model and the PPP reference model based on the benefits and merits obtainable from each 
of the model. However, lack of adequate information at the feasibility stage of the project could 
constitute difficulty in the choice of the best option regarding VfM. 
In most instances, the VfM analysis based on the use of the PSC has led to the choice of PPP as 
the best option to procure infrastructure projects. Moreover, the literature states that the many 
advantages of PPP over the traditional procurement methods led to its full acceptance and 
adoption in the delivery of both toll and non-toll UK road projects (Bowerman, 2007). However, 
notable literature attests to specific areas of failures of PPP in the delivery of toll road projects, 
mainly based on cost and time overruns (Reeves, 2004; Reeves, 2003). The findings of these two 
kinds of literature contrast other PPP studies, which indicates more benefits regarding cost and 
time taken to deliver infrastructure projects.  
PPP/PFI road projects delivery in Ireland has, therefore, been identified as having shortcomings, 
which include: delay, time and costs overrun that are higher than those experienced on contracts 
procured on traditional procurement basis (Reeves, 2003). These time and cost overruns pose 
problems to the achievement of VfM in PPP road projects and are attributed to the level of 
efficiencies, enormous costs of finance and the defective tendering and bidding process. Despite 
the shortcomings observed in the adoption of PPP for infrastructure project delivery, governments 
have continued to utilise PPP because of the many advantages, especially regarding the provision 
of solutions to their respective financial constraints and the higher level of efficiency, expertise 
and workforce of the private sector amongst others (Sarmento, 2014). 
Having defined VfM at the early stage of this chapter and emphasised the importance of achieving 
the respective criteria, the occurrence of time and cost overruns established from the literature are 
attributed as a factor threatening the enthusiasm of the private sector for investing in road projects 
(Reeves, 2004). Though, the profits generated by the private sector partner has been a source of 
concerns as well to the public client and has also reduced the confidence of the public sector 
because of the VfM generated for the road users (Sarmento, 2014). Therefore, the findings suggest 
that the achievement of VfM has caused agitations and inconclusive arguments among the 
stakeholders especially the public and private sector partners and no project can lay claim to its 
full performance during the process of implementation. Hence, there is need to investigate the 
achievement of VfM in PPP road projects, especially in the context of UK PFI (DBFO) road 
projects. The reason for the need to examine PFI (DBFO) is in consideration of the long history 
of PPP adoption for road projects delivery. 
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 ROAD PROJECTS IN THE UK 
There are various types and classification of road projects. The road network of the UK has been 
categorised into motorways, trunk roads and local and urban roads, which is about the same 
categorisation with the road networks of twenty-nine countries of the world (Doll and Van Essen, 
2008). All the categories of road networks are adopted to varying degrees across countries. 
However, the respective levels of adoption of each of these classes of road projects in the UK 
road sector is as shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Road Classes in the UK and their Level of Adoption 
Country  Motorways (Number) Other trunk roads (Number) Local/ Urban (Number) 
  Total Tolled Total Tolled Total Tolled 
United Kingdom  3,638 42 47,928 - 364,689 - 
Source: Adapted from (Doll and van Essen, 2008) 
The model of PFI road projects in the UK, which constitute 60% of all roads in the UK fall into 
any of this forms and classifications (Doll and van Essen, 2008). Further findings on road services 
provision in Europe reveals that all the types of road projects can be referred to as tolled and non-
tolled road networks. Toll roads are relatively short roads, classified as congestion reliever, inter-
city arteries, development roads, bridges, and tunnels, and are constructed to relieve heavy traffic 
congestion on existing urban routes (Doll and van Essen, 2008). These roads attract user charges, 
which are either paid by the users or on behalf of the users (Soomro and Zhang, 2013; Abdel 
Aziz, 2007b). All other roads are categorised as non-tolled. When toll levies, taxes or fees are 
paid directly by the users, such payment can be regarded as a direct toll (Akbiyikli and Eaton, 
2005). However, a payment mechanism, which provides that the government or the public 
agencies representing the state pay fees, levies or a tax for the use of roads, is called a shadow toll 
(Abdel Aziz, 2007b). The model of PFI road projects in the UK based on their respective types 
and classifications are shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       Chapter 2 An Overview of Public Private Partnership Projects 
30 
 
 
 
 Source: Adapted from (DoT, 2012; Doll and Van Essen, 2008) 
Figure 2.2: Model of Road Projects in the UK. 
Information from Figure 2.2 indicates that the local and urban roads in the UK constitutes major 
roads followed by other trunk roads. Motorways (particularly tolled roads) are the least procured 
roads in the UK. Furthermore, UK Department of Transport (2012) corroborates this finding 
providing the information of Britain’s roads classification (excluding motorways) as follows: 
• Class A roads are major roads intended to provide large-scale transport links within or 
between areas. It constitutes the highest class of classified road and the top tier of the 
road’s classification. 
• B roads are intended to connect different areas and to feed traffic between class A roads 
and smaller roads on the network. This category of roads is regarded as the second tier in 
the classified road system. 
• Classified unnumbered roads are Smaller roads intended to connect unclassified roads 
with A and B roads, and often linking a housing estate or a village to the rest of the 
network. Like ‘minor roads’ on an Ordinance Survey map and sometimes known 
unofficially as C roads. It represents the third class of classified road and a tier in the 
roads classification system. 
• Unclassified roads are local roads intended for local traffic. It is the fourth and lowest 
class of detailed road in the classification system. The majority (60%) of roads in the UK 
fall within this category. Though, local and urban roads network have been put ahead of 
all other road networks in the UK. 
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 The Type of Public Private Partnership for UK Road Projects 
Public Private Partnership in the context of a business enterprise has been defined as a situation 
where the private sector finances and shares the risks and rewards of business investment with 
the public sector (Shaoul et al., 2008). The PFI is a PPP type, which adopts the finance provided 
by the private sector for the delivery of infrastructure projects (Akintoye et. al., 2003; Debande, 
2002).  The types of contract structure adopted in the UK for infrastructure projects delivery 
especially in road projects of the transport sector are DBFO such as freestanding projects, 
concessions or franchises (Akintoye, 2009). 
The DBFO is a PFI method of procurement usually adopted for road projects delivery in the UK 
(Debande, 2002). The reason for the adoption of PFI in the UK according to Carrillo et al. (2006) 
is to improve the level of public services. In the DBFO arrangement, the government makes 
payment for the utilisation of the road asset over a specified period of thirty years, e.g., the A55, 
A13, A74 (M) / M74, which are freestanding projects and concessions. The private concessionaire 
charges the users directly in the form of tolls and fees on a toll road, e.g., British M6 toll road or 
Dartford Bridge (Debande, 2002). Freestanding projects, concessions, and franchises emerge in 
a situation where there is a mix of both public and user charges in the partnership arrangement. 
These are opposed to the joint venture or joint ownership arrangements of PPP where either the 
public sector or the users may be charged for the services provided (Shaoul et al., 2008).  
In general, DBFO is a PFI arrangement for transport projects (especially roads) procurement in 
the UK (Shaoul et al., 2006). In this arrangement, the Highways authority other procuring 
authority buys the road service provision for about 30 years instead of buying the capital assets 
or procuring through the traditional procurement method. The primary objective of the adoption 
of DBFO for road projects is the provision of quality public services, which constitute VfM for 
the users, taxpayers and public-sector client. Hence, VfM is a significant consideration in 
ascertaining whether to procure an asset through PPP (Akbiyikli et al., 2011). The primary 
objectives of DBFO road projects are to maximise VfM through appropriate allocation of risks 
between the public and private sectors towards ensuring the construction, operation and 
maintenance of new roads with minimal adverse impact on the environment, maximum benefit to 
road users and minimum financial contribution from the public sector (Shaoul et al., 2006). 
Technical, operational, financial and commercial innovation is the aim of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects.  
The essence of using the private sector’s entrepreneurial skills is to achieve significantly more 
VfM for the taxpayer than the conventional or traditional method of road projects procurement 
(Shaoul and Shaoul, 2008; Shaoul et al., 2006). For instance, the DBFO procurement method has 
been found to offer substantial savings in comparison with conventional procurement method  
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with a total of at least £100 million savings in infrastructure cost, which is about 13% of the 
contract sum (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007a). Contrastingly, other PPP studies have identified the 
non-achievement of VfM within infrastructure projects delivery, particularly road projects in 
Portugal and Spain (Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010; Shaoul, 2005). These suggest 
that the outcome of PPP infrastructure projects varies within project environment and across 
countries. Other studies corroborate these finding as revealed from the result of Latin America 
and Caribbean countries, which claim non-achievement of VfM in PPP road projects (Guasch et 
al., 2014; Bitran et al., 2013). Though, other studies have indicated the achievement of VfM 
mainly on the first eight PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK (Bain, 2010). 
 Characteristics and Stakeholders of PFI Road Projects in the UK 
The evidence available from numerous sources provides vital information concerning UK 
exposure to PFI in the road sector via the Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) model. The 
number and types of road concessions and highway maintenance project in the UK (excluding 
street lighting and highways offices projects) and their procuring authorities including the capital 
value of the projects are shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Privately Financed Road Projects in the UK 
Public Authority Type of Concession Number of 
Concessions 
Capital 
Value (£M) 
Highways England DBFO & Free standing with user tolls 14 2, 827.30 
Scottish Office/ Executive and Agencies DBFO/Free standing with user tolls, with 
contribution from the public sector for the 
infrastructure and later the tolls 
4 609.70 
Welsh Office/ Assembly/ Development 
Agency 
DBFO (Excluding the non-devolve projects) 4 236.40 
Northern Irish Department for Transport/ 
Road Service Agency 
DBFO 2 365.00 
Local Authorities in England DBFO 8 1,846.00 
Transport for London DBFO 2 327.40 
Total  34 £6,211.80 
Source: Adapted from (PPI Database, 2016; Roy, 2008) 
 
As illustrated in Table 2.4, England has the highest concentration of privately financed road 
projects in the UK with 14 current projects, which constitute 43.75% at £2,827.30 million capital 
value for all the roads and highways maintenance projects. Data for the current PFI (DBFO) road 
projects of the remaining countries represented in the UK are also indicated in Table 2.3. Scotland 
and Wales recorded four PFI (DBFO) road projects each while Northern Ireland private sector 
invested in two PFI road projects on a DBFO basis. 
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The data available from the PPI Database (2016) reveal 34 current road transport projects 
including highway maintenance projects of local authorities and excluding the cancelled and 
terminated projects, which include the project initiated by the Welsh Development Agency, which 
is no longer in existence (See Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 respectively). An evaluation of this 
extensive list of PFI (DBFO) road projects reveals that only 25 road projects could be attributable 
to roads and highway maintenance sector, which resolves into 14 roads and highway maintenance 
projects procured by the Highways England. Four DBFO roads are obtained by the Scottish and 
Welsh office individually, and two projects are attributable to DBFO road procured by the 
Northern Irish Department for Transport/Roads Service Agency as shown in Table 2.4. 
The total number of the road and highway maintenance projects in England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland including other details concerning the concession projects, which includes the 
procuring authority, SPV and equity holders amongst others are as shown in Table 2.5.
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                Table 2.5: Details of DBFO Roads and Highway Maintenance Projects in the UK 
S/N   Project Name Date of Financial 
Close 
Date of Construction 
Completion 
Contract 
Period 
Capital Value 
(£ Million) 
Equity Holder Details (Name &Share %) Procuring Agency 
1 A1 Darrington to Dishforth 01/02/2003 Data not provided 33 245 1st- Semperian PPP Investment Partners                                                            
2nd- Barclays Private Equity (BPE) (41.7%)                                                                   
3rd Kellogg Brown & Root Limited (25.0) 
Highway Agency
2 A1(M) Alconbury to 
Peterborough 
01/02/1996 Data not provided 2mnb7 128 1st- Abertis Motorways UK Ltd (33.3%)                                                               
2nd-  Barclays Private Equity (BPE) (41.7%)                                                               
3rd- Kellogg Brown & Root Limited (25.0) 
Highway Agency
3 A19 Dishforth to Tyne Tunnel 
DBFO 
01/10/1996 02/09/1998 30 29 1st- Sir Robert McAlpine Enterprises Ltd 
(100.0%) 
Highway Agency 
4 A249 Stockbury to Sheerness 01/02/2004 Data not provided 30 73 1st- Barclays Integrated Investment Fund 
(50.0%)                                                2nd- 
HICL Infrastructure Company Limited (50.0) 
Highway Agency 
5 A30/A35 Exeter to Bere Regis 01/07/1996 01/07/2000 30 75 1st- Balfour Beatty Plc (20.0%)                                                                                     
2nd- Barclays Private Equity (BPE) (15.0%)                                                           
3rd- Equitix Holdings Ltd (65.0%) 
Highway Agency
6 A417/A419 Swindon to 
Gloucester 
01/02/1996 16/01/1998 30 110 1st- Abertis Motorways UK Ltd (33.3%); 2nd- 
Barclays Private Equity (BPE) (41.7%); 3rd- 
Kellogg Brown & Root Limited (25.0%) 
Highway Agency 
7 A50/A564 Stoke to Derby Link 01/05/1996 Data not provided 30 21 WS Atkins Investments Ltd -                        
Balfour Beatty- 
Highway Agency 
8 A69 Carlisle to Newcastle 01/01/1996 Data not provided 30 9 1st- Henry Boot Construction Ltd (61.2%)       
2nd- Pell Frischmann Concessionaires (18.8%) 
3rd- Societal Initiative Autostadali e Servizi 
S.p.A (SIAS) (20.0%) 
Highway Agency 
9 M1-A1 Lofthouse to Bramham 
Link 
01/03/1996 Data not provided 30 214 1st- Balfour Beatty Plc (50.0%)                        
2nd- Barclays Private Equity (BPE) (50.0%) 
Highway Agency 
10 M40 Denham to Warwick  01/09/1996 Data not provided 30 65 1st- John Laing Infrastructure (50.0%) 
2nd- Semperian PPP Investment Partners 
(50.0%) 
Highway Agency 
11 M6 Toll Road (Formerly 
Birmingham Northern Relief 
Road BNRR) 
01/02/1992 Data not provided 46 485 Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG) 
(100.0%) 
Highway Agency 
12 National Roads Tele- 
communications Serv. 
01/09/2005 01/03/2008 9 54.2 1st- HSBC Infrastructure Fund Management 
Ltd. (55.0%)                                                             
2nd- Fluor International Ltd. (45.0%) 
Highway Agency 
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               Table 2.5: Details of DBFO Roads and Highway Maintenance Projects in the UK (Contd.) 
S/N Project Name Date of Financial 
Close 
Date of Construction 
Completion 
Contract 
Period 
Capital Value (£ 
Million) 
Equity Holder Details (Name &Share %) Procuring Agency 
 
13 
M25 Orbital 20/05/2009 01/04/2013 30 988.1 1st- Balfour Beatty Plc. (40.0%) 
2nd- Skanska (40.0%) 
3rd- WS Atkins (10.0%) 
4th- Egis Projects SA (10.0%) 
Highway Agency 
14 Severn River Crossings 01/10/1990 05/06/1996 30 331 1st- John Laing Plc (35.0%)  
2nd- Vinci Concessions S.A.S Grupo ACS  
3rd - Barclays PLC (15.0%)  
4th- Bank of America (15.0%) 
Highway Agency 
 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
      
15 Carlisle Northern 
Development Route 
15/07/2009 10/02/2012 30 60.1 1st - Balfour Beatty Infrastructure Investments Ltd. 
(82.4%) 
2nd- Reliance (17.7%) 
Cumbria 
16 A130 01/09/1999 Data not provided 29 97.5 John Laing PLC. (100.0%) Essex 
17 Portsmouth Highways 
Maintenance 
01/07/2004 01/04/2009 25 63.1 1st- Colas SA (50.0%) 
2nd- Colas Ltd (50.0%) 
Portsmouth 
18 Doncaster Interchange 01/12/2003 Data not provided 32 200 Data Not Supplied South Yorkshire 
19 Birmingham Highway 
Maintenance 
06/05/2010 01/04/2015 25 322 1st- Amey Investments Ltd (33.3%) 
2nd- Lloyds (Uberior Fund) (33.3%) 
3rd- Equitix Ltd (33.3%) 
Birmingham 
20 Sheffield Highways 
Maintenance 
31/07/2012 01/09/2017 26 369 1st - Amey Ventures Asset Holdings Limited 
(33.34%) 
2nd -Equitix Highways 2 Limited (33.33%) 
3rd- Aberdeen Asset Mgt. Ltd. 
Sheffield 
21 Mersey Gateway Project. 28/03/2014 31/03/2017 30 589 1st- Macquarie 
2nd- FCC 
3rd –Bilfinger 
Halton 
22 Isle of Wight Council - 
Highways Maintenance 
26/09/2012 31/03/2020 18 145.3 Island Roads Services Ltd The Isle of Wright 
 
TRANSPORT FOR 
LONDON 
      
23 A13 Thames Gateway 
DBFO 
12/04/2000 30/09/2006 30 230.4 1st- AMEC (25.0%) 
2nd- Carillion (25.0%) 
3rd- Kellogg Brown & Root Limited (25.0%) 
4th- Grupo ACS (25.0%) 
Transport for London 
24 London Borough of 
Hounslow Highways 
Maintenance 
30/08/2012 31/12/2017 20 97 1st- Vinci Infrastructures SAS (50.0%) 
2nd- BIIF Holdco Ltd. (50.0%) 
Hounslow 
25 MOT Computerisation 01/02/2000 Data not provided 11 57.7 Siemens AG 100% (this is a corporately financed 
project) 
Department for Transport 
 
SCOTTISH SCHEMES 
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             Table 2.5: Details of DBFO Roads and Highway Maintenance Projects in the UK (Contd.) 
S/N Project Name Date of Financial 
Close 
Date of Construction 
Completion 
Contract 
Period 
Capital Value (£ 
Million) 
Equity Holder Details (Name &Share %) Procuring Agency 
26 M6 DBFO 01/4/1997 - 30 96 Innisfree Nominees Ltd (60%) 
Laing Roads Ltd. (20%) 
PFI Investors Ltd (20%) 
Scottish Executive and 
Agency 
27 Skye Bridge,              - 1995 - - Terminated Terminated 
28 M77 / Glasgow Southern 
Orbital Road (SE / East 
Renfrewshire) 
30/05/ 2003 Spring 2005 32 135.0 Balfour Beatty Capital Projects Ltd. (85%) 
Infrastructures Investors Ltd (15%) 
Scottish Executive, East 
Renfrewshire Council 
(ERC) 
29 M80 Stepps to Haggs 11/2008 09/2011 30 320.0 HICL Infrastructure Company Limited Scottish Executive and 
Agency 
30 A74 (M)/M74 
 
05/12/2008 30 65.0 
 
Transport Scotland  
WELSH SCHEMES 
      
31 A55 Llandyygai to 
Holyhead Trunk Road 
01/12/1998 08/2001 30 120.0 UK (Highways (A55) Holdings Ltd (100%) National Assembly for 
Wales 
32 Newport Southern 
Distributor Road 
29/3/2002 - 37 57.1 Morgan Sindall Investments Limited (50%) 
Innisfree (50%) 
Newport CBC 
33 Lloyd George Avenue & 
Callaghan Square 
09/7/1999 2007 25 189.0 Vinci Pensions Ltd (60%)  
Laing Road plc (20%) and 
 PFI Investors (20%) 
Former Cardiff Bay 
Development Corporation 
(now Welsh Assembly 
Government) 
34 Sirhowy Enterprise Way 
Road Scheme 
21/01/2004 12/2005 30 35.9 Costain Civil Engineering & Construction Ltd. (50%) 
Costain Engineering & construction Ltd. (50%) 
Caerphilly County 
Borough Council 
Caerphilly (CCBC) 
35 Severn Crossing (Non-
devolved Project) 
01/10/1999 05/06/1996 30 331 Cofiroute UK Limited and Laing O'Rourke. 
Prudential Trustee Company Limited and Prudential 
Assurance Company Limited mutual interest in 
ordinary shares 
Department for Transport 
 
NORTHERN IRISH 
SCHEMES 
      
36 DBFO1 M1/ 
Westlink/M2/M3 
02/2006 11/2009 30 115.00 Highways Management Group (HMG). HMG 
(GRAHAM, Northstone Ltd and Bilfinger Berger). 
33% each.  
Department for 
Infrastructure 
37 DBFO II Northern Ireland 12/2007 01/2011 30 250.00 Bilfinger Berger Projects Investments S.C.A. 
SICAR (75%) 
Graham Investment Projects Ltd (15%) 
Northstone NI Ltd. (10%)  
Department for Regional 
Development- Roads 
Service 
             Source: Adapted from (HM Treasury, 2016; PPI Database, 2015; PPP Forum, 2011) 
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Out of the 25 PFI projects in England as shown in Table 2.5, only 14 can be categorised as 
involving roads and highway maintenance. The remaining 11 DBFO road projects are mainly 
electrification and street lighting requiring some operation and maintenance at the local 
authorities and Transport for London procuring agency.  
Different types of financing and funding regimes are in place and adopted. These road projects 
are contracted within an agreed contract period. However, there are options for renegotiation and 
termination of the contract. The associated details and addresses of the respective government 
agencies, private companies, and the individual shares of the equity holders involved in the 
procurement of the PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK are numerous. However, the details of 
the public and private sector stakeholders are shown in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 shows that the responsibility of Highways England includes the procurement of most 
DBFO road projects in the UK (mainly in England). Other public-sector procuring authorities’ 
Northern Irish office, Scottish office, and Welsh office. Autolink Concessionaires and Midland 
Expressway Ltd amongst others are all examples of DBFO private companies operating in 
Scotland.  
 CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
ROAD PROJECTS  
The implementation of PPP road projects to successful completion at every phase of the PPP 
projects is essential particularly in the achievement of the VfM objectives of the primary partners. 
Critical assessment of existing literature indicates that there are various implementation themes 
for PPP road projects (Verweij, 2015; Rouhani, 2009). The implementation topics borders on 
VfM issues, risk management system issues, quality management systems issues, legislative and 
institutional framework, problems regarding the achievement of specified construction 
time/project duration, especially about the A15 motorways, which is a road connecting Rotterdam 
and the interchange Ressen in Netherlands (Verweij, 2015). The implementation of budgeted cost 
or contract and the implementation of project profit or proposed investment return, however, 
constitute important project implementation themes. 
Nevertheless, existing literature on PPP implementation at the respective stages identifies some 
implementation issues on PPP projects executed in the USA. These issues include and not limited 
to: sustainability, conflicting objectives of private and public, lengthy agreements and stability of 
accord, non-compete clauses, renegotiations, flexibility in pricing, fixed-term franchise, 
interoperability of the entire network, social and physical events, environmental constraints,  
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political support, stakeholder’s management, amongst others (Rouhani, 2009). However, one of 
the leading implementation challenges for infrastructure projects procured through PPP in Latin 
America and Portugal has been found to be renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014). 
Research conducted in Spain has also identified renegotiation as one of the issues impeding the 
successful implementation of PPP projects, especially in the road sector (Acerete et al., 2010; 
Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). The reason why renegotiation is one of the prominent problems of 
PPP is premised on the findings of the literature, which states that it has a direct implication on 
VfM criteria through the increase in concession cost and completion time (Sarmento, 2014; 
Guasch et al., 2014). However, empirical investigations are necessary to uncover these areas in 
the context of some countries including the UK. Also, renegotiation impacts the outcomes of the 
renegotiation negatively during the implementation of PPP road projects (Acerete et al., 2010; 
Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). 
There is the need to efficiently manage renegotiations to achieve acceptable and satisfactory 
outcomes in PPP road projects. This need is based on accounts concerning PPP road projects and 
the challenges militating against efficient and effective road provision. There have been 
suggestions in Germany on the need to put specific measures in place to ensure effective 
implementation of PPP framework for road projects (Fischer et al., 2006). Also, the need to put 
in place a framework to address the constraints posed by the cost and time overruns, transparency 
issues, environmental challenges has been emphasised in India towards successful 
implementation of PPP infrastructure projects through responsive and innovative measures 
(Lakshmanan, 2008; Nataraj, 2007). Hence, necessary actions can deliver the objectives of the 
stakeholders and address the challenges inherent in the implementation of PPP infrastructure 
projects including roads. 
Value for money (VfM) has been defined as the combination of the costs, risks, completion time 
and quality throughout the whole life of a project to meet public requirements (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2005).  VfM in road projects borders on proper risk transfer, quality of transport products, 
completion of the project within the specified time, achieving sound cost and returns within the 
infrastructure life and the transfer of the project to the government at the end of the partnership 
as agreed in the contract based on the project residual value. Client’s satisfaction, project cost, 
risk transfer and performance of road projects are paramount considerations when deciding to 
implement road projects for value for money.  
The current practice in the UK regarding PFI road projects based on the analysis of different case 
studies reveals the need for a long-term perspective of VfM by all the stakeholders in a PPP 
arrangement, especially at the inception of the contract (Akbiyikli et al., 2012). Though, PPP has 
been identified as a method of implementing road projects to ensure a sustainable outcome than  
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what is achievable in the traditional method of infrastructure projects procurement (Akbiyikli et 
al., 2011). However, VfM variations in PFI projects in the healthcare and transport sectors has 
been established in the literature, which indicates uncertainty in the VfM assessment results of 
PFI projects in both roads and healthcare sector (Henjewele et al., 2011). These suggest that there 
may be variations and changes in costs, timescales and client requirements during the 
implementation process of PFI projects in both transport and healthcare infrastructure sectors. 
Debande (2002) agree that risk transfer in UK PFI projects leads to the reduction of construction 
costs with relatively high transaction costs during project implementation. Based on the VfM 
variations, which exist in some instances of PPP transport projects evaluated, the VfM assessment 
of transport projects tends to differ considerably across a range of projects and models. Hence, 
there is the assumption from this experiences that VfM regarding cost is also an implementation 
issue in PFI infrastructure projects delivery in the UK. 
The findings of the literature also confirm cost savings in PPP road projects (Chang, 2013; 
Willoughby, 2013; Cingolani, 2010). Though achieving transparency between the stakeholders 
within the process of PPP implementation remain a challenge (Lakshmanan, 2008). PFI reduces 
construction costs by risks transfer to the private sector, which notwithstanding does not in any 
way remove the high transaction costs of PFI during the transport projects implementation in the 
UK (Debande, 2002). These transaction costs are generated during the pre-implementation and 
implementation stages of the PPP process and constitute significant implementation issue in PPP 
projects in the UK. However, the transactions costs, which emerge as a procurement issue borders 
on several challenges, which include and not limited to principal-principal problems, 
renegotiation & hold-up problems, and soft budget constraints (Ho and Tsui, 2009). These 
challenges are also regarded as problems that could mitigate effective PPP road project 
implementation (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014). 
Evidence from existing literature shows lack of empirical information regarding PPP 
renegotiation, especially in the UK (Makovsek et al., 2015). There is a need to extend the 
theoretical knowledge to reduce the variations in VfM usually achieved across PPP projects 
during the implementation of transports projects and address the incidences of high transactions 
costs, especially as it relates to renegotiation. Moreover, the motive of any private investor in PPP 
is to recoup the expenses incurred in the projects in its entirety. Construction costs, cost of finance, 
risks, and all other associated costs, etc. Any investment, which will not yield return or profits 
and VfM for the users, is unattractive to both the public and private investor and not worth the 
investment. Thus, the benefits of the private investor and VfM for the public project are 
considerations, which should be taken seriously during the implementation of road projects. As  
 
                                                       Chapter 2 An Overview of Public Private Partnership Projects 
40 
 
 
results, PPP road projects should be implemented to yield maximum VfM returns for the public 
sector without compromising profitable returns to the private sector. 
Time is another variable in PPP road projects, which is relative and requires critical investigation 
because of its impact on VfM (Engel et al., 2014; Bitran et al., 2013; Ho and Tsui, 2009). As 
contract duration and the concession period are vital to both public and private partners, there is 
usually the need to consciously ensure that there is no adverse impact, which could negatively 
impact the project deliverables regarding duration. In doing so, there is the need to critically 
appraise PPP road projects from real life experience to investigate the level of implementation 
success concerning the timely delivery of the road project at the construction and operation stages.  
Attitudinal behaviour also constitutes implementation challenge in PPP infrastructure projects. 
The attitudes of the stakeholders within the tender, design and construction phases of UK PFI 
(DBFO) road projects have an impact on the quality, cost and function of the product of PPP 
arrangement supplied to the users (Hall, 1999). The study further reveals that attitudinal change 
by the stakeholders during PPP implementation tends to affect the quality and other VfM criteria. 
For instance, negligence or nonchalant attitude of the managers or operatives during the 
construction or operation stage of PPP road project could impact negatively on time and cost 
because of delay that can arise in the execution of works. Therefore, an assessment of attitudinal 
barriers, which influences VfM at the planning and construction stage, is germane towards 
effective PPP infrastructure implementation.  
Galilea and Medda (2010) probe the implementation of PPP transport projects on countries basis. 
The findings of this recent study conducted on the premise of the six countries experience 
revealed that corruption level and democratic accountability impact on PPP transport projects 
success. The research also indicates that change in democratic government and political instability 
has a significant effect on the successful implementation of transport projects. These imply that 
successful implementation of transport projects is also a function of the stability of the political 
system of the host country. Thus, the unfavourable political climate tends to be unattractive to 
private investors as it is usually difficult to implement PPP road projects in such a situation. 
A further challenge in PPP transport projects falls within the remit of the provision of the 
legislative and institutional framework of countries (Willoughby, 2013; Medda et al., 2013). 
Medda et al. (2013) establish that the impacts of EU institutions or PPP units in the development 
and success of financial management for the transport sector in Europe cannot be over-
emphasised. These are to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the budgeted cost of 
the projects. Therefore, lack of these PPP institutions and units constitute the challenge to PPP 
projects implementers because of lack of useful parameter for the management and operation of 
PPP. 
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Numerous studies have proposed solutions to these issues, which has become challenges in PPP 
implementation, especially in the transport sector. Rostiyanti and Tamin (2010) suggest the need 
to solve the problems facing the implementation of PPP in toll road projects through performance 
policy framework to enhance the PPP approach in toll road development while Adetola (2014) 
developed conceptual, collaborative engagement framework for road transport infrastructure 
management. Also, a model through a partnership framework that will encourage the involvement 
of the private sector in PPP road projects in Kenya has been proposed (Gor and Gitau, 2010). 
Furthermore, Willoughby (2013) states the need for assisting developing countries in public 
transit provision through adequate monitoring systems, progressive policies and federal 
institutional frameworks for the practice of PPPs among others. Though, these studies recognise 
that there are challenges experienced in the implementation of PPP in the delivery of 
infrastructure transport projects. However, none of the studies has been able to address the current 
problem encountered at renegotiation, budget constraints and hold up issues constituting 
significant challenge regarding VfM achievement for the stakeholders. Hence, the need for the 
development of a framework to address this critical challenge in PPP road projects delivery 
cannot be over-emphasised. 
 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
The chapter reveals that public agencies across the world, especially in the UK are now adopting 
PPP for infrastructure projects delivery because it fosters efficiency and delivers VfM for the 
stakeholders. Though, there have been conflicting arguments regarding the merits of PPP over 
the traditional method of infrastructure project procurements. The chapter, however, indicates 
that road projects constitute the most significant infrastructure projects that are procured through 
PPP across countries. The high financial implications of road projects for both the private investor 
and governments has been identified as the main reason why clients favour PPP for road projects 
delivery. This is because the procurement method affords the government the utilisation of the 
private sector financial resources and higher-level management skills and expertise. The high 
capital intensity of PPP road projects is the justification for the reason why its implementation is 
critical, especially regarding the achievement of VfM. 
PPP has also been recognised as a unique model of procurement that is formulated to positively 
affect the economic, quality, environmental and social aspects of road projects to provide VfM to 
the public partner, return on investment (profits) for the private sector and satisfaction for the 
users. However, in most situations, there is inefficiency in the management of the risk allocated, 
budgeted cost and construction time during the phases of PPP projects. The outcome of the 
literature also indicates that one of the emerging challenges and issues in PPP procurement  
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impacting cost and time amongst others is renegotiation. In fact, renegotiation is one of the most 
critical problems impeding the successful implementation of PPP contracts. Therefore, based on 
the appraisal of relevant studies across PPP practising countries concerning the procurements of 
infrastructure PPP projects, the focus of the next chapter is on the renegotiation of PPP projects. 
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CHAPTER 3 RENEGOTIATION IN A 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
ENVIRONMENT 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses Objective 2 of this thesis by investigating the incidence of renegotiation 
and identifying the factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP road projects. The section 
establishes renegotiation as an issue in PPP procurement, especially in road projects. Other 
problems emanating from the renegotiation in PPP road projects environment are discussed in 
this chapter. The renegotiation problems are observed to have a knowledge gap requiring further 
empirical investigation. Numerous research works have attested to the efficiency advantage of 
PPP in the procurement of infrastructure projects, including roads. Despite the perceived merits 
of PPP over other procurement methods, projects undertaken by this approach have faced various 
challenges including the challenge of contract renegotiation.  
The chapter, therefore, reviews renegotiation of PPP contracts based on the concepts and types 
of renegotiation, renegotiation leading factors and initiation of renegotiation. The behaviours of 
the parties to PPP contract, objectives of the stakeholders at renegotiation, outcomes, and impact 
of the renegotiation, and measures to ensure the achievement of VfM at renegotiation are in this 
chapter. The chapter concludes by summarising VfM as the principal renegotiation challenge and 
issue among other topical issues in PPP road projects. 
 THE CONCEPT OF CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties, which is recognised by law as binding 
on the parties (Matheson, 2006). A valid contract subsists when the elements of a valid contract 
are present, and the procuring partners state the terms of the agreement. These conditions are 
indicated in the contract with a clause specifying the requirements of the contract for the parties' 
adherence during the implementation of the contract. The experience of contract renegotiation as 
stated in the literature, however, reveals that situation occasionally arise during the contract that 
may make the parties individually or jointly indifferent to the initial contract or agreement (De 
Brux, 2010; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005).  The renegotiation may also occur in a situation  
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where the terms of the agreement do not serve the needs of the parties as expected (Arino and 
Reuer, 2004). This circumstance may necessitate renegotiation of the contract.  
Literature has abundant evidence of the descriptions of the concepts and processes of contract 
renegotiation (Ping Ho et al., 2015; Xiong and Zhang, 2014; Bi and Wang, 2011; Dainty, 2008). 
However, the occurrence of an event, which results in the adjustment of the contract is termed 
contract renegotiation. Sarmento (2014) corroborates this definition by indicating that 
renegotiation of the contract may result in compensation of a party to the contract usually by way 
of change in the financial conditions of a concession contract. Also, within a psychological 
contract, the employer and the employee may inform each other about the terms and conditions 
of the contract, which is usually open to negotiation, monitoring, renegotiation or cancellation 
(Dainty, 2008). Thus, renegotiation of a contract could occur after contract formation and during 
the implementation of infrastructure projects up to the end of the contract or the transfer of the 
contract to the procuring party. 
 RENEGOTIATION FROM PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS 
PERSPECTIVES 
A critical review of renegotiation studies in PPP infrastructure projects revealed that there 
exist several descriptions of renegotiation. The literature presents numerous definitions 
of contract renegotiations in recent PPP studies (Makovsek et al., 2015; Guasch et al., 
2014; Sarmento, 2014; Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014; Cruz and Marques, 2013a; Bi 
and Wang, 2011). Few kinds of literature have been able to uncover issues about the 
subject of renegotiation over the past years (Sarmento, 2014). As a result, research in this 
area has faced great difficulty concerning scarcity of literature to premise current studies 
in PPP renegotiation. However, there is an improvement in the past few years with respect 
to renegotiation studies on PPP renegotiation. Thus, numerous definitions of 
renegotiation in PPP studies have been identified from authoritative sources.  
Guasch et al. (2014) define contract renegotiation in a PPP arrangement as a change in 
the terms and conditions of the contract agreed between the procuring entity and the 
private party at the inception of the contract. This change could be regarded as distinct 
from the payment adjustments, which occur as stated in the terms of the original contract.  
A renegotiation can also be agreed in a PPP contract in a situation where there is a major 
or significant amendment, which is not envisaged or expected at the time of signing the 
original contract (Nikolaidis & Roumboutsos, 2013; Guasch and Straub 2009).  
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The literature on PPP renegotiation in Portugal brings to the fore corroborative meaning 
of PPP renegotiation. Sarmento (2014) and Sarmento and Renneboog (2014b) refer to 
renegotiation [referred to as financial rebalancing or financial rescue agreements (FRAs)] 
as the occurrence of substantial departures from the original contract, which resulted in 
contract amendment or change of the contract. These definitions suggest that an 
unexpected event, incidence or occurrence could necessitate the revision or amendment 
of the original contract. Thus, renegotiation may be evidenced in the change of project 
scope, which may result into rebalancing the financial agreement or financially rescuing 
the project to avoid abandonment or contract incompletion.   
Furthermore, Bi and Wang (2011) reveal that renegotiation could be considered as the 
negotiation, which takes place after the initial negotiation leading to the original contract. 
Rounds of negotiation may, therefore, happen in a situation where there is divergence 
opinion or differences in stakeholder’s benefits and level of investments expected by the 
parties to the contract. The disagreement could be because of specific reasons or drivers, 
which are beyond or within the control of the parties to the PPP contracts. Cruz and 
Marques (2013a) also give another definition of PPP contract renegotiation from another 
dimension. The study identifies renegotiation as non-alignment of PPP contract terms 
with present circumstances, which result in a request for change by one or all the 
contracting parties. Hence, the inability or difficulty of contracting parties (government 
and the concessionaire) to comply with terms of the contract can result in renegotiation 
request.  
These definitions corroborate the definition of Makovsek et al. (2015) on contract 
renegotiation in PPP, which describes renegotiation as a change in the risk matrix 
assignment of a project or a change in the contract conditions or project scope. These 
definitions suggest that renegotiation of PPP contract is an unexpected change in contract 
terms due to unforeseen events at the time of contract formation, which leads to the 
amendment of the original contract terms. These amendments could bring about a change 
in the agreed contract sum. However, in some situation, a clause may be stated in the 
contract saying that a renegotiation may occur, or the agreement may be subject to 
renegotiation (Sarmento, 2014). Therefore, all the selected definitions on PPP contract 
renegotiation provide a proper understanding of the subject and serves as a basis for 
relating previous studies to the need for further research. 
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The description of PPP contract renegotiation will be incomplete without an examination 
of the respective classes or divisions of PPP renegotiations in PPP infrastructure project 
transactions.  Bi and Wang (2011) and Xiong and Zhang (2014) note that renegotiations 
could be divided into three types and categories according to the different initiators. These 
initiators are the contracting parties or partners, which agrees to pool their respective 
resources together for the achievement of mutual objectives. 
 CLASSIFICATION OF RENEGOTIATION TYPES 
There are various types of renegotiations in the literature, which can be categorised and 
grouped into different classes. Since renegotiation of a contract could occur after contract 
formation and during the implementation of infrastructure projects up to the end of 
transfer of the contract, therefore, renegotiation can be classified according to the 
implementation stage where it occurs. Renegotiation can also be categorised by the party 
requesting the renegotiation. Fundamentally, renegotiation can be classified into two as 
discussed in this section. 
 Renegotiation Types According to Contract Implementation Stage  
Three types of contract renegotiation are identified in the literature and include intra-deal, 
post-deal and extra-deal renegotiations. A renegotiation, which takes place at the end of 
the contract when the parties are free from all contractual obligations are known as post-
deal renegotiation while a renegotiation, which occurs during the period of 
implementation is regarded as intra-deal renegotiations (Salacuse, 2000). The latter type 
of renegotiation may provide a specification that the parties may request contract 
renegotiation or ask for the review of the provisions of the terms of the contract.  This 
type of renegotiation is peculiar to infrastructure construction contracts including PPP 
contracts (Salacuse, 2000). Renegotiation is regarded as an extra-deal when it violates the 
provisions of the contract or when there is no clause in the contract authorising a 
renegotiation. In this situation, the rounds of negotiation usually take place without 
reference to the framework of the existing contract. Hence, contract renegotiation in 
infrastructure projects (construction inclusive) could take the form of any of these 
categories. 
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 Renegotiation Types According to Public and Private Partners 
Initiative 
Renegotiation of a PPP project can be categorised according to the party requesting the 
opening of the renegotiation process. Many kinds of literature support this submission by 
stating that renegotiation request in PPP projects can be opened by either the public or 
private partner or both (Cruz and Marques, 2013a; Bi and Wang, 2011). Thus, 
renegotiations can be classified into three according to the stakeholder requesting as 
follows: renegotiation initiated by private enterprises/company, renegotiation started by 
the government, and renegotiation commenced by both private firm and the government. 
Renegotiation initiated by the employer is regarded as employer-led renegotiation. 
However, in a PPP contract, the government can be considered as an employer. Therefore, 
the renegotiation requested or initiated by the government is referred to as the government 
led renegotiation while a renegotiation process undertaken by the employee or the private 
party is an employee-led or private party-initiated renegotiation (Lohhman and Rotzel, 
2014; Ho, 2006). Most of the renegotiations initiated are targeted at ensuring that the 
changing needs are met towards the achievement of individual objectives of the 
contracting parties, i.e., both the public and private party. For instance, the goal of the 
client or procuring authority in a PPP arrangement is value for money for the users while 
the private concessionaire seeks to achieve the profit maximisation motive (Acerete et 
al., 2010; Reside and Mendoza, 2010; Ho and Tsui, 2009). 
Moreover, renegotiation can also take place at the joint request or initiative of both the 
public party, i.e., government and the private party, which is frequently referred to as 
public and private parties led renegotiation (Cruz and Marques, 2013b; Bi and Wang 
2011). In this case, both parties jointly agree to the renegotiation unlike the previous 
classes, which is strictly at the request of the individual party, i.e., the government or the 
private party. It is only after any or both parties have requested renegotiation that 
renegotiation of PPP contract can take place.  
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Xiong and Zhang (2014), however, opine that renegotiation requests are usually allowed 
in a concession contract to be made by the private partner to attract private finance and 
in a situation of severe risk, which could affect the profitability of the concession for the 
SPV. The implication is that renegotiation can take place at the request of one or both 
parties at any point in the implementation of PPP projects when a risk scenario occurs.  
The literature has classified renegotiations initiated by private enterprises into two 
namely: opportunistic and cooperative renegotiations (Bi and Wang, 2011). 
Opportunistic renegotiations undertaken by a private company aim at gaining a maximum 
return either warranted or not warranted while the cooperative renegotiation is usually 
initiated bearing the interest of both parties in mind (De Brux, 2010; Guasch and Straub, 
2009a). Though, the private enterprise stands to gain additional investment profit, 
especially in an opportunistic renegotiation. However, the additional profits gained by the 
private party is not at the expense of the client or the procuring authority in a cooperative 
renegotiation. In other words, opportunistic renegotiation can be initiated solely to satisfy 
the profit motive of the private enterprise while the latter is for the mutual benefits of the 
partners. The levels of renegotiation initiatives across PPP projects, especially within the 
respective modes of transports are shown in Table 3.1.
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                               Table 3.1: Cross Country Analysis of PPP Projects Renegotiation Initiatives 
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The experiences of renegotiations as shown Table 3.1 reveal that out of the infrastructure projects; 
road projects account for the highest number of PPP renegotiations most of which are initiated by 
both the government and the private operator. The findings from international PPP literature (See 
the 19 kinds of writing in Table 3.1) indicates that incidence of renegotiation in the US appears 
to be low, there is, however, no comprehensive research available to provide detailed statistics. 
Gifford et al. (2014), however, explicitly focused on cases where changes to the contract did 
occur. The evidence of the six cases studied indicates that only three could be regarded as 
renegotiations, whereas three were bankruptcies. In the US case studies there is also no clear-cut 
direction or principal reason for renegotiation as observed in the study of Gifford et al. (2014). 
However, the literature indicates that Florida only recorded scanty renegotiations with evidence 
of only one road project renegotiation out of 13 road sector PPPs renegotiated claimed to have 
occurred within the period, which was identified as emanating from the SPV. 
In the UK, NAO (2008) reports the fiscal impact of changes to the contracts for the year 2006 in 
their survey of 171 PFI projects, which was identified based on statistics from all sectors. 
Unfortunately, a more comprehensive view of the impact of changes over the life of the projects 
is not available in the literature. The majority, i.e., 82% of modifications involved £5 000 or less 
(Hasselgren et al., 2014). Evidence from this literature suggests that all the changes originated 
with a request from the public sector rather than from the private sector contractor or because of 
a change in the law. In Portugal, the economic crisis prompted much of the national highway 
programme to undergo renegotiations while the poor or inaccurate estimation of traffic levels 
encourage request for the renegotiation of road concessions in Spain (Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). 
Literature evidence reveals that no renegotiations have been allowed by the government up to the 
year 2014 in India. However, many PPP projects went into operation with confirmations of 
requests for renegotiation by the private parties, possibly due to overaggressive bidding. Adequate 
responses have been given to the problems of aggressive bidding through the minimisation of 
moral hazard in the bidding and project specification processes and reservation of renegotiation 
for the very exceptional circumstances (Hasselgren et al., 2014). Thus, the standard road sector 
PPP contract in India provides for a range of foreseeable changes in conditions that can be allowed 
without renegotiation. Evidence of renegotiations in France suggests that subject to some contract 
caveats, renegotiations between the contract parties aim to improve outcomes for both parties to 
the contract through the cooperation of both partners. 
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Furthermore, the Canadian experiences of PPP projects do not reveal precisely the initiators of 
PPP renegotiations as data on renegotiation are scarce. Though, change negotiations in PPP 
projects were established to be within the initiative of both the public client and the PPP private 
company (Vining and Boardman, 2008). Summarily, the SPV record the highest number of 
renegotiations in comparison to the government corroborates the findings of academic studies on 
PPP renegotiation (Xiong and Zhang, 2014; Cruz and Marques, 2013b). Though, regional 
experiences differ considerably from one another. The number of renegotiations initiative in each 
of the PPP infrastructure projects shown in Table 3.1 indicates that all the renegotiation initiatives 
of the private partner are in road projects, which account for the highest number of initiatives in 
the transportation sector. These suggest that most renegotiation requests in PPP road projects are 
at the instance of the SPV or the private sector company. The incessant renegotiation request by 
the SPV during the renegotiation of the PPP road project, therefore, supports the evidence 
provided by the literature and substantiates the findings of Table 3.1.  
 RENEGOTIATION OBJECTIVES OF THE STAKEHOLDERS 
Public and private parties are the main parties in the execution of a PPP project, who share 
responsibilities and play roles at strategic phases of the implementation of PPP projects including 
renegotiation responsibilities. Government/regulator, the users, private operators and sponsors or 
financiers are the stakeholders in a PPP arrangement (Nikolaidis et al., 2013). These groups have 
a differing interest in PPP projects, and only two can individually initiate the renegotiation process 
in PPP projects. These stakeholders to the PPP projects have their respective interest or objectives 
to protect, which in most instances differ considerably from the individual goals. 
Sarmento (2014b) and Mackintosh (1992) identify that the interests of the private and public 
partners differ significantly from each other, which justifies the need for a synergy between the 
differing interests. Synergy is necessary to enhance additional benefits and even distribution of 
the benefits among the project's stakeholders, particularly the public and private partners 
(Mackintosh, 1992). The synergy of interest based on individual objectives of the public and 
private partners are shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1:  Synergy of Interest in PPP  
Source: Mackintosh (1992) 
The interests of the partners as identified in Figure 3.1 are the objectives of the parties to the PPP 
contract. For example, the government agency representing the government has the sole purpose 
of achieving VfM for members of the public, i.e., the creation of social benefits and infrastructure 
in the most economic terms (Henjewele et al., 2011; HM Treasury, 2007). However, this objective 
is opposite to the purpose of the private company in a PPP contract, which is to maximise the 
profits of the investments or risks. Thus, the defined objectives remain the focal points for both 
stakeholders in PPP infrastructure project development and represent the motive behind 
opportunism in PPP projects (McErlane et al., 2016). These are based on the widely held 
assumption that the parties to PPP contractual agreement usually seek to achieve, or if possible 
surpass, their respective objectives or targets that are set from project inception. 
Therefore, for the success of any renegotiation process in PPP projects, there is the need for a 
private partner and public partner joint venture, which is premised on mutual understanding and 
cooperation to ensure the achievement of stakeholders’ objectives at every stage of the PPP 
project implementation. In addition to the aims of the main parties in a PPP contract renegotiation, 
other stakeholders have their respective goals usually defined at inception prior to the 
commencement of the PPP. For instance, the lenders or financial institutions require the 
investment or the loan to yield the best possible interest based on the prevailing rates in the 
economy. 
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 PROCESS OF RENEGOTIATIONS 
The procurement process of contractual infrastructure projects starts with the inception and 
planning of the contracts, which usually represent the start of the contract. The client defines the 
method of procurement to adopt at the beginning of the contract during the planning stage 
amongst others, which include the modalities for the execution of the contract.  However, 
literature findings reveal that the implementation phases of a contract vary from one category of 
the project to another and the method of procurement adopted in the specific instance. Ahadzi 
and Bowles (2004) indicate that the four main stages of PPP projects are the feasibility and 
planning phase, the bidding and negotiation phase, the construction and operation phase. These 
four stages, according to the literature represent critical phases identified in the initiation and 
planning phase, procurement phase and partnership phase, which have been internationally 
recognised as the respective categories of PPP project stages (Liu et al., 2014). The bidding and 
negotiation phase identified by Ahadzi and Bowles (2004) fall within the procurement phase, 
which is indicated by Liu et al. (2014) as one of the three main aspects of PPP project 
development. Though, there are sub stages under each of the phases identified in the literature. 
After the completion of all these three main phases, there is the transfer of the facility to the public 
partner. However, the renegotiation phase is not included as this could occur at any of the four 
stages of the PPP (Salacuse, 2000). Hence, this implies that there is a place for contract 
renegotiation during PPP at the respective phases of the project implementation.    
The renegotiation process involves bargaining between the contracting parties with the aim of 
reaching a mutually satisfying agreement (Nikolaidis et al., 2013).  Further studies support this 
by stating that renegotiation of PPP contracts is procedural and follows prescribed steps, which 
involve collectively making decisions (Acerete et al., 2010; Sarmento, 2010; Guasch et al., 
2007b). These suggest that for the successful renegotiation of PPP contracts, the process should 
follow the necessary procedure or form. Thus, the submissions of these authors suggest that 
renegotiation entails deciding on the most effective and efficient course of action from a list of 
options or alternatives.  
In PPP projects, however, the process of renegotiation is usually defined from the inception of 
the contract (Sarmento, 2014). The formation of the renegotiation process is stipulated in the 
contract renegotiation clauses assigned to the process of renegotiation (Beckers et al., 2010). 
There is also the definition of the variation procedures, dispute resolution mechanisms, and 
termination clause at the inception of the contract.  
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Moreover, the description of the method to calculate the changes or variations required to the 
contract to establish or ascertain appropriate compensation is necessary for the renegotiation 
process. Failure of the parties to agree at the modification procedure stage may necessitate the 
invocation of the dispute resolution mechanisms (Beckers et al., 2010). 
Although renegotiation has been acknowledged to follow a process, the process is not static and 
could differ from one PPP project to another and from country to country (Sarmento, 2014). Cruz 
and Marques (2013a p. 355) corroborate this by stating as follows: “the renegotiation 
development process differs significantly from country to country and among different sectors.” 
Notable among the processes of renegotiation is the General Concession Renegotiation 
Framework (GCRF) presented by the literature (Xiong and Zhang, 2014), which 
diagrammatically shows that the renegotiation process follows a path and flows sequentially from 
one stage to another (See Appendix 6). The framework indicates that the formation of a contract 
between the parties, i.e., public and private entities begins the contractual relationship. However, 
events may occur after the formation of the contract leading to new developments and require an 
action or decision to be taken. These events or developments, according to Xiong and Zhang 
(2014), may bring about the decision to renegotiate the contract or to go ahead with the provisions 
of the contract.  
Also, if the primary stakeholder’s decision favours renegotiation, then specific outcomes are 
expected within the renegotiation process, which could include the need to enforce the initial 
contract in the event the renegotiation succeeds, and the agreement is upheld or amended. There 
could be outright abandonment or closure of the contract in the event of failure of the 
renegotiation to achieve the objectives expected by one or both primary renegotiation 
stakeholders. Beckers et al., (2010) explains the formation of the renegotiation process by 
identifying three renegotiation clauses, which could be assigned to the process of renegotiation 
as follows: variation procedures; dispute resolution mechanisms; and termination clauses. First, 
there should be the definition of the variation procedures for the determination of an appropriate 
compensation, including both process and calculation rules. Second, the study proposed that if 
the parties to the PPP contract are not able to reach an agreement in the variation procedure, 
dispute resolution mechanisms could emerge. The third and ultimate means in the renegotiation 
process is that the project can be cancelled using termination procedures, which could consist of 
the renegotiation process as well as calculation rules (See Appendix 8). 
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 COMPENSATION MEASURES IN CONCESSION CONTRACT 
RENEGOTIATION 
Previous studies on PPP renegotiation have established that renegotiation occurs because of 
events external or internal to the projects, which necessitate a change in project scope, terms or 
conditions (Hasselgren et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014). A severe risk scenario in PPP projects 
resulting in the deviation or unfavourable outcome to both or either parties may warrant 
compensation (Xiong and Zhang, 2014). Thus, the need to provide for necessary compensation 
measures in the partnership agreement for adoption during PPP project implementation has been 
identified by previous studies (Xiong and Zhang, 2014). The process and procedure of awarding 
compensation to contracting parties at renegotiation are illustrated in the General Concession 
Renegotiation Framework (GCRF), which typically indicate the point of opening renegotiation 
within a concession contract and the respective compensation measures available (See Appendix 
7).  
The exposure of the PPP contract to a severe risk scenario may give rise to a problem that could 
warrant a check on the project performance indicators at the project implementation stages. If the 
risk scenario results in non-achievement of the project performance indicators, i.e., the minimum 
traffic, minimum revenue, shareholders’ and internal rate of return among others, then the project 
can be renegotiated. The renegotiation process could give rise to compensation measures: toll 
increase, contract extension, direct government reimbursement and other measures. Moreover, 
conflicting interests during the implementation phase of PPP projects could also result in contract 
renegotiation. Nikolaidis et al. (2013) attest to this by stating that problems may arise between 
the parties during the negotiation process because of a conflict of interests over a set of available 
alternatives, which could result in contract renegotiation, thereby necessitating procedural 
adoption of a defined process during the implementation stages. This process usually follows 
prescribe form in the contract agreement. 
 EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN TRANSPORT 
PROJECTS 
There are varying experiences across the world regarding the participation of countries in the use 
of PPP for infrastructure projects delivery. Evidence available from large international bodies 
such as World Bank and European Investment Bank reveals the statistics of several countries 
regarding PPP participation across the respective infrastructure sectors (PPI Database, 2016; 
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Bain, 2009). The investment commitments of various regions in the delivery of infrastructure 
projects across countries particularly in developing countries are shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Regional Experiences of the Transport Sector Projects Modes 
S/N Snapshots or Details Transport Modes Highlights (1990-2016) 
  Airports Railways Roads Seaports 
1 
No of countries with 
private participation 144 101 233 255 
2 
Projects reaching financial 
closure 181 128 981 448 
3 
Region with largest 
investment share SSA (1735%) SSA (1969%) SSA (1714%) SSA (1588%) 
4 
Type of PPI with largest 
share in investment 
Management& lease 
contract (1879%) 
Management& lease 
contract (2073%) Greenfield (1912%) 
Greenfield 
(1874%) 
5 
Type of PPI with largest 
share in projects 
Management& lease 
contract (1506%) 
Management lease 
contract (1903%) Greenfield (1789%) 
Greenfield 
(1605%) 
6 
Projects cancelled or under 
distress 
15 (134% of total 
investment) 
19 (366% of total 
investment) 
74 (268% of total 
investment) 
12 (56% of 
total 
investment) 
 
 Projects Reaching Financial Closure (By Sector) 
Region Airports Railways Roads Ports 
1 
East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP) 32 33 218 123 
2 
Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA) 34 8 12 32 
3 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) 78 63 334 164 
4 
Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) 12 2 - 22 
5 South Asia (SA) 10 9 403 51 
6 Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) 15 21 14 56 
 
Total Regional Projects 
Reaching Financial Close 181 136 981 448 
 Region 
Investment in projects by region (US$ million) 
Airports (US $M) Railways (US $M) Roads (US $M) Ports (US $M) 
1 
East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP) 5,832 34,409 48,135 21,705 
2 
Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA) 48,988 5,356 23,295 4,351 
3 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) 39,549 55,295 127,407 26,418 
4 
Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) 2,007 343 - 5,103 
5 South Asia (SA) 5,629 7,905 75,785 11,999 
6 Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) 1,674 5,119 3,057 11,833 
 
Total Investment in 
Projects by Sector 103,679 108,427 277,679 81,409 
 Source: PPI Database (2016) 
Based on the highlights of the respective regions shown in Table 3.2, Latin America countries 
have the highest private participation in PPP and the largest number of projects reaching financial 
closure. The region also has the largest investment share, the most significant share in the project 
and a tremendous record of cancelled or distressed projects in comparison with other parts of the 
world (PPI Database, 2016). The investment levels, project values and the characteristics of 
private participation in infrastructure delivery across the regions indicate that road projects 
account for the highest level of investments across countries, particularly in Latin America 
                                           Chapter 3 Renegotiation in a Public Private Partnership Environment 
57 
 
countries. The most significant numbers of new projects were in electricity, followed by 
telecommunication and transport sectors respectively.  
Furthermore, the record of cancelled or distressed projects is also higher in the road projects in 
Latin America (PPI Database, 2016). Latin America attracted investments within the last ten years 
that far outweighs the percentages of the remaining regions of the world with a robust 64% of 
total global investments (PPI Database, 2014). These findings make it imperative and pertinent 
to evaluate and assess PPP road projects of other regions because of the experience of Latin 
American in PPP road projects. 
The renegotiation experience of PPP projects also flows in conformity with the general skills of 
countries regarding infrastructure projects delivery. Previous theoretical and empirical studies 
investigated PPP contract renegotiation (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2016; Reside and Mendoza, 
2010; Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014; Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010; 
Estache et al., 2009; Acerete et al., 2009). These studies reveal data on the renegotiation of PPP 
infrastructure projects with reference to road projects within the last two decades in Latin America 
and other countries such as Portugal and Spain. In Latin America, for instance, there is evidence 
that renegotiation in the transport sector usually occurs after three years of signing the contract 
especially after competitive bidding (Guasch et al., 2004). 
Hasselgren et al. (2014), however, claim few data on PPP renegotiations in the UK. The reason 
for this experience in the UK may be related to the experience in Portugal where the literature 
established that private companies do not usually provide information on contract agreements and 
are unlikely to reveal information regarding renegotiation decisions and outcomes (Sarmento, 
2014). Based on the attendant challenges of little renegotiation research in the UK, there is a need 
for empirically guided study to address the gaps in knowledge on road projects delivery. In 
addition, most renegotiation studies evaluate incidences of renegotiation in developing countries 
(Guasch et al., 2014; Guasch and Straub, 2006). Renegotiations of PPP infrastructure projects 
also occur in some developed nations (Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos, 2013; De Brux et al., 2011) 
in varying and differential degrees. However, the subsisting issue based on the renegotiation 
experiences of few developed and developing countries is the non-achievement of VfM at 
renegotiation (Cruz et al., 2015; Guasch et al., 2014; Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos, 2013). 
The literature provides detail evaluation and assessment of the issues and outcomes of the 
renegotiation of PPP road projects concerning the experiences of countries through theoretical 
and empirical studies (Gifford et al., 2014; Bi and Wang, 2011). The highlight at the end of the 
literature review reveals that the renegotiation outcomes across the countries identified are due to 
one or more of the factors identified and explained in the succeeding section of this thesis. Thus, 
the renegotiation incidences across selected regions and countries are in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3:  Incidences of Renegotiations of PPP in Selected Regions of the World 
Region Sector % of renegotiated contracts Source 
Latin American and Caribbean Total 68% Guasch et al. (2014) 
Electricity 41% 
Transport 78% 
Water 92% 
India All sectors 0% Guasch et al. (2014) 
US Highways 40% Engel et al. (2011) 
France Highways 50% Athias and Saussier (2007) 
 Parking 73% Beuve et al. (2013) 
UK (Scotland) All Sectors 22% NAO (2003) 
 All sectors 51% CEPA ((2005) 
Source: Hasselgren et al. (2014) 
 FACTORS LEADING TO RENEGOTIATION IN PPP ROAD PROJECTS 
This section discusses the findings of the literature regarding the factors leading to the 
renegotiation of PPP road projects. The discussion is by a systematic review carried out with 22 
kinds of research within the last ten years. The factors grouped into 11 categories based on the 
contract implementation stages. The reason for this categorisation along the dimension of the 
phase of implementation is because the stakeholders in most instances have the right to request 
renegotiation during the implementation stages. Moreover, the factors leading to the PPP road 
projects renegotiation indicated in the literature were observed to fall in the respective categories 
of design, technical, economic, contractual and administrative, tendering and bidding, regulatory 
and legal, environmental amongst others. There is the discussion of the findings of the literature 
regarding the factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP road projects. 
A comprehensive search of the literature, which includes journals, conference proceedings, 
working papers, newsletters, workshop booklets, seminar papers, internet documents and other 
available sources of information on factors leading to PPP road projects renegotiation are 
identified. However, only journal and conference papers, which are relevant and applicable to 
PPP road projects, are selected from the downloaded materials. The findings from each of the 
literature were used to group the factors into the respective categories. The numerous factors are 
cross-examined through the analysis of the content of each of the research to ascertain their 
criticalities and were rank based on their frequencies of occurrence as shown in Table 3.4.  The 
thorough and adequate critique of the identified kinds of literature is in Table 3.4.
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                         Table 3.4: Factors Leading to Renegotiation 
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A Design and Planning factors 
                        
1 Inaccurate estimation of traffic level ⱱ ⱱ ⱱ 
    
ⱱ ⱱ 
             
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
2 Misallocation of traffic risk 
 
ⱱ ⱱ 
    
ⱱ ⱱ 
           
ⱱ 
 
5 
3 Poorly written contract (ambiguity) 
 
ⱱ ⱱ 
      
ⱱ 
        
ⱱ 
   
4 
4 Change in concession design scope 
    
ⱱ 
                
ⱱ 2 
5 Unilateral changes of design concept 
during execution 
ⱱ 
   
ⱱ 
                 
2 
6 Inaccurate estimation of capital cost 
        
ⱱ 
             
1 
7 Defective contract award criteria or 
incorrect assumptions in the contract 
          
ⱱ 
       
ⱱ ⱱ 
 
ⱱ 4 
8 Characteristics of the contract 
              
ⱱ 
       
1 
B Technical factors 
                        
9 Specification changes during technical 
development  
 
ⱱ 
 
ⱱ ⱱ 
                
ⱱ 4  
 
 
 
7 
10 Variations or additional works 
                     
ⱱ 1 
11 Efficiency or standard of technical skills 
and expertise 
          
ⱱ 
           
1 
12 Delays during the construct stage of the 
project 
                     
ⱱ 1 
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                      Table 3.4: Factors Leading to Renegotiation (Contd.) 
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C Economic Factors 
                        
13 External or macro-economic shock    ⱱ   ⱱ    ⱱ    ⱱ      ⱱ  5  
 
 
 
15 
14 Changes in economic policy  ⱱ      ⱱ      ⱱ     ⱱ    4 
15 Changes in general price level  ⱱ   ⱱ                  2 
16 Change in demand  ⱱ    ⱱ                 2 
17 Weak economic environment           ⱱ           ⱱ 2 
D Contractual Factors                        
 
18 Effectiveness and efficiency of contract 
enforcement 
         ⱱ    ⱱ     ⱱ ⱱ  ⱱ 5  
 
 
 
11 
19 Contract delay occasioned by 
expropriations 
ⱱ    ⱱ                 ⱱ 3 
20 Incomplete contract  ⱱ ⱱ                    2 
21 Use of multidimensional auctions             ⱱ          1 
E Tendering and Bidding Factors                        
 
22 Poor evaluation of aggressive bid  ⱱ    ⱱ ⱱ     ⱱ  ⱱ        ⱱ 6  
14 
23 Anticipation of renegotiation at contract 
formative stage 
   ⱱ      ⱱ    ⱱ   ⱱ      4 
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       Table 3.4: Factors Leading to Renegotiation (Contd.) 
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24 Opportunistic bidding  ⱱ     ⱱ   ⱱ             3  
25 Bidding error during procurement  ⱱ                     1 
F Administrative and Managerial Factors                         
26 Corruption at the project level (e.g. 
financial abuse) 
 ⱱ                     1  
 
 
 
5 
27 Non-commitment to contract clause  ⱱ                     1 
28 Administrative delays                      ⱱ 1 
29 Transparency in the discharge of 
managerial duties 
 ⱱ                     1 
30 Inadequate contract management expertise               ⱱ        1 
G Institutional factors                         
31 Misaligned/weak institutions & 
jurisdiction of decisions 
 ⱱ ⱱ                    2 2 
H Regulatory & legal factors                         
32 Availability of regulatory institutes                 ⱱ ⱱ     2  
 
24 33 Poor or inadequate of regulatory account  ⱱ ⱱ    ⱱ ⱱ          ⱱ  ⱱ  ⱱ 7 
34 Type of tariff regulation        ⱱ  ⱱ ⱱ       ⱱ  ⱱ ⱱ  6 
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35 Governance and regulatory effectiveness           ⱱ    ⱱ   ⱱ ⱱ   ⱱ 5  
36 Specific legal changes                      ⱱ 1 
37 Weak legal environment                      ⱱ 1 
38 High or ncremental changes to corporate tax and 
levies. 
                     ⱱ 1 
39 Changes to PPP legal or general procurement 
framework 
    ⱱ                  1 
I Political Factors                         
40 Political instability (e.g. change in govt. or govt. 
priorities) 
 ⱱ  ⱱ       ⱱ        ⱱ  ⱱ ⱱ 6  
 
 
 
 
 
18 
41 Political opportunism  ⱱ               ⱱ  ⱱ    3 
42 Corruption at governance (e.g.  misappropriation of 
funds) 
 ⱱ               ⱱ ⱱ     3 
43 Awarding concessions shortly before or after 
elections  
 ⱱ        ⱱ            ⱱ 3 
44 Favouritism of SPV based on nationality and 
affiliation  
                  ⱱ ⱱ   2 
45 Inordinate ambition to meet or surpass electoral 
agenda 
        ⱱ              1 
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                        Table 3.4: Factors Leading to Renegotiation (Contd.) 
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J Environmental Factors                         
 
 
 
6 
46 Changes in design due to environmental 
problems 
ⱱ     ⱱ                 2 
47 Poor or erroneous environmental impact 
assessment 
  ⱱ  ⱱ                  2 
48 Unforeseen events & challenges (e.g. 
earthquake, erosion) 
     ⱱ                 1 
49 Archaeological findings                      ⱱ 1 
K Social Factors                         
50 Social acceptability of projects 
characteristics 
  ⱱ                    1  
 
3 51 Social acceptability of user charges or fees                ⱱ       1 
52 Cultural dimensions and willingness                ⱱ       1 
 Total Number of Citation from Author 4 20 7 4 7 4 4 5 4 6 7 1 1 4 4 2 4 5 8 5 4 18   
       
                                           Chapter 3 Renegotiation in a Public Private Partnership Environment 
64 
 
 
The factors leading to renegotiation as indicated in Table 3.4 may also be the reasons why the 
primary stakeholders involved in the procurement of PPP infrastructure projects usually 
renegotiate the contract (Guasch et al., 2014). Some justifications are genuine, and the others are 
not genuine. Also, certain circumstances may necessitate the renegotiation of PPP road projects. 
Each of the categories is enumerated as follows: 
 Design and Planning Factors 
There are factors, which emerge at the preliminary stage of the PPP contract, which drives or 
influences renegotiation. Several studies identified these factors as design factors with their 
driving effects observed at the design stage of the PPP procurement process. As indicated in Table 
3.4, the factors include inaccurate estimation of traffic level; misallocation of traffic risk; poorly 
written contract or ambiguity in the contract; change in concession design scope; unilateral 
changes of design concept during execution; inaccurate estimation of capital cost at the planning 
stage. First, there may be an error in the evaluation of the traffic expected to use the road network, 
which may either reflect in either underestimation or overestimation of traffic level and 
consequently affect the actual revenue in comparison with the anticipated revenue (Domingues 
and Zlatkovic, 2015; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). Also, the risk inherent in the future traffic level 
that may not be allocated equitably in the contract at the inception (Montecino and Saavedra, 
2014). The agreement may, therefore, be renegotiated during the implementation at the 
operational stage due to the variance in the revenue because of the inaccurate estimation of traffic 
levels. The intention of PPP operators or private companies in this instance is to renegotiate the 
contract because of the possible financial imbalance occasioned by the changes in revenue 
because of the shift in traffic level.  
An incorrect assumption in the agreement is one of the contractual basis of the PPP road projects 
renegotiation (Reside and Mendoza, 2010; Guasch and Straub, 2009a). The risk-sharing ratio or 
matrix, the responsibilities of the parties under the contract, the contractual specifications and 
clauses are among the assumptions usually included in the contract agreement and constitute the 
basis for the formation of the deal. Errors, over or underestimation of any of the identified 
assumptions may necessitate renegotiation of the PPP road contract during the implementation of 
the project. Estache et al. (2008) identified the characteristics of the contract as a possible 
contractual factor leading to renegotiation. The attributes under consideration here could include 
contract duration (e.g., contractual agreement concerning the concession period), specification 
concerning quality and quantity of materials and quality of workers, the contractual parties’ main 
and subsidiary objectives, etc.   
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Guasch et al. (2014) corroborate this submission by identifying poorly written contracts as one of 
the drivers of renegotiations occasioned by the error of the planners and designers of the 
concession contracts. The design error at the planning stage usually necessitates the review of the 
agreement during the implementation (De Brux, 2010). Other PPP road project renegotiations 
studies identify the error in the criterion for contract award established by the designers and 
planners of the PPP projects, which include the length of the concession contracts, material and 
equipment standards amongst others (Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2015; Guasch et al., 2004). 
Moreover, changes introduced at both the design and construction stages of the contract may hurt 
the contract deliverables. The changes could be regarding concession design scope and unilateral 
modifications of design concept during project execution, which may lead the stakeholders to 
renegotiate the terms of the contract. Also, the estimation of the capital cost of the project at the 
planning stage of the contract by the quantity surveyor or estimator may not take into 
consideration all the cost requirements at the design and planning stage. As a result, there may be 
the need for contract renegotiation to adjust the financial conditions and rebalance the PPP road 
project economic structure towards achieving an acceptable contract sum to the stakeholders 
especially the client. 
 Technical Factors 
The factors leading to renegotiation of PPP road projects are also attributable to the construction 
stage, i.e., technical stage of PPP road projects procurement. Poor management of workforce, 
machinery and equipment, materials and money at the construction stage of PPP road projects are 
technical issues constituting factors leading to renegotiation of contracts at the construction stage 
(Cruz et al., 2015). Guasch et al. (2014) support these by identifying poor contract management, 
which includes the construction phase as one of the possible drivers of PPP road projects 
renegotiation. The poor management of the construction resources may be because of the 
attendant impact on the project deliverables regarding time, cost and quality as stipulated in the 
contract. For instance, an increase in contract cost, concession duration and poor quality during 
implementation may be unsatisfactory to the client and may lead to a renegotiation request by 
either the client or the private partner. Hence, the client usually makes unilateral changes to the 
terms of the agreement at the construction stage at this point to meet the interest of the public 
sector (Cruz et al., 2015; Cruz and Marques, 2013b). 
Other studies have identified among other things changes to the extent or scope of work and 
inclusion of additional or complementary jobs (Bitran et al., 2013). These changes could be 
because of several reasons, which may be the changing taste and fashion of the governments, 
changes in materials cost and other variations in the prevailing market condition. All the identified 
outcomes are evidence that PPP road projects have experienced some level of cost overruns  
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particularly at the construction stage of PPP road projects implementation in both Latin America 
and Portugal could necessitate the revision or amendment of the agreed contract sum. (Guasch et 
al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014). Besides, road concession contract in Spain and some Latin America 
countries provided sufficient evidence regarding time overruns in PPP road projects because of 
the extension of concession contract (Guasch et al., 2014; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010).  
 Economic Factors 
There could be changes in economic circumstances of a country that significantly result to 
contract renegotiation, e.g., fluctuations, devaluation of currencies and exchange rates of 
regulated markets, which can drive renegotiation of PPP projects (Dethier and Moore, 2012; 
Gifford et al., 2014; Burger et al., 2009). The influence of the changes is evident, especially when 
no prices of materials and other inputs required can be adjusted (Dethier and Moore, 2012; 
Gifford et al., 2014; Burger et al., 2009). Furthermore, existing literature on renegotiation 
corroborates this submission by stating the reasons attributed to the influence of economic 
conditions on the need for renegotiation of PPP projects. One of these reasons is the occasional 
unexpected change in the economy due to external and economic factors, e.g., change in 
economic regulation by the government concerning financial policies (Guasch et al., 2014; 
Montecinos and Saavedra, 2014; Athias and Nunez, 2008). Renegotiation of PPP projects, 
especially in the transport sector could, therefore, occur because of one or more of these changes.  
The literature has also identified abuse of financial equilibrium principle stated in the contract as 
one of the possible causes of renegotiation in PPP road projects (Cruz and Marques, 2013b). The 
fiscal budget needs adherence, and any deviation from the budget defined at inception could be 
regarded as an abuse and hence necessitate the renegotiation of the contract. A renegotiation could 
also occur because of the changing price of goods and services required during the 
implementation process because of the changing price level of materials, labour, and equipment, 
which are used during the production process of PPP road projects (Guasch et al., 2014; Cruz and 
Marques, 2013b).  
A change in demand for the products of PPP transactions is another drive of renegotiation in PPP 
projects (Guasch et al., 2014). The event could also arise during the PPP project implementation 
where the source of finance for the PPP projects will cease, and there will be the need to assess 
another financial institution or banks to secure other means of funding (Guasch et al., 2004). In 
this situation, the initial contract ends abruptly and requires a new agreement based on original 
terms of the deal. Last but not the least is the influence of macroeconomic shock on PPP road 
project renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2008b; Guasch et al., 2003). In the event of a macroeconomic 
shock, the economies of affected countries tend to be more volatile with some associated 
economic crises that are deeper and more prolonged than the experience of nations having  
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advanced economies (Green et al., 2001). The impact of macroeconomic shock to the economy 
of countries can be recession and inflation leading to increasing poverty level and low acquisition 
potential for infrastructure services by the government. 
 Contractual Factors 
The influence of delay can be evident at the formation of the contract and during the 
implementation of the provisions of the agreement, especially before the commencement of the 
stages of work cannot be overemphasised. Delays in expropriations of PPP projects are one of the 
types of delay, which could result to PPP road projects renegotiation as established by the 
literature (Cruz et al., 2015; Cruz and Marques, 2013b; Sarmento, 2014). The delays experienced 
can cause renegotiation problems, which could affect the variables of cost and time negatively. 
An unaddressed delay could result in contractual incompleteness and lead to renegotiation of PPP 
road projects. 
Other PPP road project renegotiations studies identify contract delay occasioned by 
expropriations, i.e., a situation where the public agency takes private property for a purpose 
deemed to be in the public interest (Cruz et al., 2015; Cruz and Marques, 2013a). Incomplete 
agreement at the contract formulation stage before the start of the project implementation could 
also result to renegotiation of such contract during the stages of execution (Domingues and 
Zlatkovic, 2015; Guasch et al., 2014). Conclusively, the use of multidimensional auctions during 
the tendering phase may introduce complexity into the criterion for contract award established by 
the designers and planners of the PPP projects, which may unnecessary extend the length of the 
concession contracts amongst others.  
 Tendering and Bidding Factors 
Operators or private concessionaire due to the competitiveness of the bidding process, which 
usually characterises PPP procurement are prone to the submission of aggressive bidding to win 
the contract (Menezes and Ryan, 2015b; Bi and Wang, 2011; Montecinos and Saavedra, 2014; 
Guasch and Straub, 2009b). The aggressiveness in the submission of the bid is because of the 
concessionaire’s seizure of the opportunity to inflate the contract sum (Chan and Levitt, 2009). 
Therefore, the intention of the PPP operators or private companies may be to renegotiate the 
contract during the implementation of the projects because of the possible financial imbalance, 
which may arise because of the aggressive bid submitted. Hence, PPP contract may be 
renegotiated because of the willingness and anticipation of contract renegotiation from the onset, 
which may be evidence in lowballing or capital cost underestimation and aggressive bidding 
(Bitran et al., 2013; Menezes and Ryan, 2015b; Engel et al., 2009). Nikolaidis et al. (2013) 
corroborate that renegotiation may be influenced by aggressive bidding during PPP  
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implementation particularly when there are an intention and willingness of the by the public party 
to renegotiate the contract in the future. 
Other factors, which may lead to renegotiation of PPP road projects include issues related to 
unforeseen events, assignment of cause causation & poorly treated compensation levels in the 
contract (Guasch et al., 2014). Inefficient or low percentage of land allocated to the operator from 
inception (Montecinos and Saavedra, 2014). Securing additional investments or projects without 
going through due diligence (Cruz et al., 2015). However, these are limited and may encompass 
more than the identified factors. The factors leading to the renegotiation of DBFO road projects 
are also the reasons for renegotiation. These answer the question “why renegotiate.” The 
conditions in some instances may be the reason for renegotiation of PPP projects and in other 
situation may not be the reasons. Therefore, the primary stakeholders do renegotiate the contract 
in PPP projects because of several motives (Sarmento, 2014). These motives are on the premise 
of specific factors, which drive renegotiations. These factors may also be the reasons why the 
stakeholders may want to renegotiate a concession contract. 
Grounds for renegotiation may be related to the driving factors. However, what drives the 
stakeholders may not necessarily be the motive behind seeking renegotiation as renegotiation may 
be requested to align the contract to the specified terms while at the same time trying self-interest 
with guile (Mackintosh, 1992). Therefore, what drives renegotiation may be the reason and 
motive for renegotiating a contract and at some other point or situation, it may not. Thus, the 
literature provides evidence of the possible causes for the renegotiation of PPP projects, 
particularly within the road sector (Estache et al., 2009, Estache et al., 2008).  
Ho and Tsui (2009) corroborate these through a clear diagrammatic presentation of the framework 
for PPP interaction dynamics, which shows the respective process of renegotiation as shown in 
Appendix. According to the framework context, transaction sources can affect the objectives of 
the primary stakeholders because of the interaction dynamics of the cost sources.  The respective 
transaction costs sources can impact the individual goals of the partners. The effect of the impact 
could reflect the level of social gains to the governments, users and the profitability of the 
concession to the private sector (Ho and Tsui, 2009; Trebilcock and Rosenstock, 2015). 
The reasons for renegotiation are classified into four categories namely: underbidding at bidding 
stage, opportunistic behaviour, over-demand, unexpected project changes (Cruz et al., 2015; 
Guasch et al., 2014; Bi and Wang, 2011). The economic, environmental, political amongst others 
are the categories of changes which could impact the project outcomes. Private sector players 
have argued that unforeseen changes in the environment had resulted in making projects 
commercially unviable (Guasch et al., 2004). Other reasons leading to renegotiations are based 
on anecdotal evidence like faulty contract designs, failure on the part of the government to honour  
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contract clauses, weak regulation and its effects (Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2015; Guasch et al., 
2014; Guasch et al., 2007). Conclusively, opportunism by the private partner tends to increase the 
tariffs and fees charged to the user, which can, in turn, erode the VfM of the project. There are 
also instances that can arise in situations where governments through bilateral renegotiation to 
gain undue advantage in favour of the private company to the detriment of the users and for the 
political gains of a government representative.   
Therefore, both the private operator and the government use renegotiations as means of unlawful 
appropriation (Sarmento, 2014). Though opportunism is observed in the private sector, it also 
manifests within the circle of public sector clients in the form of an increase in infrastructure 
spending in the bid to create social services towards the welfare of the members of the public. 
However, the expenditure is misused towards the political gains of public office holders (Engel 
et al., 2006).  According to Engel et al. (2006), the inappropriate spending is to increase the 
government's prospect of winning future elections, especially during electioneering period or 
campaigns. Furthermore, there is evidence that states also use renegotiations as means of budget 
evasion to ensure an increase in expenditure on the infrastructure project. However, the 
government and regulators contested these actions because of the impact it has on value for 
money, the protection of public welfare, profit-seeking, claimed inefficiency and mismanagement 
of projects by the private partner (Sarmento 2014). Therefore, opportunistic behaviours are not 
prevalent in the private-sector partner circle alone, but it can also manifest within the procuring 
authority establishment and as such leads to the PPP renegotiations in the road sector. 
 Administrative and Managerial Factors 
Recent kinds of literature acknowledge that corruption, which manifests in various forms during 
the management and administration of PPP projects across infrastructure sectors can significantly 
determine the renegotiation level of PPP road projects renegotiation. (Guasch and Straub, 2009a; 
Guasch and Straub, 2009b). The level of corruption at the country governance level can, therefore, 
be an indicator of the degree of renegotiation in that country PPP implementation process. 
Contrastingly, few renegotiations have characterised renegotiation in a less corruption-prone 
environment. The corruption experienced in PPP procurement is committed by human factors, 
some of which have been identified to be stakeholders of the PPP infrastructure projects. 
Therefore, perceived corrupt opportunities, which the primary stakeholders seek during the PPP 
projects implementation is one of the prominent influencing factors of contract renegotiation 
(Guasch and Straub, 2009a; Guasch and Straub, 2009b). Corruption manifests in several 
dimensions within the PPP procurement environment at the respective stages of implementation.   
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Opportunism usually manifest in the private partner’s opportunistic behaviour, and it is exhibited 
at the implementation stages of PPP infrastructure projects (Boardman and Vining, 2012; Bi and 
Wang, 2011; Zheng et. Al., 2008). Public sector clients can also use renegotiation advantage as 
an opportunity to avoid the due process of competitive bidding through the available opening, 
which permits application for additional finance and parliament authorisation (Engel et al., 2009). 
The private concessionaire could also exhibit opportunism at the bidding stage through lowballing 
and intentional under-bidding to win the contract (Capaccio, 2017; Engel et al., 2014a). The 
reason for under-bidding is usually on the expectation of renegotiating the terms of the agreement 
later in the future.  
Collusion also tends to increase the contract sum in a situation where the bidders connive and 
agree to inflate the project bid submitted. All these categories are all manifestation of corruption 
in PPP projects. Other administrative and managerial factors can lead to contract renegotiation in 
PPP road projects renegotiation. These may include errors during the bidding process, 
bureaucratic delays occasioned by bureaucracy and other human-related problems, e.g., 
nonchalant attitude of the handlers (Guasch et al., 2014). 
Also, the availability of competent workers in PPP projects can assist in the achievement of 
positive results or outcome for members of the public (Willoughby, 2013; Reside and Mendoza, 
2010). Hence, the need for considerable professional expertise and knowledge in the management 
of the contract, especially at renegotiation cannot be over-emphasised. Estache et al. (2008) 
identify proper experience and knowledge in the management of the construction process as a 
pre-requisite for successful renegotiation of PPP road projects. Numerous works of literature have 
also recognised the effectiveness of contract enforcement as one of the factors leading to 
renegotiations in PPP road projects (De Brux, 2010; Athias, and Nunez, 2008; Estache and 
Serebrisky, 2004). Thus, for a contract to achieve its expected results, there must be adequate and 
efficient contract enforcement during the management of the contract by the appropriate 
government agencies representatives, consultants or project stakeholders. 
  Institutional Factors 
Renegotiation can also take place in PPP road projects because of the activities of some public 
agencies that are saddled with the responsibilities of making some vital decisions on behalf of the 
government particularly during the process of implementation of the contract (Guasch et al., 
2014). Since PPP, the respective bodies saddled with the responsibility of governance and 
administration governs projects. The governmental agencies take several decisions about the 
processes and procedures, which affect the renegotiation process. Corporate and regulatory 
institutions are vital to the sustenance of PPP (Engel et al., 2009).  
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There is, however, literature finding, which indicates that the regulatory institutions required for 
PPP are inadequate and, in some cases, there is the lack of regulatory systems (Guasch and Straub, 
2009a; Engel et al., 2009). Hence, these have constituted one of the factors leading to PPP 
renegotiations across infrastructure sectors including road sector. Availability of adequate 
organisations to provide corporate governance of the PPP implementation process will help 
towards the reduction of the negative impact of renegotiation on PPP infrastructure projects 
especially road projects. 
 Regulatory and Legal Factors 
Regulatory and legal factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP road contracts are numerous and 
include the availability of regulatory institutes; poor or inadequate of regulatory account; type of 
tariff regulation; governance and regulatory effectiveness; specific legal changes and weak legal 
environment including high or incremental changes to corporate tax and levies. However, changes 
to PPP legal and procurement framework and weak regulation regarding investment/performance 
have been identified as pertinent to PPP renegotiations in the road sector (Montecinos and 
Saavedra, 2014; Estache et al., 2003). The results as revealed in Table 3.4 show that regulatory 
and legal factors have the highest number in comparison to all other categories of factors leading 
to the renegotiation of PPP road projects. The findings, therefore, implies that the renegotiation 
of PPP road projects is mostly related to regulatory and legal reasons.  
Within the regulatory and legal category, weak or inadequate regulatory account, which can serve 
as a framework and processes that guide the renegotiation of PPP projects have been attributed to 
the series of negative renegotiation results in infrastructure projects, especially in PPP road 
projects (Guasch et al., 2014). The weak and inadequate regulatory account as indicated in Table 
3.4 represents the main regulator factor influencing PPP road projects. The lack or insufficient 
transparency in the PPP renegotiation process has been prevalent because of the inadequacy of 
necessary regulations that can ensure that project participants activities are evaluated in such a 
way as to encourage implementation of the project in the most transparent manner. Hence, there 
is a need for a clear framework, which spelt out the modalities for contract renegotiation. Other 
factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP infrastructure road projects are the type of tariff 
regulation or agenda and the degree of autonomy of the regulator and ability to make an 
independent decision. Also, the level of transparency of the operational framework and processes 
within the stipulated regulation, governance or failure of the rules and increase in tax of the 
corporate organisations are other factors considered as leading to the renegotiation of PPP 
infrastructure road projects.   
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In addition to these regulatory factors, legal changes, which are unique to each PPP road 
concessions, other regulatory and legal factors in their respective order or importance include 
type of tariff regulation; governance and regulatory effectiveness; specific legal changes and 
weak legal environment including high or incremental changes to corporate tax and levies 
(Sarmento, 2014, Cruz and Marques, 2013a; Reside and Mendoza, 2010). The specific legal 
changes could involve changes to the concession contract and the additional clause to further the 
scope of the original agreement. A weak legal environment tends to quickly lead to statutory 
modifications of the contract terms, unlike a strict legal situation where there are stringent 
requirements for making specific changes to the contract provisions. 
 Political Factors 
The prevailing political environment is another factor, which influences renegotiation of PPP road 
projects. The respective political situation such as a change in government or change in the 
priorities of the government could affect the renegotiation of PPP road projects to a considerable 
extent (Sarmento, 2014; Bitran et al., 2013).  
The change in government may warrant policies change as well as priorities changes. Thus, the 
need for renegotiating existing or ongoing PPP infrastructure projects (roads inclusive) may 
emerge. Furthermore, the electoral cycles in each country could drive the renegotiation of PPP 
road projects. Literature has identified that the award of concession contract shortly before or 
soon after elections in most instances influence the renegotiation of PPP projects as this may 
make either or both incoming and outgoing governments to behaviour opportunistically (De Brux, 
2010; Engel et al., 2009). 
Moreover, each jurisdiction has a clear motive or agenda to achieve during the administration or 
tenure of such government. These reasons constitute the cardinal objective, which guides the 
procurement decision of governments across the countries. It, therefore, suggest that any terms 
of awarded or ongoing PPP projects, which does not align or agrees with the objectives of the 
government are discarded and replaced with ones that coincide with the agenda and motives 
defined by the government. However, these are achieved through the renegotiation of PPP 
projects. Hence, the reason for attaining the electoral/political agenda of the government is also 
another political factor, which is one of the influencing factors of renegotiation in PPP road 
projects (Montecinos and Saavedra, 2014).  
The literature acknowledges that a more corrupt environment leads to more firm-led 
renegotiations and significantly reduces the incidence of the government led one (Guasch and 
Straub, 2009a). Contrastingly, less renegotiation occurs in an environment where corruption is 
less prominent. The financial crime experienced in PPP procurement has been found to be  
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committed by political office holders, which have been identified to be the public stakeholder of 
the PPP infrastructure projects. The corruptions attributable to political factors include but not 
limited to outgoing government intentional increase in contract sum to transfer repayments to 
incoming governments and initiation of PPP projects during electoral years for political gains etc. 
All the identified manifestation of corruption has resulted in policy discussion and debates in 
scientific and academic journals over the last few years, especially developing countries.  
Nationality and affiliation of the concessionaire of the stakeholders are also identified as another 
factor influencing the renegotiation of PPP road projects (Guasch et al., 2004; Estache et al., 
2003). The reason for this may be on biases or sentiments of the principal stakeholders or 
contracting parties. 
 Environmental Factors 
There is evidence from the available literature that some environmental-related factors, which 
include the impact of the external environment such as erosion, landslide, and earthquakes, could 
lead to the renegotiation of PPP projects in the road sector (Menezes and Ryan, 2015a).  Further 
observation revealed that proper understanding and appreciation of all environmental factors 
might assist in the appropriate management of the projects, which may include the reduction of 
costly renegotiations. Thus, the renegotiation of PPP projects is influenced by the impact of any 
of these environmental problems during the implementation of PPP projects (roads inclusive). 
The environmental factors in this regard encompass but not limited to all physical factors, which 
relate to the physical environment within which a construction project is located, which could 
include but not limited to the conditions of the ground, and weather patterns. 
Therefore, relevant PPP studies have attributed the environmental drivers of renegotiation in PPP 
projects to one or more of the identified physical influences of construction development projects.  
For instance, changes in design due to environmental reasons/requirements have been recognised 
as one of the factors that affect PPP road projects renegotiation (Cruz et al., 2015; Menezes and 
Ryan, 2015b; Miranda Sarmento, 2014a). Inclement weather and other environmental challenges 
such as floods, erosion amongst others could become more severe and pose some threats in such 
a way that construction work will become practically impossible to execute. These could also be 
regarded and categorise as environmental problems, and challenges are affecting the development 
of Infrastructures PPP projects (Cruz et al., 2015; Menezes and Ryan, 2015b). Furthermore, the 
changing impact of weather conditions could pose a difficulty to the continuation of the 
construction of the facility or road projects, which could give rise to renegotiation of PPP road 
projects (Menezes and Ryan, 2015b).  
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Other environmental factors could be traced to the act of God, e.g. earthquake, erosion, tsunami, 
terrorism, and landslides.  Archaeological findings of the construction location can tremendously 
influence the construction site activities and could necessitate the renegotiation of contract terms. 
The outcome of this exercise could affect the project completion time regarding the extension of 
the contract duration because of the delay experienced during the construction process because 
of archaeological issues. 
 Social Factors 
Social factors are causes of contract renegotiation in PPP road projects. The literature has 
identified that the accruable cost of the PPP road projects must be acceptable to the potential users 
and members of the public and there should be the readiness of potential users to pay for the road 
services (Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2015; Guasch et al., 2007a). Recent literature has questioned 
the social acceptability of PPP for the delivery of road projects to the users and taxpayers 
(Sarmento, 2014; Guasch and Straub, 2009a). These indicate that the viability and feasibility of 
successful VfM implementation of the PPP road projects are in doubt. Adair et al. (2011) 
corroborate the submissions of the many PPP kinds of literature by attesting to the several social 
concerns, which could arise regarding the acceptability of PPP projects. One of the concerns is 
the enormous profits generated by the private sector, which is to the detriment of the procuring 
authority and members of the public, users or taxpayer because of the high charges. 
The intention of the PPP initiative by the client is to provide social services for the members of 
the public. Hence, the public client takes the responsibility of ensuring that such facilities meet 
the satisfaction of the users or the members of the public, especially in the event of renegotiation. 
Though, the users have the right to reason regarding the utility of the services provided and 
express their level of satisfaction through the appropriate quarters. Public opinions, 
demonstrations and protests regarding nature, quality and operation of the road network could 
lead to renegotiation request by the clients or procuring authorities whose main objective of 
initiating PPP road projects is to ensure the satisfaction of the members of the public and the 
users.       
 OUTCOMES OF THE RENEGOTIATIONS 
As discussed in the succeeding parts of the thesis, renegotiation could impact any of the criteria 
of VfM (Sarmento, 2014). The impacts of PPP road projects renegotiation could result in an 
outcome, which could be positive or negative (Nikolaidis, and Roumboutsos, 2013; Guasch et al., 
2007). Therefore, the outcomes of PPP road projects renegotiation have been identified in the 
literature as illustrated in Table 3.5.
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                                        Table 3.5: Outcomes of the Renegotiations 
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1 Toll modification, e.g. from toll to a non-toll regime and extension of the period of 
concession 
 Spain, US, 
Latin America 
ⱱ ⱱ         ⱱ   3 
2 Improvement of the terms of the operator and / or 
 Investors 
 Latin America   ⱱ           1 
3 Reduction of quality for users All Latin America   ⱱ           1 
4 Higher tariff charged to users, which is beneficial to the concessionaires All mode Latin America   ⱱ ⱱ   ⱱ       3 
5 Direct compensation or subsidies by the government Road Spain, US, & 
Latin America 
ⱱ     ⱱ  ⱱ      3 
6 Extension in the length of the concession contracts Road Portugal, Latin 
America 
ⱱ   ⱱ   ⱱ       3 
7 Excess aggregate revenue growth above the projected level Rail           ⱱ ⱱ   2 
8 Deficits caused by higher than expected costs and lower than-expected traffic Rail           ⱱ    1 
9 Increase in investment requirements level occasioned by currency crisis Road & Rail   ⱱ      ⱱ      2 
10 Adverse fiscal impact by increasing direct and contingent liabilities to the government All Latin America    ⱱ          ⱱ 2 
11 Efficiency reduction      ⱱ          1 
12 Redefined investment plans All          ⱱ     1 
13 Unexpected tariff changes (increase or decrease) All Latin America    ⱱ    ⱱ ⱱ    ⱱ 4 
14 Delays in investment obligation targets (leading to reduction) All      ⱱ         1 
16 Increase in the number of cost components with automatic pass-through to tariff 
increases 
All      ⱱ ⱱ        2 
17 Financial rescue of projects All Latin America     ⱱ         1 
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All the identified outcomes in Table 3.5 shows that contract renegotiation in PPP could result into 
cost difference such as increase or decrease in the contract sum, or cost of construction in a 
situation where the renegotiation occurs at the construction stage. Hence, the outcome of the 
renegotiation can be an increase or derease in cost while the impact can be related to cost 
(Sarmento, 2014; Guasch, 2005). Thus, the renegotiation of PPP projects could, therefore, be 
positive or negative (i.e., through an increase or decrease in cost to the client). 
Moreover, the renegotiation could also lead to a situation where there is neither increase nor 
decrease in the cost of PPP road projects (See discussion in subsection 3.7.1). Sarmento & 
Renneboog (2014) corroborates this through the identification of the outcome of abnormal 
frequencies of renegotiations totalling 254 renegotiation events in Portugal PPP transports 
projects. The continuing payment by the public sector over the extended concession period 
increases the whole life cost of the contract, which is one of the outcomes of PPP renegotiations 
in the road sector (Sarmento and Renneboog 2014). The continued payment by the client implies 
that there is a cost overrun, which requires additional payment through either direct financial 
compensation, financial rescue of the projects or subsidies (Sarmento 2014). 
Moreover, Baeza & Vassallo (2010) also gives the outcome of renegotiations in Spain to include 
Toll modification (50%), an extension of the concession duration (24%), and other results (26%). 
These suggest that toll modification is the most likely outcome of renegotiation in PPP projects. 
Toll modification means either increase or decrease in toll fees paid by the users or members of 
the public. Hence, when there is toll modification, there could be an increase in user charges in 
the case of PPP toll roads. Furthermore, the incidences of renegotiations of road projects 
according to Acerete et al. (2010) have resulted in higher charges for road users in Spain. This 
study also concluded that Spanish government bear the substantial cost of providing eight 
concessions through subsidies to the private concessionaire to ensure the viability of the road 
schemes (Acerete et al. 2010: Acerete et al., 2009). However, the same situation is not the case 
for private concessionaires, as most of the renegotiations in the transport sector (road inclusive) 
have been found beneficial regarding the profits generated amongst other project benefits 
(Acerete et al., 2009). 
The submissions of numerous renegotiation studies in Latin America can be summarised and 
supported by the findings of the literature (Guasch et al., 2014; Estache et al., 2008; Guasch and 
Straub, 2009). This literature identifies the central issues in the renegotiation process to include 
the adjustment of tax and fees, review of private sector company investment obligations, revision 
of cost, changes in the base of assets and concession contract extensions, which are all remedial 
actions based on the outcomes of the renegotiation. It is, however, worthy of note that the  
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outcomes of PPP renegotiations particularly in the transport sector have generated significant 
questions regarding the viability of the PPP approach in delivering VfM for the public sector 
(Sarmento, 2014). However, Xiong & Zhang (2014, p.1) contrast these findings and as follows, 
“International PPP practices have shown conflicting results in concession renegotiations.” 
These suggest that PPP projects outcomes (including renegotiation results) differ from country to 
country and from an infrastructure project to the other. Though the VfM challenge of 
renegotiations has been identified, renegotiations have been advantageous in some instances as it 
had assisted the public and private partners to reduce future uncertainties, share the risks and 
opportunities, and maximise common utility in some PPP projects (De Brux, 2010). 
Some scholars argue that renegotiations, which leads to adverse outcomes evidenced in 
substantial public financial guarantees had caused massive public resources to be devoted to 
covering private sector losses in PPP projects (Xiong and Zhang, 2014). The rescue of the PPP 
projects through fiscal adjustment and rebalancing has resulted in damages to the procuring 
authority, which is transferred to the users in the future in the form of higher tariffs and charges 
(Sarmento and Renneboog, 2016). These higher fees erode the VfM available for the users and 
members of the public. Xiong & Zhang (2014) state that renegotiation experiences have revealed 
that host governments must compensate concessionaires for their losses on most occasions during 
contracting. This practice of paying the SPV is premise on the fact that the government is the 
ultimate owner of the PPP contract with the responsibility of ensuring the success of the 
partnership for the benefit of the users, which encourages frequent intervention through the 
financial rescue and rebalancing of the concession contracts (Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos, 2013). 
As a result, the least consideration is given to the termination of the project during the 
renegotiation process.  
Due to the desire of the public sector to complete PPP projects and commission it for the use of 
the members of the public, despite the massive cost of renegotiations, the outcomes of most 
incidences of renegotiation have not favoured the public sector. The literature confirms that most 
renegotiations in the transport sector especially road projects have addressed the viability of the 
concession contracts to ensure a profitable return to the private sector towards the success of the 
partnership (Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). The poor or non-achievement of 
VfM, which is the common outcomes of renegotiations support the submissions of the literature 
that PPP renegotiations within the transport sector have not achieved VfM for the public sector 
(Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014; Hodge and Greve, 2009; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). Thus, the 
central question regarding PPP renegotiation especially in the water and transport sectors is based 
on the level at which it delivers VfM for the public sector (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014).  
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Based on the non-achievement of VfM claim (Sarmento, 2014), remedial actions in PPP 
renegotiations are taken to address deviations in the VfM criteria (Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 
2014; Zhang, 2005). Some of the remedial actions on the requirements of VfM that can be adopted 
are in the literature that is related to the renegotiation of PPP’s as shown in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Remedial Actions Occasioned by Outcomes 
S/N Remedial Actions Literature 
1 Changes in government payment e.g. direct 
financial compensation to the SPV, and 
government financial rescue arrangement 
Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento 2014b; Sarmento and 
Renneboog, 2014; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010; 
Athias and Saussier, 2007; Guasch et al., 2004 
2 Review of SPV’s Profit Fatokun et al., 2015; Estache et al.,2009a; Ho, 
2006; Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 
2010 
3 Changes in payment mechanism 
necessitating increase or decrease in 
payment. 
Akibyikli and Eaton, 2005; Sarmento, 2014; 
Soomro and Zhang, 2010; Akbiyikli, 2011 
4 Aggregate revenue growth exceeded the 
revenue projection set at the bidding stage 
Engel et al.,2011 ; Estache et al.,2009 ; Estache et 
al., 2008 ; Kain, 2007 
5 Toll increase or extension of the length of 
concession 
Xiong and Zhang, 2014; Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza 
and Vassallo, 2010; Engel et al., 2006 
6 Redefined investment plans or reduction in 
investment obligations 
Guasch et al., 2014; Reside and Mendoza, 2010; 
Estache et al., 2008; Guasche et al., 2004 
7 Higher tariffs and charges to users Xiong and Zhang, 2014; Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et 
al., 2014; Acerete et al., 2010 
8 Review of quality and performance Estache et al., 2009; Harris, 2003; Freeman, and 
Beale, 1992 
9 Construction cost review Engel et al., 2008; Ahadzi, and Bowles, 2004 
10 Review of O & M cost Ho and Tsui, 2009 ; Blanc-Brude et al., 2006 ; 
Akintoye et al., 2003 
11 Revision of Cost of risk transferred Bitran et al., 2013; Medda, 2007; Guasch and 
Straub, 2006 
12 Review of construction and concession 
duration 
Engel et al., 2009; Ho, and Tsui, 2009; Hart 2003 
13 Review of private sector management 
expertise and skills 
Public PPP Malaysia, 2009; Ahadzi, and Bowles, 
2004; Pitt et al.,2006 
14 Changes based on the use of output 
specification 
Guasch et al., 2014 ; Bitran et al., 2013 ; Cruz and 
Marques, 2013a 
15 Revised service delivery modalities Kamugumya, and Olivier, 2016; Byiers et al., 2016 
16 Project finance cost Engel et al., 2010; Ho and Tsui, 2009 
17 Whole life cycle cost review Sarmento, 2014 ; Blanc-Brude et al., 2006 
18 Review of concession duration Baeza and Vassallo, 2010; Guasch et al, 2008 
The results or outcomes of the renegotiation of PPP projects have been found to be numerous as 
shown in Table 3.6. Other studies indicate that governments have had to step in to rescue 
individual projects through subsidies and direct payment to the private concessionaire (Sarmento, 
2014; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). Financial rescue and rebalancing of the concession contract 
have been the remedial action of the government in response to the negative outcome of the 254 
renegotiations in Portugal’s PPP transport projects (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014). These 
findings corroborate the findings of concession renegotiations in Spain where the government  
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have had to intervene by financially rescuing the road projects before agreed completion date to 
forestall the extension of concession duration, contract incompleteness and possible abandonment 
(Baeza and Vassallo, 2010).  
Government intervention through financial rescue arrangement is usually due to the outcomes of 
renegotiation particularly in a situation where there is an increase in concession contract cost 
(Acerete et al., 2010; Acerete et al., 2009). The government may also intervene to rescue the 
project in the event of the extension of the contract duration, modification of tolls amongst others.  
Therefore, the remedial actions that can be taken by the procuring authority could be direct 
compensation through payment or subsidies to the private concessionaire or modification of 
shadow toll amongst others as shown in Table 3.6. 
 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
The chapter has succeeded in examining renegotiations from the theoretical perspectives from the 
respective types and classifications. The definitions provided by various PPP renegotiation 
authors assisted in the full appreciation of the concept of renegotiation. Renegotiation request 
mostly involves the private sector partner. The client also has a few instances of renegotiation 
requests. The renegotiation experiences across countries reveal that the water and transport 
sectors undergo renegotiations in most situations in comparison to other infrastructure projects. 
In the transport sector, however, the road sector has a high percentage of renegotiation, which is 
prominently at the request of the SPV/ concessionaire. The findings of the literature further reveal 
the factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP road projects in the transport sector. These factors 
are categorised according to the respective stages of implementation and are in their order of 
literature prominence as follows: regulatory and legal factors, tendering and bidding factors and 
design and planning factors amongst others. 
The experiences of renegotiation especially in Latin American, Spain and Portugal reveal that the 
critical issue is the challenge of VfM achievement for the public sector. Contrastingly, the private 
sector partner has been found to maximise the gains of the renegotiations through the performance 
of own objectives (i.e., profits). Though, the renegotiations of PPP road projects have been 
observed to impact the VfM criteria as evidenced in this chapter. Remedial actions are, however, 
available for appropriate application to keep the PPP project on track and in conformity with 
expected outcomes and project objectives. Having established that there are a relationship and a 
gap between the renegotiation of a PPP road project and VfM, there is a need for an evaluation 
of VfM in general and specifically about PPP road projects. The succeeding chapter, therefore, 
addresses these lacunae in the literature.
Chapter 4 Value for money in public private partnership projects 
80 
 
CHAPTER 4 VALUE FOR MONEY IN 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
PROJECTS 
 INTRODUCTION 
The public client has acknowledged value for money as the principal reason for the adoption of 
PPP for infrastructure project delivery. It is essential that there is the achievement of VfM in PPP 
infrastructure projects for all the stakeholders, especially the client. The identification of the 
achievement of VfM as an issue in PPP infrastructure projects, especially in the water and 
transport sectors informs the decision to evaluate VfM criteria in PPP project environment in this 
chapter. The chapter particularly referenced PPP road projects as stated in Objective 2 in Chapter 
1 (See section 1.4). There is a further establishment of the relationship between VfM and 
renegotiation in PPP projects before the evaluation of VfM criteria and payment mechanisms in 
PPP environment. An assessment of recent PPP studies revealed that attention has mostly focused 
on VfM in general infrastructure projects. However, the relationship between VfM and contract 
renegotiation seems to have inadequate empirical findings in the academic literature. These, 
therefore, prompt the review of the literature in this sphere, which follows an explicit discussion 
of the subject of renegotiation concerning VfM. 
The chapter further extends the frontier of knowledge by exploring value for money in its entirety 
regarding concept, stakeholder's perspectives and objectives. There is also the discussion of the 
measurement and evaluation of VfM in PPP infrastructure projects.  The chapter concludes by 
examining the successful implementation of PPP road projects at renegotiation based on the 
achievement of VfM for the stakeholders. Measures and general suggestions, which can foster 
the achievement of VfM are enumerated. The chapter concludes by providing an explanation of 
topical issues, which substantiates the need for the integration of VfM into the renegotiation of 
PPP road projects. The summary of the literature findings on matters bordering on VfM in PPP 
road projects renegotiation concludes the chapter. 
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 THE CONCEPT OF VALUE FOR MONEY 
Value for money (VfM) is the optimum combination of the whole life cycle costs (Boussabaine 
and Kirkham, 2008; HM Treasury, 2007). The combination of the Whole life costs (WLC) implies 
that there is the summation of all the costs associated with the project during the entire life cycle 
of the project. Soomro and Zhang (2010, pp. 1) describe VfM as follows, “bringing efficiency, 
economy, and effectiveness of the services, processes, or the creation of a solution to problems 
through best possible utilisation of available resources.” This definition implies that the critical 
VfM consideration in PPP is ensuring efficiency, effectiveness, and economy while also utilising 
the resources optimally to achieve workable solutions to economic problems. Akbiyikli and Eaton 
(2006) substantiates these by stating that economy represents cost and quality of resources, 
efficiency is the ratio of output to the level of resources and input used, and effectiveness is the 
extent to which the actual results matched the expected or desired results. Hence, VfM can be 
considered achieved when services are efficiently provided at an affordable price and defined 
quality.   
Also, VfM represents a robust and complex process, and an analytical tool applied in the life 
cycle of the project, e.g., feasibility, selection, and evaluation amongst others (Morallos and 
Amekudzi, 2008). VfM, therefore, helps to evaluate the worth and quality of an infrastructure 
project over the life of the project. A VfM situation presents itself where the total net present 
value (NPV) of cost of private sector supply is less than the NPV of the base cost of the service. 
Moreover, there is an adjustment for the cost of risks retained by the government, and transferable 
risk to the private sector partner (Pangeran et al., 2010). Hence, the motive for initiating private 
provision of public infrastructure projects is VfM (Soomro and Zhang, 2013; Soomro and Zhang, 
2011). 
Since VfM is the paramount consideration in any PPP infrastructure investment, it is necessary 
and expedient to apply quantitative and qualitative tools in a project environment to provide a 
proper justification of the organised capital outlay. The application of necessary modalities, which 
ascertains the worth, quality and overall costs of a project is crucial as it compares the total cost 
throughout the project implementation stages to the defined benchmark specified at the formation 
of the contract (Coulson, 2008; Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008). Thus, VfM evaluation is 
necessary as it assists in achieving stakeholders project objectives in a PPP environment.  
VfM is, therefore, a central, fundamental and principal objective of any infrastructure project 
development (Henjewele et al., 2011). Therefore, the achievement of VfM at any stage of PPP 
implementation process creates a lasting impact throughout the lifecycle of the PPP infrastructure 
project.  
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Since, PPP infrastructure projects are procured when there are possibility and certainty of 
achievement of VfM. During the evaluation of the prospects of achieving VfM in an infrastructure 
PPP project, the procuring authority usually carries out VfM analysis at the inception of the 
contract, which precedes the choice of PPP as the preferred procurement decision.  
The essence of the VfM analysis is to ensure that the proposed infrastructure project will first 
deliver VfM for the public sector and all other stakeholders (Yuan et al., 2009; Shaoul, 2005). 
The literature states that a thorough evaluation of the financial requirements of infrastructure 
projects at the initial stages of the project, especially during the process of bid evaluation is 
essential (Grimsey, and Lewis, 2005; Akintoye et al., 2003). The reason is on the assumption that 
the assessment of financial requirement helps to ensure the achievement of VfM and secures for 
the primary stakeholders an in-depth knowledge of the bids submitted including an understanding 
of the strength and weakness of the financial proposals (Soomro and Zhang, 2013; Soomro and 
Zhang, 2011). Hence, to achieve VfM in an infrastructure project development, knowledge of the 
characteristics and peculiarities of the investment proposals cannot be over-emphasised. 
 STAKEHOLDERS VALUE FOR MONEY PERSPECTIVES 
There is the need to understand and appreciate the perspectives of the stakeholders in a PPP 
infrastructure project regarding VfM. The stakeholders are the main parties with vested interest 
in the delivery of the infrastructure projects for the benefit of the users and the members of the 
public. Though the public client, SPV, and the financial lenders are the stakeholders having a 
primary interest in the successful delivery of the infrastructure projects in PPP (Delmon, 2010). 
However, the road users are also stakeholders that are not directly involved in the partnership 
agreement. The perspectives of all the stakeholders, i.e., the public client, SPV or private sector 
partner, financial lenders and the users of the road regarding VfM differ from one another 
significantly. Based on the differences in the perspectives of the stakeholders, this section 
discusses coherently and transparently the respective views of the stakeholders, especially the 
primary parties to the partnership agreement. 
 Clients Value for Money Perspectives 
The public partner stakeholder is the procuring authorities at every level of governments which 
is responsible for the initiation of the PPP infrastructure projects. The government agrees with 
the private sector company to enter into partnership towards the delivery of PPP projects on the 
understanding that the VfM objectives defined at the contract inception are achieved. The public 
client ensures that VfM is achieved from the inception of the contract by weighing the possibility 
for the performance of a PPP project through the estimated cost against the cost of executing the  
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project through the traditional method of procurement (Yuan et al., 2009). Hence, a PPP project 
is usually reckoned by the client to be able to deliver VfM in terms of cost, if the cost of executing 
the project through PPP is less than the cost required to implement the project through the 
traditional procurement method. The literature has attested that the selection of a profitable and 
viable infrastructure project by the client is guided by the principle of “3E’s”, which seeks to 
achieve low cost for greater outputs and right results at first attempts (Muvirimi, 2012). Hence, 
the perspective of the client regarding cost is based on the understanding that the lower the cost, 
the better the investment decision.  
Primarily, PPP tends to attain the objective of VfM only in a situation where members of the 
public and users have been able to derive the desired level of utility based on affordability of the 
service provided (Sarmento, 2014). The view and overarching objective of the public-sector client 
in PPP project delivery is to achieve users’ satisfaction with the services provided by the private 
sector company. The client principal objective in any given PPP initiative has been to ensure that 
the users of the product derive utility and satisfaction from the use of the facility. Hence, the 
achievement of VfM by the client is premised on user’s satisfaction. 
Henjewele et al. (2011) further corroborates previous submission of the literature by identifying 
VfM as the most compelling reason for public client initiative in a PPP environment. Therefore, 
the achievement of VfM by the procuring authority means the provision of affordable roads 
culminating in reasonable and economic tariffs imposed for the use of the PPP facility 
(Santandrea et al., 2015). The imposition of tariffs and charges by direct toll charges to the users 
of the facility or government payments to the SPV should be such that it is affordable and 
economical to the users. Clients also expect that payments to the SPV during the implementation 
stage in the case of shadow toll should be economical and should offer useful results and 
satisfaction to the users. Thus, user’s satisfaction should not only be the goal of the client in a 
PPP project but all the stakeholders. 
 Private Partners Value for Money Perspectives 
The private partner is the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) also referred to as concessionaire 
(Marques, and Berg, 2011; Bing et al., 2005). The perspective of the private sector regarding the 
achievement of VfM in any given infrastructure project is by its ability to bear the risk transferred 
towards obtaining maximum profits on the investment (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). The financial 
requirement is the first consideration of the private sector followed by the technical needs of the 
project before the calculation of the time it will take to recoup the investments in the infrastructure 
project. The estimate of the investment returns is by the preparation of the cash flow analysis at 
an appropriate discount rate (Bain, 2010).  
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The risks of the project along with other factors are weighed and compared to the capability of 
the project to generate the desired level of profits while also assessing the possibility of achieving 
VfM on the PPP project (Muvirimi, 2012).  
The perception of VfM based on ability to generate profits on investment differs from the 
objectives of the client, especially as evident in the PSC and PPP bid analysis usually carried out 
at the feasibility stage of infrastructure project procurement. Grimsey and Lewis (2005, p 357) 
substantiates this submission by stating concerning the clients VfM perspective as follows: 
“Assuming all things equal (i.e., quality and risk allocation), value for money is demonstrated 
when the total present value cost of private sector supply is less than the net present value of the 
base cost of the service, adjusted for the cost of risks to be retained by the government, cost 
adjustments for transferable risk, and competitive neutrality effects." These implies that the cost 
to the SPV must be lower that the cost generated from the use of the facility, especially in the 
case of a toll road.  Hence, clients seek to ensure that the cost to the private sector does not increase 
during the life of the project in such a way that VfM is eroded. 
 Financial Lenders Value for Money Perspectives 
The lenders are the credit grantors who are responsible for providing credit and equity for the 
project executors, i.e., the SPV or the private partner and the client. Though, the SPV heavily 
relies on the financial resources provided by these institutions. The lenders and credit grantors 
could be commercial banks, insurance companies, equity investors, lessors amongst others. These 
lenders, however, have unlimited access to credit facilities (Akbiyikli et al., 2011). The financial 
constraint of the public client and the limited financial resources of the private concessionaire 
often necessitate recourse to the credit facilities of these lenders by both public and private sectors 
for the execution of PPP projects. The financial lenders can only release the funds at its disposal 
just in a situation where it is satisfied that the funds can be recouped. Therefore, the SPV must 
prove the feasibility and viability of the investment proposal to the financial lender and fulfil other 
requirements among which is the provision of collateral to gain access to funds required to 
execute the PPP project.   
 Road Users Value for Money Perspectives 
Though, user’s satisfaction should be the goal of the PPP project delivery process. The 
understanding of the user regarding VfM achievement in PPP is different from the perspectives 
of the private sector. The private sector partner usually finds every means possible to transfer the 
cost, which is the financial risk borne at the technical implementation of the project delivery for 
the benefits of the users and significant profits to the operator. Higher charges to the users and 
considerable gains to the concessionaires because of the risk transfer have been found detrimental  
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to the motive of the PPP investment (Adair et al., 2011; Acerete et al., 2010). Adair et al. (2011) 
indicate that a good percentage of PPP projects was unacceptable to the users of the facility and 
members of the public on the ground of the high profit generated by the private partner. Hence, 
there is the need for a conscious effort to address this trend during the implementation of PPP 
projects. 
Though, the private sector partner is in business to make profits and generate returns on 
investment as identified in the literature (Spence and Rutherfoord, 2001). However, the 
maximisation of profit by the private sector partner should not be detrimental to the economic 
objective of the partnership. The achievement of VfM implies the delivery PPP infrastructure 
products that are economical to the users and are void of high service fees or government 
payments during the operation of the facility. A fair profit to the private sector partner is essential 
and the VfM defined for the project at the contract formation stage should not be compromised 
as it is the desirable outcome expected by the public client. 
 EVALUATION AND MEASUREMENT OF VALUE FOR MONEY 
Governments, international organisations, and international financing institutions (IFIs) around 
the world have adopted the VfM concept as its principal objective in infrastructure projects 
delivery (HM Treasury, 2014). It has become a frequently used method and criterion for selection 
and evaluating infrastructure projects, making capital budgeting decisions, delivering public 
infrastructure projects with lower cost and limiting the risk to the public sector (Prokopowicz, 
2014). VfM evaluation technique for measuring the profitability and benefits of investment 
decisions is the most comprehensive, analytical and management technique applied by 
governments for evaluation of transport projects (Prokopowicz, 2014). The assessment, therefore, 
entails the appraisal of the advantages of various schemes for project design, assessment, 
implementation and monitoring of the project lifecycle for efficiency and effectiveness.  
The stakeholder's perspective or objective is usually adopted to estimate whether a project is 
providing VfM for the stakeholder or not. The basis for the definition of stakeholders’ goals is to 
foster sound achievement of VfM in the procurement of infrastructure projects. Governments as 
clients of public projects measure VfM in infrastructure highway projects through the instrument 
of the Public-Sector Comparator (PSC) (Coulson, 2008). Ismail (2013) also, state that the PSC is 
used in the measurement of VfM to ascertain the profitability of the private sector investment 
proposal regarding its ability to achieve VfM for the public sector in comparison with the 
traditional form of infrastructure projects procurement. The PSC method is used to evaluate 
investment proposals at the early period of infrastructure concession to benchmark competing 
bids for VfM achievement (Sarmento, 2010). 
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There is the evaluation of the PSC by taking into consideration all estimates of costs, risks, and 
revenues, which are all, set out in the form of cash flows with the inclusion of discount rate for 
the public sector towards the determination of the Net Present Value (NPV) of the project 
(Sarmento, 2010). The calculated PSC at this point is on a comparative basis with the offer 
proposed by the private party according to the payments value, costs and public sector retained 
risks (Cruz & Marques, 2013). The PSC can then be used to assess the PPP projects at the 
respective stages of PPP procurement.   
The belief that price alone is an indication of VfM has proven wrong, as the best VfM is 
unattainable in a project environment where the basis for tender or bid acceptance solely relies 
on the lowest costs or tender. Parker (2013) corroborates these by stating that the procuring 
authorities in PPP projects development cannot get the best deal or VfM if the focus is to always 
accept the lowest price from a potential investor or concessionaire. Hence, there is more to 
achieving best VfM in PPP environment than price or acceptance of the most economical bid.  
Therefore, the process of procurement within government operations can only result in VfM when 
some guiding principles and measurement standards are available. These principles and 
measurement standards include tough and open competition among contractors, suppliers, and 
providers of services amongst others including the establishment of a set of criteria for VfM 
measurement at the respective stages of PPP projects development (PPP Public Malaysia, 2009). 
In addition to the VfM objective of the public sector, the many stakeholders’ intentions in a PPP 
including the perspective of the private business entities are premised on the profit generated, 
return on investment and adequate competition to get the best deal (Hodge and Greve, 2007). 
The user's satisfaction is another yardstick for measuring the achievement of VfM in a PPP 
infrastructure project (PPP Malaysia, 2009). The perspective of the procuring authority 
representing the interest of the users of a PPP service is that the tariff imposed on the product of 
the partnership should be affordable and economical (Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2006). The service 
should give satisfaction in use and should be easily adaptable to changing circumstances. Thus, 
VfM is achieved for the users if the road services provided are of delight and provides the needed 
utility at less economic costs within the life of the infrastructure project. PPP evaluations are 
adopted to ascertain whether there is the achievement of the public-sector objectives regarding 
VfM achieved.   
Conclusively, the financial institutions and banks also possess different perspective of VfM. The 
commercial lenders expect that the contract sustains the agreed interest rates plus all other accrued 
benefits of the debts to be serviced by the private partner (Estache et al., 2000). Hence, the 
consideration of VfM by these institutions regarding the adequacy of returns on the loans obtained 
and the possibility of paying the indebtedness within the stipulated period and as at when due.  
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Thus, the primary consideration for financial lenders is to gain a maximum return on the amount 
of money invested in the form of loan awarded to the private sector party (Yescombe, 2011). The 
measurement of VfM concerns the achievement of the respective objectives of the stakeholders. 
 VALUE FOR MONEY ACHIEVEMENT IN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
PROJECTS 
The need for a thorough, rigorous and careful effort during the implementation of PPP 
infrastructure projects cannot be over-emphasised to ensure achievement of VfM. VfM 
achievement for the public sector, primarily from inception to the handing over the stage of the 
project through appropriate assessment before the commencement of the project and during the 
implementation of the project plan. These submissions agree with the literature that the evaluation 
of VfM can be carried out at strategic points during the execution of PPP projects (Sarmento, 
2010). Hence, this section discusses the assessment of VfM in PPP infrastructure projects from 
literature viewpoints and perspectives.  
 Preliminary Assessment of Value for Money 
Several studies have identified the need to appreciate the peculiarities of PPP and the VfM 
requirements to ensure the achievement of the VfM objectives of the stakeholders. For instance, 
Tanaka et al., (2005) propose a VfM risk assessment methodological approach for developing 
countries. The risks assessment involves risk about the cost of finance, risks related to; project, 
price, time and quality deviations, which could be human and environmental related amongst 
others. Carpintero and Petersen (2014) corroborate the submission of Tanaka et al. (2005) by 
recommending rigorous assessments of future PPP rail projects in advance. All the risk 
assessments are, therefore, an aspect towards ensuring effective implementation of PPP project. 
The risks involved in PPP transport projects are enormous, and as such, private partners are 
unwilling to accept the risk transfer from the client, especially in developing countries because of 
increased transaction cost recorded in PPP projects (Vickerman, 2004). Hence, there is the 
suggestion that there could be an increase in the transaction cost of PPP project because of the 
failure to thoroughly assess the associated risk at the inception of the contract. 
The risk level of road projects has a considerable effect on the success of PPP projects, which 
eventually impact the achievement of VfM.  The risk is a constituent of VfM, which has various 
categories as follows: political, environmental, contractual, project-based risks at the technical 
level of implementation amongst others (See Table 3.4). The risk of PPP projects should be 
allocated equitably among the partners, particularly to the private partner. The fair allocation of 
the project risks between the primary stakeholders will allow the individual investor to be willing  
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to assume the risks. Hence, there is an opportunity at the feasibility stage of PPP projects (roads 
inclusive) for the testing of the proposed investment through the evaluation of all VfM variables 
to ensure the achievement of VfM. In the UK, for instance, there is the initiation of value 
assessment early in the program stage when the investment plans are decided (HM Treasury, 
2006). 
The VfM testing and analysis are carried out at two points during the period of implementation 
of PPP projects, which are the feasibility stage of PPP projects and the procurement point where 
there is usually the evaluation of bid. Emphasis on the assessment of VfM at the inception of the 
contract is necessary since changes during the later stages of the project may result in non-
achievement of VfM (Treasury, 2006). Hence, there is the need for prior consideration of VfM at 
the preliminary stage of the PPP project. VfM descriptions should be included at the inception of 
the contract for the implementation stages and should encompass all associated criteria of a 
project including raw cost elements (quantified and valued) and all extra or additional cost that 
may arise (Ontario, 2007).  
The preparation of the bid documents by the public-sector representatives on behalf of the 
government for approval of the best tender is a crucial point at the preliminary stage where 
assessment of requirements is necessary (Sarmento, 2010). There is the need for the bid evaluator 
to ensure at the bidding stage that the bid submitted is used to update the reference Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) as indicated in the literature (Sarmento, 2010; Morallos and Amekudzi, 2008). 
These, therefore, suggest that the VfM may be reassessed based on the VfM targets referenced in 
the contract at the beginning of the deal. Moreover, the actual information from the bidders can 
serve as a decision guide at the planning stage regarding the establishment of the VfM target. The 
decision guide provides an understanding of whether PPP is cost-effective for the public sector 
initiating such the projects. 
Summarily, a sound VfM assessment borders on the appreciation of all the factors, which could 
impact or influence VfM achievement in any PPP infrastructure project. The reason for this is 
because VfM is crucial, critical and a statutory requirement, especially in UK PFI (DBFO) road 
projects (Debande, 2002). Hence, PFI projects require the utmost attention through a thorough 
assessment of all the variables to ensure that VfM is achieved (Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2006). 
Therefore, to attain VfM, individual facilitators must be put in place. The literature has shown 
from experience that the government in British Columbia have used some payments types and 
mechanisms to achieve state specific objectives (Abdel Aziz, 2007a). These imply that value for 
money is the statutory requirements of governments, which can be met through appropriate 
contract mechanisms used for allocating payments to the concessionaire or SPV.  
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The contract mechanisms are defined and incorporated into the contract at the inception of the 
agreement by the client for adoption during the implementation of the project to ensure the 
achievement of VfM.  
 Assessment of Value for Money during PPP Implementation Stages 
PPP project developments span across some stages as identified in the literature (Koppenjan, 
2005). These stages include exploration, planning, realisation, and operation (Mustapha and 
Carrillo, 2008; Koppenjan, 2005). The exploration stage involves the project feasibility and 
forecasting while the planning stage includes the design and project conceptual development 
among others (Kopenjan, 2005). The evaluation of VfM is carried out at the strategic aspects of 
PPP projects (Sarmento, 2014; Sarmento, 2010). The assumption at the project initiation, 
planning, and design stage is that the project needs are related to the defined objectives that the 
project intends to achieve (Andersen et al., 2009; Ann et al., 2007). The identified targets are 
aligned with the budgets developed by the client’s representatives on the project. Also, there is 
the usual practice of assessing the project during implementation to ascertain whether it meets or 
surpasses the financial, technical and economic requirements (Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001).  
The practice has the possibility of assisting the procuring entity to take necessary actions in a 
situation where there is a deviation from the requirements formulated at the start of the contract. 
The recognition phase is the stage at which the actual construction and development work takes 
place. The deliverables of this phase are usually evident at the time of service delivery or transfer 
of the infrastructure to the client (Caldwell et al., 2009). Due to the sensitivity of this stage, it is 
necessary for a proper evaluation of value for money at the construction, operation stage up to 
the handing over and commissioning phase to ensure the achievement of a sound VfM. The 
management of value is essential and desirable during the design and construction phase of 
infrastructure project delivery. The reason for this submission is premised on the literature 
understanding that necessary action can be taken to maximise the value of developmental projects 
from inception to completion (Kelly et al., 2014). Therefore, an evaluation of VfM can be carried 
out at the respective stages of infrastructure project development to address shortcomings or 
correct perceived errors during the implementation process. For instance, the literature indicates 
that the purpose of the VfM assessment in PPP infrastructure projects is to ascertain whether the 
proposed payment level for the service provided by the concessionaire is justified based on the 
project benefits or VfM achieved (Muvirimi, 2012). 
Therefore, it is expedient and necessary to begin the assessment of PPP projects for value for 
money achievement with appropriate financial and economic evaluation (Muvirimi, 2012; 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2005).  
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The economic and financial assessment regarding the decision made, especially at renegotiations 
is critical to achieving VfM. The non-achievement of VfM in PPP projects, particularly at the 
point of PPP infrastructure projects renegotiations necessitate the formulation of assumption for 
VfM achievement. The assumption is that the stakeholders should ensure that: 
VfM achieved at the end of renegotiation ≥ VfM described at contract inception.  
The assumption is that the VfM achieved at the end of the renegotiation should be greater or equal 
to VfM described at the inception of the contract and should be acceptable and beneficial to the 
stakeholders, especially the public-sector client (Sarmento, 2014b). However, the client can only 
accept the VfM achieved at the end of the renegotiation in a situation where the VfM described 
at the contract inception is reached or surpassed. Therefore, any renegotiation that will not provide 
this result should be regarded as non-beneficial to the stakeholders, particularly to the public 
sector (Engel et al., 2009). Moreover, there is a need to establish and quantitatively or 
qualitatively describe VfM required at the contract inception, as that will possibly be the basis for 
evaluating the VfM achieved at the point of renegotiation (Demirag et al., 2004; Akintoye et al., 
2003). The positivity or negativity of the VfM criteria established can be reflective of the 
quantitative and qualitative indicators adopted in the VfM assessment, which should be defined 
at the contract inception.  
The process of the VfM assessment at the respective stages from the financial close of the contract 
should be repeated throughout the phases of the PPP project developments to check the 
conformity of the projects with the defined VfM (Desgrees du Lou, 2012). Though, the findings 
of this literature indicate current problems in the VfM assessment during the implementation 
stages, which usually make the VfM analysis hardly reliable. However, there is the possibility of 
obtaining an accurate assessment of VfM through sound practices to achieve potential solutions 
to the problem of VfM achievement during the implementation of PPP projects. Though, other 
extant literature has corroborated the uncertainties in VfM assessments of PPP projects. However, 
there is still the need to evaluate VfM during the implementation of PPP projects. In estimating 
PPP projects renegotiation for VfM, there is a need for cross-evaluation and assessment of all 
financial and non-financial criteria to ensure that the project performance is consistent and 
increase the chances of project success regarding VfM achievement to the several stakeholders, 
especially the client (Pangeran et al., 2010).  
There is also the need for the assessment of VfM on a continuous basis during the operations of 
concession projects through effective and efficient audits and appropriate monitoring of contracts 
caveats (Sarmento, 2010). For instance, PPP infrastructure projects require expert supervision of 
the VfM provided at every stage of the contract through adequate monitoring to ensure that it is 
equal or above that defined in the contract documents at the planning and design stage. Since  
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proper assessment and evaluation of VfM at the respective steps is necessary towards the VfM 
success of PPP projects, it, therefore, becomes essential to establish the criteria for the 
achievement of this critical requirement. There is a necessity to ensure that when calculating or 
testing for VfM in PPP projects, it is essential to put into consideration individual steps and full 
sets of alternatives. A financial evaluation, which quantifies VfM in monetary terms, is necessary. 
However, economic and fiscal assessment coupled with social benefits assessment needs to be 
carried out at the inception of the PPP project (Heald, 2003). These assessments will then serve 
as a guide and reference point during the implementation stages up to the end of the partnership.  
 VALUE FOR MONEY CRITERIA 
The literature has identified that VfM is importance in PPP infrastructure project including road 
projects (Guasch et al., 2014; HM Treasury, 2007; Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). Several criteria 
of VfM for concession projects delivery are identified in the literature, which includes amongst 
other things user’s satisfaction, completion duration, contract cost or budget and returns on 
investment or profit (Carbonara et al., 2014). Also, there are other primary criteria for VfM 
adopted in infrastructure project delivery (Public PPP, Malaysia, 2009). The adoption of this 
criteria implies that to achieve VfM in a PPP project; there is a need for the achievement of 
individual variables regarded as VfM criteria, which are numerous in PPP procurement across 
countries. The success of a project regarding the accomplishment of VfM is dependent mainly on 
the attainment of these criteria, which serves as quantitative indicators for measuring VfM. 
The achievement of VfM is also dependent on other VfM drivers or criteria, which are optimal 
risk transfer between the public and the private sectors, whole life cycle costs, and the use of 
output specification, which allows bidders to innovate (Public PPP Malaysia, 2009). Besides, a 
competition provides the fair value of the project, performance-based payment mechanisms, and 
private sector management expertise and skills. The literature has also established that the primary 
measure for evaluation of VfM in PPP road projects is time; costs; quality; and user’s satisfaction 
(Fatokun et al., 2015; Liyanage and Villalba-Romero, 2015). Cost, time, quality and users’ 
satisfaction are, therefore, paramount considerations in the establishment of VfM for a PPP 
project. However, each of these criteria is embedded in one another and has interrelationship 
attributes. For instance, the user’s satisfaction is by the quality of the product (i.e., the road 
network), the affordability of the road (i.e., user fees) and the travel time on the road network 
(i.e., journey time reliability), which all adds to the utility derived by the users of the road.  
Time is a variable in PPP road projects, which is relative and requires critical investigation 
because of its impact on VfM. Contract duration and the concession period are vital to all the PPP 
stakeholders especially the public sector. An extension of concession period because of delay  
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during construction or renegotiation usually have an impact on the time and attendant effects on 
the delivery and handing over of the infrastructure to the public investor (Acerete et al., 2010; 
Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). Cost overrun is also peculiar to PPP projects mainly in the contract 
stage of transport projects (Acerete et al., 2010; Guasch et al., 2008b). The impact of cost is 
usually evident at the end of the concession through evidence of increases or decreases in the final 
costs of materials, equipment, workforce amongst others in PPP projects. The increase in the 
contract sum because of changes in the cost of materials and manpower amongst others may 
necessitate the transfer of additional costs to taxpayers in the form of charges in the case of toll 
roads and higher government payments in shadow tolling arrangement.  
The motive of any private investor in an infrastructure PPP is to recoup the expenses incurred in 
the projects in its entirety and maximise the profits (Cartlidge, 2006). Individual investors always 
ensure maximisation of profit and return on the investment of all shareholders. Any investment, 
which will not yield return or benefits, is unattractive to the private investor and not worth the 
investment (Sarmento, 2014; Corbett and Smith, 2006). One can, therefore, conclude that the 
criteria that the private sector partner adopt in ascertaining whether a project achieves VfM are 
the ability of the project to yield returns on investment and generate a substantial profit. 
Contrastingly, the main criteria used by the public corporation to establish whether there is the 
achievement of VfM in PPP road projects is the satisfaction derived by the users of the road 
network. Profit of the private sector stakeholder and the utility derived by the users of the road 
network are essential criteria to measure the achievement of VfM in PPP infrastructure projects. 
 VALUE FOR MONEY IN THE RENEGOTIATION OF PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS 
One of the principal issues in PPP infrastructure projects is the renegotiation of contract, 
especially in the water and transport sectors, which has continued to challenge stakeholders 
involved in the agreement (Guasch et al., 2014; Roumboutsos et al., 2010). Renegotiation of PPP 
road projects has generated outcomes, which have resulted in user's criticism of the affordability 
of the product among other related issues (Stafford et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). Baeza 
and Vassallo (2010) explain based on renegotiation experiences of two concession period in Spain 
(i.e., 1967-1975) to substantiates the frequent incidences of renegotiations and their causes. The 
findings of this study indicate that 50% of the renegotiations in the road sector results to toll 
modifications, which have led to complaints from users and taxpayers as follows: “Neither users 
nor taxpayers have tended to complain very much about this situation (Baeza and Vassallo, 2010; 
p 303)”.  
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Moreover, Stafford et al., (2010) indicate that there had not been proper accounting to users and 
taxpayers by governments in PPP road projects of Spain and the UK, which suggests that the 
users and taxpayers have been in a disadvantaged position through this practice. Thus, the study 
corroborates concerns regarding adequate accountability to taxpayers and citizens that use the 
roads. Hence, these findings suggest that renegotiation of PPP road projects and the use of PPP 
for road projects delivery has generated outcomes, which have resulted in user's criticism of the 
affordability of the product to road users among other related issues such as accountability to the 
users and members of the public (Stafford et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010).  Therefore, 
the main reason for the criticisms is on the level of VfM achieved for the client. The non-
achievement of VfM, especially for the users based on the submission of the previous study 
suggests that further research is required (Sarmento, 2014). 
Corroboratively, other extant literature identifies that the criticism of renegotiation of PPP 
projects, particularly in the road sector is that such projects have not achieved VfM for the public 
sector procuring authorities (Cruz et al., 2015; Estache and Serebrisky, 2004). Hence, the issue 
of renegotiation of PPP projects is the problem of achievement of VfM for the clients initiating 
such projects. The literature reports the data collected based on the renegotiation experience of 
PPP projects in Latin American countries (Engel et al., 2014; Bitran et al., 2013; Nikolaev, 2012; 
Estache et al., 2009; Engel et al., 2009), Portugal (Sarmento, 2014; Cruz and Marques, 2013c) 
and Spain (Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). The literature also reveals the VfM 
achieved at the renegotiation of PPP infrastructure projects, especially in the road sector.  
However, the examination of the research on PPP road projects reveals no substantial empirical 
information regarding renegotiation of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects (Hasselgren et al., 2014).  
Though evidence of VfM achievement exists in some PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK, there 
is still some evidence of non-achievement of VfM in some instances (Bain, 2010). Enough 
evidence is available as indicated in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Value for Money of PFI Roads Projects in the UK 
PFI 
road 
PFI value for money (NPV £m) Does the PFI represent value for money? 
 Discount Rate 
= 8% 
Discount Rate 
= 6% 
Discount Rate 
= 3.5% 
Discount Rate   
= 8% 
Discount Rate = 
6% 
Discount Rate 
= 3.5% 
A30/35 1 -19 -44 - - - 
A50 10 8 8 Yes Yes Yes 
A19 41 40 34 Yes Yes Yes 
A1(M) 50 30 -3 Yes Yes No 
A419/A
417 
11 -3 -18 Yes No No 
A69 -5 -12 -17 No No No 
M40 94 101 126 Yes Yes Yes 
M1-A1 112 84 57 112 84 57 
Total 314 229 143 314 229 143 
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Source: Adapted from Bain (2010) 
Table 4.1 shows that VfM is achieved in the A50, A19 and M40 PFI road projects at discount 
ratios of 8%, 6%, and 3.5% respectively. A1 (M), however, indicate that VfM is achieved at only 
discount rates of 8% and 6%. There is evidence of non-achievement of VfM on A1 (M) at 3.5% 
discount ratio. A419/A417 road projects show proof of non-achievement of VfM at a discount 
rate of 6% and 3.5% respectively excluding the 8% discount rate, which gives different evidence 
of VfM achieved. The respective discount rates substantiate our findings in the literature, which 
identifies non-achievement of VfM at the renegotiation of PPP road projects (Sarmento, 2014; 
Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). However, the non-achievement of VfM on the 
A419/A417 DBFO projects are unclear regarding renegotiation, but it is based on the calculation 
of VfM at a discount rate 6% and 3.5% respectively over a period (Bain, 2010). These findings, 
therefore, suggest that research into the VfM achieved at renegotiation in the context of PFI 
(DBFO) road projects in the UK is appropriate and have a potential to make an original 
contribution to knowledge.  
The finding of Table 4.1 reveals that PFI road projects recorded considerable level of success 
based on VfM recorded on most of the road projects. However, the level of VfM achieved on 
A30/35 DBFO road project, A1 DBFO road project, A419/A417 DBFO road project, and A69 
DBFO road project at 6% and 3.5% discount rates are not satisfactory. Thus, one can rightly 
conclude that there is evidence of achievement of VfM in most PFI (DBFO) road projects in the 
UK (Bain, 2010).  
Though the respective values regarding NPV achieved varies from project to project at the 
individual discount levels. These agree with the literature, which states that the level of VfM on 
PPP infrastructure project differ from one project to another (Yuan et al., 2009; Akintoye et al., 
2003). There could be measures that stakeholders can adopt to ensure the achievement of VfM 
on the respective road projects as shown in Table 4.1. 
There is the likelihood that the projects identified in Table 4.1 could have undergone renegotiation 
and still achieve VfM. However, no record of renegotiation in the literature establishes the 
incidence of renegotiation on any of the PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK through empirical 
study (Hasselgren et al., 2014). Therefore, the establishment of the instances of renegotiation in 
PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK through empirical findings can assist to corroborate or 
contrast the results shown in Table 4.1. Hence, this study aims at integrating considerations of 
VfM into the renegotiation of PPP road projects through the specific objectives outlined in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis (See section 1.4). The developed framework intends to address the poor 
and non-achievement of VfM at the several incidences of renegotiation of PPP road projects  
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through a useful parameter for the primary stakeholders. This sub-section, therefore, evaluates 
the impacts of the renegotiation on the respective criteria of VfM. 
 Impacts of PPP Renegotiation on Value for Money Criteria 
There are impacts of PPP renegotiations in the literature. Numerous authors have discussed 
multiple topics about renegotiation including the several criteria and objectives of the 
stakeholders in PPP infrastructure projects. The long duration of the PPP contract makes it 
practically impossible for the avoidance of changes and renegotiations (Darvish et al., 2006). PPP 
negotiations, which occur during the pre-construction period has an impact on the contract bid, 
including the contract duration at the pre-contract stage (Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004). The 
implications also extend to the contract stage of PPP projects where there has been a need for the 
primary stakeholders to renegotiate the contract during the implementation process of PPP 
(Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2015). It is, therefore, imperative to identify and assess the impact of 
renegotiation in PPP infrastructure projects especially road projects. The impacts of renegotiation 
of PPP projects on the respective criteria of VfM as established in the literature are identified in 
their order of significance as shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Main Impacts of Renegotiation 
 
S/N Impacts Literature Frequency Rank 
1 Construction cost 
Guasch et al., 2014; Ho and Tsui, 2009; Reside and Mendoza, 
2010; Athias, and Saussier;2007 
4 1 
2 Construction duration 
Engel et al., 2014; Bitran et al., 2013; Ho and Tsui, 2009; 
Albalate, and Bel, 2009. 
4 1 
3 User’s Satisfaction 
Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014; Acerete et al., 2010; 
Baeza and Vassallo, 2010 
4 1 
4 
Operation & Maintenance 
(O& M) costs 
Ho and Tsui, 2009; Blanc-Brude et al., 2006; Akintoye et 
al.,2003 
3 4 
5 Cost of risks transferred Engel et al., 2014; Bitran et al., 2013; Ho and Tsui, 2009 3 4 
6 Concession duration 
Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014; Ahadzi and 
Bowles,2004 
3 4 
7 Quality of service delivery Estache et al., 2009; Harris, 2003; Freeman, and Beale, 1992 3 4 
8 
Competition that provides 
fair value of the project 
Bi and Wang 2011; Public PPP Malaysia, 2009; Ho, 2006 3 4 
9 Project finance cost Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Freeman, and Beale, 1992 2 9 
10 
Performance based 
payment mechanism 
Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014 2 9 
11 Concessionaires profits Cruz and Marques, 2013a; Estache et al., 2009a 2 9 
12 
Whole life cost of the 
contract 
Public PPP Malaysia, 2009 1 12 
13 
Innovation of bidders in 
the use of output 
specification 
Public PPP Malaysia, 2009 1 12 
14 
Private sector management 
expertise and skills 
Public PPP Malaysia, 2009 1 12 
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 Impact on Construction Cost 
The transaction costs related to the cost of materials, workforce, machinery and other associated 
costs including operational expenses associated with the technical, operation and maintenance 
phases could necessitate renegotiation during the implementation of PPP projects (Reside and 
Mendoza, 2010). The transaction costs generated at each of the stages of PPP project 
implementation could have an impact on the cost of construction, cost of operation, maintenance 
and service costs amongst others (Guasch et a., 2014; Athias and Saussier, 2007). Thus, 
renegotiation of a contract could occur after contract formation and during the implementation of 
infrastructure projects up to the end of transfer of the agreement. The occurrence of an event or 
set of circumstances that result in the adjustment of the contract is termed contract renegotiation 
(Ho et al., 2015; Xiong and Zhang, 2014). These events or set of circumstances could occur during 
the stages of implementation of a given PPP project. Transaction costs are generated during the 
execution of PPP projects.  
These transaction costs and their sources could include construction cost, operation & 
maintenance (O&M) costs, project finance cost, cost of risks transferred, which can have a 
considerable impact on the respective objectives of the partners (Ho and Tsui, 2009). The 
literature corroborates these by identifying transaction costs usually incurred during the 
implementation process of PPP infrastructure projects to include bidding cost, costs of materials 
and workmanship, cost of risk and project finance cost, contingencies cost, etc. (Engel et al., 
2014a; Bitran et al., 2013; Ho and Tsui, 2009). Other transaction costs include the cost of rework, 
wastes cost, cost of delay in deliveries and work executions. These costs cannot be defined or 
measured at the time of the formation of the contract. As a result, they are all classified under the 
cost of construction and associated costs or any other costs. 
 Impact on the Satisfaction of Road Users 
Studies on renegotiation experiences in Latin America, Portugal, and Spain reveal high incidences 
of renegotiations, which have adverse impacts on the fees paid by the users in a direct tolling 
payment mechanism (Sarmento, 2014; Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). In these 
instances, there is a question regarding users’ satisfaction because of higher than expected user 
charges in the form of taxes or toll fees in the case of direct toll roads. As a result, the users’ 
satisfaction is affected by the renegotiation. 
A high user charge is evidence of non-achievement of VfM for the public sector. Therefore, the 
critical issue that requires investigation is how to ensure that the renegotiation does not adversely 
impact the VfM objectives of the public sector (Acerete et al., 2009). The reason for this is that 
most renegotiations in PPP projects, especially in the road sector have not delivered satisfactory  
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VfM for the public-sector users and members of the public (Sarmento, 2014; Acerete et al., 2010). 
Hence, the need to investigate and assess the impact of renegotiation on the achievement of this 
identified criteria of VfM in the context of UK PPP road projects. 
 Impact on the Duration of the Concession Contract 
There is always a time factor in the renegotiation of PPP infrastructure projects. The time required 
to renegotiate the contract when the need arises in most instances are not in the original 
agreement. The reason for this may be because the renegotiation of PPP projects in most situations 
is not envisaged or expected at the time of the signing the contract. Hence, the occurrence of 
renegotiation can lead to extension or reduction in the duration of the process of construction or 
concession arrangement (Cruz, and Marques 2013a; Athias and Saussier, 2007). However, in 
most instances, renegotiation has been found to affect the process of construction through the 
increase of its duration. However, in most situations, there is increase occasioned by the 
incidences of renegotiations which has been found to characterise this phase of the PPP project 
implementation (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). 
Having established that the renegotiation of PPP road projects impacts the construction duration, 
it is essential to state that there is a direct impact of any changes to the period of the construction 
stage of the contract duration of the PPP projects. The renegotiation impacts the length of 
construction with a direct effect on the overall duration of the PPP projects. For instance, an 
extension of the construction period will directly lead to a change in the defined term of the PPP 
project. Hence, the length of a PPP road project can be affected by renegotiation. These can be 
through either decrease or increase in the time required for the implementation of the PPP 
projects. 
 Impact on Quality of Service Delivery and Performance of PPP Projects 
The quality and performance of an infrastructure project are essential to the procuring authority 
initiating the projects (Jefferies et al., 2002). Quality and performance of PPP projects are 
substantial measures for assessing VfM for the public sector. Renegotiation, as described in the 
previous sections can also impact the quality and performance. The impact can be reflected in 
erroneous changes in specification during the technical development of projects (Estache et al., 
2009; Harris, 2003; Freeman, and Beale, 1992). The introduction of additional works, changes in 
standards, changes in design and level of technical expertise and skills of project personnel, which 
usually lead to the amendment of the contracts all have a way of affecting the quality and 
performance of PPP road project (Guasch et al.,2014; Sarmento, 2014; Cruz and Marques, 2013a; 
Bitran et al., 2013). 
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 Impact on the Profit of the Concessionaire 
The profit gained in a concession project is one of the criteria for measuring the achievement of 
VfM in PPP infrastructure projects. The motive of any business venture or organisation is to 
maximise its profits and stay in business. Also, the funds invested in the maarket must yield 
revenue and sufficient returns to the private company for the business organisation to remain in 
business. The renegotiation of PPP infrastructure projects has also been found to have an impact 
on the profit of the private concessionaire (Cruz and Marques, 2013a; Estache et al., 2009a). A 
good example is a case of PPP road projects renegotiation in Portugal, which led to the grant of 
subsidies as compensation to the concessionaire in the form of subsidies and financial payments 
(Sarmento, 2014). Corroboratively, the benefit of the renegotiation of transport concessions to 
the private sector in Latin America are in the literature (Guasch, 2004). 
Based on these examples, the renegotiation of PPP infrastructure projects implies the achievement 
of the profit motives and objectives of the private sector partner. The three possible impacts of 
the renegotiation of PPP road projects on the profit of the private sector are: increase in profit, a 
decrease in profit or neither increase nor decrease in the profit defined at the start of the contract 
(Lohmann and Rotzel 2014; Estache et al., 2009). All these suggest that renegotiation of PPP road 
projects can affect the profits of the concessionaire either positively or negatively. Also, there 
may be a neutral effect on the renegotiation of PPP projects (i.e., a situation where the profits 
remain the same).  
 Impact on Government Payment to the Special Purpose Vehicle 
In a shadow toll payment arrangement, the government pays the SPV based on the number of 
vehicles using the road per kilometre instead of the users paying directly for the use of the road 
(Abdel Aziz, 2007b; Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). There are other categories of conditional 
payments, which include lane availability payment, congestion management payment, safety 
performance adjustment payment, and lane closure charges amongst others (Akbiyikli et al., 
2012; Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). The conditions for making these payments are in the contract 
at the time of formation of the deal. However, events usually occur that necessitate changes to 
these requirements as stated in the agreement. The modifications occasioned by renegotiation 
may, therefore, lead to an increase or decrease in government payments on any of the categories 
identified.  
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 Impact on Revenue 
The increase in transaction costs sources is usual in the delivery of PPP infrastructure road 
projects (Engel et al., 2014a; Bitran et al., 2013). Other costs can emerge, e.g., costs of rework; 
wastes cost; cost of delay in deliveries and work executions. For instance, in a direct tolling 
arrangement, charges are often transferred to the users in the form of user fees. These transfers of 
the additional costs occasionally lead the users to avoid the roads because of the higher taxes for 
an affordable and economical road network. As a result, the revenue on the road avoided by the 
road users will lead to a reduction in the tax generated. Contrastingly, a situation could also arise 
where there is no increase in the transaction cost (i.e., no additional and extra expenses during 
implementation), the revenue of the project usually remain positive or neutral.  
 Efficiency and Credibility of PPP to Deliver Value for Money  
The performance, efficiency, credibility and VfM criteria of PPP concessions are affected by 
renegotiations (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014). Renegotiation majorly changed the 
performance and efficiency of PPP road concessions in Portugal (Sarmento, 2014). The impacts 
of the renegotiation on the performance and efficiency of PPP has generated a high degree of 
scepticism regarding the ability of PPP to deliver a project based on the VfM criteria described 
in the contract.  
Also, renegotiation primarilly influences the respective objectives of the stakeholders, especially 
the paramount aim of achieving VfM for the public sector, in PPP road projects (Cruz and 
Marques, 2013a; Estache et al., 2009). Public P.P.P. (2009) state that the respective spheres of 
VfM objectives and criteria of the procuring authority, which formed the basis of ascertaining the 
VfM, achieved during the implementation of PPP infrastructure projects in Malaysia. These 
included risk transfer between the public and private sectors, whole life costing, use of output 
specification that fosters innovation, a competition that provides the fair value of the project, 
performance-based payment mechanism and private sector management expertise and skills.  
Therefore, in ascertaining the impacts of renegotiation on VfM criteria, it is pertinent to base the 
evaluation on the inherent implications on the variables identified in this section of the thesis. 
Thus, renegotiation tends to affect the VfM objectives of the public client, the profitability of the 
concession for the private concessionaire and the users’ satisfaction, which is the primary 
objective of the public-sector party in initiating PPP projects. Renegotiation usually impacts the 
individual goals of the stakeholders, mainly the paramount aim of achieving VfM for the public 
sector, in PPP road projects (Cruz and Marques, 2013a; Estache et al., 2009). 
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 CONTRACT MECHANISMS FOR PAYMENT 
Payments mechanisms have been structured and designed by the governments and stipulated in 
the contract to ensure that the PPP contractors are compensated and remunerated appropriately 
(Abdel Aziz, 2007b). The payments arrangements identify different modalities of payment in PFI 
projects in the UK, which specifies the terms and conditions upon which payments are to be made 
to every DBFO contractor. Corroboratively, experience has also shown that the government in 
British Columbia have used some payment types and mechanisms to achieve individual state 
specific objectives (Abdel Aziz, 2007b). The government's targets include safety improvements, 
which fosters the optimisation of road space and availability, increase in road performance and 
demand, which all represent VfM to the public sector. Essentially, the payment mechanisms can 
be referred to as mechanisms to ensure the achievement of VfM for the users.  
Another study identifies the objective of the government to include the provision of high-quality 
services to the end user of the facility through increased efficiency of resource allocation, VfM, 
maximum transfer of risk, resilience, and affordability (Akbiyikli et al., 2012). The statutory 
requirement of any government is the achievement of VfM and all the objectives depending on 
the nature of the DBFO contract structure (Debande, 2002). The goals of the procuring authority 
in public sector investment through private finance have been to achieve VfM for the taxpayer, 
road users and all members of the public (Sarmento, 2014). Though, the private sector is also 
expected to have equal benefits and returns for money invested. There should be no compromise 
regarding the satisfaction of the users in the process of renegotiations. These objectives are pre-
requisite for the selection of mechanisms used for payments or compensation to the 
concessionaire (DeCorla-Souza et al., 2013). Therefore, the payment mechanisms are designed 
and developed to ensure the achievement of VfM objectives of the procuring authority through 
evidence of the output specifications (Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). 
There are various types of payment mechanisms usually adopted for infrastructure projects 
delivery, especially in the road sector. These arrangements according to the literature are for 
payment as an essential driver of VfM in transport PPP's since it affects the public and private 
sector stakeholders regarding the level of satisfaction derived by the end user and the revenue 
generated by the SPV (Soomro and Zhang, 2013). These mechanisms differ from one DBFO 
contracts to another and ranges in characteristics depending on the DBFO contract (Abdel Aziz, 
2007). Shadow toll payment mechanism, availability payment mechanisms, and active 
management payment mechanisms are the broad categories of contract mechanisms used for 
payment to the private concessionaire. The sub-categories of the contract mechanisms for 
payment are in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: PFI (DBFO) Road Projects Payment Mechanisms 
Source: Akbiyikli, and Eaton (2005) 
 Shadow and Direct Toll Payment Mechanisms 
In this payment arrangement, the government pays a fee for every vehicle using the road per 
kilometre instead of the users paying the taxes directly (Abdel Aziz, 2007a). However, an 
adjustment for a lane closure and safety performance amongst others depending on the 
requirements of the DBFO contract types. These imply that in a shadow toll mechanism, the users 
of the road are relieved from the responsibility of paying user charges for the road. Three variants 
of shadow toll mechanism are demand; availability of service; and performance respectively 
(Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). 
Shadow tolls payments are based on usage or demand of the road facility based on the number of 
vehicles per kilometre of the road. The road available for service can also be the basis of payment 
to the SPV as payment in this sense relate to the capacity of duty on the road network per time. 
Performance payments also reflect the safety performance, i.e., improvements schemes to the 
road network and the personal injury accidents that are avoided by the SPV. Contrastingly, in toll 
road projects, the users of the road pay the toll fees to the concessionaire company directly. The 
SPV or concessionaires collect the money directly from the users during the operation of the road 
at every instance of the road usage.  
Furthermore, there are alternative payment mechanisms to shadow and real tolls, which are used 
in the UK to ensure VfM, though, to varying degrees. These alternative payments arrangements 
include availability payments, which is the first option to shadow tolls and active management 
payment mechanisms (Akbiyikli and Eaton 2005).  
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The procuring authority ensures value for money in shadow toll payment through the government 
representatives that are responsible for commensurate money with the cost of the project delivered 
through the defined performance standards adopted as criteria to measure VfM (Takim et al., 
2009). 
There is also the lane closure charge applied by the governments to the concession contracts as a 
penalty to the SPV in the event of closure of the road lanes to the users (Akbiyikli et al., 2011; 
Abdel Aziz, 2007; Akbiyikli et al., 2006). The principle regarding this type of mechanisms is that 
the government plan to make the road available to the users at all-time and agrees to pay the SPV 
for the availability. Charges are even paid by the concessionaire for a road closure to the public 
client as indicated in the contract. These costs of road closure agreed in the concession contract 
discourage the SPV from closing the road and make the road always available to the users. Thus, 
VfM is achieved for the road users and members of the public regarding road availability and less 
road closure on the highways. 
Shadow toll is usually adopted in an instance where there can be a straightforward calculation of 
the vehicle length and traffic band, which are defined by the number of kilometres travelled by 
each of the vehicles using the road per year (Lewis, 2008). Suitable examples of roads utilising 
the shadow toll payment-mechanism in the UK include the first eight DBFO road projects (Bain, 
2010). The shadow toll arrangements allow the government to use its financial resources and 
credit support to fund the payments for the use of the road (Tillman, 1998). Hence, users and 
members of the public are free to use the road without the obligation of paying directly to the 
facility operator as in the case of a direct toll road.  
 Availability Payment Mechanisms 
Availability payment mechanisms are four distinct types, which include lane availability 
payments, heavy goods vehicle/bus shadow tolls, safety payment mechanisms, and the 
government, pays bus journey time reliability (Akbiyikli, and Eaton, 2005). Availability fees to 
the concessionaire are based on the number of carriageways available for the users (Zlatkovic et 
al., 2017). These fees are dependent on the time of the day as there are peak and off-peak times 
with higher payment to the DBFO company for keeping the lanes available during peak times. 
The purpose of this type of payment mechanism is to ensure the minimum level of disruption to 
the road users during peak and busy times (Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). There is also a tolling 
charge for heavy goods vehicles (HGV) and public transport to ensure that there is a free flow of 
traffic on the network for car transportation. The tolling charge is on the availability payment 
mechanism.  
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Conclusively, there are journey time-reliability charges, which aimed to ensure that the SPV 
keeps the lanes available during its hour of operation to foster the reliability of bus journey times 
for the users (Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). All these mechanisms are to ensure that users enjoy the 
utility intended by the procuring client for the use of the road.  
 Active Management Payment Mechanisms 
Active Management Payment Mechanisms (AMPM) is the second alternative to the shadow toll, 
which comprises of the congestion management and safety-performance adjustment payment 
mechanisms (Lawther and Martin, 2014; Abdel Aziz, 2007b). The congestion management 
encourages the current administration of the road concession project towards ensuring the flow 
of traffic on the network (Murray, 2012). Congestion management is to reduce congestion on the 
road network and enhance the free flow of traffic on the highway. The congestion management 
also ensures that the users can travel on the road network unhindered and within the anticipated 
and expected travel time. The congestion-management payment mechanism increases the 
reliability of the journey times of road users. Moreover, an amount of money is usually deducted 
from the SPV in the event of congestion on the road network to foster reliability of journey time 
(Akbiyikli, and Eaton, 2005). These imply that a payment is made by the SPV to the client 
anytime there is congestion on the road network. Hence, this mechanism ensures that there is 
minimum disruption to the availability of the road during peak periods when demand for the road 
network has increased.  
There is also the Safety-Performance Adjustment (SPA) mechanism used to manage the road 
network based on the number of personal injury accidents that occur on the project. The SPA is 
compared objectively with a benchmark, determined from the accident records of a similar set of 
PFI (DBFO) road projects (Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). The purpose of the SPA is to ensure that 
road there is safety on the road network and the number of injuries sustained because of accidents 
is to the barest minimum. The client provides the user's satisfaction because of the use of this 
payment mechanism.   
 MEASURES TO ACHIEVE VALUE FOR MONEY AT RENEGOTIATION 
Specific measures are identified in the literature that can address PPP renegotiations, which has 
constituted severe issues in procurement policies and discussions across countries (Guasch et al., 
2014; Sarmento, 2014). Mexico and Columbia adopted new law, regulations, and procedures to 
curb the renegotiation excesses of stakeholders while Peru had to review the existing PPP law 
and regulations to address constant renegotiations. Portugal created a platform for renegotiation 
while India evolves a normative package to guide the renegotiation process (Guasch et al., 2014).  
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Previous studies on VfM in PPP road projects have also succeeded in the examination of this 
concept in general and specifics as it relates to the individual infrastructure sectors including road 
projects (Xiong and Zhang, 2014; Montecinos and Saavedra, 2014). Most of these studies have 
not assessed the impact or influence of the renegotiation on VfM, which is germane and relevant 
to the contemporary question. To address the presumed issues surrounding the relationship, 
impact, and outcomes of renegotiation regarding VfM achievement, some of the measures that 
are taken in these countries to tackle renegotiation (Guasch et al., 2014). These measures are as 
follows:  
First, there should be the stipulation of the renegotiation approach, criteria, and process at the 
contract formation stage (Guasch et al., 2014). The public sector should also establish a reputation 
of non-disposal to renegotiation demands through the implementation of the framework for 
transparency. The increase of the political cost of accepting requests for renegotiation and 
cancellation of PPP concessions characterised with aggressive and opportunistic bids during the 
tendering and bidding process could be useful measures for renegotiation (Ho, 2009; Saussier et 
al., 2009). A panel of qualified and competent experts can also be employed to evaluate aggressive 
bids, renegotiation request and conflicts resolution for ensuring the achievement of VfM (Marcus 
et al., 2011; Guasch et al., 2014). However, appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms, vital 
contractual clauses, and bidding documents should be established for adoption by the panel of 
experts. Though, new bidding process should be made mandatory for all additional infrastructures 
and interest rate for PPP financing. 
The public sector can also establish a freeze period for renegotiations, e.g., giving allowance to 
renegotiations between 3 to 5 years of contract award (Grimshaw et al., 2012). A freeze period of 
renegotiation represents the number of years that the public client places an embargo on 
renegotiation. During this period, no stakeholder can request renegotiation or initiate a 
renegotiation proceeding. The establishment of a clear jurisdiction over the decision to 
renegotiate, e.g., at high levels, such as inter-ministerial committee led by the Minister of Finance 
could also be of assistance (Guasch et al., 2014). There is also the need for the establishment of 
risk matrix, which gives detail modalities for identification and allocation of risk with a clause 
that any modification to the contract during the implementation process should not alter the 
allocated risk (Guasch et al., 2014). Also, the amendment of the agreement must preserve the net 
present value (NPV) which should always be zero (Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014; Bain, 
2010). 
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Also, appropriate performance bonds on the investment should be imposed on the SPV as a 
condition for payment. For instance, the contracting parties usually adopt 15% to 25% 
performance bonds of the total investment. Contingent financing over time is also essential. These 
according to Guasch et al. (2014) should not be done at the beginning only but throughout the 
renegotiation process. The establishment of necessary guidelines to ascertain and decide on the 
appropriate levels of compensation due to the concessionaire will also be of extreme benefits to 
the stakeholders. Competing measures should be applied on a competitive basis, e.g., award 
criteria to increase the costs of the contract and make an exit from the agreement more expensive 
(Guasch et al., 2014). 
 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
The principal requirement of PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK is the achievement of VfM for 
the public sector, which according to the findings of this chapter has been a significant 
implementation issue for the stakeholders. The success of the project regarding VfM borders on 
proper risk transfer, quality of transport product and completion of the project within the specified 
time. Though, client's satisfaction, project cost, risk transfer, timely delivery and performance of 
road projects are paramount considerations and criteria when deciding to implement road projects 
for value for money. However, there is an indication that there is inadequate and non-achievement 
of all or some of these criteria during the implementation of PPP road projects. 
This chapter, therefore, concludes on the need for value for money assessment at the stages of the 
renegotiation process to ensure that there is the optimum achievement of VfM. Measures that can 
foster the attainment of VfM and provide the principles for checking the variance between the 
defined contract specifications and project objectives at the respective implementation phases are 
desirable and necessary. The uniqueness of this chapter and its relevance to the output of the 
project encourages the inclusion of the findings in the research instruments shown in Appendix 1 
and 2. Summarily, there is an indication that there is a link between PPP renegotiations and value 
for money.
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
106 
 
CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter presents the research methodologies, which include qualitative and quantitative 
research methods that are used to achieve the aim and objectives of the research. The 
characteristics, peculiarities, and merits of the methodology of the research are highlighted to 
allow for the selection of the most appropriate method for the study.  The examination of all the 
available methods reveals that there is the need to adopt a mixed method of data collection in the 
form of an embedded design approach, (i.e. qualitative method integrated within the primary 
quantitative method to enhance the quantitative result). The embedded design consisted of four 
main stages that are chosen as described in this chapter. This chapter further shows the logical 
sequence followed to obtain the data based on the methodology adopted. There is a further 
explanation regarding the framework and process for the research. The chapter concludes by 
highlighting the characteristics of the survey respondents, i.e., information relating to the 
company, experience, and qualification. The information, therefore, forms the basis for linking 
this chapter to the discussion of the empirical findings of the study in the succeeding sections of 
this thesis. 
 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research is an investigation carried out systematically to establish facts and arrive at new 
inferences (Naoum, 2012). A systematic, controlled, empirical and critical scientific investigation 
on propositions about the assumed relationships between and among phenomenon of diverse 
nature is known as a scientific research (Cohen et al., 2013). Grinnell and Unrau (2005) defined 
a study as a structured inquiry that utilises acceptable scientific methodology to solve problems 
and creates new knowledge that is acceptable. A scientific survey that may investigate 
hypotheses, it may also suggest interpretations of data in a new way and further proffer solutions 
to the identified problems. In most instances, there is the creation of new frontiers for research 
exploration in the future (Howarth, 2005). Thus, a research project requires a careful organisation 
and arrangement of its relevant parts to fit into its whole or main body.  
Research design stands to put together, in a concise form, a logical problem, sets of issues or 
questions (Punch, 2013). Similarly, research design logically and sequentially ensures that there  
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exists a proper connection between the aim and objectives of a study and the empirical data 
proposed for collection (Voss et al., 2002). Also, it provides a link between the findings of the 
data collected with the interpretation inferred from the survey and ultimately to its conclusions 
(Neuendorf, 2016). Creswell (2009) corroborates this submission by stating that the design of 
research involves the planning of the procedural sequence of the study to encompass broad 
decisions and assumptions detailed in the methodology proposed for the collection and analysis 
of the data. Hence, research is usually characterised by logical sequence and procedure for data 
collection and analysis.  
Yin (2009) describes research design in a logical way and as one, which sequentially provides 
sequence, which includes connection among the empirical data of research to the aims, objectives 
and the conclusion of the study. Hence, the problem identified in PPP renegotiation informs the 
objectives of the research. The literature recognises that the choice of a research design may be 
premised on the aim and objectives of the research, and research problem (Creswell et al., 2003). 
As a result, this study adopts the research aim and objectives in the decision-making process 
regarding the research methodology. This is based on the understanding that the method selected 
for research needs to be related to the subject area under investigation (Kagel and Roth, 2016). 
The existing literature indicates that renegotiation has become an issue that has generated interest 
and found worthy of theoretical and empirical inquiry in PPP infrastructure projects amongst 
others (Hasselgren et al., 2014). 
Existing PPP renegotiation researchers have adopted diverse designs including holistic and 
embedded research design. The choice of the research methodological approach was by a 
thorough evaluation and assessment of previous renegotiation studies in PPP infrastructure 
projects especially in road projects renegotiation. De Brux (2010) discusses case study analysis 
of two transport projects to assess the facet of renegotiation. Ho and Tsui (2010) also use two 
case studies to examine transaction costs generated during PPP renegotiation and the 
appropriateness of PPP for project delivery. Baeza & Vassallo (2010) also adopt case studies on 
road concessions research in Spain, which is also qualitatively analysed to generate empirical 
findings. Bi and Wang (2011) discuss based on qualitative and quantitative approach how moral 
hazard resulted in the loss of provision of surplus social services for the members of the public 
including the failure of the contracting parties to maximise benefits in PPP project renegotiation. 
Quantitative analysis was used to evaluate the influence factor of moral hazard in the PPP project 
renegotiation while qualitative method was adopted to establish the existing relationship between 
the moral hazard factors. Hence, this justifies that a mixed methods design can be chosen for a 
renegotiation study in a PPP project environment.  
 
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
108 
 
 
Guasch and Straub (2006) used the theoretical and empirical contributions on contract 
renegotiation to survey existing evidence on the determinants of infrastructure projects 
renegotiations. A review of theoretical and empirical research can provide details of experiences 
and incidences of renegotiation in PPP infrastructure projects across boundaries and countries. 
Guasch et al. (2008b) also adopt World Bank secondary data to provide information about the 
analysis of the renegotiation incidences in infrastructure contracts in Latin America and 
Caribbean countries. Sarmento and Reis (2012) also use literature review and data generated from 
public documents to discuss how the financial crisis in Portugal has created a unique arbitrage 
opportunity that provides a solution to the problem of the budgetary constraints of the 
government. A good example is evidenced in the government of Portugal’s spending in the road 
sector of the economy. Other examples of studies, which adopts the general findings of the 
literature to develop conclusions on PPP infrastructure projects renegotiation (Engel et al., 2014a, 
Guasch et al., 2008a). Secondary sources of data, i.e. (government’s reports and policy 
documents, literature on PPP renegotiation, concessionaire’s company publication) are all 
appropriate for application to specific research projects.  
There are numerous examples in the literature regarding the conduction of PPP transports projects 
renegotiation studies using specific case study projects using one or more research 
methodological approaches (Moore et al., 2014; Bitran et al., 2013; Nikolaidis et al., 2013; 
Guasch et al., 2008a). Xiong and Zhang, (2014), however, adopt quantitative NPV analysis 
method to ascertain the present value of gains in consideration of the renegotiation impact in the 
road sector in Greece. Other previous studies utilise qualitative methods in the form of case 
studies to evaluate renegotiation of PPP transport projects. Case studies methodology for a 
renegotiation study in the transport sector is appropriate based on the experiences of these studies.  
All these studies provide evidence that most renegotiation research in PPP transport projects are 
premised on the findings of data collected through the literature and case study results 
(Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2014). There are also some instances of adoption of quantitative 
methods especially when there is the need to evaluate and quantify factors and other measurable 
renegotiation variables. The evidence provided by these studies provide a basis for the distinct 
survey research approaches and further justifies the choice of mixed methods as more applicable 
and appropriate for this research. Hence, the succeeding sections provide discussion on the 
research design adopted for the study and fully elaborate on the how the philosophy of the 
research is conceptualised and supported including the methodology and methods that are taken 
to achieve the aim and objectives of the study. 
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 PERSPECTIVES AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE RESEARCH 
Many types of research have attributed different meanings to research mainly from varying but 
related perspectives. Research philosophy or paradigm is a cluster of beliefs and intellectual 
perception embraced by individuals, people and the society (Mertens, 2010; Creswell and Clark, 
2007). Beliefs and intellectual perceptions are retrospective and guide the actions and the way 
people view the world (Bryman, 2008; Ponterotto, 2005). It forms a standard model to measure 
the way and manner of operation of things or events in the world. Corroboratively, Bryman (2008) 
and Denzin and Lincoln (2005) state that the research philosophy is a cluster of belief which 
forms part of the human system and dictates what to be studied, how to investigate it and the 
modalities for the interpretation of the results emanating from the study. 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005) opine that an interpretive framework can be adapted to view the world 
and how the humans work in their immediate environment. Creswell (2007) identifies four 
research philosophies, i.e. (post-positivism, constructivism, advocacy/participatory and 
pragmatism), which are conceived and explained as worldviews. These descriptions of research 
philosophy agree with the submission of the literature (Ryan et al., 2007; Fossey et al., 2002). 
Also, rhetorical assumptions have also been indicated in the literature as part of the variants of 
the philosophies of research (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Lincoln and Guba (1994) supports the 
submission of Creswell by identifying four major research philosophies in qualitative research, 
which are positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, and constructionism. There is an 
observation that there is minor difference among the lists of research philosophies in comparison 
(Creswell and Clark, 2007). 
Neuman (2006) broadly conceived methodologies of research while Fossey et al. (2002) identify 
three principal research paradigms, which are empirical-analytical, interpretive and critical 
research paradigms. These research philosophies are all regarded as worldviews of research and 
system of ideas. A school of thought has described the philosophy of research as knowledge 
claims (Creswell, 2013). Another study identifies different theoretical research perspectives 
regarding epistemology and methodology, which is in consideration of research theories available 
for the conduct of the investigation (Crotty, 1998). These works were further revised in a 
systematic manner in their respective categories of research philosophy, which are ethics or 
axiology, epistemology, ontology and methodology (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  
Epistemology implies the theory of knowledge (Crotty, 1998) and ontology are the theory of the 
existing features or creatures of the world (Benton and Craib, 2010). The methodology can, 
however, be viewed as the way, manner, procedure, and modalities of studying the world realities, 
features, creatures, and humans (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).  
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Finally, axiology refers to the assumptions, which are usually assigned research values or 
variables (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Creswell and Clark, 2007). Thus, the other literature 
submissions reveal that study into the philosophy of research has been approached from various 
views and standpoints namely: positivism and interpretivism (Bell and Bryman, 2007). These two 
methods are peculiar and have constituted the debate in social science research over the years. 
Positivism ensures that there is careful observation and measurement of the real-life situations 
while interpretivism is an approach, which is concerned with how human beings interpret and 
make sense of reality (Creswell, 2009). 
Interpretivism is distinct from positivism from the social scientist point of view. Interpretivism 
adopts qualitative modalities and approach for the execution of a research study through cultural 
and historical iterations and interpretations of happenings in the social world. However, 
quantitative research is more aligned with an approach to positivism. Hence, positivism entails 
reliable quantitative measurement of the study variables to arrive at straight answers and 
conclusions, which can be categorically numbered or quantified. Based on these philosophical 
viewpoints, it, therefore, becomes imperative to agree with the three types of research designs; 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods (Creswell, 2009). 
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The approach adopted to execute a research is the primary aspects of the process of research, 
which helps the researcher to choose the most effective and efficient manner of carrying out the 
activities required towards providing appropriate answers to the research questions (Bryman, 
2008; Bell and Bryman, 2007). The approach to research has also been regarded extensively in 
the literature as the strategy adopted to implement the objectives of the study (Schofield, 2001).  
The general orientation of a researcher towards the conduct of investigation has been regarded as 
the strategy of the research (Bryman, 2008). These imply that the study approach and research 
strategy connote the same meaning and can be used interchangeably. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) 
state that the philosophy of a research and the research approach are interrelated as both works 
harmoniously towards creating the needed working empirical pedestal through appropriate and 
accurate data collection methods. Hence, research approach is the manner of collecting data to 
address the objectives of the research towards proper conclusions (Starks, and Brown Trinidad, 
2007).  
Research Methodology has also been the view from diverse perspectives and distinct from a 
research design (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Grinnell and Unrau, 2005). Rational and philosophical 
assumptions, which necessitate the study is research methodology (Dainty, 2008) while research 
methods are ways, manners, and modalities for the collection or gathering of data and analysing  
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or processing of the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The design of research is the manner and 
form in which the study is crafted and organised within an aspect (Creswell, 2013). The principle 
and procedure of data collection and enquiry based on research questions and objectives can be 
regarded as the methodology of the research. Research design paves the way for the “plan” or 
“the procedures” for a study, which covers decisions about the philosophical and methodological 
issues about research methods (Creswell, 2009). The preceding descriptions, therefore, indicates 
that research methods could be qualitative, quantitative, mixed methods, i.e. (combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods). 
Therefore, to accurately channel the course of investigation effectively and efficiently, it must 
follow the appropriate methodology, guidelines for broad assumptions and the application of the 
right methods to foster the achievement of accurate and incontestable results. It becomes 
necessary to distinguish between research methodology and research methods in scientific 
research as opposed to traditional studies. Research methodology is the procedure to follow in 
the making of an investigation and inquiry for a thorough assessment of the findings leading to 
the collation of new empirical information. The method adopted for a research study must be one 
that allows for ease, orderly and proper collection, collation, processing and analysing of the data. 
The techniques, modalities of data collection, data processing, and analysis methods are all 
encapsulated within the research methodology adopted and explained in this chapter. There are 
two main types of research methods, which are qualitative and quantitative research approaches. 
 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is a descriptive research type, which seeks to provide an interpretation of 
contexts and settings towards addressing an issue or idea. The literature has identified qualitative 
research as interdisciplinary, trans-disciplinary, and sometimes counter-disciplinary, which tend 
to form a network that interlinks the social and natural sciences (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). A 
qualitative research ensures that verbal and textual data are collected, analysed and interpreted to 
foster uniqueness, complexity, specificity and other traits among which are interpersonal 
dynamics (Cohen et al., 2011). The research type seeks to explore the opinions, perceptions, 
views, understandings, and beliefs of others regarding an entity, problem, phenomenon, and the 
world at large (Fellows and Liu, 2015). The main advantage of this research approach over 
quantitative research is that it gives room for innovation and flexibility, which affords the 
opportunity for the research to be carried out within a designed framework (Charmaz, 2006; 
Creswell, 2003).  
The flexibility inherent in qualitative research leads to the emergence of the research process 
during the execution of the study (Cohen et al., 2011; Kumar, 2011).  
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
112 
 
 
The lack of rigidity and threat to validity premised on the inability to ascertain through measurable 
means the reliability of data in qualitative research makes the process susceptible to change during 
the collection of data (Patton, 1999). The tendency for the guided or drafted questions to change 
during the process of data collection including the individual respondents and other research 
objects make qualitative research unique and different from other methods of conducting research 
survey (Cohen et al., 2011; Creswell, 2009).  
The qualitative researcher develops the research instruments usually through a comprehensive 
literature review and archive documents and validates the developed instrument (i.e., the guided 
interview questions) with experts working on the field, industry or academia as appropriate. The 
researcher thereafter embarks on the collection of data by using the validated instrument 
(Yarcheski and Mahon, 2007). The qualitative data collection at the advanced stage of the 
research has been identified as having the possibility of execution through interviews and personal 
observations, which represents multiple sources of data collection (Yin, 2009). Other secondary 
documents may be relied upon as means for the collection of data. Though, a single source of 
data can also be used in qualitative research approach. However, most research adopts the 
multiple methods of research. Qualitative research does not rely on the subject and object of 
inquiry alone but also focus on the understanding and interpretation of the actions of humans 
towards achieving the outputs or products (Benton and Craib, 2001).  
The qualitative research approaches in social sciences are mainly based on case studies, 
interviews, focus group, observations amongst others (Crowe et al., 2011). However, one of the 
most adopted qualitative research is the interview technique, which assists in the administration 
of the data collection process (Rubin and Rubin, 2011; McDonald, 2005). The research adopts 
the interview technique as part of the data collection methods. There are various modes of 
conducting interviews, which include personal contact with the interviewees and the investigator 
or researcher, telephone interview or video conferencing via Skype and other means are sufficient 
ways to carry out interviews in social science research. The three main categories of interviews 
include:  
• Personal Interview: This is an interview, which requires close working between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. In this type, there is direct contact with the respondents, 
which can promote proper interaction, dialogue, and rapport within the work or closed 
environment.  
• Telephone interview: This type of interview is fast and ensures rapid, quick and 
economical collection of data. It eliminates the cost of travelling and arrangement of 
appropriate video conferencing facilities. 
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• Video Conferencing: This is more convenient than the personal interview. However, it 
has attendant cost; it allows data collection from a distance. 
The first two techniques, i.e., personal and the telephone interviews were adopted for the study 
as both methods provide the opportunity to be actively engaged with the respondents including 
the chance to ask questions on any technical issue, which may arise in the process. It further 
assists in securing the audience of respondents at a very convenient time outside busy work period 
on the telephone. Finally, this interview method seeks to assists in seeking opinions on emerging 
issues from the initial structured list of questions. 
This research adopts the semi-structured interview technique of case study data collection from 
the available arrays of case study methods of data collection. Interviews are used as a flexible 
tool of research employed for collecting data, which encompasses verbal, non-verbal, spoken and 
hearing sensory channels of communication (Cohen et al., 2013).  The interviews bring the 
interviewer (the person administering the interviews) and the interviewee together in an exchange 
of views, information or discussion of the topic of joint and mutual interest towards the giving 
and collection of data (Kvale, 2006; Kvale, 1996). Cohen et al. (2013) corroborate this by stating 
that interviews fosters participation of an individual or a group of persons in the discussion of 
issues and provide their interpretation of the world they live including problems or situations 
affecting the world from their point of view.  
Various types of interviews have been identified from the literature, which includes standardised 
interview, in-depth interview, elite interview, life history interview, ethnographic interview and 
focuses group interview (LeCompte and Presissle, 1993). Semi-structured and group interview 
was established in the literature (Bodgan and Biklen, 1992) including a structured interview 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1992) and exploratory interview (Oppenheim, 1997). The reason for these 
different types of discussions is to ensure that respondents are open to diverse approach to 
eliciting information to suit the research (Mishler, 1991). These interview types can also be used 
concurrently to secure the advantage inherent in their use, which is to assist in ensuring that the 
limitation of one is removed and addressed by the other especially in a situation where one type 
seems inappropriate in a case. It is on this basis that a semi-structured interview technique was 
adopted in this study to allow for the advantages of both structured and unstructured interviews. 
Cohen et al. (2011) however, indicate four types of interviews namely structured, unstructured, 
non-directive and focused discussions. Interviews should be conducted to collect comprehensive 
and quality data, which can address the research questions. The quality of data collected during 
an interview is dependent on the experience of the interviewee and the level of interaction with 
the interviewee including the skills and commitment of the interviewer (Kumar, 2005).  
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
114 
 
 
Most interviews are structured or unstructured depending on the type and nature of research. 
Cohen et al. (2011) give the distinction between structured and unstructured interviews in Table 
5.1. 
Table 5.1: Distinction Between a Structured and Unstructured Interview 
S/N Structured Interview Unstructured Interview 
1 Quantitative Approach Qualitative Approach 
2 Numbers Words 
3 Predetermined, given Open ended, responsive 
4 Measuring Capturing uniqueness 
5 Short term, intermittent Long term, continuous 
6 Comparing Capturing particularity 
7 Correlating Valuing Quality 
8 Frequencies Individuality 
9 Formality Informality 
10 Looking at Looking for 
11 Regularities Uniqueness 
12 Description  Explanation  
13 Objective facts Subjective facts 
14 Describing Interpreting 
15 Looking in from the outside Looking from the inside 
16 Statistical Ethnographic, illuminative 
Source: Cohen et al. (2011) 
Summarily, the process of qualitative research entails the development of questions and procedure 
to execute a study for collection of an inductive analysis based on the building of general theme 
and developing interpretations and argument to establish the meaning of the data (Creswell and 
Poth, 2016; Creswell and Clark, 2007). This meaning could be subjective and could result in the 
understanding and interpretation of actions of human and the product they deal with on a day-to-
day basis (Creswell, 2007). Thus, the investigation of PPP road project renegotiation is 
understood to apply to this approach of research as it seeks to unravel the behaviour of the 
stakeholders regarding the reasons for initiating renegotiations, the outcomes of the renegotiation 
and the impacts of the renegotiation on VfM as stated in the research questions. All these represent 
variables defining the nature of the product (i.e., road projects). 
 Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research is a type of investigation, which is usually conducted to test theories 
objectively. The relationships existing between variables are examined and measured on 
instruments for analysis (Creswell, 2013). The quantitative research is an appropriate method of 
gathering data based on geographical area or locations. The data could be substantial or of a 
sizeable number with minimum cost. Hence, quantitative research concerns the measurement, 
generalisation, causality, and repeatability, to ascertain the degree of difference between a 
circumstance, situation, event or issue and more appropriately to determine or quantify the extent  
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of variation in a problem, issue, phenomenon or condition (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Thus, 
quantitative research is a type of investigation conducted in a case where there is a need for 
measurability or quantification of the study variables. Moreover, quantitative analysis enables 
data, which can be quantified and analysed using appropriate statistical tools to be collected from 
the respondents (Lewin, 2005).  
The quantitative method of research has also been found to help in adhering to strict research 
design defined from inception. It also employs quantitative measurement and eases the use of 
numeric statistics in the research (Scott et al., 2003). Thus, quantitative research is particularly 
relevant to this study as it provides the necessary tool to measure and quantify the factors leading 
to renegotiation in PPP road projects including other measurable and quantifiable data within the 
confine of the research objectives. It may be impossible to achieve this sphere with the use of 
qualitative research approach. The most common quantitative research is a questionnaire survey 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015).  
Questionnaire surveys are usually in the form of mail; group administered questionnaires and 
household drop-off (Bowling, 2005). The mail survey adopts the use of postage stamp to deliver 
the questionnaire for the study to the identified potential respondents’ addresses. It helps the 
researcher to send the same questionnaire to categories of people or population at a low cost and 
ease. Though, this method allows respondent to provide answers to the questions at a convenient 
time, however, the response rate has been found to be low due to lack of prompt or persuasion 
that other methods afford. Hence, consideration is not usually given to this approach as the best 
approach to questionnaire administration. 
The one to one administration of questionnaires affords the researcher the opportunity of meeting 
the identified respondents in their respective homes, offices or place of business with the research 
instruments to elicit information about the research objectives. The collection of the data usually 
takes place after completion in private or at a convenient time (Blair et al., 2013). The method is 
advantageous as it allows for personal contact with the respondent and fosters interaction between 
the administrator and the respondent. However, the group administered questionnaire seek to 
devise avenue where members of a group, organisation or establishments are brought together to 
facilitate the conduction of survey administration drafted in the form of structured questions, 
particularly on those who are present and have sound knowledge of the subject (Bryman, 2003). 
Group questionnaire can be administered online, at professional meetings, at head or branch 
offices of companies and organisations. Thus, there is evidence of convenience in the 
administration as well opportunity to answer any unclear questions, which may be asked by the 
respondents. Usually, there is evidence of high response rate from the group administered 
approach than the initial methods of quantitative data collection. 
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Questionnaires can be developed into four main measurement scales, which include nominal, 
ordinal, interval and ratio scales (Haughton and Stevens, 2010). Scales are used in social science 
research for capturing the direction, level, and intensity of the research variable regarding 
construct, accuracy level, data simplification, coverage strength and the basis for comparison 
amongst data (Neuman, 2006). There are other types of scale, which are Thurstone scale, the 
Bogardus, Guttman scale, semantic differential scale and social distance scale including the Likert 
scale (Chimi and Russell, 2009; Miller and Salkind, 2002). In addition, the literature identifies 
three methods of designing a questionnaire survey, which includes unstructured, structured and 
semi-structured questionnaires (Gillham, 2008, Schensul et al., 1999). However, the 
appropriateness and merits of the structured questionnaire over other methods lead to its adoption 
in this research (Clark-Carter, 1998). The benefits inherent in the adoption of the structured 
questionnaire, according to Clark-Carter (1998) include: 
• A range of possible answers included as part of the questions in a questionnaire fosters 
clarity of purpose and appropriateness of respondent’s answers. 
• The questions are characterised by precise words, which are usually in a fixed order 
eliciting response in the defined order.  
• Respondents have the options of completing the questionnaire and returning it either to 
post or online. This enhances optimal utilisation of the researcher’s time and energy. 
• It ensures standard format in the presentation and asking the questions. 
• It improves quick and immediate quantification of the data collected, e.g., through the 5-
point Likert scale questions, which allows the allotment of scale 1-5 for alternative 
answers.  
 Identification of Population 
The population for this research are the public and private sectors stakeholders involved in PFI 
(DBFO) road projects in the UK. The renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK has 
been found to be between the public and private sector stakeholders. Though, there is usually the 
measurement of a population by the general census of that population. However, the research 
aims to collect data from a sample of the required people. Hence, the study only sampled the 
public and private stakeholders in UK DBFO road projects based on the understanding that they 
are the primary stakeholders involved in the renegotiation.  
 Sampling Unit and Strategy 
Practitioners engaged in PFI (DBFO) road projects (i.e., public and private sectors) in the UK 
constitute the sampling unit for this research. Since all these practitioners are not a party to 
renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects, the study seeks to collect data from the primary  
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stakeholders. The reason for this is to ensure that the data obtained from the sample population 
provides a perfect representation of the study population including relevant features of the 
population in their proportions as argued in the literature (Blaikie, 2009). All the PFI (DBFO) 
road projects in the UK are the projects considered for the execution of this research (See Table 
2.4). No data on the two DBFO projects in Northern Ireland as the public entity indicated at the 
onset that the current workload makes it practically impossible for participation in the study. 
Information regarding the lists of respondent’s organisations is available through PPI Database, 
2016, relevant literatures the website of the procuring authorities and private organisations. The 
contact persons from these organisations assisted in providing the e-mails and phone numbers of 
appropriate members of staff required for the data collection exercise. 
The strategy adopted in the sampling of the population agree with the recommendation of Blaikie 
(2000), which states that data for a specific research study can be obtained from several 
individuals or units of a population, whole population of an investigation, or selecting the entire 
sample of the element of a sampling unit as the sampling frame. In this study, the total population 
of PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK as shown in Table 2.4 serves as the sampling frame for 
both interviews and questionnaire survey, which are public and private sector representatives 
from the 34 DBFO road projects. Therefore, only stakeholders from 22 PFI (DBFO) road projects 
initiated by the Central authorities in England, Scotland and Wales could be reached through the 
online questionnaire based on available contact details. DBFO road projects undertaken by the 
procuring entities of the local authorities and Transport for London were not considered as they 
majorly involve minor highways maintenance, building maintenance and electricity projects. The 
total population (44) stakeholders in public and private sector were selected for the questionnaire 
survey to achieve a wide range of responses on the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects 
across the UK. Respondents from all the PFI (DBFO) road projects were found operating in public 
and private organisations in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales including Local 
Authorities, and Transport for London. 
 The Use of Likert Scale in the Questionnaire  
This research, however, adopts the Likert scale for the data collected. For instance, the research 
questionnaire requests the respondents to identify and rank based on a scale 1-5 the factors leading 
to the renegotiation of PPP road projects. Likert scale was used to rank factors, evaluate measures 
amongst others in the questionnaire. The Likert scale has been known to have a high degree of 
reliability and viability, which allows ranking of the respondent’s information (Bontis, 1998). A 
very high reliability of between 0.85 and 0.94 is considered very high in Likert scale, which was 
adopted in this research (Dittner et al., 2004, Kopec et al., 1995).  
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Moreover, the five-point Likert scale can meet the needs of researchers, and that is why it is 
popularly known and adopted. Ordinal questions, which are also on 5 points Likert scale, are 
used. Therefore, a combination of the nominal and ordinal level is chosen.  
Nominal questions elicit answers that border on counting such as questions bordering on the 
number of years of experience of the respondents and the type of PPP stakeholder and number of 
staffs in the organisation of the respondents. Contrastingly, ordinal questions are on a 5-Level 
Likert scale, which is commonly used as a quantitative research method because it allows 
respondents to choose from a wide range of several degrees of possible answers available 
regarding a statement. The 5-point Likert scale provides balanced response options, which are 
based on equal positives and negative scales including eliciting opinions from respondents with 
fewer choices to make meaning out of the number of response categories (Losby and Wetmore, 
2012). Thus, the Likert scale makes researchers have essential meeting needs. Moreover, there 
are varying types of scales that should be remembered among which the five-point scale was 
adopted in this study. This Likert scale has five-level, which are stated as follows: Strongly Agree 
(5), Agree (4), Indifferent (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1). 5 & 4 are the two positive 
numbers while 2 and 1 are the negative numbers.  
The Likert scale of 5 fosters the classification of the criticalities of the factors, impacts, outcomes, 
and measures to ensure VfM at renegotiation. The respondents identified the degree of criticality 
of each of the factors on a scale of 5 to 1. Scale 5 stands for strongly agree, scale four stands for 
agree, scale three stands for indifferent, scale 2 implies disagree, scale one indicates strongly 
disagree. According to (Thiagarajan and Zairi, 1998), the factors that a researcher feels critical 
are essential when rating a group of factors to ascertain their respective level of importance. 
The use of Likert scale type 1 to 5 ensures that the respondents indicate their agreement with the 
factor, impact, and measures amongst others separate categories of questions stated in the 
questionnaire within the confine of the scale. A practical and tested method of ascertaining the 
criticality levels of the factors, impacts, and measures is to adopt the methods identified in the 
literature by evaluating the mean values or percentages to decide the degree and level of 
criticality. Consideration can, therefore, be given to the mean values or the percentages as a score 
out of the maximum score expected from the responses. This maximum rating, which is based on 
the maximum Likert scale obtainable in the instance of the questionnaire designed is 5.  
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The scale five is chosen because it is considered appropriate and convenient to work with as well 
as the ease it affords in facilitating accurate statistical calculation and conversion through the 
estimation of the mean values of the respective individual nodes and variable. The classification 
of the criticalities of the factors, impacts, outcomes, and measures to ensure VfM at renegotiation 
are evaluated after analysis.  
Each is based on their criticalities level, which may either be represented as follows: very critical, 
critical, moderately critical and non-critical. Thus, the critical levels of the factors leading to the 
renegotiation are identified after careful analysis and evaluation in any of the criticality 
categories. 
 Ethical Practices and Administration of Questionnaire 
There were deliberate efforts in the administration of the questionnaire for the collection of data. 
The introductory letter indicates the purpose of the questionnaire survey while the adoption of 
ethical principles such as administration of questionnaire and conduction of interviews within the 
confine of the approval as shown in Appendix 6. The strict adherence to the terms of the ethical 
approval contributes to the quality of the work and ensures the confidentiality and privacy of the 
information provided by the respondents. Bias was drastically reduced using prompts and 
straightforward questions during the interviews and by ensuring that only respondents working 
on PFI (DBFO) road projects offered answers to the research instruments. The respondents are 
not aware of one another’s opinions, and there was no collusion by the respondents. Ethical 
standards were followed in the administration and collection of data as agreed during the 
submission of the research proposal for consideration by the ethics committee. There was no 
conspiracy between the respondents as all the responses given were individually provided by each 
of the respondents in such a way that none of the respondents has access to one another during 
the data collection process. Though, the data collected was small. However, it reflects the exact 
position of relevant stakeholders that are required to provide information regarding the 
renegotiation experiences in PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK. The researcher maintains a 
high level of integrity by working with the sample population during the data collection while 
also ensuring that there is the analysis of the data collected without the distortion of facts and 
figures.  
The final questionnaire emanating from the second pilot study was administered to further test 
the research questions towards the development of a framework for VfM renegotiation. The 
understanding was premise on the fact that the successful execution of the stage would afford the 
opportunity for robust findings on the objectives of the research, which would verify and 
complement the conclusions of the interviews.  
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The questionnaire survey was designed to address the research objectives and categorised into 
sections and six main headings. These involve the assessment and evaluation of the following: 
respondents; project specific renegotiation characteristics; factors leading to renegotiation; 
impacts of the renegotiation on VfM criteria; outcomes of the renegotiation, including remedial 
actions to ensure VfM through appropriate VfM measures (See Appendix 3). 
The robustness of the data collected at this stage can be justified, based upon the administration 
of questionnaires on respondents, which cuts across some of the UK PFI (DBFO) road projects 
as indicated in Table 2.4. Although, DBFO projects involving local authorities and transport for 
London are excluded from the list of investigated projects because most of the projects are mainly 
maintenance and telecommunications contracts (Mackie, 2005). Thus, the total UK PFI (DBFO) 
road projects where questionnaires were administered to both the public and private stakeholders 
totals twenty-two (22). Responses were received from the stakeholders working on these projects 
in the UK. 
The client and SPV on each of the PFI (DBFO) road projects asked to participate in the 
completion of the questionnaire. The reason for this is based on the understanding gained during 
the first pilot study that the stakeholders involved in the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects are the client and the SPV. Therefore, the total number of questionnaires administered 
on both public and private sector stakeholder on each of the projects identified is forty-one (41) 
as three respondents declined to participate in the study at this stage of the research. The 
respondents that provided information are the primary parties to the renegotiation of the privately 
financed road projects in the UK (See Table 2.4). 
 Questionnaire Data Analysis 
The research questions guided and informed the selection of this statistical analysis technique and 
test. The descriptive statistics and the reliability and validity test conducted on the data collected, 
coincided with the views of the supporting literature (Coakes and Steed, 2009; Bryman and 
Cramer, 2005). The descriptive statistics set out in detail the respective answers, frequencies, 
percentages and mean response analysis of each of the questions outlined in the individual 
sections of the questionnaire.  
The variables, regarding respondent's information, were presented as explained in Sub-section 
5.6.3.1 of this thesis. The findings from these sources, i.e. (the case study projects sampled) are 
used to draw relationships, transparently, between and amongst the variables, items and sections 
of the questionnaires.  
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The questionnaire was analysed using the descriptive method of analysis, which includes 
frequency and tabulation and mean statistical techniques for comparison purpose. Also, Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA) in the one-way format was carried out to ascertain the significant level of 
the data collected, while Cronbach's Alpha values were calculated to evaluate the reliability and 
validity of the responses provided by the respondents.  
➢ Descriptive Statistics 
The frequency of all the variables is measured and ranked in their respective decreasing order of 
importance, which shows the distribution of the frequencies across the sections of the 
questionnaire. Pallant (2010) indicates that descriptive statistics could be presented using 
frequency distribution and cross tabulation. The research objectives and the nature of the data 
collected guide the selection of the descriptive statistics. Thus, it became clear that it would be 
more appropriate to analyse the data using the descriptive method of analysis, especially due to 
the few numbers of responses received. 
➢ Frequency Distribution and Tabulation of Results 
The SPSS software analysed the questionnaire by providing the results of several survey variables 
through the outputs printed after the execution of the command. The results, shown on the 
frequencies of the variables are presented in tabulation to indicate the respective percentages, 
mean values etc., of the factors impacts and others. The frequency distribution is regarded as a 
method involving the calculation of the frequency distribution of the data collected and the 
incorporation of the dataset in table format (Pickard, 2008). Simple frequency tables or a series 
of charts can be adopted to describe the cases characteristics by ascribing numerical values to 
each case (Pallant, 2010). The frequency of the number of responses provided to a question in a 
questionnaire is in a tabular form, as well as the percentage of the number of answers given by 
the respective respondents (Haughton and Stevens, 2010). Clearly, the distribution of numbers 
and percentages is essential and usually presented in tables as part of the activities required for 
the analysis of the data.  
Tables are also crucial as they show whether there is a difference between one variable of the 
research to the other. In tabulation, it may be necessary to cross-tabulate the results obtained from 
the questionnaire survey. Cross-tabulation merely involves the presentation of the data from one 
or more variables in a single table, to foster the identification of similarities and differences and 
to compare one variable to another (Haughton and Stevens, 2010, 2000).  
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Cross-tabulations as shown in this chapter of this thesis to ensure that the inherent differences 
between the numbers, mean values and percentages are explained, and the readers, including the 
researcher, can vividly observe the links and connectivity between the variables indicated in the 
tables (Haughton and Stevens, 2010; Pickard, 2013). These frequencies, means and their 
respective percentages, as stated in the tabulated results, show the values of the factors, impacts, 
outcomes and measures respectively. 
 Mixed Methods 
Creswell (2003) study on methods of research leads to the discovery of the use of mixed methods 
as a remedy of the shortcomings and deficiencies inherent in the use of one method of research 
over the other, i.e. (either quantitative or qualitative) method. The mixed methods of research, 
therefore, adopt the quantitative and qualitative methods of research in varying ways and manner. 
Plano Clark et al. (2008) attest to these by identifying the various standard techniques that are 
available for the design of mixed methods research. Thus, mixed methods research provides an 
opportunity to combine qualitative and quantitative methods to foster the collection and analysis 
of survey information through four top mixed methods of research design as shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1:  Mixed Method Designs 
Source: (Plano Clark et al., 2008) 
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Based on Figure 5.1, mixed methods research can be designed for implementation through either 
triangulation, explanatory, exploratory and embedded forms. Plano Clark et al. (2008) by 
identifying the use of mixed methods research in a sequential way to elaborate the findings of one 
method of study with the use of another research method. Creswell and Poth (2016) further opine 
there can be the concurrent use of quantitative and qualitative data as well as a transformative use 
of the lens of the available theories established in the literature to generate a framework for a 
research design that encompasses both quantitative and qualitative data collection. Thus, mixed 
methods of research help to extend the frontier of one method to another method through the 
mixing of their attributes and characteristics to determine the crest of the research based on the 
continuity between the two ends of research (Creswell, 2003).  
Therefore, a researcher must decide, which of the research methods is more applicable in each 
situation and circumstances by keeping in view the research problem, the personal experiences 
of the researcher and the intended audience when choosing a research approach (Creswell, 2003). 
The research aim established in chapter 1 of this thesis (Please refer to section 1.4) is specifically 
targeted at “integrating considerations of VfM into the renegotiation of PPP road projects.” Two 
concepts are proposed for investigation in this research, and one is a subset of the other, i.e., VfM 
is in context a dependent research variable, which is open to broad possibilities of outcomes based 
on the process and effectiveness of renegotiation of PPP road projects. Hence, the investigation 
of these conceptual variables requires a real-life situation research in a working environment and 
setting capable of eliciting practical answers, which is unbiased and realistic. 
 CHOICE OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The explanation of the several philosophical assumptions and approaches in the preceding section 
provides an overview of the available methods for the implementation of this research. Also, less 
research on renegotiation in the UK informs the choice of mixed methods. The need for a proper 
choice of a research approach cannot be over-emphasise in the achievement of the aims and 
objectives of the research. A sound research approach is aimed at eliciting the best possible 
manner of executing the research and answering the emerging research questions (Blaikie, 2000). 
The understanding of the author of the numerous available research methods identified was that 
mixed methods seem better fitting to address the aim and objectives outlined in section 1.4 of this 
thesis. The reason for this understanding was in consideration of the peculiarities and differences 
observed in the research objectives.  
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A mixed method as previously described adopts both qualitative and quantitative methods of 
research. Therefore, it is expedient and necessary to explore the opinions and views of the relevant 
stakeholders of PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK, which has been identified as having long 
history of adoption and high or extensive knowledge gap (Makovsek et al., 2015). The adoption 
of mixed methods was also understood to gain first-hand information and understanding of 
renegotiation with regards to the achievement of VfM. Verbal and textual data emanating from 
the qualitative method of data collection ensures unique information that was attributed to the 
respective case studies. On the other hand, quantitative research method was found useful in the 
execution of objectives 3, 4, and 5. 
Based on the practicalities of this qualitative and quantitative techniques, which benefit the 
implementation of the research objectives, the execution of the research is appropriate in both 
interpretivism and positivism philosophical spheres. The study was designed in such a way as to 
allow qualitative method through interviews to assist and enhance the quantitative method. The 
research instruments are developed from the literature and qualitatively refined towards the 
design of a questionnaire adopted for the advanced stage of data collection. Discussion of findings 
of the research is premised on the interpretation of the data collected through the quantitative 
method (i.e., questionnaire).  
The reason for adopting the quantitative methodology as the sole method for generating most of 
the answers leading to framework development was because the results of the literature review 
and the case study interviews were used in the design of the questionnaire, which represents an 
instrument of a quantitative methodology. The design of the study, therefore, allowed qualitative 
method through interviews to assist and enhance the quantitative approach. Thus, the conclusion 
regarding the choice of design for the research is based on the adoption of epistemology and 
axiology philosophies as identified by Crotty (1998) and supported by Denzin and Lincoln 
(2011).  
The adoption of the epistemology and axiology philosophies is regarded as mixed methods, which 
seek to ensure that the limitation of adopting only one technique is removed and replaced with a 
feasible and legitimate alternative to both methods of data collection (Doyle et al., 2009). The 
mixed method approach also affords theoretical and practical merits, which makes its application 
justifiable in terms of vigorousness and thoroughness of the data collection method (Plano Clark 
et al., 2008; Creswell and Clark, 2007). The choice of research design and method are premised 
on the variables of the study, i.e., axiological assumption (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). 
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The aim, objectives, and research problem including the relationship between the research 
variables and related empirical studies constitute the considerations in the choice of a research 
design and method. There are the identification and assessment of previous renegotiation studies 
in PPP transport projects and their respective methodologies. These earlier studies serve to 
premise the methods and design of this study research based on the methods adopted for the 
execution of the previous renegotiation studies. 
First, Brux (2010) apply case study analysis of two transport projects to assess the positive and 
negative sides of renegotiation, which depicts qualitative analysis methodology. On the other 
hand, Guasch et al. (2008) use original data set from World Bank database attributed to 307 
concessions awarded in Latin America from 1989 to 2000. These infrastructure concessions cover 
data collected in both water and transport sector, which are used in the analysis towards 
ascertaining the determinants of high incidence of renegotiations of infrastructure contracts. 
Furthermore, Sarmento & Reis (2013) uses literature review and data generated from public 
documents to discuss how the financial crisis in Portugal has created a unique arbitrage 
opportunity that provides a solution to the problem of budgetary constraint of government. This 
study reflects government spending in the road sector.  
Sarmento & Renneboog (2014b) address the process of conducting renegotiation in transports 
projects with the aid of two case studies on bridge construction and railway infrastructure in 
Portugal (i.e. Fertagus and Lusoponte) after careful literature review on PPP renegotiation. 
Similarly, previous studies adopt methods in the form of case studies to evaluates renegotiation 
of PPP transport projects after having extensively reviewed the literatures relevant to the survey 
(Engel et al., 2014; Domingues & Zlatkovic, 2014; De Brux et al., 2011; Blank, et al., 2009; 
Athias & Nunez, 2007). All these studies provide evidence that most renegotiation research in 
PPP transport projects are premised on the findings of data collected from case studies either by 
document analysis of secondary data or interviews, which are then qualitatively analysed using 
the appropriate techniques (Domingues & Zlatkovic, 2014; De Brux et al., 2011; Blank, et al., 
2009). These literatures provide a basis for the distinct survey research approaches and justifies 
the choice of mixed methods as more applicable and appropriate for this research. 
All the previous studies identified adopt the literature and interviews for the execution of the 
research. However, Beuve et al. (2014) illustrate the use of quantitative analysis in a PPP 
renegotiation study by developing a quantitative compensation model to estimate future cash 
flows using descriptive statistics, which evaluates the renegotiation percentages and means 
values.  
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The quantitative methodology adopted also assist in the estimation of future traffic demand and 
the operation and maintenance costs, which are both critical stochastic variables of the study. A 
mixed-method is, therefore, feasible for adoption in this study. The reason for the utilisation of 
this method is to ensure that the limitation of utilising only one technique is removed and replaced 
with a viable alternative (Doyle et al., 2009). Also, the mixed methods approach was adopted 
because it offers theoretical and practical merits as suggested by these studies (Creswell and 
Clark, 2007).  
The merits include the opportunity to use two methods (i.e., quantitative and qualitative) to gain 
a thorough understanding of the research problems. It affords the opportunity for the researcher 
to respond to the needs of more than one perspective regarding varying interest and needs while 
further providing comprehensive, precise and accurate outcomes, which ensure framework 
development. A mixed methodology assisted the conduction of both qualitative and quantitative 
research surveys based on the objectives of the research as stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, i.e., 
a combination of interviews and questionnaires of professionals involved in UK PFI (DBFO) road 
projects is used in the study to achieve the objectives as shown in Figure 5.2.
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As shown in Figure 5.2, case study interviews and questionnaires relevant to the investigation 
and the observed population of the survey are used to achieve the research objectives. The critique 
of the literature, content analysis of the qualitative data and the use of descriptive statistics to 
analyse the quantitative data collected lead to results that assist in the development of the 
framework. There is the validation of the developed framework through the interviews of 
potential users in the UK public and private sectors. 
Since research is multifaceted and requires proper and thorough execution of its respective 
process, the use of the mixed method is considered fitting for this research as it provides further 
insight and different perspectives concerning the renegotiation and VfM towards the development 
and validation of a sound framework. The merits obtainable from the exploration of the study 
justify the choice of a mixed method. The mixed method provides an avenue for a comprehensive 
collection of the data spanning the breadth and width of renegotiation in PPP road projects as well 
as issues surrounding VfM. Also, quantitative method of research will help in adhering to strict 
research design defined from inception, which aids the employment of quantitative measurement 
and eases the use of mathematical statistics. These assisted in measuring the factors influencing 
renegotiation and other measurable data. Conversely, the qualitative research is a methodological 
principle based on social interactions, which allows data collection from respondents based on 
the reality and experience of each case. 
 Operationalisation of the Mixed Method of Research Approach 
Research implies the collection and analysis of primary data through the adoption of 
methodologies considered appropriate and aligned to the research objectives. The mixed methods 
of research use the embedded design approach as shown in Figure 5.1 because of its suitability 
and relevance to the objectives of the study. Also, it affords the opportunity of combining both 
methods for the collection of data on PPP road projects in the UK. Since mixed methodology 
approach involves the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods, the qualitative method 
seeks to unravel information to improve the theoretical knowledge of renegotiation within the PFI 
(DBFO) road projects domain in the UK. However, the quantitative method aims to generate 
quantitative values based on the established variables from the literature and case studies within 
the same research population.  The examination of the available methodologies leads to the choice 
of mixed methods approach to resolving the identified research questions.  
A qualitative method is needed to evaluate the incidences of renegotiation in the selected cases 
of UK PPP road projects. The literature, case studies, and analysis of the selected instances of 
renegotiation in PPP road projects were adopted. Quantitative method is needed to measure the 
renegotiation influence factors in PPP road projects.  
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The mixing of both methods allowed for objective comparison of the outcome of both approaches 
as well as a thorough evaluation of the incidences of renegotiation in PPP road projects. 
There is also the conduction of a full investigation based on the findings of the literature and the 
preliminary pilot survey. This thorough investigation constitutes the central data collection and 
encompasses both qualitative and quantitative studies. The conduct of the pilot study led to the 
refinement of the research instruments based on the comments and suggestions of the respondents 
about renegotiation and value for money. However, the interviews conducted at the advanced 
stage of the research were carried out to elicit information for collection of the data. The reason 
for this decision is to ensure that the data collected adequately address the empirically motivated 
research as indicated in objectives 3, 4 and 5 of the first chapter of this thesis. The administration 
of the questionnaires followed the interview surveys whose respondents willingly consented to 
participate in the study. The analysis of the findings leads to the development of a VfM 
renegotiation framework for renegotiation of PPP road projects. The reason for the consideration 
towards the elaboration of a VfM renegotiation framework in the succeeding chapters of this 
thesis was to foster the achievement of public sector VfM objectives. 
 Mixed Method Research Variables 
Research variable is the attribute of a research and indicates the several facets, cases, and 
components of the research. Researchers usually identify variables of research because it is an 
entity, which varies and does not have a definite or specific quantity but takes on different values 
(Trochim, 2006a). A variable can be resolved into the empirical dimension and can be categorised 
into constituent’s units namely: independent and dependent variables (Trochim, 2006b). The 
types of variables include in addition to independent and dependent variables extraneous and 
descriptive variables. The variables of research are: 
• Independent Variable: This is a variable, which influences the outcome of the dependent 
variable. It is a manipulator and threat to the resultant position of the dependent variable. 
For instance, the independent variable of this research is the renegotiation of PPP road 
projects. This variable has a direct effect on the criteria of VfM, which are, cost, time, 
quality, risk, project finance cost, Whole Life Cycle cost, concessionaires profit and user's 
satisfaction amongst others.  
• Dependent Variables: The dependent variable impacts the independent variable and 
imposes an influence on the independent variable. Research dependent variables are 
affected and influenced by the independent variables or other variables. Based on this 
description, value for money is the dependent variable of this research whose results, 
position or values have been found to be affected by the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) 
road projects (Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014). 
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• Descriptive Variables: These are variables requiring investigation or reporting and which 
have no conclusion concerning the responsible factor. However, the research must 
provide answers concerning the position or situation of these variables because of the 
impacts of some or all other variables (Carter et al., 2000). The independent variable 
directly impacts the explanatory variables in most instances. Hence, the descriptive 
variables of this research are user's satisfaction, quality, time, cost and concessionaires 
profit, which represent the criteria’s of VfM. 
• Extraneous Variables: These variables provide alternative causal explanation and relate 
or link the dependent with other variables, i.e., independent and the explanatory variables 
(De Vaus, and De Vaus, 2001). 
Having identified the appropriate decision regarding the research variables of the mixed method 
of research, it is necessary to identify and establish for adoption in this research a suitable strategy 
for the study. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) state that an inquiry strategy could encompass the skills, 
assumptions, enactments and material practices appropriate for adoption in a research. Grounded 
theory, ethnography, phenomenology, case study and narrative research are amongst the most 
common strategies usually adopted for the execution of qualitative research (Saldana, 2015, 
Alvesson, and Skoldberg, 2009). The reason for the adoption of these techniques for qualitative 
research inquiry is because of the readily available systematic procedures and rigorous methods 
of data collection and analysis inherent in its adoption (Creswell, 2007). As previously described, 
this research used mix strategies to make enquiries into the aim and objectives of this study. These 
mixed methods include; (i) Literature review; (ii) case studies with the use of QSR NVivo 
analysis; (iii) Questionnaires analysed with SPSS software. The succeeding sections present the 
research framework, which discusses the rationale for selection of each of the methods used for 
the collection of the data and the analysis under each of the distinct purpose of the mixed 
methodology approach. 
 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
A research framework has been developed to show the four critical stages of the research from 
inception to completion. The research framework and process including discussions based on 
each of the stages indicated in the framework are given in this section as shown in Figure 5.3.
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 Stage 1- Theoretical Stage of the Research Framework (Literature 
Review) 
Stage 1 involves the preliminary and main literature review. Eighteen (18) subject areas form the 
basis for the identification of the research gap in PPP transport project literature. Subject domains 
that are found having a high knowledge gap in the body of knowledge of PPP transport projects 
grouped accordingly. The transport modes include rail, ports, airports, bridges/tunnels, urban 
transit and roads. However, road sector is the most discursive sector of all the transport modes, 
which have the highest literature citations. The literature findings were evaluated, and data 
reduction technique was employed through analytic categorisation of the subject areas, and 
individual keywords (Neuman, 2006; David and Sutton, 2004). Hence, the review adopts the 
content of the pieces of research, which serves to address the objectives identified in section 1.4 
of the thesis. The reason for the extensive literature search and review was to ensure that the 
questions developed at the preliminary stage are well researched through desk study for 
appropriate test and pilot study.  
Figure 5.3 further shows the secondary research study, which involves the review of the literature 
such as journal and conference papers, scholarly textbooks amongst others. An in-depth and 
focused literature review began at the commencement of the analysis of the data collected to 
strengthen the argument of this research further and improve the credibility of the research 
findings (Charmaz, 2006). The literature identifies various approaches usually adopted in the 
analysis of textual and written data, e.g., journal paper and conference proceedings. These 
strategies include; literature critique, systematic review, content analysis, semiotics, 
deconstruction, and hermeneutics (Grbich, 2012). A thorough critique and systematic review of 
the literature in the analysis of the preliminary and primary documentation used in the writing up 
of the research proposal as well as the chapters of the literature review. 
All these sources of secondary information provided an avenue to identify and develop research 
gap concerning issues bordering on the use of PPP in the delivery of infrastructure projects, 
especially roads. These assisted towards the writing up of the research proposal and the literature 
review chapters. Though, the supervisory team advice provided the direction with regards to 
current issues in PPP studies as well as feasible, viable areas of PPP research. The timely 
information from the supervisory team provided the right direction and strengthened my resolve 
and decision to investigate PPP renegotiation in road projects regarding VfM achieved for the 
public sector. The secondary research conducted provided the background information required 
for this study including the exploration of available research methodologies to ascertain the most 
appropriate method for the pilot studies and initial investigation.  
 
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
134 
 
 
The preliminary research effort involving desk study, literature search, review of crucial PPP 
areas culminated in the writing of a research proposal. The primary literature review was linked 
to the preliminary desk study and constitutes the first and the most crucial phase of this research 
as it forms the pedestal upon which other stages of the research methodology rest. This 
submission agrees with Bryman (2008), which state that there is the avoidance of the trap of 
reinventing the wheel because of the establishment of the body of the knowledge within the 
research area through the review of the literature. Thus, literature review began at the very outset, 
i.e., conception stage of the research and establishes the focus and central areas of the study as 
shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4: Main areas of the Literature Review 
The preliminary review of the literature necessitated an in-depth literature review in the 
exploratory phase based on the data collected and the results obtained from the analysis. The 
research gap, research problem, aims, and objectives established in the initial literature review 
form the benchmark for the conduction of literature exploration, which concisely follows as 
shown in Figure 5.3. The exploratory research phase, therefore, indicates that the novel findings 
of the desk research were within the sphere of the respective vital variables and research criteria. 
The statement of the research goals, which constitute the first stage of the study, addresses 
objectives 1 and 2 of the research (Please see section 1.4). Thus, there are specific references to 
PPP road projects, their renegotiation incidences, and the respective renegotiation leading factors 
including VfM. The literature review further intensifies and conducted throughout the study to 
update previous literature findings of the main subject areas of the study. These serve to support 
the arguments emanating from the results of the data analysis towards improving the reliability 
and the credibility of the findings of the research.   
 Stage 2- Qualitative Research Survey and Data Analysis 
Qualitative research survey and data analysis stage are one of the advanced stages of the research, 
which involves the collection and analysis of the qualitative data to address objectives (3), (4), 
and (5) as identified in subsection 1.4 of Chapter 1. As earlier indicated, the available strategies 
for making qualitative enquiries are assessed.  
PPP
Renegotiation
VfM 
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The results of these evaluations at both the pilot and advanced stages reveal that case study 
methodology with Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) approach is appropriate for the research. 
Case study methodology was suitable because it affords the opportunity of a comprehensive and 
in-depth investigation into the renegotiation experiences of the respondents on the respective case 
study projects (Denscombe, 2007). Though, case studies represent a strategy of inquiry into a 
subject; they also stand to connote the choice of what the researcher intends to study (Creswell, 
2007, Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Since the renegotiation of PPP road projects was not clear at 
the time of the literature review regarding the UK experience, it became evident to adopt case 
studies for the execution of the research. Yin (2003) corroborate this submission by stating that 
the case study methodology is appropriate in a situation where there is no apparent justification 
for the separation of the phenomenon of study from its context or environment. 
Case studies have been attested to assist in gaining a proper understanding of the dynamics of a 
setting and sphere. It is also useful in investigating complex situations to achieve positive 
outcomes of life events (Barret and Sutrisna, 2009). Therefore, research into PPP road projects 
renegotiation was found complex in the case of UK research environment because the subject is 
new and requires thorough preliminary field studies, which engages experts working in practice 
to give information that guides the feasibility and viability of researching in the subject area. 
Therefore, the first pilot study on two cases of PFI (DBFO) road projects assisted in gaining first-
hand information regarding renegotiation as explained in the next sub-section. 
 Stage 2A- Pilot Study 1 
A case study is a qualitative research strategy involving the analysis of one or multiple case study 
in detail. However, the first pilot study adopts interviews of professionals to ascertain the 
renegotiation incidences in the UK PFI (DBFO) road projects and their implication on VfM. This 
assist to improve the feasibility and viability of researching within the scope of the main areas of 
the study in UK PFI (DBFO) road projects based on the few pieces of evidence in the literature. 
The second stage of the research, therefore, adopts case study semi-structured interviews to pilot 
the investigation by the findings of the literature review. The first pilot research involves both 
public and private stakeholder’s interviewees from two PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK. The 
interviews conducted ascertains the renegotiation characteristics and peculiarities in the context 
of the UK PFI road projects.  Moreover, the reason for the adoption of more than one case studies 
at the first pilot study stage is to allow for robust and elaborate findings on the renegotiation of 
PFI (DBFO) road projects to address the research objectives comprehensively.  
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The pilot study conceptualises the theoretical research and establishes the basis for the advanced 
research towards framework development. Moreover, the essence of the pilot study is to ascertain 
the integrity and reliability of the findings of the literature review regarding PPP road projects 
renegotiation and to compare the outcomes of PPP road projects renegotiation from other regions 
of the world. Hence, the findings of the literature were objectively compared with the case studies 
interviews findings at the initial stage of the research. Thus, the first pilot study complements the 
theoretical conclusions of the literature and form the basis for the development of the 
questionnaire. 
 Stage 2B- Main Qualitative Survey 
Data collection regarding objectives 3, 4 and, 5 enumerated in Chapter 1 of this thesis takes place 
after the establishment of the theoretical basis of the research. The research design adopted at this 
stage is as indicated in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5: Research Design for Stage 2B of the Framework 
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As shown in Figure 5.5, this stage provided an explanation on the renegotiation experiences of 
PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK based on the verbal data collected through the semi-
structured interviews, which were transcribed into textual data for NVivo analysis.  
The use of NVivo for the qualitative analysis of the data collected through the interviews followed 
the procedure of ground theory. The method is a general methodology involving interpreting 
through rigorous thinking and conceptualising data (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). The data collected 
were first audio recorded, transcribed and read for accurate interpretation based on sound 
thinking. These ensure systematic review, data collection and analysis. The systematic review of 
the literature and the collection and analysis of qualitative data agree with the evidence that 
abound in construction management literature regarding the development of theory and 
theoretical assumptions (Carter and Fortune, 2008). The theoretical constructs could be from the 
literature or theory gathered from other sources, e.g., public and government policy documents. 
Hence, the full description and explanation of the phenomenon under investigation are facilitated 
by Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) and with the aid of NVivo software version 11. The data 
collected through interviews followed methodological procedures as shown in Figure 5.5.  
The methodological procedures adopted to align with the principle of grounded theory, which 
involves the gathering and analysis of the data through the defined research process. The 
methodology ensures effective integration of the findings of the literature and the interviews 
conducted at the pilot stage towards the design of an instrument that facilitates the development 
of a framework (Thompson, 2010). The framework developed is considered fitting and 
appropriate for adoption since it addresses the current renegotiation challenge observed within 
PPP road projects as explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Thus, the approach to model 
development involved the combined use of the findings of the literature and case studies, which 
are integrated into the VfM renegotiation framework as explained in chapter 9. 
More than one case study allows for robust and elaborate findings, which addresses the research 
objectives from a more comprehensive and holistic standpoint (Yin, 2009). As a result, the 
research seeks pertinent information through the pilot survey regarding the feasibility and 
viability of researching within the scope of the main areas of the study in UK PFI (DBFO) road 
projects. Respondents from both the private and public sectors indicated interest to participate in 
the study.  
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The targets respondents involved professionals and managers working on PFI (DBFO) road 
projects in the UK excluding experts working on PFI road projects in Northern Ireland. The 
reason for this consideration is because most PPP road projects in the UK are usually procured 
based on PFI (DBFO) road projects. The respondents possess the right experience on PFI (DBFO) 
road projects.  
Representative case studies were selected within the UK at the exploratory stage. The 
consideration was to provide direction for the empirical work required at the advanced stage of 
the research. The literature supports the development of the necessary instruments to conduct the 
sophisticated research. There is the identification of cases of road concession projects within the 
sample population. The stakeholders were followed up at both stages of the data collection. Two 
respondents in each of the road projects indicated interest to be part of the pilot study stage.  
The semi-structured interviews were conducted to elicit the opinions of the experts with 
considerable experience in public and private sectors on the objectives of the study. Experts are 
suitably chosen based on the satisfaction that they have enough hands-on experience in the 
industry and possess adequate knowledge of the subject area. The benefits of conducting 
qualitative data collection via the interviews are enormous as identified in numerous pieces of 
literatures, which highlights the advantages adduced for the conduction of a research survey via 
the interview technique (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Bryman, 2004; Punch, 2003). The qualitative 
interview research study conducted encourages the building of the relationship between the 
interviewee and the interviewer and helps in clarifications and cross-examinations of the 
experiences. The interviews at the first pilot stage also assist in the exploration of differences in 
the respondent's knowledge and aid in the proper presentation of the research outcomes amongst 
others. 
The information collected in the respective case studies are form eleven interviewees were.  Nine 
respondents gave full responses to the interview questions. The remaining two respondents are 
observers who assisted the main interviewees. Five of the respondents who provided complete 
answers are from the procuring authorities of the public sector while four respondents are from 
the private sector. Table 5.2 shows the background information and characteristics of the case 
studies. From these nine respondents, five are from the client and include respondents from the 
public sector, which are coded as follows: XY1-Pub; XY3-Pub; XY4-Pub; XY7-Pub; and XY8-
Pub. Four respondents are from the private sector and include XY2-Pri, XY5-Pri, XY6-Pri and 
XY9-Pri. 
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The representatives of the client provided more responses in comparison to the private 
concessionaire involved in PFI DBFO road projects in England. XY1-Pub represent the 
government of Wales while XY3-Pub, XY4-Pub and XY7-Pub represent Highways England as 
public client representatives on CS2, CS3 and CS4 respectively. XY8-Pub represent the Transport 
Scotland on CS5. Table 5.2 shows the detail of all the respondents who identified with the public 
and private concessionaires on the PFI (DBFO) road projects. For easy understanding, the 
individual public-sector respondent is identified with code -Pub and the individual private-sector 
respondent is designated as -Pri in each instance as indicated in the 3rd column of Table 5.2.   
Summarily, the public and private sectors in all the case study projects under investigation are the 
Highways England, the division of transport of the Wales government and Transport Scotland 
including the respective concessionaire companies on each of the case studies. The five projects 
investigated are in England, Scotland and Wales. The SPV is made up of the consortium of four 
companies. All the case studies projects are currently in operation and maintenance stages with 
their respective start dates and the number of years into the concession shown in Table 5.2.
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                                               Table 5.2: Background Information on Case Studies and Project Characteristics 
S/N Project.  
Code 
Respondent 
Code 
Sector Project 
Location 
Estimated Cost 
of PFI (£) 
Project Stage Contract 
Duration. 
(Yrs.) 
Start Date Year of PPP Road Length 
(Km) 
1  
CS1 
 
XY1-Pub 
 
Public 
 
Wales 
132 Million  
Operation 
 
25 
 
2004 
 
13th 
 
50 
2  
CS2 
 
XY2-Pri 
 
Private 
 
England 
 
6.2 Billion 
 
Operation 
 
30 
 
2009 
 
8th 
 
188 
3 
 
 
XY3-Pub 
 
Public 
 
England 
 
6.2 Billion 
 
Operation 
 
30 
 
2009 
 
8th 
 
188 
4 CS3  
XY4-Pub 
 
Public 
 
England 
520 Million  
Operation 
 
30 
 
2003 
 
14th 
 
- 
5 
 
 
XY5-Pri 
 
Private 
 
England 
250 Million New 
Build 
Operation and 
Maintenance 
 
33 
 
2003 
 
14th 
 
           50  
6  
CS4 
 
XY6-Pri 
 
 
Private 
 
England 
 
935 Million 
 
Operation 
 
30 
 
1997 
 
20th 
 
120 
7 
 
 
XY7-Pub 
 
Public 
 
England 
959 Million  
Operation 
 
30 
 
1997 
 
20th 
 
120 
8  
CS5 
 
XY8-Pub 
 
Public 
 
Scotland 
------- Operation and 
Maintenance 
 
30 
 
1997 
 
20th 
 
90 
9 
 
 
XY9-Pri 
 
Private 
 
Scotland 
170 Million 
Constr. Cost 
 
Operation and 
Maintenance 
 
30 
 
1997 
 
20th 
 
90 
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The section presents the mode of analysis of the interview data collected. The qualitative 
interview data collected at the pilot stage were audio recorded and transcribed. There are the 
interpretation and discussion of the transcribed data from the preliminary research based on the 
findings and served as a guide for the collection of qualitative data for the advanced stage. The 
recurring keywords were coded and collated in their respective thematic order of parent and child 
nodes as reflected in the transcribed interviews. The parent and child nodes, which stands as the 
recurring themes discussed during the meetings, are shown in Appendix 9. 
This analysis as previously described involves PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK and creation 
of an individual profile, nodes, codes and themes as enumerated in subsection 6.8 of this thesis. 
In total, there are nine interviews on five case studies in the UK. Three case study projects were 
from England, 1 case study project from Scotland and the last case study project was from Wales. 
The importation of the audio recording into the analysis software help in the creation of parent 
nodes on the NVivo template. Words, sentences and ideas with similar meanings and connotations 
were coded. After the identification of the parent nodes, the process ended. In addition to the 
parent nodes, the child nodes were created, which relates to the parent nodes.  
Two NVivo parent nodes were identified from a comparative assessment of the responses 
provided by the respondents (See Appendix 9). These parent nodes include contract renegotiation 
and value for money, which represent two critical words of this research. Nine child nodes emerge 
from the two parent nodes and cover all aspects of the questions asked during the case study 
interviews. All these were carried out through axial coding as identified in the literature 
(Mehmetoglu and Altinay, 2006). The relationships and interactions that exist among the 
responses are in another set of categories under the parent nodes called child nodes. The child 
nodes were generated under the parent's nodes with the NVivo software as shown in Appendix 8. 
On developing the child nodes through the process of selective coding, there is the integration of 
the parent and the child nodes with a central concept, which provides necessary details required 
for theory evolution (Bitsch, 2005). These child nodes assisted in an excellent manner in 
delivering a proper understanding of the parent nodes. The following outline presents the required 
phases of the qualitative research analysis with the use of NVivo. The first stage is the interview 
planning stage and involves the preparation of interview questions, the selection and gaining of 
the consent of the interviewees, the desk research and the modalities for carrying out the interview 
survey. The second stage is the qualitative interviews and its recording in a digital audio recorder 
including the safekeeping in a password-protected computer.  
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The third stage is the verbatim transcription of interview information recorded in the audio 
recorder. Appendix 10 shows a typical transcript of the interview administered on one of the 
respondents at the advanced stage of the research. 
Furthermore, there is the analysis and creation of an individual profile, nodes, codes, and themes. 
These are through the QSR NVivo statistical software, which involves the creation of nodes, 
identification of similarities and differences in wording and coding including the identification 
and evaluation of the tree codes. For instance, the assessment involves the creation of "nodes" 
and central "themes" table, checking the need and adequacy of each node. Also, the clustering, 
grouping of nodes together, and writing a brief and explanatory note on the respective nodes and 
themes became necessary. The fifth and sixth stage involves the identification of general and 
unique "themes" from the interview transcribed and the presentation and descriptions of the 
research findings of the respective study objectives in a logical order to foster understanding. The 
questions were semi-structured in such a way that it enables the respondents to think widely and 
expand on their thought and knowledge of the subject. 
 Stage 3- Quantitative Research Survey and Data Analysis 
The third stage of the study involves the collection of data with the use of a questionnaire. Two 
aspects of work were carried out at this stage, which is the pilot study 2 and the administration of 
the refined questionnaire data as explained in the two sub-sections discussed herein. 
 Pilot Study 2 
There is the refinement of the questionnaire required for stage 4 of the research through a pilot 
study. The pilot study seeks to address the research objectives 3 to 5 and serve as a trial survey 
before the initial research at the advanced stage 4 of the research. The development of the draft 
questions required for the quantitative data collection address pertinent issues about objectives 3, 
4, and 5. The draft questionnaire, which serves, as the instruments for data collection at stage 4 
of the research were refined based on the comments and suggestions of the respondents.  
The pilot investigation further affords the opportunity to test the methods and instruments of the 
research for suitability in the project environment. It further assists in the evaluation of the 
adequacy of the sampling frame of the study and the appropriateness of the structured questions. 
Also, the second pilot study proved beneficial as it enables the preliminary discovery and 
identification of the limitations, deficiency, mistakes, and errors, which requires necessary 
corrective actions before the commencement of the full-scale data collection at stage 4 of the 
research. The pilot questionnaires, therefore, help to guide the instrument through the second 
phase of the empirical data collection. 
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Hence, five questionnaire surveys from the field experts and senior researchers assisted in refining 
and modifying the questionnaire instrument for correctness, consistency, and accuracy towards 
the execution of the advanced research.  
The comments and responses obtained were carefully modified and tailored to the advanced 
research. These also assisted in the modification of the questions incorporated into the full case 
studies instruments. The data collected at the second pilot study was premised on the findings of 
the literature and the interview survey, which was adopted in the development of the final 
questionnaire. It also established the course of the second phase of the quantitative research, assist 
in examining the accuracy and the practicality of the questionnaire designed to foster efficient 
conduction of the questionnaire survey.  The enumerated activities uncover the significance of 
the research and further intensify and ascertain the need for the study, research problems, and 
sub-problems. There was the identification of the readiness of the proposed participants, the 
practicability of the research within the intended environment and the appropriateness of the 
research approaches and questions. 
The questionnaire was developed based on the findings of the literature and the case study 
interviews. The results were subjected to further pilot study with industry experts working in 
procuring authorities and private concessionaire’s establishments. The contributions of these 
industry experts included in the questionnaire, which reflects the renegotiation characteristics and 
peculiarities of the UK road concessions. The pilot study serves as an exercise to refine the 
findings of the literature and the case studies to ensure its applicability to the UK environment 
and foster respondents understanding. The reason is based on the researcher’s knowledge that the 
questionnaire is to be completed individually by the respondent without any third-party 
interference or the researcher’s assistance.   
Five questionnaires were distributed to both the public and private sector representatives at the 
second pilot stage to elicit information on the case study projects. Three professionals working in 
the private and public sector and two academic members of staff at UK Universities experienced 
in PFI procurement assisted in assessing the questionnaire to ensure that the data collected are 
comprehensive and suitable for analysis. Also, two academic staff and industry experts working 
at universities in the UK provided answers to the questionnaire; personnel were contacted to 
ascertain the adequacy and conciseness of the questions, the respective identity of the respondents 
and to give their opinion on how to gain the audience of relevant stakeholders working on 
individual DBFO road projects in the UK. One of the purposes of the pilot study before the 
administration of the questionnaires is to ensure the relevance of the questions asked and the 
practicality of adopting the survey within the study population.  
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The results of the investigations, especially the questionnaire survey is discussed and form the 
basis for the execution of the sixth research objective, which is the development of a framework 
for VfM renegotiation in PFI (DBFO) road projects. 
 Main Quantitative Survey 
The comments and suggestions of the respondents at the pilot stage are in the final draft of the 
questionnaire. On receiving the approval of the supervisory team, the closed-ended questionnaires 
requiring the respondents to choose from an array of answers received and analysed to provide 
solutions regarding objectives 3, 4, and 5 of the research. These led to the development, of a VfM 
renegotiation framework. Thus, the second stage of research at the fourth stage of the research 
framework involved the second pilot study and the administration of questionnaires. The process 
of the study for the advanced stage is in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6: Questionnaire Survey Research Process 
Out of the Forty-one (41) questionnaires administered, twenty-five (25) were completed, i.e. 
60.98% response rate of the sampled population (England, Scotland and Wales road DBFO). 
However, a thorough analysis of the questionnaires reveals that only 22 surveys are fully 
completed by the respondents, which represents 32.35% of the available total of the public and  
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private sector respondents in the UK (i.e., 68 respondents) as shown in Table 2.4. Hence, the 
responses received can be considered adequate and representative of the entire population of the 
study, which includes Northern Ireland, even though it is not part of the study. Blaike (2009) 
agree with this submission by stating that a researcher may choose an entire population of an 
investigation, or sample or select a whole element(s) of a sampling unit, as the sampling frame. 
This study chose PFI (DBFO) road projects in England, Scotland and Wales due to the decline of 
the Northern Ireland department of transport to participate in the research.  
The response rate, as revealed by the analysis of the questionnaire is 32.35% based on the 22 
respondents that fully complete the surveys from the sample population, which suggest that the 
data collected seems adequate. The evidence of the literature supports the argument based on the 
response rate of 20-30%, which is the norm in questionnaire surveys in the construction industry 
(Akintoye and Fitzgerald, 2000). Similarly, Sacks (2010) claims that student questionnaire 
surveys or employee surveys do not receive more than between 30-40% response rate or more, 
on average. The results of the quantitative study are discussed and form the basis for the sixth 
objective of the research, which is the development of a framework for VfM renegotiation in PFI 
(DBFO) road projects. The response rate of the central questionnaire survey is in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Response Rate of the Main Questionnaire Survey 
S/N Questionnaire Administered Total Number Returned Total Completed (Fully) 
  Number Rate (%) Number Rate (%) 
1 41 25 60.98 22 53.66 
The results from Table 5.3 reveal that 53.66% respondents returned the questionnaire fully 
completed. The fully completed surveys, therefore represent 32.35% of the total number of 
primary renegotiation stakeholders (i.e. public and private partners) of the sample population as 
shown in Table 2.4 as earlier described. 
 Reliability and Validity of the Data Collected 
Reliability of research is measured and understood in terms variance of the numerical results, 
which can be ascertained by an indicator, which shows the characteristics of the process of 
measurement process and instrument adopted (Neuman, 2006). The reliability test, therefore, 
evaluates the degree of dependability or consistency of the measure of a variable in given 
research. The internal consistency of the data collected is usually assessed when conducting a 
reliability test to identify whether the degree that makes up the scale relate together (Pallant, 
2010).  
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The data collected are typically measured to evidence the reliability of the results based on a set 
level and standard while providing information regarding the relationships between the individual 
items in the scale. One of the most commonly used indicators used to measure the internal 
consistency is Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Pallant, 2010). DeVellis (2003) as cited in Pallant, 
2010), the Cronbach alpha coefficient of a scale should be above 0.7. Table 4.9 gives the 
Cronbach’s alpha values of the scales used in this research. The reliability of both categories of 
respondents measured as shown in Table 5.4 
Table 5.4: Overall Cronbach’s Alpha Values of the Categories of Respondents 
 
As shown in Table 5.4, the only significant variable of respondents without practical renegotiation 
experience is 0.781, whose information is considered very reliable. Though, 0.000 could not 
conduct reliability tests due to few cases available for analysis. The results of the analysis suggest 
that the information provided by these respondents cannot be discarded entirely for two reasons. 
First, there is an indication that the responses given by the respondents without renegotiation 
experiences are based on privileged information by their respective positions in the public and 
private sector organisations. Secondly, the combined reliability and validity test results regarding 
the findings of the respondents involved with renegotiation and respondents without renegotiation 
indicate that most of the Cronbach alpha values are within the required range of significance.  
The reliability and validity test statistics, therefore, ascertain the quality and consistencies of the 
responses provided by the respondents (McCrae et al., 2011, Forza, 2002). For instance, the 
reliability and validity test, based on the research objectives as defined in the data collected, 
highlights the factors leading to renegotiation, renegotiation impacts on VfM, outcomes of the 
renegotiation and measures to ensure VfM at renegotiation. Firstly, the internal consistencies and 
measurement of the data collected are calculated by testing the reliability of the sample through 
SPSS. Furthermore, the calculation of the Cronbach's alpha coefficient of all the items was 
completed in comparison with the overall total coefficient of alpha, to arrive at an estimation of 
the internal consistencies of the data collected, which assisted in establishing the results of the 
survey.  
Renegotiation Involvement (Yes) Renegotiation Involvement (No) 
Question 
No 
Variable Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Question 
No 
Variable Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Q9_1-37 Factors leading to renegotiation 0.919 Q9_1-37 Factors leading to 
renegotiation 
0.000 
Q10_1-14 Impacts of the renegotiation 
VfM criteria 
0.952 Q10_1-14 Impacts of the renegotiation 
VfM criteria 
0.411 
Q27_1-42 Measures to ensure the 
achievement of VfM at 
renegotiation 
0.956 Q27_1-42 Measures to ensure the 
achievement of VfM at 
renegotiation 
0.781 
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The values of the Cronbach alpha coefficient of all the items and overall total coefficient of alpha 
vary from 0 to 1 respectively. According to Field (2009), the number of issues on the scale 
determines the value obtained, i.e. the higher the number of items on the scale, the higher the 
alpha coefficient and vice versa. The significant value of the Cronbach alpha coefficient can be 
estimated as significant if the results or its value is between 0.7 and 0.9 (Field, 2009; DeVellis, 
2003). Pallant (2010), citing DeVellis (2003), states that a Cronbach alpha value, which is above 
0.7 proves to be significant and indicates the reliability of the system. In the context of the analysis 
of all the responses to the questionnaire used to collect the data for this study, the Cronbach’s 
alpha values of the survey data are as shown in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Standardised Cronbach Alpha Values of the Questionnaire Survey Data 
S/N Question 
Number 
Variables Cronbach’s Alpha 
(Standardised) 
ANOVA 
1 9 Factors leading to renegotiation 0.959 0.00 
2 10 Impacts of the renegotiation on the VfM criteria 0.964 0.01 
3 27 Measures to ensure VfM at the renegotiation of road DBFO’s 0.941 0.00 
 
As shown in Table 5.5, the results of all the 22 questionnaire numbers that are analysed with 
SPSS, falls within the remit of the Cronbach alpha values theoretically established. As a result, 
the findings of the questionnaire infer that the results obtained during the survey, regarding the 
respective variables of the research, are reliable and valid. Hence the responses of all the 22 
respondents are adopted for analysis.  
5.6.4.1 Mean Statistics Comparison and Analysis of Variance 
All elements of the descriptive statistics were evaluated and through the estimation of frequency, 
such as the mean and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) amongst others. The results of the 
questionnaire data provided information concerning the factors influencing the renegotiation of 
PFI (DBFO) road projects in their varying degrees, based upon the frequency and mean values 
amongst other things. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is used to explore data and verify the 
possibility of having more samples sharing the common trait of likelihood (Field, 2009). The 
central tendency and sample mean of the different items and data are compared and tested 
indirectly with ANOVA.  
The results produced are usually the F-ratio, which compares the number of systematic variances 
in the data with the number of unsystematic variations. Therefore, the "F-ratio" test value can be 
considered as significant when the value obtained by evaluation is less than or approximately 
equal to 0.05 (5%).  
 
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
148 
 
 
In all the sections of the questionnaire analysed, the ANOVA values are less than 0.05, which 
justifies that more samples within the respective variables have typical traits of likelihood, and as 
a result there is evidence that the values of the data collected are significant, as shown in Table 
5.5. 
5.6.4.2 Relative Critical Index of the Research Variables 
The critical index estimated and adopted for the interpretation of the level of criticalness of the 
respective factors, impacts and measures that have a mean value of 4-5 imply very critical factors. 
The mean value of a factor, which falls between 3-4 imply critical factors, while the mean value 
of a variable or criteria, which falls between 2-3, is considered moderately critical. Mean value 
of 0-2 is assumed non-critical and is regarded as a variable with less significance or level of 
importance. The criticality estimation of factors has been estimated through the adoption of the 
mean values. Though, standard deviation has also been found useful in other analysis of data. 
Somers and Nelson (2001) indicate the criticality levels of individual variables through the means 
and standard deviation, based on twenty-two CSF’s in descending order of importance, which are 
5 = critical, 4 = very high, 3 = high, 2 = moderate and 1 = low: to establish the critical success 
factors across enterprise resource planning implementation stages. However, in the context of this 
research, the mean values are estimated in the case of each variable of factors, impacts, outcomes 
and measures, as identified in the questionnaires adopted in the data collection. The interpretation 
of the analysis on the criticality indexes was based upon the criticality level defined in the 
literature (Somers and Nelson, 2001). 
 Stage 4- Triangulation, Development and Validation of the 
Framework 
The findings of the objectives 1,2,3,4, and 5 of the research, which are all premised on the 
literature review, qualitative case studies and questionnaire survey, informed the constituents of 
the value for money renegotiation framework. Figure 5.2 indicates how the research framework 
incorporates the respective objectives in each stage of the research process leading to the 
development of the framework. However, there is the mixing of the research methods to achieve 
the framework. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) describe triangulation as a term, which is used to give 
a vivid description of the adoption of multiple methods of research in a single study to foster 
thorough and in-depth understanding of the subject. Though, the literature shows that 
triangulation cannot be a tool for validation (Flick 1998). However, triangulation provides the 
depth of richness, rigour, comprehensiveness and complexity that research requires. 
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Based on the understanding of the importance of triangulation in a research, this study adopts the 
findings of the literature as established in chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis to develop the research 
instruments for the case studies. The case studies findings as explained in Chapter 6 were mapped 
comparatively with the results of the literature as established in chapters 2, 3, and 4 towards the 
development of the questionnaire. However, the research instruments in both cases (i.e., 
interviews and questionnaire) were subjected to pilot studies, and the comments and suggestions 
were included in the survey instruments. Thus, the inquiry is composed of the triangulated results 
of all the stages shown in Figure 5.3, which are a literature review and case studies. The overall 
findings of the questionnaire are used in the development of the value for money framework for 
the renegotiation of PPP road projects. These results are presented in Chapter 8 of the thesis. 
There was, therefore, the need to validate the developed framework for renegotiation to ensure 
the achievement of VfM for the users.   
Validation could be achieved through the involvement of internal and external stakeholders to the 
project and can be done through either qualitative or quantitative methodology as discussed in 
Section 5.4 of this thesis to confirm the accuracy and trustworthiness of the research framework 
(Bernard, 2013).  The validation exercise, therefore, seeks to evaluate the developed framework 
from the potential user’s perspective and helps to address VfM issues in the renegotiation of PFI 
(DBFO) road projects. The validity of the content of the framework was to identify potential 
users, and their respective background as indicated in Section A. Section B seeks to establish the 
relevance and ease of understanding of the context while Section C evaluates the applicability 
and usefulness of the framework to potential users during the renegotiation of road concessions. 
Though, the literature argues that validity can be a subjective logic given that the opinions of 
individuals could be different and contradictory (Kumar,2011). However, the validation of the 
framework was carried out on selected groups of experts that are within the class of potential 
users of the instrument to ensure that there is adequate knowledge of issues about renegotiation 
of PFI (DBFO) road projects.  
The development of the framework is on the understanding and interpretation of the findings of 
the questionnaire, which consist of all the other segments of the research. The validation exercise 
assisted in illustrating the applicability, reliability and usefulness of the framework for the 
evaluation of renegotiation regarding the achievement of VfM for users. 
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 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter explains the procedures and process adopted in developing the research design, 
instruments, and methodology. The information collected, and their method of analysis was 
discussed extensively in this chapter. There is the explanation of the rationale for the mixed modes 
of research adopted was explained. There is a thorough explanation regarding how the diverse 
techniques utilised in the study address the research objectives 3, 4, and, 5 in chapter 1 of this 
thesis.  The characteristics of the respondents regarding their profile, number of responses and 
other details of the case study projects are in this chapter. The chapter further provides sufficient 
justification concerning the study population, the number of interviews conducted and the choice 
of respondents. The strategies adopted at every stage of the research including the techniques for 
the collection and analysis of data collected from the study population. Approaches that further 
enhanced the data gathered based on the research instrument are justified in this chapter. 
The subsequent chapters'(i.e. Chapters 6 and 7) present the results of the case study interviews 
and the questionnaires. Also, there is the discussion of findings based on the methodology and 
analysis techniques described in this chapter in the subsequent sections of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 6 DESIGN-BUILD-
FINANCE-OPERATE ROAD 
PROJECTS CHARACTERISTICS AND 
RENEGOTIATIONS PERSPECTIVES 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reports the research undertaken within the UK PFI (DBFO) road projects, based on 
the qualitative methodology described in Chapter 5. A qualitative method through the interview 
technique for the execution of all five case studies based on objectives 3, 4 and 5 of the research 
as stated in chapter 1. Relevant and pertinent information of each of the case study project is 
discussed in this chapter towards identifying the following: factors leading to renegotiations, the 
impact of renegotiation on VfM criteria, the outcomes of renegotiation and VfM implications of 
the renegotiations amongst others. The case studies result through a cross analysis approach, and 
the empirical findings are comparatively evaluated with the literature findings to conclude the 
study objectives in the context of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation experiences. The 
findings enhance the understanding of the results of the literature and serve as instruments to pilot 
the data towards the second, advanced stage of data collection. The data collection findings of the 
second stage assisted in positioning the research towards achieving the aim and objectives 
outlined in chapter 1 of this thesis, especially the development of the VfM renegotiation 
framework. 
 CASE STUDIES RESPONDENTS PROFILE 
Nine interviewees were interviewed on five case studies, as shown in Table 6.1. There are three 
categories of questions that require answers during the case studies interviews. The first category 
elicits responses from the respondents regarding information about the position, the sector, 
academic and professional background, characteristics of the project regarding length, location 
amongst others as shown in Appendix 2. In the second category, eight sub-questions were asked 
to address objectives 3, 4 and 5 of the research. These questions as shown in Appendix 2 attempt 
to evaluate and assess the renegotiations instances to ascertain the implications of achieving VfM 
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in PFI (DBFO) road projects. In the third category, thirteen questions seek to identify the 
guidelines and measures to address problems of VfM achievement (if any) during the 
renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects (Please see Appendix 2).  
Besides, the questions asked were designed to identify instances of renegotiation, the factors 
leading the stakeholders to initiate renegotiation request, the criteria adopted to assess VfM and 
impact of the renegotiation on the VfM criteria identified including the outcomes of the 
renegotiation. The respondents were also asked to comment on the VfM achieved for the 
stakeholders especially the public client and were also asked to identify measures taken to ensure 
achievement of VfM where the respondents indicate that there is evidence of VfM achievement 
for the client. Though these respondents are reluctant and unwilling to reveal cost and profit 
information after renegotiation, they were encouraged to make some practical examples to 
evidence the achievement of VfM for the public client. The semi-structured interview technique, 
however, allows the interviewees to answer the questions openly and based on the realities of the 
individual cases. 
The findings of the preliminary interviews conducted on two case studies informed the design of 
the interview questions asked during the advanced stage of the study. An abstract of one of the 
transcripts of the interviews based on the three categories of questions asked is in Appendix 10. 
The analysis of the data collected from the five case studies leads to the development of critical 
themes and sub-themes of contract renegotiation and VfM in PFI (DBFO) road projects as 
identified and explained in subsection 5.6.2.3 of this thesis. Altogether, the profile of the case 
study respondents regarding their respective positions, sector, qualification and professional 
standing are in Table 6.1.   
Table 6.1: Respondent Profile 
S/N Case Study 
Project 
Respondent 
Code 
Sector Years of 
Experience in PFI 
Road Projects 
Respondent 
Professional 
Standing 
Qualification 
1 CS1 XY1-Pub Public 12 Chartered Engineer - 
2 CS2       XY2-Pri Private 7 - B.Sc. MBA 
3 XY3-Pub Public 9 - B.A (Hons.) 
Business Mgt. 
4 CS3 XY4-Pub Public 15 - - 
5 XY5-Pri Private 15 Chartered Engineer - 
6 CS4 XY6-Pri Private 20 Chartered Engineer B.Sc. (Hons) Civil 
Engr. 
7 XY7-Pub Public 4 Not provided Not provided 
8 CS5 XY8-Pub Public 21 Operations Engineer M.Sc. Civil 
Engineering 
9       XY9-Pri Private 20 Chartered Engineer B.Sc.(Hons) Civil 
Engr. 
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The information given by the interviewees as shown in Table 6.1 reveals that four interviewees 
are from the private sector, with five respondents from the public sector. Also, five of the 
respondents have at least a bachelor’s degree and a chartered status of relevant professional 
institutes respectively.  
The respondent’s years of experience in PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK as indicated in Table 
6.1 suggests that the respondents have significant experience of road concessions, particularly 
within the case study projects investigated. The number of years of PFI (DBFO) road projects as 
shown in Table 6.1 further reveal that the years of experience of the respondents is averagely 12 
years’ experience (i.e. six of the respondents have 12 years’ experience and above). Only three 
respondents have less than ten years’ experience of road concession experience in the UK, which 
is distinct from the general knowledge of PPP projects in the transport sector.   
Therefore, regarding the number of years of DBFO road projects experience, the results of the 
interviewees as shown in Table 6.1 suggests that the responses received can be regarded as 
reliable and valid. The reason for this submission is due to the high levels of experience, 
qualifications and professional standing gained by more than 56% of the respondents. Moreover, 
information given by the respondents regarding renegotiations and change requests is observed 
to be accurate and consistent within the data. The renegotiation experience, which is on the 
personal involvement of all the respondents on the road concessions, gives credence to the 
reliability and unbiasedness of the data. 
 OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES 
The five case studies in this section concerning their respective characteristics, project locations, 
project length, type and model of PPP including the respective procuring authorities and private 
concessionaires amongst others. The overview of the individual projects is as follows: 
 Case Study 1 (CS1) 
The road is one of the leading ones in the UK, which extends through to Bangor from Chester. 
The road project has a lateral extension to the A5, which spans through Holyhead Docks via 
Anglesey in North Wales of the UK (Daily Post, 2015). The road network starts from the M53 
motorway, also known as the Chester Southerly Bypass, and cuts the River Dee and the Welsh 
border into Bangor (Motorway Archive Trust, 2009). There is a dual carriageway with three-
lanes, which allows free flow of vehicles through the A494 and the A55 up to Chester. This road 
is the main route to Holyhead, which has a significant port that links Britain to Ireland and 
includes other aspects of the strategic E22 Euro route, which extends from the Baltic coast to 
Dublin (Laing, 2001). The road affords all traffic to access England via a single lane curve at a 
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270-degree inclination through the hill to the A55 and A494, which has a speed limit distinct from 
the 70-mph norm (Motorway Archive Trust, 2009). 
The ongoing works on the road include improvements and additional jobs partly funded by 
European money, under the Trans-European Networks programme, as the route is part of the Euro 
route E22. National Transport Plan (2012) state that the improvements to the road involved the 
removal of two roundabouts; also, there are options for transport improvements through to the 
A55/A4. National Transport Plan (2012) further appraises and evaluates the available 
opportunities to improve transport in North-East Wales and the A55/A494 areas. The works 
programme, for completion on this road, includes some possible changes as part of the planned 
improvements to the road network. These changes, which form improvements works to this 
DBFO road project, add the application of the management of the motorway, the provision of 
hard shoulders, the delivery of crawler lanes at strategic locations on the network and the redesign 
and improvement of slip roads. All of this highlights the upgrading and improvements type of 
work which is occurring on the road network. 
The concession includes the design, building, finance and operation (DBFO) of a 40km trunk 
road of which 22-miles is a dual carriageway, which is worth £101 million in construction costs, 
making the total investment in the trunk road to be about £120 million (Senedd Research, National 
Assembly for Wales, 2001). The finance of the project is made possible through £132 million 
commercial loans provided in 1998 by a consortium of international banks, which is expected to 
be recouped by the concessionaire through shadow tolls based on the availability of the road to 
users and calculated on the number of vehicles using the road network (Jakab, 2016).    
The National Assembly for Wales is the contracting authority, and the UK Highways (A55) Ltd 
is a consortium that comprises of John Laing and Carillion Private Finance, who were involved 
in this Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) road project. A Director, who oversees the 
transport directorate, heads the Network Management Division and operates as a representative 
of the public stakeholder (See Figure 6.1). Since the project is a DBFO, UK Highways (A55) Ltd 
employs the services of John Laing, Carillion Private Finance and Hyder consulting, which is a 
joint venture, saddled with the responsibility for the design and construction services. Gwynedd 
Civil Engineering acts solely as the provider of routine maintenance services (Daily Post, 2015). 
Also, there is a consortium of ten commercial banks led by Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd., Dresdner 
Kleinwort Benson and EIB acting as lenders of the funds required for the implementation of the 
concession contract. Road users are expected to commence the use of the road from the M53 
motorway, which is the Chester Southerly Bypass through the river Dee and the Welsh border 
straight to Bangor. 
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The procurement objectives of the road, according to Senedd Research, National Assembly for 
Wales (2001), is to ensure that there is a reduction of journey times for road users, including a 
reduction in the costs of operating the road for the concessionaire and road users towards attaining 
economic value. Moreover, the need to enhance safety for road users coupled with the provision 
of appropriate relief for traffic-related problems in and around the communities close to the road 
are a few of the paramount objectives of the contracting partner.  The organisations involved in 
the CS1 contract are in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Organisations Involved in the CS1 Contract 
This road project began in May 2009 with an expected end date of September 2039 (National 
Audit Office, 2010). Hence, the concession is for a 30-year period. The services commenced 
immediately after the financial close in 2009. Also, Connect Plus is entirely responsible for the 
management of the project lifecycle; though, the operations and maintenance (O&M) aspects of 
the work are executed and delivered by the Connect Plus Services, which happens to be a joint 
venture between Balfour Beatty PLC with a share of 52.5%, Atkins with a share of 32.5% and 
Egis having a 15% share. There are numerous instances of renegotiations in this case study project 
as discussed below. 
 CS1 Renegotiations 
The renegotiation of the project occurred during the operation and maintenance of the road assets 
due to changes and improvements to the road project in 2009. The changes and improvements to 
the road network include the removal of assets like CCTV and replacing them with ones of a 
different standard. The reason for these changes is because many of the options outlined did not 
work out financially during the project implementation stage. XY1-Pub justifies the reason for 
these changes, which necessitated the renegotiation of the contract as follows: “because the way 
the contract was written. It was a 1998 specification, which has a definition in the contract. CCTV 
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since 1998 has changed a lot since then”. These suggest that the old and unclear specifications 
necessitated a change in technology during the project implementation stage; this coincides with 
the literature that change in specification of assets can lead to the renegotiation of PPP road 
projects (Guasch et al., 2014; Bitran et al., 2013). 
Renegotiation requests in this contract originated from the client through the appointed designated 
representative. The client had to initiate renegotiations through the provisions of the agreement 
since the original design could not address the current needs and circumstances. The experience 
in the UK differs from the experience of renegotiations in the Latin America, Portugal and Spain 
where the private partner is the prime initiator of the renegotiation of PPP infrastructure projects, 
especially in the road sector (Guasch et al., 2014; Cruz and Marques, 2013b; Acerete et al., 2010). 
The finding, therefore, suggests that either the client or the SPV can make renegotiation requests 
for DBFO road concessions. However, in this case, the procuring authority makes renegotiation 
requests, with the requests solely initiated to address the shortcomings inherent in the contract 
specifications. In contrast, the literature findings reveal that the renegotiation requests are at the 
insistence of the private sector company and, are in most cases, influenced by the corrupt 
renegotiation environment, which includes opportunistic bids and inappropriate designs (Engel 
et al., 2014a). 
Interviewee XY1-Pub indicated that the cost of the contract regarding construction, operation and 
maintenance amongst other things remained the same even after renegotiation: “because it was 
just a small part of the contract, it did not affect the terms. Marginally, and I mean marginally, 
by like 100,000 pounds a year out of you know like a multimillion project payment”. There is the 
implication that the changes in the cost of the contract were insignificant and did not have any 
significant impact on the VfM regarding the concession projects. 
 Case Study 2 (CS2) 
The main work on this network began in 1975 and completed in 1986. The road project has been 
in existence since 1986 and spanned along the London Orbital, which links all Greater London 
(Skanska, 2009). It has an estimated length of 117 miles (188km) with essential junctions, 
including the orbital around Greater London, which makes it the second largest orbital road in 
Europe after Berliner Ring Road, and makes it one of the busiest road networks in Europe (Jakab, 
2016; O'Flaherty, 1997). Overall, CS2 connects most significant land-maps in London and 
represents one of the UK’s largest ever PPP and one of the world's most colossal orbital 
motorways. However, information on the entire road network reveals that the road network is a 
short non-motorway stretch, which can be found adjoining the Dartford crossing (A282) (CIHT, 
2008; Queiroz et al., 2008). This short non-motorway stretch technically means the CS2 is not an 
orbital motorway. 
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Furthermore, the work involved in the partnership entails O&M of the entire 188km of the M25, 
existing road and new ones, including a further 188km into London and to two of the busiest 
airports in the world, Heathrow and Gatwick (Skanska, 2009). Also, there are up to 1,800 
structures, including 750 bridges, 150 gantries, five tunnels and one long span bridge, which 
happens to be the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge. On successful completion of the road scheme, the 
following benefits are on the network: improved and more reliable journey times, reduced 
congestion, enhanced motorway safety, better driver information and faster-flowing traffic. 
The traffic levels are more than the maximum capacity designed and envisaged when the 
motorway was open to traffic in 1986. There is, therefore, the need to widen and extend the whole 
of the M25 to four lanes due to the growth in the level of traffic. The continuous rise in traffic 
levels had resulted over the years in poor and unreliable journey times up to the year 1993 when 
the number of vehicles per day on the road network increased to 200,000 vehicles, which 
represent approximately 15% of the UK motorway traffic volume (Skanska, 2016). It was, 
therefore, necessary for the client at that time to add six lanes to the road section along Junctions 
12 to Junction 15. The reliability of journey times became the objective of the procuring authority 
during the period, and there is evidence of the introduction of additional lanes to the road network 
to allow for higher traffic volume. 
Skanska UK executed the construction aspects of the project, which included four components, 
which involved the widening of the motorway to four lanes. The refurbishment of the two-lane 
tunnel, each 1.25km, follows this work towards the development of a smart highway which 
involves the widening and conversion of an additional 45km of tasks and the removal of the toll 
plaza and cash collection point which is at the crossing of Dartford. The project operates as a 
Private Finance Initiative (Design-Build-Finance-Operate) road network in England. Thus, it is a 
30-year concession, which is worth about £6.2 billion. Highways England (then known as 
Highways Agency) awarded the road concession project to the consortium of Connect Plus (M25) 
Ltd, consisting of Skanska Infrastructure Development and Balfour Beatty having 40% interest 
respectively (Skanska, 2009). Atkins and Egis also have a 10% interest respectively in the 
partnership (See Figure 6.2). Skanska UK and Balfour Beatty executed the design and build 
aspects of the work as a joint venture on a 50/50 consolidated basis (Skanska, 2009). Skanska UK 
leads the consortium with DBFO responsibility, including the maintenance of the M25 motorway 
for 30 years on behalf of Highways England. 
As a result, the organisations involved in the DBFO contract includes amongst others, the 
procuring authority, i.e. Highways England, the SPV and Connect Plus (M25) Ltd, which is 
responsible for the execution of the DBFO road. Highways England employed 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, while Connect Plus (M25) Ltd secured the services of HSBC as their 
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respective financial advisers. Highways England contributed £500 million of the estimated 
contract sum of £6.2 billion towards the financing of the project (Villalba-Romero and Liyanage, 
2016). Numerous financial lenders complemented the contribution of both the client and the 
concessionaire; these included the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 16 other commercial 
banks, i.e. Lloyds, Barclays, BBVA, SMBC, KfW, WestLB, HSBC, Bayerische, Dexia, RBS, 
Calyon, Helaba, Mitsubishi, NAB, Natixis and Societe Generale (Reuters, 2013). These 
organisations are in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2: Organisations Involved in the CS2 Contract 
This road project began in May 2009 with an expected end date of September 2039 (National 
Audit Office, 2010). Hence, the concession is for a 30-year period. The services commenced 
immediately after the financial close in 2009. Also, Connect Plus is entirely responsible for the 
management of the project lifecycle; though, the operations and maintenance (O&M) aspects of 
the work are executed and delivered by the Connect Plus Services. There are numerous instances 
of renegotiations in this case study project as discussed below. 
 CS2 Renegotiations 
The primary works of the case study project are the widening and extension of the whole of the 
road network to four lanes, because of an increase of traffic on the road and the need to add six 
lanes to the section from Junctions 12 to 15 of the M25 orbital. There have been some changes, 
which led to many renegotiations in the project. These changes and renegotiations have had a 
significant impact on the contract, which started in 2009. However, most of the renegotiations 
experienced in most of the case studies occurred during the project implementation stages. The 
renegotiations ended in 2012, and the works aspects finished in November 2014. Both 
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interviewees XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub agree that the changes led to the amendment of the terms of 
the original contract to generate equal benefits to the primary stakeholders. Currently, two 
changes are under renegotiation, with more renegotiations envisaged or expected in the future.  
The changes that have required amendments to the original contract consist of the latter upgraded 
sections, representing two areas of the small motorways; the first change to the contract happened 
in 2012 and amounted to £360 million. Since the early renegotiation of this contract occurred 
about three years after the inception of the deal, it coincides with the previous literature that PPP 
contracts are found to be renegotiated a few years after the agreement is signed (Engel et al., 
2014). The research also reinforces the notion that most renegotiations are not in the public’s 
interest (Engel et al., 2014). Hence, renegotiations have been the subject of attention across 
various policy discussions and documents across the world, which, coincidentally, justifies 
research into PPP road projects renegotiations. 
The contract defines the changes to CS2, which entails the widening of the road network and 
adding additional lanes to the road. These corroborate the supporting literature that amendments 
to the contract can agree with a clause (Salacuse, 2000). The second change in standards involved 
the M3 motorway, consisting of additional works costing up to £5 million: these were not in the 
initial contract. The third change in standards led to another contract renegotiation, including the 
removal of toll collection obligations at the Dartford crossing. Stage 1 was carried out on behalf 
of the client, which happens to be a significant renegotiation costing up to £125 million in changes 
to the contract. However, £5 million was deducted from the concessionaire by the client to award 
it to a new company. This payment is assumed to cover the initial obligation vested in the 
concessionaire, which, in the opinion of the client, would be better executed by a new and 
independent company.  
The fourth change in standards was the introduction of the new Regional Technology 
Maintenance Contract (RTMC) worth about £2.5 million. The fifth change on the contract is 
currently underway and entails the Dartford crossing (stage two), which involves the extensions 
and inclusion of new works during the operation, maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure 
projects. These works were not in all tasks envisaged in the original contract. The respondent’s 
findings further reveal that there will be two new renegotiations, one takes place in 2017 and the 
second renegotiation will take place in the future. These changes include alterations to junction 
M25 and the junction 30-improvements scheme, which was completed in the early part of 2017. 
Secondly, there was a renegotiation to adhere to safety measures required in the tunnel on the 
road orbital; these measures were based on the EU directive to avert the loss of lives because of 
future incidences of fire outbreak. 
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Both respondents XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub agreed that Highways England, which is the public 
sector procuring authority in England, had initiated these renegotiations. In contrast, the literature 
findings show that a higher percentage of the renegotiation requests are by the concessionaire 
(Cruz and Marques, 2013a; Cruz and Marques, 2013b). The first change, according to XY2-Pri 
and XY3-Pub was the latter upgraded sections, which was initiated by the procuring authority 
due to the need to add the asset that was not part of the original contract. XY3-Pub corroborates 
this previous submission: “therefore, there is a need to renegotiate the main contract because of 
the added assets.” 
XY2-Pri also states that there was a contract renegotiation because of a change in scope of the 
work, along with changes to the maintenance costs in conformity with the provisions of the 
contract. In other words, as XY2-Pri outlines: "It was an option in the contract, but it was never 
or not in detail, there is not to be a renegotiation of the contract". These imply that there were no 
detail renegotiation provisions regarding the criteria, procedures and guidelines for contract 
renegotiations. In most instances, renegotiation of contracts is usually discouraged as being 
impracticable. Small-scale changes were determined to take place under Schedule 26 of the 
DBFO contract: the schedule changes were not made available on request, as all the respondents 
considered the document to be confidential and private.  
The change to the scope of the contract, which necessitated the addition of assets, according to 
XY2-Pri, consist of £360 million to the contract sum, which is an addition to the scope of works 
required under the contract. XY3-Pub corroborates this submission and states that there is an 
increase in contract costs when there is the addition of assets, and a reduction in contract costs 
occur where there is the removal of assets. The increased contract price is because of additional 
assets. However, there was no impact on the 30-year concession. These findings support the 
varying increases and decreases in costs; the results also indicate that the rise in price can be 
desirable if the stakeholders demonstrate VfM, as contract renegotiations are expected to foster 
the value of the project. An increase in costs demonstrates VfM if the client is satisfied with the 
service provided by the SPV regarding the quality and performance of the road network which 
takes into consideration safety and journey time reliability amongst other mechanisms.  
Based on this, XY2-Pri states: “the construction was early to complete, and on the budget and to 
date there have been some minor issues and some naggings about some defects rather than 
overall quality.” Regarding the concessionaire's profit, XY2-Pri agrees with XY3-Pub: “any 
renegotiation intends to be effectively cost neutral.  None of the parties will benefit or be a 
disadvantage by it. Therefore, you are effectively pricing the change. Seeing what the impacts are 
and making sure that it is not affecting either party from profit, budget or cost perspectives”.  
One can infer from this information that the contract undergoes renegotiation in such a way that 
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there was no adverse impact on the concessionaire’s profit, user's satisfaction and other VfM 
criteria. This finding differs from the renegotiation experience identified in the literature as the 
concession cost, concession duration, concessionaires profit and user’s satisfaction were 
adversely impacted (Engel et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014). 
XY3-Pub attested to the fact that VfM is consistent throughout the contract and does not vary 
with changes; VfM remains in a state of neutrality with renegotiation because the specifications 
and outlined programme at the inception of the agreement are fix. Also, due consideration was 
given to VfM by the stakeholders at the point of renegotiation as there was no loss and no gain 
situation for the project stakeholders, which implies that VfM remains constant throughout the 
project lifecycle as defined in the contract inception. Both XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub agree that there 
is evidence regarding the achievement of VfM for their organisations. XY2-Pri substantiates that 
the outcome of the renegotiation is as follows: “Not because of the renegotiation. As I said before, 
the renegotiation is design as cost neutral. The renegotiation has not profited any of the parent 
companies or Connect Plus itself. It has not adversely impacted it". The evidence is that no party 
to the contract unduly benefitted from the renegotiation process.  
Moreover, XY3-Pub hint that there are benefits that can be attributable to the renegotiation of the 
projects, which were in detail in the Benefits Realisation Plan (BRP). However, there is a need to 
assess the document to ascertain the level of benefits from the project regarding VfM.  XY2-Pri 
also indicates that there is a guaranteed rate of return on the finances, as well as a receipt of the 
value intended from the budget for both organisations. The comparison of the budget and value 
to the current expenses on the project imply that VfM was achieved for the consortium members 
of the SPV as well as the parent body of the consortium and the client. 
Based on the financial model which represents a fixed budget required to maintain the network 
over the service year period. The success of the project regarding the achievement of VfM is 
measured based upon the financial model. XY2-Pri justifies this financial model principle: “And 
to date, we are running pretty much on the budget at about 1% to 2% around that budget". The 
findings, therefore, implies that there is evidence of VfM achievement during the renegotiations 
regarding the contract criteria and estimated cost. These reinforce XY1-Pub position, which 
identifies cost reduction as the main VfM objective of the client on the project. Hence, contract 
renegotiation in PPP road projects does not necessarily have to lead to overrunning costs, which 
is a high-performance measure regarding VfM achievement. The literature contrasts these 
empirical findings and posits that "renegotiation of transport projects have in most instances 
resulted in the provision of government support in the form of subsidies to infrastructure 
development to address that nation's infrastructure gap.” Therefore, subsidies provided in the 
private sector can lead to higher charges regarding toll charges to the users or taxpayers. 
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XY3-Pub expressed a lack of knowledge regarding the position of other stakeholders concerning 
the achievement of VfM, while XY2-Pri differs in opinion and claims that the consortium and the 
parent body, as well as the client and the lenders on the project, achieved VfM.  The reasoning 
for this, in XY2-Pri’s opinion, is that both parties have signed up for the changes and 
renegotiations; therefore, the achievement of the objectives neither improve nor hinder the 
condition for both stakeholders regarding the renegotiation. Both public and private parties 
involved in the contract have not made a loss or made any undue or unnecessary profit because 
of the renegotiations in the road concession contract. Regarding road users, XY3-Pub states: “I 
don't think our customers outside of the partnership or process of change understand the changes 
made, but all the customers (i.e. the stakeholders within the change process are all satisfied with 
changes made on the project and are all confident that there is the achievement of VfM.” This 
submission suggests that everyone within the purview of the partnership is happy with the 
outcome of the changes and consequently the renegotiation. 
 Case Study 3 (CS3) 
This case study project consists of a motorway that forms part of the national road network 
between Scotland, the North East and the South of England, which provides a strategic connection 
between the roads in the UK (Hart, 1993). This network runs from Darrington to Dishforth and 
comprises of improvement works to the current operation and maintenance of 53km of the A1 
road network, which spans between Darrington, south of the A1 /M62 interchange and the 
A1/A168 interchange at Dishforth (Highways Agency, 2011). The Highways England (then 
Highways Agency), the government, awarded the A1 route to the Road Management Services 
(RMS) in 2003 as part of its improvements programme for motorways across England. The 
upgrades involve three significant improvement programmes to the road network, which includes 
a full upgrade of the A1 road to motorway standards. Upgrading work to the A1Wetherby to 
Walshford, A1 Ferrybridge to Hook Moor and A1 Braham to Wetherby respectively (Highways 
Agency, 2011). The project is a 33-year concession, which started in February 2003 and it will 
reach completion in May 2036. The contract signed on the 13th of February 2003, and the project 
commenced on the 7th of May 2003, and the close or completion date is expected to be 6th of 
May 2036. The objective of the project is to widen the A1 road, by adding another lane, improving 
the road network and reducing congestion, thereby providing VfM for road users.  
RMS (2014) states that the project was awarded to Road Management Services Ltd for the 33-
year DBFO contract by the Highways Agency (now Highways England) for the operation and 
maintenance of the A1 (Highways Agency, 2011). However, the Road Management Services 
happens to be a consortium of numerous organisations. Indeed, the organisations involved in this 
case study project are in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3: Organisations Involved in the CS3 Contract 
As shown in Figure 6.3, the RMS, as a DBFO company, operates as a consortium, which includes 
Mouchel- Parkman, Road Management Group and Alfred McAlpine, representing the designer, 
construction contractor and operation and maintenance contractor respectively. Though the 
Highways Agency (now Highways England) awarded the 33-year DBFO contract to RMS for the 
operation and maintenance of the 53km stretch of the A1 (M) road network, the construction stage 
only lasted for three years. However, the literature indicates that after a re-tendering process in 
2011, Lafarge Tarmac's contracting division won the 8-year contract. Hence, this company 
saddled with the responsibility of ensuring proper implementation of the two Targeted 
Programmes of Improvement (TPI) schemes, which creates 24km of a new dual 3-lane motorway 
(Association of European Transport, 2003). The A1 (M) Ferrybridge to Hook Moor is estimated 
to cost £183million and A1 the (M) Wetherby to Walshford is valued at £46 million for the 
technology improvements programmes (Briggs, 2003). 
The work involved in this road project includes the design and construction of the improvements 
and maintenance of the highway, with a 30-year deadline. However, there are additions to the two 
TPI schemes between Bramham and Wetherby, which involves further upgrading works on the 
AI (DBFO) road projects, which brings the total up to £263 million for the A1 improvements 
(Association of European Transport, 2003). Thus, these improvements to the A1 (DBFO) add up 
to a total of £520 million. 
The payment mechanism on this DBFO project road is through congestion management, 
although, the first eight DBFO road projects in England are procured on shadow tolls and are on 
the number and types of vehicles used on the road. The congestion management payment 
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mechanism was adopted to reduce the congestion rate on the road network, thereby providing an 
avenue to achieve the set VfM (Villalba-Romero and Liyanage, 2016). Congestion management 
is a recent development to ensure that payment is on how well the concessionaire manages the 
congestion and improvements are going to ensure the safety of road users on the road network. 
The congestion payment is made based on the amount of traffic on the road, which is considered 
90km/hr and above. However, this payment to the concessionaire commences after substantial 
completion of improvement works on the road network and at the inception of the operation of 
the road facility. Also, the safety of road users, regarding the safety record of the road network, 
is measured based upon Personal Injury Accidents (PIA) to users, which constitutes another basis 
for payment. These mechanisms are to ensure the achievement of VfM for the road users. 
 CS3 Renegotiations 
According to respondent XY5, there is the signing of the DBFO on the 13th February 2003. The 
project commenced on the 7th May 2003 and had a contract completion date of 6th May 2036, 
i.e. the end of the contract period. The transfer of the project to the procuring authority will take 
place on or immediately after this date. Although, the contract period was extended from 30 years 
to 33 years to meet the contract requirements (Highways Agency, 2008); the government’s 
intention for initiating the road project was to implement significant improvement and 
maintenance schemes of the project. These coincide with RMS (2014), which indicates that there 
are vast quantities of structures required on the road network; there are new road infrastructure 
facilities such as CCTV and emergency telephone units that were installed to increase the number 
of existing structures. 
The data collected on this project reveals that there are changes to the standard of road assets and 
works that are in the contract documents. The standards adopted in this case are different from 
the ones agreed at the beginning of the project and exceed the monetary value of the requirements 
of the contract. The reason for these changes in the standards, according to XY5-Pri, is due to the 
provision of the agreement, which allows the contracting parties to introduce changes in the 
standards of materials, assets, and workforce, amongst other things during the project 
implementation. XY4-Pub corroborates that the changes in standards are envisaged in the 
contracts and are allowed during the implementation process of the road concession. 
Even though XY5-Pri indicates the existence of renegotiations in the contract, which are minor, 
XY4-Pub proposes that there are only changes to the agreement, rather than the reality of changes 
leading to an amendment of the deal. There are contrasting opinions regarding the renegotiation 
process of this project. XY4-Pub states: “It’s to try and keep up with current standards and best 
practice. Some of the DBFO's that were signed before their standards were established in the 
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90's. Otherwise, we pay quite a significant amount of money to change the standards. Some of 
the standards are integrated into the 1996 standards". XY5-Pri corroborates this submission by 
identifying changes to the contract: "the project operates to all new standards. Unlike all other 
PFI's which have frozen standards, we adopt all new standards". These new standards, according 
to XY5-Pri, primarily focus on roads and bridge work standards, including the supervised notes 
issued by the Highways England. However, in addition to the changes claimed by XY5-Pri, it is 
outlined that the contracting authority initiated the renegotiation experience on this project: “It 
was due to the experience they have had on other PFI projects where the standards were frozen, 
and the projects have 30 years duration date”. These imply that the client allowed the 
renegotiations of the contract to take place due to prior experience of other DBFO roads where 
the standards were frozen. 
The introduction of new standards, as indicated by XY5-Pri and XY4-Pub, attests to the 
uniqueness and distinctiveness of this concession contract in comparison to other PFI (DBFO) 
road projects. XY5-Pri notes that project standards are open to changes, and amendments are 
possible as included in the initial agreement. The reason for renegotiations of this project is on 
the need to keep up with new, modern standards and the best practices. The previous criteria 
defined in the agreement are deemed unrealistic and unsuitable to the present needs. Hence, there 
is a need to change and renegotiate the contract through the introduction of standards changes. 
XY5-Pri further attests to the existence of differences in standards in this project by identifying 
about 519 standards changes since the beginning of the concession contract in 2003. The 
introduction of these standards changes, according to XY5-Pri and XY4-Pub, reaffirm that these 
introductions were at the discretion and insistence of the client. The renegotiations according to 
XY5-Pri and XY4-Pub respectively, were based upon the client’s previous experience, i.e. 
Highways England handling other DBFO where the standards were frozen. 
 Case Study 4 (CS4) 
Case study 4 (CS4) is one of the PFI (DBFO) roads, which was procured in the 1990's as part of 
the government's Tranche 1A PFI's (Partnership UK, 2009). The length of the road is 118km, 
having two and three-lane carriageways for road users (Boles and Liyanage, 2013a). The road has 
significant conurbations and links to cities such as Newcastle, Sunderland and Middleborough. 
The Department of Transport is responsible for the management of the road on behalf of the 
government. Highways England serves as the body in charge of the regulation and handling of 
the contractual aspects of the project on behalf of the government.  
The inception of PFI's as a procurement option in the UK in 1992 provided an avenue for the 
adoption of the DBFO model in the maintenance and upgrading of existing road infrastructures 
(Highways Agency, 2012). The SPV is Autolink Concessionaires (A19) Ltd, which is currently 
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owned by Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. The contracting authority employed Autolink 
Concessionaires (A19) Ltd, i.e. Highways Agency (now Highways England) for the delivery of 
the DBFO contract. To date, Highways England and Autolink Concessionaires (A19) Ltd worked 
collaboratively in the management of the concession, as shown in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Organisations Involved in the CS4 Contract 
Scot Wilson was the design consultant for the CS4, followed by the contractor, i.e. Hanson 
Contracting who was employed by Autolink Concessionaire (A19) Ltd for the design and building 
of part of the work. Sir Robert McAlpine established a firm called Sir Robert McAlpine Routine 
Operation and Maintenance (ROM) that executed the operation and maintenance responsibilities. 
The lenders of the funds for this project were CIBC Bank, Canada, IBJ bank and Japanese bank 
as indicated in Figure 6.4. These lenders are responsible for the fund’s provision and act as 
lenders, as a last resort.  
The road project is significant to local and regional boundaries. The A1 trunk road is one of the 
most used road networks in the area. Boles and Liyanage (2013b), opine that this road provides 
additional capacity to traffic, as it allows for service to some communities across the North East 
of England to further support the carriage capacity of the A1 motorway. The basis for receiving 
tenders is on performance objectives, and bidders’ requirements, which were a shadow toll. It 
was a PFI initiative, which covers upgrading, works, operations and maintenance of the road 
network. The period required for the execution of all these works was 30 years. The break-even 
period needed to cover the costs and repay debt incurred was at 20 years from the contract start 
date. This amount of time was considered necessary to protect against the eventuality of lower 
returns, which could arise because of lower than expected traffic. Thus, this preserved the 
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investors’ response in a situation where vehicles did not reach the expected level of the shadow 
toll arrangement.  
Conclusively, changes to the regulatory framework, amongst other changes, have been identified 
as having a possible impact on the private sector. However, the government takes responsibility 
for this and in most instances, indemnifies the private sector against the implications of the 
changes. In addition to the regulatory changes, other characteristic changes and renegotiations 
occurred on the contract. These renegotiations especially, are explained in the next sub-section. 
 CS4 Renegotiations 
The SPV on this PFI (DBFO) road project identifies that the stakeholders are 20 years into the 30 
years concession, which have five core requirements to be completed. The first four requirements 
have reached completion, and the fifth one, which is the T viaduct structural refurbishment has 
been agreed to be extended until 2024 to ensure there is a profit in the technology improvements 
occasioned by the deterioration of the structure. The core requirements, according to XY6-Pri, 
include the need to build a new pathway, which stands at the sum of £48 million and involves the 
widening of the north and south areas of the T via the duct. Moreover, XY6-Pri opines that there 
is also a need to achieve the enlargement from Geo 2 lane to Geo 3 lane and to carry out 
refurbishment to a tilting bridge, which was a major crossing of the river Sunderland. The last 
requirements of this project are to fortify and assess completed road structures as part of the 
upgrading works achieved to date. There is also the need to install two emergency telephones 
north of the T side area of the road network. 
The standards of this project are currently frozen since the contract was signed in 1996, which 
implies that the standards are unchanged as stated in the 1996 agreement. Since standards change 
due to the passage of time, the contract provides an allowance for the introduction of changes to 
the contract by additional works, something which XY6-Pri indicates regarding the two 
mechanisms in the agreement through which additional works can be introduced at renegotiation. 
These mechanisms according to XY6-Pri are as follows: “The client which is the Secretary of 
State for Transport can introduce change and renegotiate those changes if he wants to. Also, 
there is a mechanism for us to promote change and the secretary of state will pay for that change. 
And there is a mechanism for us to introduce change where if we promote the change we will 
identify what needs to be improved". This statement by XY6-Pri agree with the literature, which 
identifies that renegotiation requests could be at the insistence of either the procuring authority 
or SPV (Bi and Wang, 2011). In some instances, both partners in a PPP arrangement have had a 
course to jointly initiate a renegotiation request (Cruz and Marques, 2013b). 
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So, most changes renegotiated in this contract were introduced by additional works through a 
notice from the clients in 2000, which is about three years from the contract start date. This finding 
agrees with the literature that contracts undergo renegotiation within a few years of signing the 
contract (Cruz and Marques, 2013a; Cruz and Marques, 2013a). However, the differing position 
is that the SPV as the party with a higher proportion of renegotiation requests.  
The first additional works involved a small improvement scheme for the road network. These 
other works must be separately renegotiated with Highways England depending on the value of 
the works. If the capacity of the work is high and above £100,000, it must go through the process 
of competitive tendering. The changes in standards on this project add up to the governments' 
statistics of over 400 standards introduced nationally. In most cases, the reason for renegotiating 
contracts is the obsoleteness of specified standards occasioned by the long-term nature of the 
concession. Thus, XY6-Pri states: “Yes, the standards are review and new technology introduced. 
When they (i.e., Highways England) examine the standards, they look at the new technology 
introduced and see whether they provide VfM and a safer road for the travelling public.” 
XY6-Pri states regarding the value for money achieved for the public client as follows: “We are 
now 20 years in and the condition of our network is excellent. Highways England recognises that 
there is the realisation of VfM. It is also known nationwide because people are commenting on 
the condition of the road. Some said that the condition of the road is the best and well maintained 
throughout the country". The SPV has achieved their profit objective on the contract and is 
satisfied with the outcome of the agreement to date. Similarly, the client representative agrees 
with the concessionaire about the benefit claim by the users. There is an assurance that the work 
undertaken is of the right quality and that there is the further possibility of achieving the whole 
life costs at the end of the contract period. There has been no variance between the VfM realised, 
and VfM defined for implementation at contract inception. 
Conclusively, proper collaboration and a good working relationship within the concession 
arrangement resulted in the achievement of VfM during the renegotiation of this project. A 
productive partnership will also be beneficial to everyone. The stipulation of appropriate hand-
back requirements and project plan reviews process in the contract also serves as a practice, which 
can sustain and improve the VfM defined in the agreement at inception. However, XY6 states 
that there is a need, in the PFI concession projects, for proper pre-tender administration and 
management, which seeks to appraise contractors’ estimates with a view of reducing or 
eliminating aggressive and opportunistic bids. These, in the opinion of XY6-Pri, will serve as a 
measure to further ensure VfM at the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects. The need for 
effective and efficient management of the contract, particularly at the implementation stage of 
PPP road projects, cannot be over-emphasised to actualise VfM. 
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 Case Study 5 (CS5) 
The findings of the interviews reveal that the CS5 is a 90 km motorway. According to XY9, the 
CS5 is the A74 and M74 project road that spans from the English border going north 90 km up 
to junction 12, which is in Southern Yorkshire. However, there is a section of 37 Km along the 
CS5 motorway, which spans from Glasgow to Carlisle section of the M6 in the UK that is part of 
the CS5 (Merriman, 2009). The section of the CS5 from Glasgow to Carlisle incorporates 28.2 
km from Paddy’s Rickle Bridge to Cleuchbrae, and 8.8 km from the Scottish border to junction 
44, which is north of Carlisle (Montgomery, 2015). The road project is one of the early design-
build-finance-operate road projects awarded to Autolink Concessionaires (M6) PLC by Transport 
Scotland of the Scottish Office. 
The Scottish government is the client that manages the contract through its representative at 
Transport Scotland. Autolink Concessionaires (M6) plc is the consortium of companies including 
Scott Wilson Scotland, which is responsible for the design and preparation of contract documents 
that serve as the basis for the contract administration. The contractor is Hanson, who works 
alongside Autolink in the construction of the project. Sir Robert McAlpine carries out the routine 
services, executing the operation and maintenance. Clearview Intelligence Ltd serves as the traffic 
measurement contractor that quantifies and measures the number of vehicles using the road for 
shadow toll payment.  
The EIB led other commercial banks to provide the loan for 25 years towards the execution of 
the DBFO road project, which require the inclusion of the upgrading and enlargement of the road 
to full dual 3-lane motorway standard, which spans the entire between Glasgow and Carlisle (EIB, 
1997).  Though, EIB (1997) identifies the length of the road project to be 100Km. However, the 
findings of the interviews from both public and private sector partners reveal that the length of 
the road project is 90 km from the English borders going north 90km up to junction 12, which is 
in Southern Yorkshire. Therefore, there is a different position regarding the submission of this 
literature and the findings of the interviews conducted with both respondents on CS5. This study, 
however, adopts the 90 km road length indicated by both respondents on CS5. The DBFO road 
is to be operated by the SPV and maintained for 30 years. Thus, Autolink is entitled to receive 
shadow payment from the UK government for the actual number of cars using the road. This 
award was made on behalf of the Scottish Ministers on a concession basis as shown in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5: Organisations Involved in the CS5 Contract 
This road is different from the M6 toll road in England, though it shares the same name with that 
of England, it is an un-tolled road called the Scotland M6 DBFO (EIB, 2007). XY9-Pri outlines 
that the road spans all the way from Birmingham in England to Glasgow in Scotland and has its 
historical roots dating back to the time it was known as the M74. There are three shareholders of 
this road project, and this includes Sir Robert McAlpine, Innisfree and John Laing Infrastructure 
as indicated in Figure 6.5. Moreover, XY9-Pri notes that although it is confusing and somehow 
impossible to distinguish between the M6 and the M74 as the name M74 was also retained by the 
Scottish government to be used for the road; the M6 DBFO road spans to the English border and 
connects the M74. XY9-Pri corroborates this, by stating: “When the contract was set up, it was 
part of the process to make the M6 run from Glasgow to Birmingham, which is why it is called 
the M6 DBFO. It is confusing, but it is known as the M74". Furthermore, and according to XY8-
Pub, the project is necessarily a DBFO and extends to a length of 90km long of two dual-lane 
motorway hard shoulders. These go from junction 12 of the M74 Scotland road down to the 
Scottish border and the M6 axis, 90 km, which represents the current motorway. 
The current motorway includes all new works for the project including the 60km of the entire 
length of the road along the Eco-branch junction, which provides access to the whole network. In 
addition to this intersection, the new works include the M74 DBFO road project in Scotland, 
which reached completion in the year 1999. XY9-Pri divide the construction aspect of the works 
into three central section’s that are completed one after the other. The first 30 km was constructed 
as part of the first phase of the project while a further 30 km road length to the south of the built 
section, and another 30 km to the north of the M74 DBFO road project. These roads are part of 
the upgraded section. However, since the completion of these constructions and upgrading works 
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in 1999, there has been consistent maintenance and renewing or resurfacing of the road network 
in the context of the activities required for the operation stage of the road network.  
The contract start year was 1997, and the road becoming operational in 1999 with an expected 
completion date of July 2027. Thus, the project currently stands at 20-year duration with a 30-
year concession period, and it indicates a two-third completion level of the PFI DBFO project. 
XY8-Pub and XY9-Pri agree that there are renegotiations occasioned by the evidence of specific 
changes to the contract. 
 CS5 Renegotiations 
XY8-Pub and XY9-Pri acknowledge the existence of minor changes and variations leading to 
few instances of renegotiations on the CS5. According to XY8-Pub, this is on minor additional 
works requirements such as barriers and railways, flooding and change in climatic and weather 
conditions. XY8-Pub outlines: “Yes, I can give you some examples of this, but those that apply 
as I said are minor drainage, small signage, minor safety barrier, and sub-flood mitigation 
works.” XY9-Pri agrees with this submission and comments: “To be honest, there have been very 
few. I think because the DBFO is quite a new concept, I think the clients have been very wary of 
making any changes. So, even when it doesn't make sense, they stick very rigidly to the project 
agreement.” The changes made on this project do not necessitate significant renegotiation, which 
indicates that renegotiations experienced on this road project are minor and insignificant.  
XY8-Pub further substantiates this by stating: “So to date; we have not had many renegotiation 
instances.” Indeed, the minor renegotiations that occur on the project, according to both 
interviewees, took place at the contract renewals stage when some changes take place during the 
operation and maintenance period. More importantly, XY9-Pri indicates that the project has less 
to do with renegotiation; renegotiation is on the leading factors or reasons rather than the DBFO 
contract. According to XY9-Pri, the motive behind the minor renegotiation experienced on this 
project, which emanates from the insistence of the client, i.e. Transport Scotland, was politically 
motivated and borders on the desire, by the members of the parliament, to renegotiate the terms 
of the contract to meet constituency demands. Some changes are occasional at the insistence of 
the SPV.  
Furthermore, XY8-Pub state that the outcome of this minor renegotiation of the DBFO road 
project has been satisfactory to the public sector. These are because there was strict compliance 
with the terms of the contract, which made no allowance for changes or variations. Therefore, no 
action was required after the renegotiation because there had been no negative impact on the 
contract sum. The costs are a lump sum and are on a one-off payment with very few recurring 
costs. Thus, the changes to the project do not impact the payments made by the client to the 
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concessionaire or increase the concessionaire's profit and the contract duration amongst other 
things. These further substantiates previous suggestions that renegotiation does not necessarily 
have to affect VfM criteria or project objectives negatively.  
XY9-Pri also agrees with XY8-Pub: "the fact of the matter is that there has been no renegotiation. 
In the client's view, they quite perceive that DBFO is quite an expensive way to procure 
construction. I mean, it is the only way they can get money to fund the project at the time, but it 
is quite an expensive mechanism. Therefore, for that reason, they do not want to spend any more 
money, and so they do not want to change anything because of the risk as that may expose them 
to more cost. So, everything is the same.” Though, there is the suggestion that there have been no 
amendments to the contract deliverables of cost and time because of client’s non-disposal to 
contract renegotiation and refusal to renegotiate the terms of the contract. The findings from the 
respondents, however, indicates that cost and time remain the same due to client efforts at 
ensuring that no overruns are arising because of changes to the contract, which may be regarding 
standards and specifications. Summarily, changes and renegotiation incidences during the 
implementation of PFI road projects can be avoided to ensure that there is the achievement of the 
budgeted cost and specified time during execution of the project plan. However, the minimisation 
or avoidance of renegotiation and changes during the implementation of PFI road projects should 
not be the only solution to the problem of inadequate or non-achievement of VfM at renegotiation. 
Also, XY8-Pub and XY9-Pri further agree that the respective stakeholders (i.e. client, SPV, 
lenders and users are happy with the results of the renegotiation. However, XY8-Pub outlines that 
there have been minor complaints from users regarding minor maintenance issues, such as minor 
defects on the roads, rather than on the overall quality of the roads. The few renegotiation 
incidences have not had any significant impact on the achievement of VfM. The revenue of the 
project has been affected by the recession, which necessitates changes to the financial model 
because of the variance experienced between the actual traffic and the assumed growth rate of 
traffic in the financial model. According to XY8-Pub, the incorporation of these changes does not 
change the terms of the financial model but reflect the same principle and characteristics of the 
financial model.  
Conclusively, XY8-Pub and XY9-Pri agree that there are no general and specific VfM targets 
defined during the strategic implementation stages of the contract. The non-inclusion of VfM 
marks at these phases of the project may be due to the standards required for the works and 
because all aspects of the concession were frozen and do not allow for contract renegotiation at 
the contract formation stage. XY8-Pub indicates that there are procedures for measuring the 
success of renegotiations regarding whether the achievement of VfM. The responses received 
from XY9 contrasted with those of XY8-Pub regarding the establishment of the renegotiation 
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criteria at the inception of the contract and indicated that there was no procedure adopted when 
assessing the minor renegotiation experienced regarding the achievement of VfM. This 
submission corroborates XY1-Pub opinion and suggests that there is a need for the definition of 
renegotiation criteria at contract inception to foster the success of VfM efficiently and effectively.  
VfM is not measured at strategic renegotiation points, as claimed by both parties in the contract 
on this project. XY8-Pub and XY9-Pri determine that necessary measures should be adopted to 
ensure that VfM achievement during the renegotiation stage. One of the rules, according to XY8-
Pub and XY9-Pri, is that the variations and changes should be made to ensure cost neutrality or 
savings and to foster the achievement of VfM. Also, there is a need to establish VfM as the basis 
of the decision to renegotiate the contract, while also ensuring that all the parties in the 
renegotiation have adequate concession renegotiation experience. 
Also, there is a need to establish a benchmark, which is on industry standards that follows a 
competitive process. Sets of indices are, however, advised to be placed against the parameter to 
allow for accurate estimation and evaluation. A productive collaboration and regular discussion 
between the contracting parties and partners at the inception of the contract is beneficial. Another 
measure, recommended by these respondents, is that the project stakeholders’ profits should be 
distributed evenly throughout the project lifecycle to ensure the achievement of the whole life 
cycle cost as described in the contract. The establishment of necessary restrictions in the 
agreement regarding what is allowed and what is not authorised is considered helpful and will go 
a long way in preserving the VfM defined at inception. These measures support the suggestions 
of Guasch et al. (2014) to address renegotiation challenges to ensure the achievement of VfM. 
 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
This section presents the analysis of the case studies based on the data collected from the nine 
respondents from both the public and the private sector. The discussion of the findings is premise 
on the objectives defined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 Renegotiation Characteristics and Types 
The findings of this study reveal the respective stages of PFI (DBFO) road projects that are 
characterised by renegotiations on the case studies and the year that the contract commenced 
including the year that the first renegotiation takes place. Details regarding the experience of each 
of the case studies as indicated by the individual respondents are in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2: Renegotiation Type and Stage of Occurrence  
S/N Case 
Study 
Stage of Occurrence Contract Start Year of 1stRenegotiation 
1 CS1 Operation and Maintenance 2004 2010 
2 CS2 Construction 2009 2012 
3 Construction  2009 2012 
4 CS3 - 2003 - 
5 Financial close of the contract 2003 2003 
6 CS4 Operation and Maintenance 1997 2010 
7 Operation and Maintenance 1997 2010 
8 CS5 Operation and Maintenance 1997 1999 
9 Operation and Maintenance 1997 1999 
Key: CS1: Case study 1. CS2: Case study 2 CS3: Case study 3. CS4: Case study 4. CS5: Case 
study 5. 
Also, the findings of these case studies reveal that renegotiation occurs on average, three years 
from the contract start date, which is usually close to the end of the construction or shortly after 
the beginning of the operation and maintenance, as indicated in Table 6.2. The only exception is 
found in CS3 where one respondent demonstrates that renegotiations occurred shortly after the 
financial close during the implementation of the contract, which suggests that the renegotiation 
falls within the construction stage. Thus, the type of renegotiations that occur in these case studies, 
as shown in Table 6.2, agrees with the literature, which states that the infrastructure construction 
contract falls under intra-deal renegotiations, which occur during the implementation period of 
the contract (Salacuse, 2000). 
Renegotiation in infrastructure contract such as PPP contract in most instances does not occur 
before the financial close; neither does it happen at the end of the concession contract, i.e. post 
deal renegotiations. Though, renegotiation may occur at the end of a concession contract during 
the defect liability period between the public and private partner about issues that may surround 
the residual value required for the transfer of the project to the procuring authority. The literature 
has identified that underestimation of risks premised on inadequate knowledge, resources and 
capabilities by the parties to manage them effectively may lead to increased costs, project delays 
and services which fail to deliver value-for-money to the community (Ng and Loosemore, 2007). 
When the risks affect the residual value of the construction product at the end of the partnership, 
either party may seek to renegotiate terms of transmission of the residual value, take, for example, 
PPP road network quality and maintenance level. However, renegotiations and changes to the 
contract occur too often or early in the concession contract process, which suggests that the results 
or outcomes of the renegotiations may be affected because of the early renegotiations and 
changes. Though, incidences of renegotiation cover every stage of the PPP project. 
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These case study findings further corroborate the literature, which states that most PPP contracts, 
especially in the road sector, are renegotiated within a few years after the financial close (Engel 
et al., 2014a). As indicated in the case studies, CS1 renegotiations occurred in 2010, which was 
six years after the contract start date. Both respondents of CS2 and CS4 agree regarding the 
renegotiation experience of 2012 and 2010 respectively, which in both cases are within the first 
three years after the contract start date. Respondents to CS5 also indicate that renegotiation 
experience began two years from the contract start date. However, the respondents from CS3 did 
not provide any details regarding renegotiations, which may be because of the existence of more 
changes to the contract, rather than a renegotiation of the contract (See Appendix 9). 
Since contract renegotiations are on good intentions, the findings suggest that renegotiations may 
take place within the contract at the advanced stage of project implementation as opposed to the 
early stages of the agreement. However, the prevailing renegotiation situation needs to be 
examined to define and establish necessary measures that could discourage initial change requests 
through the incorporation of change modalities into the contract. 
 Factors Leading to Renegotiation 
Diverse factors have led to the renegotiation of the identified case studies. Change in the standard 
of works is one of the most commonly mentioned factors that influence the renegotiation of the 
road concessions, being mentioned by eight out of the nine respondents, i.e. 89% of the sampled 
population. Changes to standards of works are recognised by all the respondents in the case 
studies, excluding XY9-Pri, and it includes all associated work to the improvements, extensions 
and upgrading of the road concessions as indicated by the respective interviewees. These changes 
could include CCTV, speed cameras on the highway and other facilities installed on the road 
infrastructure concession. Other factors prominent factors leading to the renegotiation of road 
concession projects among which is the addition of road assets. The acquisition of road assets can 
be additional works introduced by one or both primary stakeholders. Changes to the scope of the 
work and response to the provisions of the original contract are also factors identified in three 
case study projects.  
Also, the results of the data collected reveal that one respondent only identifies some of the 
individual factors out of the total nine respondents, which suggest that the factors identified by a 
single respondent are non-critical factors leading to the renegotiation in comparison to other 
factors identified. These factors include adverse weather seasons that may be due to the winter 
months, political motivations to meet constituency demands, poorly written contracts and 
previous experience of other DBFO road projects, which are: environmental, political, design and 
related contractual factors respectively. The findings of the responses in these case studies reveal 
that the answers provided by XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub in CS2 are consistent, as shown in Table 6.3.  
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Table 6.3: Factors Leading to Renegotiations 
S/N Factors Leading to 
the Renegotiation 
Case Study Projects/ Respondents Freq. Rank 
CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 
XY1-
Pub 
XY2-
Pri 
XY3-
Pub 
XY4-
Pub 
XY5-
Pri 
XY6-
Pri 
XY7-
Pub 
XY8-
Pub 
XY9-
Pri 
1 Changes in standards 
of works as stated in 
the specification e.g. 
Technology such as 
CCTV 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
8 1 
2 Addition of road 
assets e.g. new 
works. 
√ √ √ √    √  5 2 
3 Change in scope of 
works 
 
√ √ 
    
√ 
 
3 3 
4 Response by the 
parties to provisions 
of the original 
contract 
  
√ 
 
√ 
  
√ 
 
3 3 
5 Need to ensure a 
safer road for 
travelling public 
     
√ 
 
√ 
 
2 5 
6 Change in pricing 
and service 
  
√ 
    
√ 
 
2 5 
7 To provide VfM 
benefits for the 
public 
  √   √    2 5 
8 Changes to 
government 
legislation and 
regulation 
        
√ 1 8 
9 Adverse weather 
season, e.g. winter 
months 
        
√ 1 8 
10 Political reason to 
meet constituency 
demands 
        
√ 1 8 
11 Poorly written 
contracts 
√ 
        
1 8 
12 Previous experience 
of other DBFO road 
projects 
    √     1 8 
 
Total 3 3 6 2 3 3 2 6 3 31 
 
  
However, there is an indication that respondent XY3-Pub of CS3 and respondent XY8-Pub of 
CS5 possess sound and substantial knowledge regarding the factors leading to the renegotiations 
in comparison to other respondents in the remaining case studies. The number of reasons stated 
by these respondents as shown in Table 6.3 provides evidence that they are more aware of what 
led to the renegotiation. Factors leading to the renegotiations of these case studies, as revealed in 
the results of the interviews are shown in Table 6.3. Summarily, the factors, which can lead to the 
renegotiation of road concessions and include changes to standards of works, additional road 
assets and changes in the scope of the works amongst other things, as explained in the following 
subsection: 
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 Changes in Standards of Works 
XY1-Pub in CS1 attests that changes in standards during the implementation process occurred 
because of changes to technology: “But obviously, technology changes very quickly, and the way 
the contract was written did not account for that very well. To comply with the contract, they will 
be renewing old technology that didn’t suit our needs”. This old type of technology in the opinion 
of XY1-Pub include CCTV whose standard dates to 1998, which in the opinion of XY1-Pub, had 
changed from the specification of standards CCTV that was made in the year 2017. XY4-Pub 
corroborates this submission and further states that: “It is on standards and the current practice. 
It is to try to keep up with current standards and best practice”. The current practice and standards 
are assumed to be the accepted standards in the industry. Experience reveals that PPP projects are 
long-term contracts, which take between 25-30 years to complete.  
XY7-Pub further give credence to changes in standards of works as the leading renegotiation 
factor: “Because the new standards are trying to make the road more consistent with the 
standards that are operating on the rest of the strategic road network." The essence of the 
renegotiations in CS5 is to keep up with the current and best standards, due to the long duration 
of the concession contract and obsoleteness of specified materials and components standards. 
Although at the inception stage of PPP projects in the UK, contracts are defined in a rigid format, 
which makes it practically impossible to amend any terms during implementation. XY7-Pub 
substantiate this submission as follows: “The contract does not recognise any change in standards 
as such because the contract was agreed to the standards that were in vogue at the time.”  
Moreover, XY6-Pri corroborate the submission of XY7-Pub on CS4 as follows: “As I said, we 
are locked in the 1996 standards by Highways England”.  Hence, most of the early case studies 
have their set standards without making any provisions for the renegotiation of standards during 
the implementation of the project. XY6-Pri reaffirms XY7-Pub statement: “Yes, there are 
changes in standards, and we introduced those changes in 2009, and we negotiated it with 
Highways England to modify the contract to introduce the change in standards”. Therefore, 
changes in standards begin to set in many years after the road concession, as shown in CS4, where 
there was weakness inherent in the initial contract regarding performance and VfM. Meaning that 
most renegotiations in PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK involve changes to the standards of 
works.   
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 Addition of Road Assets 
For instance, XY3-Pub in CS2 indicates: “For the latter upgraded sections, we change the DBFO 
and added assets that were not part of the original contract. Therefore, there is a need to 
renegotiate the main contract”. The addition of assets was identified as a leading renegotiation 
factor, which corroborates XY1-Pub claim that this was one of the reasons for the minor 
renegotiation that occurred in CS1.  Other respondents, i.e. XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub, also agree 
that the addition of assets has a degree of influence on the renegotiation of the road concession 
projects. 
A change can be declared for either the removal or addition of assets. The removal of assets may 
be caused by some reasons, which may include obsoleteness of assets because of time, as 
identified by XY1-Pub. XY3-Pub indicates that while there is a change declaration for the 
removal of assets by the contracting authority as in the case of CS2, there is a reduction in the 
cost of the project. However, there has been the introduction of new assets, which has led to an 
increase in the value of the projects. Thus, the addition of assets, which constitutes additional 
works in the concession project, was identified in three of the five case studies. The responses to 
these case studies reveal that there are consistencies in the answers provided by the respondents 
in CS2 as shown in Table 6.3. XY1-Pub corroborate the reasons given earlier for the renegotiation 
and states that: “To comply with the contract, they will be renewing old technology that didn’t 
suit our needs. So, we decided to take it out” These indicates that the removal and addition of 
assets can necessitate renegotiation, as outlined in the literature (Sarmento, 2014). 
 Change in Scope of Works 
The scope of the works, according to the respondent’s discussion, relies on the extent and 
magnitude of the work agreed during the inception of the project and detailed in the contract. 
XY2-Pri agrees that changes to the scope of works are one of the main factors leading to the 
renegotiation as follows: “The fact that the scope of work change from what was originally 
intended makes that renegotiation slightly more complicated when drawn out than what was 
originally anticipated”. These suggest that the scope of work could change during the 
implementation process of the road concession and could necessitate renegotiation. XY8-Pub 
agrees with XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub by expanding on the notion that the contract agreement can 
influence the changes that can be made to the scope of work: “The contract is under code and 
agreement with Transport Scotland, and that affected the scope of the works and obligation”. 
Thus, the provisions of the contract, as stated by a clause, could necessitate changes to the scope 
of the works. 
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 Response to the Provisions of the Original Contract 
XY2-Pri outlines the renegotiation incidences in the CS2: “It was always put in as an option in 
the contract, but it was never or not in detail, there is not to be a renegotiation of the contract”. 
There is the implication that although renegotiation was envisaged as a possibility and envisaged 
in the original contract, which necessitated the renegotiation; a detailed description of its 
modalities was not stated as explained that renegotiation should be avoided as far as possible. 
However, the contract underwent renegotiation based on the contract clause introduced, which 
made provision for it. XY2-Pri highlights: “There is a process in the contract for the strategic 
changes procedure. Any other type of change that occurs has been envisaged and has a process 
within the original contract. Whether they are a change in the law, a change of standards, etc. 
Highways England stipulates them all”. These findings show that there is usually a change and 
renegotiation description in the contract, which outlines the modalities for a decision regarding 
contract renegotiations, as indicated by the respondents in the CS2 as shown in Table 6.3. 
 Need to Ensure a Safer Road for the Travelling Public 
XY6-Pri also indicates that the renegotiation, which occurred in CS4, was to ensure that road 
users and members of the public derived utility from the road output and achieved VfM for the 
use of the road. VfM is demonstrated by the low level of lane closures and the number of 
disruptions to service users, as the concessionaires ensured that there would be a minimum level 
of service disruptions to road users, and all the stakeholders especially the client at renegotiation 
targeted this objective as part of the most significant goal of the private concessionaire. 
 Change in Pricing and Service 
Concerning changes in prices and services XY3-Pub states: “In some sections, we have removed 
the hard shoulder which is essentially in changing the way the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
can provide services in the respective locations. So, that was a change in pricing and service”. 
The modalities and procedure for service provision were changed and revised. Because of these 
changes, there was also a change in the basis for tender, which necessitated renegotiation in the 
CS2 as stated by XY3-Pub.  
 To provide VfM Benefits for the Members of the Public 
There is an agreement by XY2-Pri regarding the existence of guidelines to assess the respective 
changes, which constitute the reason for renegotiation requests by the responsible stakeholder and 
must be followed to achieve VfM. This guideline as stated by XY2-Pri is as follows: “Each 
change has a reason. There is a reason for each change to take place. In every case, there will 
be a benefit. A VfM change on the network. So, concerning actual change, there will be VfM 
criteria set and achieved. Then the actual renegotiation will always cost neutral”. Hence, the 
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implication of this is that there is the need to establish factors leading to renegotiation and to 
ascertain the renegotiation of specific objectives defined by the public sector. In the case of CS2, 
the basis for granting renegotiations is on cost neutrality conditions, to meet the VfM aim of the 
procuring authority. 
 Other Factors Leading to Renegotiation 
There are other factors identified in Table 6.3, which are considered by the respondents as leading 
to the renegotiation of the case studies. The assumption is that these other factors may not be 
significant to the stakeholders considering the number of respondents that indicated that they are 
relevant to their projects. These other factors, in order of their prominence, include the need to 
make the road more consistent with the standards that are operating on other strategic road 
networks, changes to the legislation, regulation, and adverse weather season, e.g. winter months 
etc. However, these factors, as shown in Table 6.3, are observed to fall within the regulatory and 
legal considerations, environmental factors, political factors and design factors.  
Consequently, the findings of the responses in these case studies reveal that there are consistencies 
in the answers provided by XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub in CS2 as shown in Table 6.3. However, the 
responses given by other respondents concerning the reasons necessitating renegotiation do not 
seem to agree, in some instances, with the findings of the literature. The literature identifies 
regulatory and design factors as the prominent categories of factors leading to the renegotiation 
of road projects in a PPP road project environment (Please see Table 3.4 in this thesis). The 
regulatory and design factors having a high level of importance include weak regulatory 
framework; varying types of tariff regulations; governance and regulatory effectiveness; 
inaccurate estimation of traffic levels; misallocation of traffic risks and poorly written contracts 
(See Table 3.4 of section 3.6). 
Hence, the findings of the literature differ from the empirical results and indicate that regulatory, 
design, political and contractual category factors are the principal factors, which can lead to the 
renegotiation of PPP road projects by their significance. Summarily, the factors influencing 
renegotiations of PPP road projects can differ from one road project to another as observed in 
Latin American countries where renegotiations were all motivated by varying factors, which are 
distinct from the findings of this empirical study, as shown in Table 6.3. Therefore, there may be 
may be variance in the renegotiation outcomes from one project to the other because of the 
differences in the factors prompting the stakeholders to renegotiate the PPP road projects. 
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 Initiator of Renegotiation 
The case study findings, concerning the initiation of the renegotiation as shown in Table 6.4, 
reveal that six of the respondents indicated that the public client (i.e. procuring authority) was the 
initiator of the renegotiation of four out of the five case studies. The findings suggest that most 
of the renegotiation requests are at the insistence of the procuring authority. However, both 
respondents in CS5 agree that the public and private sector parties initiated the renegotiation. The 
only contrasting opinions were those given by both respondents in CS4, i.e. XY6-Pri and XY7-
Pub, which indicated that the public client and the private partner were the initiators of the 
renegotiation. This submission may be correct since both stakeholders are only speaking from 
their personal experiences on the projects, as both parties may jointly initiate the renegotiations. 
Hence, the initiators of the renegotiation may be the public client or SPV or both public client 
and SPV in each instance of renegotiation as shown in Figure 6.4.  
Table 6.4: Initiator of Renegotiation 
S/N Renegotiation 
/ Change 
Initiator 
Case Study Projects/ Respondents Frequency 
CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 
XY1-
Pub 
XY2-
Pri 
XY3-
Pub 
XY4-
Pub 
XY5-
Pri 
XY6-
Pri 
XY7-
Pub 
XY8-
Pub 
XY9-
Pri 
1 Public client √ √ √ √ √ 
 
√ 
  
6 
2 Both public 
client and SPV 
       
√ √ 2 
3  SPV 
     
√ 
   
1 
 
Total 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
 
Table 6.4 shows that the client mostly initiates renegotiation requests; the reason for this may be 
to fulfil the VfM objectives defined in the contract. The results of the renegotiation initiator 
substantiate some of the findings within the UK context regarding the initiators of renegotiations 
and change requests: “Nearly all changes originated with a request from the public sector rather 
than from the private sector contractor or because of a change in law” (Hasselgren et al., 2014). 
In contrast, Cruz, and Marques (2013b) identify more private sector-led renegotiations in Portugal 
PPP road projects. These suggest that there are variations regarding the initiator of renegotiation 
requests across countries, including the instances of both changes and renegotiations respectively. 
These empirical findings reveal that the public sector is the common renegotiation initiator, which 
coincides with the literature of UK PPP renegotiation studies.  
PPP renegotiation studies in other countries, where the private concessionaire typically initiates 
renegotiations have the experience of non-achievement or poor achievement of VfM, especially 
in the public sector (Engel et al., 2014b; Cruz and Marques, 2013b). Therefore, the primary 
stakeholders’ renegotiation initiative and the motives for the renegotiation have a lot to do with 
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the VfM achieved during the renegotiation of road concessions. Hence, renegotiation of 
concession projects should not be founded on opportunistic tendencies of the private partner 
towards attaining personal benefits to the detriment of the public-sector client value for money 
objectives (Engel et al., 2014b; Bi and Wang, 2011). Therefore, renegotiation should be 
cooperative, initiated by the public sector and agreed by the private partner, or both, as in the case 
of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects, where there are records of achievement of VfM at 
renegotiations initiated by the procuring authorities.  
 Main Impacts of the Renegotiation 
The value for money criteria has been identified in chapter 5 of this thesis to encompass the 
variable cost, quality of service delivery, duration, SPV profit, whole life cost (WLC), and user’s 
satisfaction etc. (Public PPP Malaysia, 2009). The renegotiation of PPP infrastructure projects 
has had an impact on the VfM criteria (Carbonara et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014). Fourteen VfM 
criteria are the basis for assessing PPP infrastructure projects during renegotiations (See 
subsection 4.7). The interviewees show that there is an agreement concerning the impact of the 
renegotiations, which are related to CS1, CS2, CS3 and CS4 respectively. Only XY8-Pub in CS5 
indicated that the renegotiation impacted the performance-based payment mechanism. The 
empirical study, therefore, revealed that the renegotiation mostly has an impact on construction 
cost and performance-based payment mechanism. The smallest effect of the renegotiation was 
found to be regarding whole life costs and construction duration as shown in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Main Impacts of the Renegotiation on VfM Criteria 
S/N Renegotiation 
Impacts 
Case Studies/ Respondents Freq Rank 
  
CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5   
  
XY1 
-Pub 
XY2 
-Pri 
XY3 
-Pub 
XY4 
-Pub 
XY5 
-Pri 
XY6 
-Pri 
XY7 
-Pub 
XY8 
-Pub 
XY9 
-Pri 
  
1 Construction cost √ √ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
   
4 1 
2 Performance based 
payment mechanism 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
4 1 
3 Concession duration 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
   
3 3 
4 Competition that 
provides fair value 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
   
3 3 
5 Concessionaires 
profit 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
2 5 
6 Users satisfaction 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
2 5 
7 Private sector mgt. 
skills& expertise 
 
√ 
   
√ 
   
2 5 
8 Quality of service 
delivery 
   
√ 
 
√ 
   
2 5 
9 Construction 
duration 
 
√ 
       
1 9 
10 Whole life cycle 
cost 
     
√ 
   
1 9 
 
Total 1 8 0 5 0 9 0 1 0   
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In these case studies, respondents XY2-Pri and XY6-Pri identified that renegotiations have a more 
significant impact. The most significant effect of renegotiations is the cost and the variation in 
the cost of construction, which borders on the technical stage and borders of changes in standards, 
specifications and scope of work. Although, the findings in Table 6.5 determine otherwise and 
include construction costs, performance-based payment mechanism, concession/construction 
duration and quality of service delivery.  
There is a suggestion that the factors leading to renegotiation at the technical stage of project 
development (i.e., construction stage) may have a direct impact on the criteria of costs at the 
construction stage of the PPP projects. These coincide with the XY2-Pri statement: “The benefit 
of Skanska, my parent company, was that for example with the later upgrading sections, which 
was the £360Million additional worth of construction works. The added worth of construction 
works was to the construction joint venture (JV), which was 50% to Skanska. Skanska, therefore, 
has additional works there, but the additional work cannot be connected to the SPV services. 
What we have generated is additional construction value, which cannot be attributed to the 
concessionaire”. The statement of XY2-Pri, therefore, suggest that the SPV has not benefitted 
nor had the profit increased to the detriment of the public sector as shown in Table 6.6.
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                  Table 6.6: Case Studies Cost and Time Differences 
S/N Project
Code 
Respondent 
Code 
Project 
Location 
Estimated Cost 
of Construction 
(£) M 
Cost of 
Construction to 
Date (£) M 
Cost 
Variance 
(£) M 
Time 
Variance 
(Months) 
Cause of Variance 
1  
CS1 
 
XY1-Pub 
 
Wales 
101 100.7 0.3 6 months 
early 
- Minor changes and renegotiation of the projects. 
- Project objective of cost reduction strictly adhered  
- Renewals, which sticks to contract cost and time provisions  
2  
CS2 
 
XY2-Pri 
 
England 
982.9 1,343 
 
 
360.0 
 
No time 
variance.  
Changes in the scope of work from what was initially intended, i.e., the later upgrading 
sections was an additional worth of construction works that constitute an addition to 
contract scope. The renegotiation was slightly more complicated than what was initially 
anticipated. 
3 
 
 
XY3-Pub 
 
England 
 
1, 133 
132.5 
 
 
On time.  
- New tasks involving the management of the road, i.e. operate and maintain the toll plaza 
and to collect the toll on behalf of the client. 
- Additional works were culminating in additional capital investment, which necessitates 
other payments, which was not envisaged in the original contract. 
-. Where a change is declared to remove assets, there is a reduction in the cost of the 
project. So, where we have introduced new assets, there has been an increase in the cost 
of the projects. 
4 CS3  
XY4-Pub 
 
England 
250 250 No cost 
variance 
On time No difference because of payment of a fixed fee for changes in standards occasioned by 
obsolete specifications 
5 
 
 
XY5-Pri 
 
England 
Estimated cost of 
construction 
achieved    
No cost 
variance 
On time The 519 changes in standards as requested by the client do not necessitate amendment of 
the contract terms, e.g., risks, prices and changes are envisaged and included in the 
original contract. 
6  
CS4 
 
XY6-Pri 
 
England 
935 1,0005 70.0 6 months 
early 
A total of 200 changes, which constitute additional works instructed by the client and 
successfully introduced by the SPV. 
7 
 
 
XY7-Pub 
 
England 
-  No cost 
variance 
On time.  No variance, the work executed was within the premise of the contract without 
necessarily changing the basis of the agreement. 
8  
CS5 
 
XY8-Pub 
 
Scotland 
170 - No cost 
variance  
No time 
variance 
-. Additional barriers & handrails, which were included in the contract 
-. Variations occasioned by flood and climate change more than expected necessitate 
payment for mitigation measures for the floods. 
9 
 
 
XY9-Pri 
 
Scotland 
170.0 Zero cost 
implication 
to the client 
 
On time 
Politically motivated and law enforcement agencies variations regarding customer care 
signs leading to additional numbers of road signs based on specification requested by the 
client. That was again another politically driven initiative. 
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Table 6.6 evaluates the cost and time criteria adopted to assess the impact of renegotiation and 
change negotiation on VfM. The results of Table 6.6 indicate that there is evidence of reduction 
additions to cost during the construction stage on three case studies, i.e., CS1, CS2 and CS4 as 
indicated by XY1-Pub, XY2-Pri, XY3-Pub and XY6-Pri. On CS1, XYI-Pub suggests that there 
is a cost reduction of £300 million per year during the three years of the construction stage. The 
reduction leads to a reduction in the contract sum according to the client objective of reducing the 
value of the project. On CS2 and CS4, however, there are increases in cost because of the 
introduction of additional works some of which are in the contract. The additions lead to increase 
in construction value without increasing the cost to the client based on the initially agreed contract 
sum as shown in Table 6.6. Hence the new and additional works including changes of standards 
were such that it does not affect the project performance matrix regarding budgeted cost defined 
at the inception of the contract. All other respondents agree that there is no variance of the 
expenses and time stipulated in the contract agreement as shown in Table 6.6, which suggest that 
the renegotiations and changes on the respective case studies have no adverse impacts on the VfM 
criteria of cost and time, which are essential project performance indicators. 
These findings further suggest that additional works are at the construction stage and tend to affect 
the costs of construction. These finding, therefore, indicates that there can be the achievement of 
VfM at the construction stage of a project, where the factors leading to renegotiation are properly 
evaluated to ensure that there is no adverse impact on the construction costs. Hence, 
renegotiations impacts can be by positivity and negativity as indicated by XY2-Pri: “But there 
are lots of examples as to whether the improvements schemes that have been suggested and 
implemented by the concessionaires or by the O & M Joint Venture (JV). The improved ways of 
working whether it has had a positive impact on the travelling public, safety initiatives etc.” 
Construction duration and whole life cycle costs are, therefore, the least impacted VfM criteria 
when compared to other VfM criteria in Table 6.5. However, the maintenance costs experienced 
some minor differences, as identified by XY2-Pri; these findings agree with XY2-Pri in CS2: 
“The renegotiation has not profited any of the parent companies or Connect Plus itself. It has not 
adversely impacted it”. 
XY8-Pub also indicates that the level of renegotiation experienced in CS5: “So to date, we have 
not had much renegotiation. Based on that, Transport Scotland has been much happy with the 
prices submitted to the carrier on those changes”. The implication is that the cost attributable to 
the renegotiation experience in the CS5 project remained the same throughout implementation. 
Thus, a renegotiation could either have had a positive or adverse impact on the value for money 
criteria established at the inception of the contract (Sarmento, 2014). All the findings from the 
case studies indicate that the renegotiation experience has an impact on the identified VfM 
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criteria, except in the case of respondents XY3-Pub, XY5-Pri, XY7-Pub and XY9-Pri, which do 
not indicate the several implications of renegotiation during the interviews.   
The literature, however, establishes construction costs as the most impacted VfM criteria, while 
the whole life cycle cost is amongst the least affected standards of VfM (See Table 3.5). This 
study, therefore, corroborates the literature by revealing that road concessions renegotiation in 
most instances impact construction costs. The impact of renegotiation on construction cost could 
be a result of the numerous changes necessitating amendments to the contract at the construction 
stage of the project development. The findings suggest that cost is a useful criterion for measuring 
the achievement of VfM at renegotiation. XY1-Pub attests the target for VfM evaluation by 
stating: “we are looking at cost reduction perspectives. Cost reduction is the main target. We are 
not looking at it (i.e., outcomes) regarding extra performance”. Based on this renegotiation 
experience, as explained by XY1-Pub, contract renegotiation does not necessarily have to impact 
the VfM criteria negatively; as the findings reveal that there is the implementation of the contract 
based on the budget specified on the respective case studies. There is also an indication that there 
is the achievement of VfM as stated in the agreement. 
Furthermore, renegotiation of road concessions has been found to have an adverse impact on the 
concessionaire profit and the user’s satisfaction (Acerete et al., 2010). The findings of this 
empirical study reveal that the whole life cycle, construction duration, concessionaire’s profit, 
quality of service delivery, private sector management skills and experience and user’s 
satisfaction are amongst the least impacted by VfM. In other words, the renegotiation does not 
seem to affect the profit of the concessionaire, quality of service delivery, construction duration 
and whole life cycle (WLC) etc. XY2-Pri substantiates the impact of the renegotiation on the 
profit generated by the SPV in the concession project as follows: “The renegotiation has not 
profited any of the parent companies or SPV. It has not adversely impacted it". This submission 
implies that the impact of renegotiation in CS2 is neutral and benefits the travelling public and 
users, not the SPV. These means that renegotiation of PPP road concessions does not necessarily 
have to have an adverse impact on concessionaire’s profit and user’s satisfaction as claimed in 
the literature (Sarmento, 2014; Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010). The whole life 
cycle (WLC) assessment may be difficult to assess since the case studies are still in the operation 
stages. 
There are, therefore, contrasting positions regarding the impact of the renegotiations on the 
project VfM criteria. Instances of renegotiation in Portugal, Spain and some important Latin 
American countries reveal that renegotiations have had adverse effects on the PPP infrastructure 
project VfM criteria (Sarmento, 2014). Sarmento (2014b, p.125) highlights the concerns 
regarding the impacts of renegotiation on the individual standards of VfM: “high incidence of 
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renegotiations even shortly after contracts were signed hurt both the PPP's performance and 
efficiency and could undermine the credibility of PPP projects. Sarmento (2014) and Acerete et 
al. (2010) indicate that the experience of PPP renegotiation, especially in the road sector, has 
negatively impacted cost, quality and user’s satisfaction. Evidence of these renegotiation impacts 
is in high road user charges, including higher payments by the public clients through subsidies or 
several lump sum payments, particularly in shadow tolling arrangements. 
These empirical studies reveal that there are no substantial renegotiation impacts on the VfM 
criteria. XY2-Pri states: “to be honest with you, regarding the penalties or bonuses that we have 
been paying through the payment mechanisms, there has been no impact because of those 
changes”. Based upon this submission and the numerous findings, one can assume that the 
renegotiation of the road concessions has not adversely impacted the VfM variables. Although, 
the findings of the cases studies reveal that there is no evidence of impact on contract cost on 
CS2. However, in all the remaining case studies, there is a positive impact of the renegotiation on 
construction cost. There is some evidence of cost savings in CS4, as indicated by XY6-Pri; this 
suggests that cost is a good criterion for measuring VfM achieved at renegotiation. XY1-Pub 
attests the cost target regarding VfM evaluation by stating that: “we are looking at cost reduction 
perspectives. Cost reduction is the main target. We are not looking at it (i.e., outcomes) regarding 
extra performance”. Based on this renegotiation experience, as explained by XY1-Pub, contract 
renegotiation does not necessarily have to impact the VfM criteria negatively, as the findings 
reveal that there is an on-budget implementation on the case studies which as outlined in the 
provision of the contract. There is also an indication of the achievement of the specified quality. 
 Outcomes of the Renegotiations 
The outcome of these case studies revealed that there is no change to the cost of the concession 
contract as indicated by all respondents in CS1, CS3, CS4 and CS5. However, the respondents in 
CS2 both agreed that there were cost savings, which occurred due to the removal of assets. XY3-
Pub substantiates the removal and addition of assets, which can lead to an increase or decrease in 
the cost of construction as follows: “So, regarding the outcomes, when a change is declared to 
remove assets, there is a reduction in the cost of the project. So, where we have introduced new 
assets, there has been an increase in the cost of the projects”. Besides, evidence from all the case 
studies reveals that the project has been completed to date and within the stipulated contract 
duration. The only respondents, XY6-Pub in CS4 and XY8-Pub in CS5, agree that there was an 
increase in concessionaire’s profit and minor changes to the payments of the concessionaire as 
shown in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: Outcomes of the Renegotiation of the PFI (DBFO) 
S/N Renegotiation 
Outcome 
CS1 CS2  CS3 CS4 CS5 Freq. Rank 
  
XY1 
-Pub 
XY2 
-Pri 
XY3 
-Pub 
XY4 
-Pub 
XY5 
-Pri 
XY6 
– Pri 
XY7 
-Pub 
XY8 
-Pub 
XY9 
-Pri 
  
1 Contract cost remain 
the same 
√ 
  
√ √ √ √ √ √ 7 1 
2 Completion within 
contract duration 
√ √ 
  
√ 
 
√ √ √ 6 2 
3 Quality and 
performance achieved 
√ √ 
  
√ √ √ 
  
5 3 
4 Cost savings 
occasioned by assets 
removal 
√ √ √ 
  
√ 
   
4 4 
5 Neutral (same) profit 
by concessionaire 
 
√ 
  
√ 
  
√ √ 4 4 
6 Timely completion of 
construction and on 
schedule 
 
√ √ 
  
√ 
 
√ 
 
4 4 
7 Good service delivery 
brings users 
complement 
  
√ √ 
 
√ 
   
3 7 
8 Few complaints from 
users and members 
of the public 
  
√ √ 
 
√ 
   
3 7 
9 Increase in contract 
cost due to addition of 
assets 
 
√ √ 
      
2 9 
10 Decrease in contract 
cost due to inclusion 
of new standards 
   
√ √ 
    
2 9 
11 Positive outcome 
achieved in terms of 
risk 
√ 
   
√ 
    
2 9 
12 Fosters good 
relationship between 
the client and SPV 
   
√ 
 
√ 
   
2 9 
13 Increase in 
concessionaire's profit 
     
√ 
   
1 13 
14 Changes in payments 
made to the 
concessionaire 
       √ 
 
 1 13 
 
Total 5 6 5 5 6 8 3 5 3 46 
 
 
These findings imply that the outcome of the renegotiations and changes regarding contract cost 
demonstrates VfM for the public client and achieves the VfM objectives (i.e. profit) of the SPV 
as defined. The minor differences in payments to the SPV and an increase in concessionaire’s 
profit in CS4 are due to the additional works and are a result of the renegotiation of the road 
concession. Thus, the results shown in Table 6.7 above seem to agree with Table 6.6, which 
indicates that the impact of renegotiation is significant regarding meeting the defined construction 
cost which will benefit the client (i.e. there is a neutral cost of construction as well as savings in 
the construction cost of the DBFO’s).  
The reason for the achievement of VfM concerning the criteria of the cost is stated by XY8-Pub 
in CS5 as follows: “The difference is minor because the changes are minor. So, there is a minimal 
impact on the cost”. The concessionaires in these case study projects (i.e. CS1, CS3, CS4 and 
CS5) usually deliver the projects to the budgeted cost as outlined in the contract, which supports 
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the previous argument of XY2-Pri: “Any renegotiation intends to make it effectively cost neutral. 
Party will neither benefit nor be disadvantaged by it. Therefore, you are effectively pricing the 
change. Seeing what the impact is and making sure that it is not affecting either party profit from 
the budget or cost perspectives. As in the case of Highway England, all of our contract changes 
are always negotiated where possible to have a cost-neutral attribute”. These imply that 
renegotiation is usually based upon the cost described in the contract from the inception and 
regarded as fixed at renegotiation, meaning no changes can the budgeted cost as shown in Table 
6.7.   
There are different outcomes in the individual incidences of the renegotiation as shown in Table 
6.7. However, respondent XY9-Pri indicates that there is no renegotiation occurrence, i.e. changes 
leading to amendments of the terms of the original contract. Instead, there are claims by 
respondents regarding some specific changes during the implementation of the project, 
particularly in CS5. Nonetheless, XY4-Pub voices the aspects of the project that underwent 
renegotiation: “No, nothing will change since it will be quite expensive for the client. It’s a lump 
sum based on traffic flows and safety performance”. Similarly, XY9-Pri state: “the fact of the 
matter is that there has been no renegotiation. In the client’s view, they quite perceive that DBFO 
is quite an expensive way to procure construction. I mean, it is the only way they can get money 
to fund the project at the time, but it is quite an expensive mechanism. So, for that reason, they 
do not want to spend any more money, and so they do not want to change anything because of the 
risk as that may expose them to more cost”. The inherent risks imply that the client tries, as much 
as possible, not to make renegotiation or variation requests because of the potential impact such 
applications may have on the concession cost. 
Therefore, to ensure the realisation of the fixed cost defined in the contract and possibly ensure 
cost savings, renegotiation was kept to a minimum in CS3, and there was no renegotiation in CS5, 
as identified by respondents XY4-Pub and XY9-Pri respectively. Thus, discussions on the 
outcomes of the renegotiations are on the findings of all other case studies excluding XY4-Pub 
and XY9-Pri. However, these road concessions undergo changes of standards, amongst other 
changes, as previously explained in subsection 6.4.2. Therefore, the results of the road concession 
renegotiation are evaluated to ascertain the outcomes of the renegotiation with the results based 
on the VfM criteria shown in Table 6.7. 
Another important outcome is that the projects are within the contract duration: CS1, CS2, CS3, 
CS4 and CS5 respectively. There is the achievement of quality and performance prescribed in the 
specification in CS1, CS2, CS3, CS4 case studies. Apart from these high-ranking outcomes of the 
road concession renegotiation as established in Table 6.7, other results, which have a low 
frequency of occurrence, are indicated in CS5 and CS4. These are minor changes in payments 
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made to the concessionaire and an increase of the concessionaire’s profit. These findings suggest 
that the planned payments by the public sector and the benefit of the SPV remain unchanged, 
which contrasts the literature findings which indicate an increase in government payments and 
SPV profit in road concessions (Acerete et al., 2010). 
The outcomes of the renegotiation, as indicated by the individual respondents regarding the 
criteria of costs, duration, quality and performance, government payment to the SPV, risk, profits, 
users’ satisfaction and the entire partnership reveals the existence of positive results. To 
substantiate Table 6.7, respondents XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub show that an additional contract cost 
of £360 million emerged because of the renegotiation of the projects, and this renegotiation was 
due to the addition to the scope of the work agreed. There was an increase in the contract sum 
because of the additional jobs carried out on the project. The increase in the contract sum, due to 
other works, supports the findings outlined by XY3-Pub, who states: “where assets are removed 
from the contract, there is a reduction in cost and where there is the addition of assets, there are 
increases in costs of those aspects of the project." The outcome of the renegotiation has been 
found to increase and decrease on some occasions, based upon the addition and removal of assets 
at the technical stage of the road concession implementation. 
Moreover, the 30-year concession duration for most of the case study projects remains the same, 
with the project still possessing the expected delivery date. XY2-Pri reinforces this by stating: 
“the construction was early and, on the budget, and to date, there have been some minor issues 
and some nagging about some defects rather than the overall quality”. As a result, VfM is found 
to be achieved by the public sector. There is a need to link the results of the empirical studies with 
the literature, to compare the own findings and draw conclusions based on the results; the 
literature’s position does differ from these empirical findings. Sarmento (2014) notes that there 
is a high degree of scepticism regarding the ability of PPP to deliver VfM; these submissions are 
concerns expressed in other classical literature (Acerete et al., 2010). 
The literature has accurately identified the outcomes of the PPP road projects renegotiations 
regarding the VfM achieved for the respective stakeholders within the road sector (Sarmento, 
2014, Engel et al., 2006). The findings of this literature reveal that VfM has eluded PPP road 
projects, as the outcome of the renegotiations recorded in PPP road projects does not seem to 
favour the public sector. The users and the procuring authorities are not fully satisfied at the end 
of the renegotiation, as stated in the literature (Sarmento, 2014; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010).  The 
findings of this empirical study, however, contrast the literature findings and suggest that 
government payments to the concessionaire do not attract significant changes, e.g. subsidies or 
direct payments, which serve as financial rescue intervention on the projects.  
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One of the reasons why there is the achievement of VfM regarding cost criteria have is because 
of the non-increase in government payment and SPV profits. Renegotiation can be considered to 
achieve VfM in the public sector; government payments to the private concessionaire must reflect 
the terms of the contract and the gain of the SPV must remain within the threshold agreed by the 
parties at the contract formation stage. Furthermore, penalties for non-performance should be 
minimal to ensure the continuation of the project. Moreover, literature, which looks at the 
renegotiation experience of essential countries in Latin America and other countries, has 
succeeded in determining the findings required for addressing the profitability of the concession 
to ensure profitable returns to the concessionaire. However, fewer contributions have been made 
concerning the provision of a robust PPP that will result to the achievement of public partners’ 
objectives and are non-detrimental to the public sector (Sarmento, 2014; Acerete et al., 2009; 
Guasch et al., 2008). Thus, renegotiation can achieve favourable outcomes for the public sector 
while not necessarily seeking to maximise profit for the SPV to the detriment of the public sector. 
 Value for Money Enquiry on the Renegotiation 
The literature establishes that VfM can be evaluated throughout the lifecycle of the project based 
on the criteria defined in the contract. The VfM criteria for measurement include, but is not limited 
to, construction costs, operation and maintenance costs, project finance costs, the whole life of 
the contract, concessionaire’s profits, construction duration, concession duration,  
quality of service delivery and users’ satisfaction etc. (Public PPP, 2009). The several VfM 
criteria have been adopted for assessing the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects to achieve 
VfM (Demirag et al., 2004). The findings of this study agree with the literature that private sector 
management expertise and skills, cost, time, quality, profit and risk perspectives amongst other 
things are the VfM criteria usually adopted for the VfM assessment of road concessions 
renegotiation. The case study interviews based on the value for money inquiries are in Table 6.8. 
. 
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Table 6.8: Details of the Value for Money Enquiry 
 
The principal findings, as stated in Table 6.8 indicate that all the respondents in the case studies 
agree that there is evidence of the achievement of VfM for the individual organisations, as well 
as other stakeholders that are internal and external to the projects. No information was given 
regarding VfM by respondents XY2-Pri and XY3-Pub; instead they provided perceptions of 
stakeholders that are external to the project in CS2. Both the procuring authorities and the SPV 
are happy and satisfied with the VfM achieved and the outcome of the renegotiations. These 
findings suggest that VfM can be reached at the renegotiation stage of PPP road projects if there 
is a precise definition of the renegotiation criteria at the inception of the contract, for adoption at 
S/N Value for Money 
Enquiry 
Respondents Answers Rank 
  
XY1-
Pub 
XY2-
Pri 
XY3-
Pub 
XY4-
Pub 
XY5- 
Pri 
XY6-
Pri 
XY7- 
Pub 
XY8-
Pub 
XY9-
Pri 
 Y 
(%) 
N 
(%) 
 
1 Is there evidence of 
VfM achievement 
for respondents' 
company? 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 100 0 1 
2 Is definition of 
renegotiation 
criteria necessary at 
contract inception? 
Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 89 11 2 
3 Is there evidence of 
VfM satisfaction for 
other stakeholders? 
Y - Y - Y Y Y Y Y 78 0 3 
4 Is there any 
difference in VfM at 
inception and VfM 
renegotiation? 
N N N N N Y N Y N 22 78 4 
5 Does the 
renegotiation 
guideline help in 
VfM achievement? 
- Y Y - Y Y Y - Y 67 0 5 
6 Do you measure the 
VfM achieved at 
strategic 
renegotiation 
points? 
- N N Y N Y N N N 67 22 6 
7 Are there 
procedures for 
measuring VfM 
success at 
renegotiation? 
Y Y N - Y Y Y Y N 67 22 7 
8 Are there measures 
for VfM 
achievement? 
Y N Y - - Y Y Y Y 67 11 8 
9 Are there strategic 
actions to address 
deviations from 
VfM targets & VfM 
at renegotiation? 
Y Y - - - Y - - Y 44 0 9 
10 Are there guidelines 
for assessing 
renegotiation for 
VfM achievement? 
N Y N Y Y Y Y N Y 67 33 10 
11 Is there definition of 
Specific VfM 
targets? 
Y Y N - N Y N N N 33 56 11 
12 Are VfM targets 
defined at strategic 
stages of PPP? 
N Y N - N N Y N N 22 67 12 
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the implementation stages, especially during the technical development stage of the road projects. 
The reason for choosing the technical phase of the road concessions is because the literature 
identifies that the factors leading to the renegotiation of the road projects border on the technical 
stage of the implementation.  
The results further reveal that in seven out of the nine interviews there was no difference between 
the VfM described at the beginning of the concession and VfM achieved at renegotiation. The 
fact that all the interviewees agreed that there was evidence of achieving value for money for their 
respective organisations corroborates the fact that there is no significant difference between the 
VfM expected and VfM achieved at the end of the renegotiation. Six out of the nine respondents, 
which represent 67% of the total, indicated that there are renegotiation guidelines that have 
assisted in the achievement of VfM recorded in the case study projects. The remaining 33% of 
respondents did not suggest the existence of renegotiation guidelines; this indicates that specific 
guidelines can assist in the achievement of VfM at the renegotiation stage of PPP infrastructure 
projects.  
Although, the literature agrees that there are financial, technical and economic requirements that 
are defined based on the objectives and goals of the procuring authority at inception for the 
assessment of the project during implementation (Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001). These 
requirements constitute the benchmark for assessing PPP projects for VfM achievement. 
However, the literature does not identify specific guidelines that can be adopted during 
renegotiation to ensure that VfM is achieved in the UK road concessions (Hasselgren et al., 2014). 
Specific measures that can be taken to ensure the achievement of VfM at the renegotiation stage 
are proposed in the context of PPP infrastructure projects (Guasch et al., 2014). Hence, the 
research can be used to help develop a framework to provide guidelines, based on the experiences 
of the respondents in the case studies, to foster the achievement of VfM. 
Six out of the nine interviewees determine that there are usually no VfM targets defined at the 
strategic stages of the implementation of projects, nor are there any specific VfM targets set at 
the inception of the contract to assist in the assessment of VfM achieved at renegotiation. Though, 
VfM requirements are defined from the point of the evaluation of PPP projects during the 
implementation stages (Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001); the evaluation of VfM is compiled to 
ensure that the payment made by the government in the case of the shadow toll for the service 
provided by the concessionaire is justified and based on the project benefits or VfM achieved 
(Muvirimi, 2012). All the submissions in the empirical studies provide insights that foster an 
understanding of the relationship between renegotiation and VfM.   
XY5-Pri further states "that there is usually no renegotiation consideration in the financial model 
which as developed in February 2003 at the time of the signing of the contract." Though, XY2-
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Pri agrees with XY5-Pri by determining: “There is a process in the contract for the strategic 
change procedure, which implies that the procedure for effecting change is outlined in the 
contract, while considerations for renegotiation are not specified or outlined in the contract”. 
These further agree with the submission of XY1-Pub: “The contract that we are looking at now, 
i.e., the CS1 is one of the first PFI’s in the UK, and it did not have anything specifically about 
renegotiation, and it’s basically at the mercy of the contract holder”. The literature has identified 
the need for the stipulation of renegotiation approaches, criteria and a contract renegotiation 
process at the contract formation stage based on the problems of VfM usually encountered at the 
renegotiation of PPP projects (Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014). 
Further findings show that the respondent observed no variance regarding VfM achieved at the 
end of the renegotiation in comparison to the VfM defined at inception. Some of the respondent’s 
statement reveals that there is no basis to link the VfM to the implementation of PPP road projects. 
However, the literature states that there is the need to assess the PPP projects during 
implementation, based upon the defined requirements, i.e. technical, economic and financial 
(Xiong Zhang, 2014; Montecinos and Saavedra, 2014; Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001).  
Nevertheless, quantified criteria regarding costs are undescribed during the strategic 
implementation points of PPP road projects renegotiation stage. Instead, there is the development 
and adoption of the financial model by the procuring authority as stated by XY2-Pub, XY3-Pub 
and XY5-Pri in CS6 respectively.  
The importance of the financial model is described by XY3-Pub as follows: “There are lots of 
lines or mandate in the financial model that are perhaps as clear as could be to help future 
renegotiations”. The situation implies that a financial model has been carefully designed with 
renegotiations in mind to address any emerging questions or challenges that could mitigate the 
achievement of VfM. The findings suggest that the financial model, as adopted in the case studies, 
ensures cost neutrality where the variables or criteria of VfM and cost of governance amongst 
other things remain fixed throughout the project implementation and particularly at renegotiation. 
This notion supports the literature, which states that one of the measures used to ensure VfM at 
renegotiation, is to ensure that the amendment of the contract agreement must preserve the net 
present value (NPV), which should always be zero throughout the implementation stages of PPP 
projects (Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014; Bain, 2010).  
67% of the respondents indicate that VfM has been found to be measured based on the financial 
model described during inception by the primary stakeholders. All the respondents further 
indicated that there are measures to ensure VfM renegotiation and that there is a definition of 
specific targets for VfM, e.g. construction costs and duration in PPP road projects. These targets 
and measures are identified by XY7-Pub as follows: “So, you have to have some measure against 
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something like what is the total cost, capital and operation cost over the lane kilometre or 
something like that. Also, compare it against the other to know how much it cost per lane km on 
the local road and how much does it cost on a motorway. And you have to do it over the longer 
period than just the year”. XY2-Pub and XY3-Pub also agree with the above, which indicates 
that the financial model stipulates cost requirements and provides a basis to evaluate and assess 
a road concession project for VfM achievement.  
Only four respondents agree that there are strategic actions to address deviation from the VfM 
targets defined and VfM achieved at renegotiation. However, XY6-Pri indicates that most DBFO 
roads procured after 1997 have targets to ensure the achievement of VfM: “All other DBFO 
contracts have, but we have not. They have targets for payments. We are paid based on the level 
of traffic using the road. However, another DBFO contract has targets based on the speed of 
traffic, travelling on the network. We have a situation where if we take a lane out or get a lane 
closed, we get charged. We are penalised for it. Now at the start of our contract, we have an 
allowance in our budget of about 26 million GBP for lane closure charges”. These, therefore, 
indicates that lane closure charges could be determined as one of the targets to ensure VfM at 
DBFO road concessions renegotiations.  
The measures adopted during the implementation of the road concession for VfM achievement 
mainly involve working on the project plan. XY6-Pri describes these as follows: “we have a 
financial model for the project that is constantly, and that is on the price of the project plan and 
what we do is we work within that project plan”. XY2-Pri also supports this statement by 
identifying the cost neutrality element of the financial model as the basis for the VfM measure: 
“Well again, given the cost neutral element of it, we don’t. We have a VfM criterion that needs 
to account for all changes, works and interventions including the actual renegotiation. There are 
no VfM criteria because you are still going back to the idea of cost neutrality”. These imply that 
the requirements defined regarding the financial model may be regarded as criteria for the 
assessment of VfM, as stated by XY2-Pri. The literature corroborates the recent submission, 
which says that the project can be done during the implementation process to ascertain whether 
it meets or surpasses the requirements, i.e. financial, technical and economic etc. (Sarmento, 
2010; Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001). 
The cost, as outlined in the financial model, is said to be neutral in the case of concession 
renegotiations to allow the verification of VfM through the adoption of the calculation 
incorporated in the financial model. XY3-Pub substantiates this as follows: “we have financial 
internal governance processes which we have to go through to evidence the process we have gone 
through to demonstrate VfM. Again, VfM is demonstrated through evidence of actual cost 
incurred and through evidence of assumed cost in the financial model. And if there is any 
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difference, then it’s been assumed as the catch up between the two costs”. According to XY2-Pri, 
XY3-Pub, XY6-Pri and XY8-Pub respectively, the financial model is crucial. XY1-Pub supports 
the cost of the main criteria of the VfM measurement: “Oh no. we are looking at cost reduction 
perspectives. Cost reduction is the main target”. Any project that achieves the defined and 
budgeted cost throughout the entire life-span is usually considered to deliver VfM for the public 
sector. 
Furthermore, XY2 reveals that VfM is usually not defined in a way in the contract; therefore, the 
initiation of PFI transactions in road infrastructure projects by the client at the inception of PFI 
projects usually considers its evaluation. In fact, XY4-Pub agrees with XY2-Pri by stating 
follows: "there are expectations and assumptions about what will be delivered based on the level 
of investment." However, XY2-Pri notes: “to date, there has not been a comprehensive task to 
determine whether VfM has been realised in the first seven years of the contract.” These occur 
mainly after renegotiation and estimating whether the variance has subsided between that defined 
at inception and the VfM achieved after renegotiation, or during the implementation of PFI 
(DBFO) road projects. The changes and renegotiations are introduced into the contract on a cost 
neutral basis, i.e. the assumption is that the VfM is consistent throughout the contract and does 
not vary with changes as indicated by XY3-Pub. 
According to XY4-Pub, the users and other stakeholders outside the partnership are unable to 
provide a valid answer on the VfM achieved at renegotiation; this is because they are not aware 
of the changes and the renegotiations made during the implementation of the contract. They may 
be able to comment on the partnership output regarding quality and service delivered. However, 
the client, SPV and lenders are all happy with the VfM achieved in CS2. The claim by XY4-Pub 
further explains this: “I think it's highly likely that Highways England has achieved VfM. The 
SPV up to this date has also achieved the objective of no better no worse. I also think regarding 
the lenders; I believe the bank has reached their goals because they've signed up the changes". 
Also, XY2-Pri states that the targets set for VfM at inception for the strategic points during the 
implementation of the project, particularly at renegotiation are as follows: "A host of objectives 
against which we set ourselves is from the construction perspectives. Bottom line figures for that 
will be programmed and valued". The programme is then measured using the time taken, the cost 
incurred, and quality achieved based upon output specification. Moreover, achievement of VfM 
during the implementation process of the contract at the construction stage according to XY2-Pri 
is: “we outperformed regarding the programme. Regarding value, most of the projects 
investigated were under budget due to innovation and efficiencies that were in the contract, which 
is evident, especially during the construction phase”. These, therefore, implies that innovation 
and efficiencies during the management of the construction process of road concessions 
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contribute a great deal to the VfM achieved at the renegotiations, which take place. Hence, 
efficiency and innovation are essential during the implementation of road concessions to ensure 
the achievement of VfM.  
Specific metrics defined at the inception of the contract can be adapted to measure the success of 
PFI (DBFO) road projects regarding the health and safety of the workers and road users, the 
performance of the service men and the VfM targets achieved at the construction stage of the 
projects. Some VfM objectives that are usually defined and documented in PFI (DBFO) road 
projects are diverse and depend on the role of the respective stakeholders on the project. For 
instance, XY2-Pri indicates, with regards to actions taken in CS2 that “A host of targets against 
which we set ourselves is from the construction perspectives regarding cost, duration, and quality 
of output, health, and safety of workers and performance of those involved in the project.” For 
XY1-Pub, however, cost reduction is the primary VfM target considered at the inception of the 
contract and during the implementation and renegotiation process of CS1. 
The extra performance is not the focus of a project, as acknowledged by XY1-Pub and XY3-Pub; 
any requirement for extra performance will attract additional cost and lead to cost increments, 
which is against the principle of cost neutrality and the fixed nature of the concession contract 
through the principle of the financial model. The VfM target is on the plan, budget and 
programme, as outlined by the respective respondents, which constitutes the stakeholder’s 
objectives. Having considered all PFI (DBFO) road projects, there is evidence to show VfM 
achievement in all the case studies. However, for other stakeholders in the concession contract, 
78% of the respondents indicate that there is no significant difference between VfM criteria and 
the outcomes of the renegotiation. The findings reveal that the PFI (DBFO) road projects 
renegotiation in the UK has been a positive experience and has significantly improved the 
achievement of the VfM as described in the original contract. These findings suggest that contract 
renegotiations do not necessarily have a negative impact on VfM criteria. The case studies 
empirical results contrast with some literature findings (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014; 
Gifford, 2014; Xiong and Zhang, 2014; Acerete et al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010).  
Renegotiations of road concessions in Spain indicates higher charges for road users (Acerete et 
al., 2010; Baeza and Vassallo, 2010), which in most instances necessitate subsidies as financial 
rescue measures. Consequently, the subsidies usually erode VfM achieved for the public sector. 
There are also examples of financial rescues in failing projects through renegotiations in Portugal, 
which involved the adjustment and rebalancing of the road concession projects (Sarmento, 2014; 
Xiong, and Zhang, 2014). Renegotiation experiences of 54.7% of transport projects in Latin 
America reveal that the concessionaires are beneficiary based on the outcomes that are premise 
on the cost criteria (Guasch, 2004). Reside and Mendoza (2010) state that most renegotiations of 
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PPP projects in Asia resulted in increased subsidies and financial compensation for the 
concessionaire companies. USA PPP project renegotiations could have been unfavourable to the 
public sector without the institutional framework, which protects the interest of the public sector 
from private opportunism through service provision guaranteeing (Gifford et al. 2014). Therefore, 
all the evidence in the supporting literature shows that not all renegotiation instances have 
achieved VfM for the public sector and contrasted the findings of this research. 
 Contract Mechanisms for Payment 
There are mechanisms for payment defined as part of the contract, which serves to ensure the 
achievement of VfM during the implementation of the agreement, especially during renegotiation 
and in some instances change negotiation in PFI road concessions. The interviewees identified 
these mechanisms about each of the case studies as shown in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9: Contractual VfM Mechanisms 
S/N VfM Contractual Mechanism CS1 CS2  CS3  CS4  CS5  
XY1-
Pub 
XY2-
Pri 
XY3-
Pub 
XY4-
Pub 
XY5-
Pri 
XY6-
Pri 
XY7-
Pub 
XY8-
Pub 
XY9-
Pri 
1 Lane occupation charges        √ 
 
√ 
 
2 Key performance indicators 
(KPI’s) 
       √ 
 
 
3 Lane closure charges      √ 
 
   
4 Journey time penalty bonus  √ 
 
       
5 Safety performance adjustment 
bonus 
    √ 
 
    
6 Critical incidence bonus  √ 
 
       
7 Proactive management bonus   √ 
 
      
8 Financial internal governance 
processes 
  √ 
 
      
9 Congestion management     √ 
 
    
 
These mechanisms are adopted for payment to the concessionaire and are used as criteria to assess 
the project for VfM achievement based on the client’s objectives. XY6-Pri identifies lane closure 
charges, which is a measure to ensure the availability of the road for users on a regular basis. The 
SPV is charged a fee when there is any lane closure during its operational hours; this discourages 
the execution of additional works, which may necessitate the closing of the road during the day 
so that the road can be available for the users. Most of the maintenance works are done at night 
to allow for the routes to be possible during the day. XY1-Pub also agrees with XY6-Pri and 
XY2-Pri that there are bonuses and penalties paid to ensure the realisation of VfM on the DBFO 
road projects, particularly regarding the criteria of time, cost and quality. The respondents identify 
lane occupation charges as the contractual VfM mechanism adopted in CS5 and shown in Table 
6.9. The payment mechanism, which sets out the level of required works before payment requests 
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can be approved and certified. According to this mechanism, the client, when reaching a threshold 
or level of expectation, can only make payment; if these falls below the requirements, there will 
be a deduction from the monthly fee. XY2-Pri, XY3-Pub, XY5-Pri, XY8-Pub and XY9-Pub 
recognise that payment to the SPV is as stated in the financial model and it is on the stipulations 
agreed in the contract, which are either on a monthly and yearly basis. Governments base this 
figure on the number of vehicles using the road, which pays for all the projects. However, there 
are some exceptions to the payment mechanisms as explained by XY5-Pri:"The payment 
mechanisms are by congestion management and not by shadow tolls”. It is the measurement of 
traffic and average speed of traffic in the sections of the road, which must be within the target 
rate for payment. XY5-Pri opines that there is no contractual mechanism used on the project: “No 
contractual mechanisms. Only the financial model". 
Regarding the financial model, this model for financial expenditure has been introduced into the 
payment mechanism through the instrumentality of the financial model. The financial model 
reflects the amount of money to be paid to the contractor, the nature and details of payments, 
including the implementation stage when the payment is due to be made. Based on this statement, 
there is a suggestion that the congestion payment is distinct from the fee required in the financial 
model. Another mechanism based on the reliability of the journey at some strategic and specific 
points on the road network. The criteria set for renegotiation based on journey time penalty 
bonuses as indicated by XY2-Pri and XY6-Pub stipulate that the journey must be achievable over 
the required distance and within the stipulated speed and time. In the event of non-achievement 
of the specified range within the specified speed and time, there will be a penalty bonus awarded 
against the SPV. 
Safety Performance Adjustment Bonus is a mechanism, which measures the performance of the 
road regarding the safety of its road users. Bonus or penalty is awarded to the SPV based on the 
safety of the road, and whether anyone is killed or seriously injured on the road network. XY5-
Pri identifies this mechanism as being adopted by the government for payment to the SPV. The 
mechanism seeks to measure the response levels about the occurrence of critical incidences on 
the road network, e.g. accidents, electrical failure and fire. However, it depends on the speed at 
which the workers can get to the incidence to clear blockages or obstructions that may be on the 
road network. Under this mechanism, according to XY2-Pri, there is usually a definition of what 
constitutes a critical incidence. The evaluation of what constitutes a critical incidence is usually 
done on an annual basis, using more subjective measures, which require a hard-scoring process 
by an individual panel to establish competency. 
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Respondent XY5-Pri notes that this mechanism was adopted during the making of payments by 
the government. The congestion management payment is a payment made based upon the 
measurement of traffic and average speed of traffic in certain sections of the road. The target set, 
according to XY5-Pri, must be met before the government can make payment. This payment is 
distinct from the payment required in the financial model. XY5-Pri identifies two types of 
payments: "We have the congestion management which is aimed at keeping the traffic flowing 
above the targeted speed, and we have a small payment for month safety on the road." 
However, the literature identifies congestion management as a payment mechanism, which is a 
recent development to the shadow toll payment mechanism adopted on this road project. These 
imply that there are recent developments targeted to ensure that VfM is achieved for the road 
users and consequently for the public sector. The financial internal governance process, as 
identified by respondent XY3-Pub, is required to prove and demonstrate value for money. The 
internal governance process seeks to explain and highlight, through the evidence of actual costs 
incurred and proof of assumed price in the financial model, whether VfM is achieved at 
renegotiation. The goal is to make the cost financially neutral. 
Contractual mechanisms to ensure the achievement of VfM during renegotiations are introduced 
to guide the contractual relationships between the main parties to renegotiation. These 
mechanisms are in the form of payment terms and other control mechanisms defined at inception 
for each of the projects to ensure the attainment of VfM (Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005). However, 
this differs from one project to another as indicated in the discussions in this chapter. The payment 
terms, otherwise known as payment mechanisms, have been classified into shadow toll payment 
mechanisms, availability payment mechanisms and active management payment mechanisms 
(Soomro and Zhang, 2011; Akbiyikli and Eaton, 2005; Acerete et al., 2010). The respondents 
identify all these payment mechanisms as the contractual mechanism, which is adopted to ensure 
the achievement of VfM during the renegotiation of road DBFO concessions. These mechanisms 
further serve as a basis to evaluate what is paid to the SPV and the VfM implication for the clients.  
Furthermore, the mechanisms, as identified by the clients, include: journey time penalty bonus, 
safety performance adjustment bonus, critical incidence bonus, lane closure charges, proactive 
management bonus and financial internal governance processes etc.; all of this corroborates the 
literature regarding payment mechanisms, which are adopted during PFI (DBFO) road projects. 
The essence of the adoption of this payments mechanism is to ensure that the objectives of the 
public sector are attained when securing utmost satisfaction for the users of the road network. 
Therefore, the payment mechanisms, which may include the monthly fixed fee payments in the 
financial model, payment conditions for monthly fee payment as stated in the financial model, 
journey time penalty bonus, are all incorporated into the provision of the contract to ensure that 
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VfM is achieved for the public sector. For that reason, these mechanisms are adopted by the client 
in the case studies to ensure that the users benefit from the projects and that the concessionaire is 
adequately rewarded for achieving the VfM objectives set by the client. Hence, the mechanisms 
seek to deliver fair reward for all stakeholders regarding VfM. 
 Measures to Ensure the Achievement of Value for Money 
The measures used to ensure the achievement of VfM at the renegotiation of the road 
concessions are shown in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10: Measures to Ensure the Achievement of Value Money at Renegotiation 
Case Studies / 
Respondent 
VfM Measures Suggested 
CS1 XY1-Pub More focus on the performance indicators. There should be criteria for performance indicators 
CS2  
XY2-Pri 
There is a need for a review of all requirements before the formation of the PFI contract 
There is a need to agree fixed fees, profit margins rate of return at the beginning of the contract 
Development of a change mechanism to guide contract implementation over the 30-year period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XY3-Pub 
The change mechanism is to ensure that what was originally agreed is achieved contract 
completion 
Include a requirement for an open and transparent cost tracking system 
Effective parameter or trust process that allows both parties to understand the impact of any 
renegotiation 
Developing a set of guiding principles, which define how both parties, can conduct themselves in 
renegotiation 
Need to build up trust between the parties to ensure that there is no need to check everything at 
renegotiation 
Need to create a one-team philosophy & adopt a collaborative and analytical approach in contract 
formation 
Ensuring that the contract is managed in a proactive and collaborative manner 
Defining contract expectations in terms of manner of its administration 
Prescribe precise and significant authorisations during implementations particularly in the event of 
renegotiation 
Defining in the contract who write the contract system and the stakeholder system to be adopted in 
the event of renegotiation 
CS4 XY6-Pri Establishment of a network board with the responsibility of ensuring minimum level of disruptions 
to service provision. 
Building a better working, partnering and collaborative relationships in place. 
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Table 6.10: Measures to Ensure the Achievement of Value Money at Renegotiation (Contd.) 
Case Studies / 
Respondent 
VfM Measures Suggested 
  Ensuring stable team members through proper motivation. 
Ensuring bid review to ensure that opportunistic bid with the intent of renegotiate during 
implementation is rejected. 
Establishment of standards of performance for SPVs as a requirement for initiating payment for a 
renegotiation request. 
Need to freeze or place an embargo on the standards for materials, work requirements and the 
quality of workmanship (amongst others) if necessary. 
Establishment of contract review processes and requirements with the aim of effecting defined or 
allowable changes to the contract. 
The inclusion of hand-back requirements (i.e. salvage value of the road project or level of 
depreciation allowed at delivery or handover. However, these must be dictated by the public 
sector). 
The inclusion of project plan reviews (e.g. every three years) to monitor the performance of the 
project and particularly of VfM. 
The fixing of penalty points for non-performance with applicable limits to SPVs before contract 
takeover by the client, etc. 
XY7-Pub Establish a reasonable comparative baseline between other procurement methods to determine 
whether we have VfM or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
CS5 
 
XY8-Pub 
There may be a need to devise variations to ensure cost savings and consequently VfM. 
Ensuring that VfM informs the decision to renegotiate the contract. 
Adequate renegotiation experience can be of great help. 
 
 
 
XY9-Pri 
Establish a benchmark based on industry traces by competitive process, or some sets of indices 
placed against the benchmark. 
Ensure effective collaboration and discussion between the partners at inception. 
The project gain should be distributed evenly throughout the whole lifecycle to ensure the 
achievement of the contract cost. 
Establish necessary restrictions in the contract regarding what is not allowed. 
 
The experience of XY1-Pub illustrates that there is a need for an appropriate description of the 
performance of the proposed road investment regarding the criteria required, and the basis for the 
measurement of the performance criteria during the life of the concession. XY1-Pub also 
recommends an excellent review of the concession project as one of the measures to ensure VfM 
at renegotiation. The purpose of the evaluation according to XY6-Pri is to ensure that 
opportunistic bids, with the intention to renegotiate the contract by the SPV during the 
implementation of the project, are discouraged. Moreover, XY6-Pri identifies that the inclusion 
of project plan reviews, for instance, project review every three years of the concession will be 
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appropriate to monitor the performance of the project and to ensure the achievement of VfM. 
These imply that specific criteria to guide the renegotiation of road concessions, such as the 
definition of performance indicators and review processes will assist in ensuring the achievement 
of VfM during project implementation.  
The experiences of interviewees XY3-Pub and XY9-Pri further indicate that there is a need for a 
responsive guideline at the inception of the contract as it will aid future renegotiations. XY4-Pub 
says: “I think a contract will need a set of guiding principles that will define how both parties 
can conduct themselves in renegotiation regarding philosophies, objectives guiding principles 
and I think that will work.” These principles, defined by XY3-Pub, are to: “create a one team 
philosophy; we need to adopt a collaborative approach and an analytic approach to the making 
of the contract.” Also, XY9-Pri states that the competitive process should be adopted when 
measuring VfM. The reference should then be the criteria for assessment of VfM at strategic 
implementation points.  
All the interviewees agree that there is a necessity to define criteria for renegotiation at the 
inception of the PPP contract. Although, such rules, according to XY1-Pub, was not explicitly 
established at the beginning of the deal and does not say any terms of renegotiation and how to 
go about it; it is essential for PFI (DBFO) contracts to state the criteria for renegotiation before 
the commencement of the project. These will serve the interest of the client very well towards 
achieving VfM. Furthermore, XY2-Pri, XY3-Pub, XY6-Pri, XY8-Pub and XY9-Pri acknowledge 
the existence of a specific contractual payment mechanism, which is designed in the contract, to 
ensure that there is the full achievement of VfM for the client. 
The interviewees have referred to these contractual payment mechanisms as contractual VfM 
mechanisms. For example, monthly fixed fee payment in the financial model, payment condition 
for the monthly fixed costs, journey time penalty bonus, safety performance adjustment, critical 
incidence bonus, and proactive management bonus, which are all contractual VfM mechanisms 
identified by the respondents in the individual case study project. XY2-Pri recognises the need 
for agreed fixed fees and profit margins rate of return, which should be included in the contract 
at inception. Also, there should be a change mechanism to guide contract implementation over 
the 30-year period to ensure that the agreement is executed as stated in the contract up to the 
project completion. 
XY3-Pub recommends an open and transparent cost tracking system, useful parameter or trust 
process as well as the need to build confidence: “Sure five ways to not get VfM out of the contract 
is to manage in an adversarial way. It’s all about managing the contract in a proactive, 
collaborative manner, building trust between parties so that you can trust each other”. To address 
the question of trust, XY3-Pub, XY6-Pri and XY9-Pri further suggest the need for a discursive, 
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partnering, collaborative and analytical approach in the formation of the contract, which builds a 
better working relationship between the partners. Moreover, there is a need to define contract 
expectations regarding the manner of administration at the technical stage, while also specifying 
the contract authorisations required at the contract implementation stage when the need for 
renegotiation arises.  
Other measures identified by XY6-Pri, include the establishment of a proper management unit to 
coordinate effective motivation of team members towards the reduction of disruptions on the road 
network. In some cases, standards of performance should be prescribed, and an embargo of 
freezing such measures, e.g. materials, work requirements should be placed over a period as 
required by the public sector. There should also be requirements stated as a clause in the contract, 
which ensures the sustenance of the value of the road concession to be delivered at the end of the 
concession period. There should also be a provision in the contract, which ensures that the SPV 
is rewarded for excellent performance and penalised for non-conformity with prescribed 
standards.  
Interviewees in CS2 and CS5, who are XY2-Pri, XY3-Pub, XY8-Pub and XY9-Pri, reveal that 
the primary stakeholders usually request for renegotiations only in a situation where it is satisfied 
the VfM will be achieved for the parties to the renegotiation. In other words, there is a need to 
ensure that VfM informs the decision of the primary stakeholders for contract renegotiation. XY9-
Pri states: “Because it is quite rigidly drafted we have never been asked to demonstrate value for 
money.” These suggest that VfM has been rigidly incorporated and built into the contract 
provisions at inception. Therefore, it is required for the stakeholders to work within the rigidly 
defined contract that has included the consideration of VfM. Hence, parties must meet the terms 
of the VfM developed in the agreement, which forms the basis of any changes and renegotiations. 
XY8-Pub notes that enough experience of road concessions could be useful in achieving VfM by 
the public sector. Therefore, only experienced and competent staff on both the concessionaire and 
the client’s side should be allowed to engage in the renegotiation process.  
Besides, XY9-Pri identifies that there is a need to establish a benchmark, which is based on 
satisfaction derived by the public sector and designed as a basis to measure renegotiations. 
Necessary restrictions should be introduced into the contract at the formation stage to define what 
is, and not, allowed at the renegotiation during contract implementation. The measures suggested 
by the respective respondents to ensure the achievement of VfM is set according to the individual 
case studies as shown in Table 6.9. 
The achievement of VfM for all the stakeholders suggests that VfM can be achieved at the 
renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects and that all the contracting parties can be satisfied at 
the end of the renegotiation. XY3-Pub gives credence to this by stating: “Again VfM is 
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demonstrated through evidence of actual cost incurred and through evidence of assumed cost in 
the financial model. And if there is any difference, then it is being assumed as the catch up between 
the two costs”. Hence, there should be no variance in the VfM achieved for the stakeholders 
regarding the criteria described for each of the variables.  
These empirical findings express a different opinion to the literature, which indicates that the 
experiences of renegotiation in PPP road projects have not addressed the VfM challenges. These 
challenges led to the non-achievement of the objectives for the stakeholders, primarily the 
procuring authority objective regarding VfM for users (Sarmento, 2014; Xiong and Zhang, 2014; 
Reside and Mendoza, 2010; Engel et al., 2009). The reason for these contrasting findings is that 
the renegotiation results and outcomes differ regarding geographical locations. More importantly, 
the findings of this study are on renegotiation experiences in the UK, which has adopted PFI for 
road project delivery since the early 1990’s (Debande 2002; Akintoye and Chinyio, 2005). As 
such, the interviewees are providing information based on the wealth of experience in PFI 
adoption for road project delivery.  
The literature suggests that the renegotiation challenge, which has posed greater VfM 
achievement problems for the public sector, can only be addressed through the adoption of the 
strategic actions and measures (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento, 2014). The findings of this study 
corroborate the literature, as suggested by the respondents, that specific measures can enhance 
the prospects of achieving profitable results for the public sector at the renegotiation of road 
concessions. Therefore, it is possible to obtain VfM during the renegotiation of PPP road projects 
through the adoption of measures outlined by the respondents, which is based upon their 
respective experience in the case studies.  
XY3-Pub observes that there is a lack of coherence and clarity regarding the specification of funds 
included in the financial model. This demerit has hindered the full achievement of VfM during 
the implementation of road concessions. XY3-Pub further corroborates this submission by 
indicating that the VfM success recorded needs to be further strengthened to foster the most 
efficient VfM renegotiation in PFI (DBFO) road projects, while also addressing the shortcomings 
inherent in the financial model. To achieve this, XY3-Pub states that: “What we do struggle with 
is to understand how the financial model apportions money fully. There are many lines or 
mandate in the financial model that are perhaps as clear as could be to help future renegotiations. 
So, it might be a line like a toll plaza with a value of it. It does not say what is included in that 
money. Therefore, it does not include the O & M toll plaza. It does not include the O&M renewals. 
It does not include the technology. It just a very standardised description of the number next to it 
but it is not necessarily transparent as it could be to help future renegotiations.  
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Therefore, what I would suggest would be a good recommendation for PPP projects going 
forward will be to be much more transparent, exact cost and financial model from inception that 
will aid future renegotiations”. 
The financial model is a model used as a standard to evaluate the expenses on a given PFI (DBFO) 
road projects and to ensure that the plan is executed based on the financial requirements. The 
findings from the interviews, especially on CS2 indicates that it is essential to adopt the financial 
model to ensure that the VfM objectives of the client are realised. Hence, it serves as a robust 
technique to compare the results regarding the cost expended to the budgeted cost of the project 
as stated in the contract. Thus, it is necessary for the stakeholders, especially the client to ensure 
that the financial model is updated annually from the start of the deal to include any changes, 
revisions or renegotiations to its terms, as stated by XY3-Pub: “The financial model is updated 
annually. However, we must change it to what has been agreed in that year. The total cost of the 
project will take into consideration the increase and decrease each year depending on what 
changes have been made”. However, XY2-Pri states that the financial model guides renegotiation 
and it assumes that the actual cost incurred during road project implementation, especially at 
renegotiation should not exceed the expected price in the financial model. 
VfM is possible through the actual cost incurred during implementation, which is less than or 
equal to the assumed value in the financial model. This cost is fixed and payable to the SPV or 
concessionaire on the basis stipulated in the contract, e.g. monthly or annually by the performance 
indicators as identified by XY1-Pub. The adoption of this principle in all the projects is 
responsible for the positive VfM results achieved in most of the case study projects. The outcome 
of renegotiation and changes in the case study projects indicate that completion of the projects 
must occur within budget, period, and must have user satisfaction and expected quality. Thus, 
renegotiations have had a positive impact on the VfM criteria designed for the project at inception. 
The financial model as established in the case studies has set out a strict guideline to adopt in 
ensuring that renegotiation achieves the VfM objective of the public sector. Conclusively, the 
respondents’ answers suggest measures, which address the problem of VfM inherent in PPP road 
projects renegotiation. The literature corroborates some of the measures identified as capable of 
assisting the renegotiation of PPP projects to achieve VfM (Guasch et al., 2014).  
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 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
The empirical research reveals that the renegotiation of road concessions does not necessarily 
have to erode the VfM criteria and the VfM objectives of the procuring authority, including the 
user’s satisfaction. Indeed, renegotiation experienced in most of the case studies contributes to 
the improvement of VfM goals for the stakeholders, particularly regarding user’s comfort. Since 
cost is the primary criteria for the measure of VfM, there should be the development of a thorough 
financial model, which should be in the contract for use at the beginning of the agreement. The 
financial model will assist the public and private users to understand how the contract stipulates 
the apportionment of cost to allow for necessary check and balances during the implementation 
of the project, particularly at renegotiation. The contract mechanisms for payments and measures 
taken at the renegotiation and change process are responsible for the positive VfM results 
achieved for users. Hence, the contract mechanisms for payment have been referred to as VfM 
contractual mechanisms as they assist to deliver the reliability of journey times, reduce road 
congestions and avoid lane closures, ensure safety performance across a range of PFI (DBFO) 
road projects amongst others.   
The procuring authority at renegotiation expects that changes, reviews, and amendments conform 
to the performance, quality, costs and standards stipulated in the financial model, as stated in the 
original contract. No deviation from the specified VfM criteria established in the agreement. The 
achievement of the estimated cost should, therefore, be consistent throughout all the stages of the 
PFI (DBFO) road contracts and should not vary with renegotiation or changes during the 
implementation of the agreement. The different position of the literature and this empirical study 
regarding VfM achieved primarily for the public sector suggests that there is a need to underpin 
these findings further and to develop a philosophy of renegotiation that fosters the achievement 
of VfM during the renegotiation of road concessions. The VfM renegotiation philosophy seeks to 
incorporate measures that will enhance optimum achievement of VfM at the renegotiation stage 
of PPP road projects.
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CHAPTER 7 RENEGOTIATION OF 
DESIGN-BUILD-FINANCE-OPERATE 
ROAD PROJECTS 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results and findings of the quantitative data collected through the 
questionnaire survey. The sections reflect the respective parts of the study administered by 
objectives 3, 4 and 5 of the research. The goals include the assessment of the factors leading to 
PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation; impacts of PFI (DBFO) road projects for the Value for 
Money (VfM) criteria; the outcome of the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects and value 
for money in PFI (DBFO) road project renegotiation. The findings from each of these sections 
are from the data analysed and presented in tables, charts, figures and frameworks. The purpose 
of the questionnaire survey is to confirm further, or identify, any deviations from the findings of 
the interviews. Moreover, the results will help develop the VfM renegotiation framework for PPP 
road projects implementation and management. 
 PRELIMINARY RESPONSES OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The responses provided by the respondents in the introductory part of the questionnaire elicits 
practical information regarding the respondents, type of PPP, nature of the organisation, the 
current position of the respondents and number of years of experience of the respondents. These 
are all explained in this subsection. 
 Category of Public Private Partnership Stakeholders 
There is the evaluation of the individual categories of PPP stakeholders in comparison. The results 
indicate that 52% of the respondents work in a private company and are responsible for both 
design and building aspects. They are called SPV or concessionaire because of their dual 
responsibilities. 28% of the responses received were from public agency representatives, while 
representatives of the public company responsible for the contracting aspect accounted for 8%. 
Also, 4% of the answers come from the private organisation in charge of the consulting 
responsibility for road DBFO projects.  
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Hence, 56% of respondents are from the private sector, and 36% of responses received are from 
representatives of the public sector, while 8% of the questionnaires collected are without 
information, as shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: PPP Stakeholder Type 
S/N PPP Stakeholder Frequency Percentage (%) Rank 
1 Private Company Contracting & Consulting 13 52.0 1 
2 Public Agency/Client Representative 7 28.0 2 
3 Public Company Contracting 2 8.0 3 
4 Private Company Consulting 1 4.0 4 
5 Without Information 2 8.0  
 Total 25 100.0  
 
 Current Position of the Respondents 
The results of the data analysed indicate that 4% of the respondents are a Managing Director/CEO, 
General Manager along with other categories of positions respectively. 16% of the respondents 
constituted Contract Performance Managers and Engineers. The Quantity Surveyors totalled 8%, 
while Project Managers that are currently serving in the organisations account for 36% of the total 
survey returned. However, 12% of the questionnaires returned were without information as shown 
in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Current Position of the Respondent 
S/N Current Position of Respondent Frequency Percentage (%) Rank 
1 Project Manager 9 36.0 1 
2 Contract Performance Manager 4 16.0 2 
3 Engineer 4 16.0 2 
4 Quantity Surveyor 2 8.0 4 
5 General Manager 1 4.0 5 
6 Managing Director/CEO 1 4.0 5 
7 Others 1 4.0 5 
8 Without Information 3 12.0  
 Total 25 100.0  
 
 Years of Experience of the Respondents 
The result of the analysis, concerning the years of experience of the respondents, shows that 20% 
of the respondents have 10-15 years, 15-20 years and 20+ years of experience respectively. 8% 
of the respondents have between 0-5 years' experience, while 24% of the respondents have 
between 5-10 years' experience in PFI (DBFO) road projects as shown in Table 5.6. These 
findings show that 60% and 84% of the respondents have over ten years and five years 
experiences respectively in UK PFI (DBFO) road projects.  
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Consequentially, only 8% of the respondents have less than five years' experience, while 20% 
have over 20 years' experience of PFI (DBFO) road projects, as shown in Table 7.5. These results 
indicate that the respondents have significant, rational and comprehensive expertise in PFI road 
project procurements in the UK construction industry, as outlined in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Years of PFI (DBFO) Road Projects Experience 
S/N Number of Employees in the Respondents Organisations Frequency Percentage (%) Rank 
1 Between 5 to 10 years’ experience 6 24.0 1 
2 Between 10 to 15 years’ experience 5 20.0 2 
3 Between 15 to 20 years’ experience 5 20.0 2 
4 20+ years of experience 5 20.0 2 
5 Between 0 to 5 years’ experience 2 8.0 5 
6 Without Information 2 8.0 5 
 Total 25 100.0  
 
 PROJECT SPECIFIC RENEGOTIATION CHARACTERISTICS 
As discussed in the methodology section in chapter 5, the questionnaires administered to the 
public and private sector stakeholder reveal distinct characteristics of the DBFO road projects 
regarding renegotiation.  
 Incidence of Road Project Renegotiation 
The researcher investigates the road concessions to ascertain the incidence of renegotiation. Of 
the twenty-two respondents that provided full responses to the questionnaire, thirteen indicated 
that they could remember a renegotiated PFI (DBFO) road project that they had been involved in, 
while nine could not think of any renegotiation of road concession that they had possible 
involvement. Given that nine respondents did not agree that they were engaged in any 
renegotiation, this confirms the results of the case studies, which indicates that there are few 
renegotiation instances in road concessions and the renegotiations of road concessions are not 
common in the context of the UK. Although the respondent’s information there may be a question 
regarding the data provided, due to their non-involvement in renegotiation processes, as the 
information provided is based on knowledge gained from their current position (See Table 7.2).  
As 59% of the questionnaire respondents agree that they were involved in renegotiation, while 
41% provide information based on their knowledge of the renegotiation process, without practical 
involvement in the renegotiation process. The percentages of the respondents suggest that most 
of the respondents had experience of renegotiation in the UK road concession projects. These 
statistics put the ratio of respondents with practical renegotiation experiences and those without 
practical renegotiation experiences at 59:41. 
 
                                  Chapter 7 Renegotiation of Design-Build-Finance- Operate Road Projects                              
211 
 
 
However, the difference between those respondents with renegotiation experience and those 
without renegotiation experience is not high. The findings suggest that renegotiation experiences 
vary and are not very common in the UK road sector, which coincides with the literature regarding 
the few pieces of evidence of PPP renegotiation in the context of the UK PPP projects (Makovsek 
et al., 2015). 
Contrastingly, there is a high level of renegotiations in infrastructure transport projects procured 
through PPP, in comparison to other infrastructure construction projects in the literature (Estache 
et al., 2009b; Guasch and Straub, 2009a). However, these studies are limited to individual 
countries in Latin America and Europe, excluding the UK. Overall, these studies show that the 
level of renegotiation experiences of stakeholders in the context of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects 
is not very high, given the responses received from the stakeholders from the two categories of 
respondents (i.e., public client and private concessionaire). 
There are many PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK; however, only twenty-one (21) projects 
have been sampled for this questionnaire survey at the central level of governance in England, 
Scotland and Wales, as explained in the research methodology section (Please see sub-section 
5.6.2.2). Thus, forty-one (41) respondents from this 21 case study projects are expected to provide 
information regarding PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK. Only seven (7) out of the forty- one 
(41) respondents from these case study projects gave the names of the DBFO road projects they 
have had practical renegotiation experience. However, due to the confidentiality of the study, the 
names of the road projects provided by these respondents remain private and confidential. The 
reason why others did not divulge the names of these projects may be because of the need to keep 
their information private and confidential, which coincides with the literature that firms often do 
not show their renegotiation experiences in PPP projects and usually prefer not to disclose their 
profits (Sarmento, 2014, Moore et al., 2014). 
 Characteristic Type of the Renegotiation 
The research also seeks to identify the nature of the renegotiation on the PFI (DBFO) road 
projects. The results of the analysis reveal that eleven (11) out of thirteen (13) respondents that 
claim involvement in the renegotiation indicates that renegotiation usually occurs during the 
execution/implementation stage of the contract (intra-deal renegotiation). This finding 
corroborates the supporting literature as outlined by Salacuse (2000), where most infrastructure 
construction contracts, including PPP, undergo renegotiation during the project implementation 
stage. The implementation or execution stage according to Koppenjan (2005) includes the 
realisation phase, which entails the design and building of the project, as well as the operation 
and maintenance phase. 
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Moreover, nine (i.e. 69.2%) out of thirteen (100%) respondents indicated that there was an 
unexpected incidence which led to the renegotiation. These statistics further reveal that 46.2% of 
the respondents agree that there are changes envisaged at the inception of the contract, which 
necessitates a renegotiation of the contract; while 69.2% of the respondents agree that unexpected 
incidences led to amendments of the agreement. A comparison of these various renegotiations 
shows that renegotiations could occur during the project execution as expected or unintended by 
the stakeholders. Unexpected incidence leading to renegotiations is most common in comparison 
to expected events and most of the renegotiations according to the responses occur after the start 
of the contract, i.e., after the financial close as shown in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4: Type of Renegotiation 
S/N Type of Renegotiation Experienced Frequency Percentage (%) Rank 
1 Renegotiation, which occurs during the period of implementation (i.e. 
from the design and financial close, build, operation and maintenance) 
of the contract as stated by a contractual clause. 
11 84.6 1 
2 Unexpected incidence, which necessitate the revision or amendment of 
the contract. 
9 69.2 2 
3 Expected changes, which necessitate the amendment of the original 
contract 
6 46.2 3 
 
Table 7.4 shows that most of the renegotiations occur during implementation from the financial 
close to the operation and maintenance, which suggest that show that the renegotiation of DBFO 
road projects are mostly intra-deals (i.e. renegotiation that occurred during the execution of the 
concession) (Koppenjan, 2005; Salacuse, 2000). This result implies that renegotiation mostly 
takes place during road concessions, as stated in the literature, after the financial close and during 
the period of practical execution of the works, i.e. within the stage of construction up to 
completion and the handover stage (Engel et al., 2014a). Hence, there are similarities between the 
findings of this study and the literature. Factors Leading to Renegotiation. 
 FACTORS LEADING TO RENEGOTIATION 
Sections C of the questionnaire also asks questions that elicit information regarding the factors 
leading to the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO road projects as shown in Appendix 2. The findings 
of the literature reveal that several factors led to a request for renegotiation by the primary 
stakeholders of PPP road projects (Guasch et al., 2014; Menezes and Ryan, 2013; Bi and Wang, 
2011 and Baeza and Vassallo, 2010).  
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Essentially, fifty-two factors are from the literature review, as factors leading to renegotiations of 
PPP road projects (See section 3.9). 
There is the classification of the factors into eleven categories (i.e. design, technical, economic, 
contractual, tendering and bidding, administrative and managerial, institutional, regulatory and 
legal, political, environmental and social). The fifty-two factors identified from the literature (See 
Table 3.4) including those from the case studies were integrated into Table 3.4 and form the basis 
of the instrument used for the second pilot study. The pilot study assisted in refining the designed 
questionnaire, based on the findings of the literature and case studies. At the end of the pilot study, 
the respondents were able to identify thirty-seven factors as being applicable and relevant to the 
UK PFI (DBFO) road projects (See Appendix 2). Out of these thirty-seven factors, thirty-six were 
found in the literature, while fourteen have traces with the case studies as well as the pieces of 
existing research. Only one (1) factor was found to be the contribution of one of the respondents 
in CS5, as shown in Table 7.5. Based on this outcome, the thirty-seven factors were included in 
the questionnaire (See Appendix 2), and the respondents were asked to answer the questions to 
show their level of agreement based on the Likert scale. 
The analysis of the responses (See Table 7.5) indicates that changes in standards of works, 
changes in specification and modifications in the scope of the works are the prominent technical 
factors leading to renegotiations of road DBFO projects. These findings agree with the results of 
the case studies, as the critical factors, in their respective order of significance, are changes in 
standards of the works, changes in the specification, the addition of road assets and changes in 
the scope of the works. Of the fifty-two factors, three are non-critical factors (i.e. opportunistic 
bidding, e.g. bid submission with the intent to increase prices at renegotiation, error in the bid 
during procurement, poor evaluation of competitive proposals and lack of transparency in the 
discharge of managerial duties). Incidentally, two of these three factors are tendering and bidding 
factors, while one falls under the administrative and managerial category. All the identified may 
be the reason why these factors are not reflected in the case studies respondents as factors leading 
to the renegotiation of road concessions, as they are non-critical to the renegotiations that occurred 
in the case study projects. 
The highly critical factors leading to renegotiations fall under the technical category. These are 
the first three factors in the hierarchy (See Table 7.5). Other significant factors are two contractual 
factors, one technical factor and one environmental factor, as shown in Table 7.5.
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                     Table 7.5: Details of the Factors Leading to the Renegotiation 
S/N Factors LR CS Category Frequency Mean Rank Criticality 
Index 
1 Change in the standards of works during the technical development √ √ Technical 22 4.14 1 VC 
2 Specification changes [e.g. change in the standard of technical skills, 
change in the type of technology] 
√ √ Technical 22 4.05 2 VC 
3 Change in the scope of works √ √ Technical 22 4.05 2 VC 
4 Additional works during construction [e.g. requirement for extension 
or widening of the road network] 
√ √ Contractual 22 3.73 4 C 
5 Additional works during operation & maintenance [e.g. removal and 
replacement of assets] 
√ √ Contractual 22 3.68 5 C 
6 Changes in infrastructure design, layout and programme during project 
execution 
√ √ Technical 22 3.68 5 C 
7 Environmental impacts √  Environmental 22 3.27 6 C 
8 Managerial initiatives to keep up with current contract standards √ √ Administrative 
and managerial 
22 2.95 7 MC 
9 Changes in pricing and service to be provided as stated in the tender √ √ Tendering and 
Bidding 
21 2.95 7 MC 
10 Social acceptability of user charges by the members of the public √  Social 22 2.73 9 MC 
11 Inaccurate or defective project specifications √ √ Design 22 2.73 9 MC 
12 Archaeological constraints √  Environmental 21 2.71 11 MC 
13 Changes to general price level and transaction costs due to inflation √  Economic 22 2.68 12 MC 
14 Opposition to continuation of the project by the members of the public √  Social 22 2.59 13 MC 
15 Inaccurate estimation of the traffic level forecasts or levels √  Contractual 22 2.50 14 MC 
16 Poorly written contract [e.g. ambiguity of terms and contract details] √ √ Contractual 22 2.45 15 MC 
17 Time overruns for bidding and contract negotiation √  Contractual 22 2.41 16 MC 
18 Political instability occasioned by changes in government or changes 
in government priorities. 
√ √ Political 22 2.36 17 MC 
19 Corporate social responsibility considerations √  Social 22 2.36 17 MC 
20 Erroneous change in the basis for tender √  Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 2.32 19 MC 
21 In-accurate estimation of capital cost √  Design 22 2.32 19 MC 
22 Political instability evidenced in contract award shortly before or after 
elections 
√  Political 22 2.32 19 MC 
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                Table 7.5: Details of the Factors Leading to the Renegotiation (Contd.) 
23 Changes in economic policy by government [e.g. high or incremental 
changes to corporate tax and levies] 
√  Economic 22 2.32 22 MC 
24 Mismatch between the public and private partners objective [e.g. in 
terms of profit sharing] 
√  Others 22 2.27 23 MC 
25 Inadequate contract management expertise or knowledge √ √ Contractual 22 2.23 24 MC 
26 Management incompetence [e.g. administrative delays during project 
execution] 
√  Administrative 
and Managerial 
22 2.18 25 MC 
27 The need to respect and adopt the overriding interest of major political 
constituency in the parliament 
 √ Political 22 2.18 25 MC 
28 Defective contract awards criteria or incorrect contractual assumptions √  Contractual 22 2.14 27 MC 
29 Ineffective governance and regulation of the renegotiation process 
necessitating specific statutory changes to the contract 
√  Regulatory/ 22 2.14 27 MC 
30 Inadequate feasibility studies and ex-ante pre-tender analysis √  Legal 22 2.14 27 MC 
31 Corruption at governance level e.g. awarding contract because of the 
nationality or affiliation of the concessionaire 
√  Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 2.14 27 MC 
32 Corruption at governance level evidenced in misappropriation of funds √  Political 21 2.10 31 MC 
33 Ineffectiveness and inefficiency of contract enforcement √ √ Political 21 2.05 32 MC 
34 Weak legal environment [i.e. in terms of effective litigation] √  Contractual 22 2.00 33 MC 
35 Lack of transparency in the discharge of managerial duties √  Legal 21 1.81 34 NC 
36 Bidding error during procurement e.g. poor evaluation of inflated/ 
aggressive bid 
√  Administrative 
and managerial 
 1.77 35 NC 
37 Opportunistic bidding [e.g. bid submission with the intent to increase 
prices at renegotiation] 
√  Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 1.77 35 NC 
                Key: VC= Very Critical, C = Critical, MC = Moderately Critical, C = Critical, NC = Not Critical. 
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Table 7.5 reveals that technical related factors and contractual factors mainly prompt 
renegotiation requests. The results show that the empirical study contradicts most of the 
submissions in the literature. The category of factors that can lead to renegotiation falls under 
regulatory, tendering and bidding, administrative and managerial factors. Some of the extremely 
critical factors under these categories include weak or inadequate regulatory framework, type of 
regulation and tariff, poor evaluation of aggressive bid and political instability, e.g. change in 
government or change in government priorities. Inaccurate estimations of traffic levels, 
misallocation of traffic risks and levels of effectiveness and efficiency of contract enforcement 
are very critical in the literature (See Section 3.6). Since the literature findings on Latin American 
countries, Spain and Portugal concession contracts, the differences in the results suggest that the 
factors leading to renegotiations of road concessions may differ from one country to another: it 
could also vary from one project to another. 
The results of this study also indicate that some of the non-critical factors and the moderately 
critical factors identified in this empirical study are in the literature (See Table 7.5). These non-
critical factors are amongst the prominent factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP road projects 
(See Table 3.4 of section 3.6 of this thesis). These imply that what drives renegotiation in some 
studies, which are on the experiences of other countries, differs from what leads to renegotiation 
in the context of the UK. There is the suggestion that there may be variations in the outcomes of 
renegotiation regarding VfM across countries. 
There is an indication of the achievement of VfM by the respective respondents as shown in the 
results (See Table 6.8). Furthermore, bidding errors, which may lead to high bidding costs, has 
also been indicated to be a non-critical factor as shown in Table 7.5. Hence, the findings agree 
with the literature, which puts high transaction and bidding cost as the most significant barrier to 
public client participation in PFI projects (Carrillo et al., 2008). The reason for this submission is 
that the respondents place less emphasis on an aggressive bid and bidding error as a factor leading 
to the renegotiation of the road concessions. However, these factors in most instances are agreed 
to be the driving factors in the renegotiation experience that results to non-achievement of VfM 
(Menezes and Ryan, 2015a; Guasch et al., 2014; Bi and Wang, 2011; Athias and Nunez, 2008). 
Inadequate evaluation of aggressive bids and bidding error may be, therefore, a barrier to the 
accomplishment of VfM during the renegotiation of road concession projects. As a result, road 
concession projects should be well planned at the tendering and bidding stage to ensure that there 
is the achievement of VfM at the renegotiations during the implementation of the project. 
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Consequently, a cursory evaluation of the findings of the literature reveals that the factors 
identified as non-critical in this study are most likely to lead to renegotiations (Guasch et al., 
2014; Bi and Wang, 2011; De Brux, 2010).  
These suggest that the factors influencing renegotiation have a relationship with the renegotiation 
outcomes, regarding the achievement of VfM. Hence, there should be an avoidance of the non-
critical factors by the renegotiation parties or primary stakeholders. Moreover, the renegotiating 
stakeholders should ensure that the reasons, which are propelling renegotiation, should not be the 
least critical factors identified in Table 7.5. The reason for this is to make sure that the 
renegotiation of the PPP contract fosters the achievement of VfM for the public sector as 
established in the case studies. 
 IMPACT OF THE RENEGOTIATION ON VALUE FOR MONEY CRITERIA 
This section also explains the analysis of the answers given by the respondents regarding the 
impacts of the renegotiation on VfM criteria. Altogether, the renegotiation was found to affect 
fourteen of the VfM criteria, which are from the literature findings, with incidentally only nine 
out of the fourteen standards are traced to the case studies findings. The fourteen impacts were in 
the questionnaire (See Appendix 2), and the respondents were asked to identify the criteria level 
of their effects, based on a Likert scale as follows: 5– strongly agree, 4- agree, 3- Indifferent, 2- 
disagree and 1- strongly disagree. The findings reveal that cost is an important criterion used in 
assessing the impact of renegotiation regarding VfM, as construction cost, project finance cost 
and operation and maintenance cost in their respective order of significance are the most impacted 
VfM criteria out of all the fourteen assessed. Thus, it became evident that cost is the main criteria 
of VfM used to assess the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects. 
Evidence from the empirical results, indicated in Table 7.6, highlight that the impact of 
renegotiation is mostly felt in their respective decreasing order of significance as follows: 
construction cost, project finance cost, operation and maintenance cost; whole lifecycle cost and 
cost of risk transferred as shown in Table 7.6. Subsection 4.6 of this thesis corroborates these 
findings. Also, the results of the interview conducted in CS1 by XY1 outlines, “Oh no. we are 
looking at cost reduction perspectives. Cost reduction is the primary target”. The statement of 
CS1, therefore, suggest that the various cost criteria are essential to the client or procuring 
authority during the measurement of the VfM achieved on PFI (DBFO) road projects. As such, 
one can conclude that the cost of road concessions is a crucial measure of VfM. Therefore, the 
price is the primary measure of VfM in PFI (DBFO) road projects as shown in Table 7.6.  
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The reason for this is that the cost criteria has the highest mean value in comparison to other 
criteria’s for measuring VfM in concession projects, all of this supports the findings of the 
interview that indicates that it is an important consideration and target. There is also an indication 
that renegotiation of the road concession projects mostly affects the cost of construction and the 
project finance cost.  
Profit for the concessionaire is the primary measure of VfM for the private sector stakeholder. 
Contrastingly, users’ satisfaction is the primary concern of the client, which constitutes the 
primary objective and focus of PPP road projects. The results of the empirical study ascertain 
which of the objectives is greatly impacted by the renegotiation of DBFO road projects, revealing 
that user's satisfaction is impacted more by renegotiation than the profit of the concessionaire. 
The nature of this impact cannot be ascertained, regarding whether it is a positive or negative 
impact at this point. The following sub-section reveals the nature of the impact based on the 
outcome of the renegotiation. These results agree with the literature that PPP road project 
renegotiations have been found to affect the deliverables of cost and user’s satisfaction through 
the increase of cost to the users and taxpayers (Guasch et al., 2014; Sarmento 2014). 
The findings of this study further revealed that the renegotiation of the DBFO road concession 
could have an impact on the concession and construction duration. However, the experience of 
the UK PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation reveals that there is a more significant impact of 
the renegotiation on the length of the construction process, rather than the concession duration. 
However, the renegotiation also affects other VfM criteria. The results show that the private sector 
management expertise and skills are profoundly impacted by the renegotiation when compared 
with other criteria used in measuring VfM. The mean value of the impact of the renegotiation on 
the quality of service delivery is 2.95, which indicates a much lower effect on the VfM criteria. 
Also, the innovation of bidders in the use of output specification and concession duration is the 
least impacted VfM criteria with a mean value of 2.77 and 2.17 respectively, as indicated in Table 
7.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Chapter 7 Renegotiation of Design-Build-Finance- Operate Road Projects                              
219 
 
 
Table 7.6: Impacts of the Renegotiation 
S/N Impacts VfM Criteria LR CS Freq. Mean Rank Criticality Level 
1 Construction cost Cost √ √ 21 3.67 1 Critical 
2 Project finance cost Cost √  21 3.62 2 Critical 
3 Operation and Maintenance costs Cost √ √ 21 3.48 3 Critical 
4 User’s satisfaction Client Objective √ √ 22 3.45 4 Critical 
5 Private sector management 
expertise and skills 
Other √  22 3.18 5 Critical 
6 Whole Life Cycle Cost Cost √ √ 22 3.14 6 Critical 
7 Construction duration Duration √ √ 22 3.14 6 Critical 
8 Cost of risk transferred Cost √  22 3.09 8 Critical 
9 Concessionaire’s profit SPV’s 
Objective 
√ √ 22 2.73 9 Moderately Critical 
10 Quality of Service Delivery Quality √ √ 22 2.95 10 Moderately Critical 
11 Competition that provides fair 
value of the project 
Other √  21 2.95 10 Moderately Critical 
12 Performance based payment 
mechanism 
Other √ √ 22 2.91 12 Moderately Critical 
13 Innovation of bidders in the use of 
output specification 
Other √  22 2.77 13 Moderately Critical 
14 Concession duration Duration √ √ 22 2.17 14 Moderately Critical 
 
An evaluation of the impacts of renegotiation on all the standards for measuring the VfM reveals 
that variations exist in the mean values of all the individual nodes of the impacts. The impacts of 
the renegotiation are felt in the costs, user’s satisfaction and construction duration. All these 
represent the VfM standard, having the highest level of influence. The least impacted VfM criteria 
are concessionaire’s profit and concession duration, which contrasts the literature that states that 
the renegotiation of PPP projects has been identified as leading to an increase in profit of the 
concessionaire as well as an extension of the concession duration (Fatokun et al., 2015). These 
suggest that the renegotiation of road concessions does not necessarily have to benefit the 
concessionaire to the detriment of the users and consequently disadvantage the procuring 
authority through the extension of concession duration, an increase in contract sum and a 
reduction in quality and performance of the concession.  
The results of the analysis, as shown in Table 7.6, reveal that the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) 
road projects has had a significant impact on the cost of construction, followed by user’s 
satisfaction, project finance cost, operation and maintenance cost etc. This result is more striking 
in the sense that it reveals that renegotiation impacts cost more at the construction stage than any 
other variables of VfM. The reason for this impact may be due to the prominent factors leading 
to renegotiation at the technical phase of the PPP road projects delivery, which has implications 
for the cost of construction, usually in a negative form. These, therefore, reiterates the literature, 
which states that PPP renegotiations within the transport sector have not achieved value for 
money in the public client (Sarmento, 2014a; Hodge and Greve, 2009).  
                                  Chapter 7 Renegotiation of Design-Build-Finance- Operate Road Projects                              
220 
 
 
However, the succeeding section of this thesis substantiates these aspects of VfM achievement at 
the renegotiation stage by a thorough evaluation of the renegotiation outcomes.    
There are no substantial changes to concessionaire’s profit in comparison with the agreement 
before the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects. These surprising contrasts the literature 
findings, which state that most renegotiations in the transport sector including road projects have 
addressed the viability of the concession contracts to ensure a profitable return to the private 
sector (Acerete et al., 2009). Thus, the literature further contrasts with the belief that PPP road 
projects can be renegotiated and benefit both the public and private sector regarding VfM 
achievement for both parties. Based on this finding, it becomes imperative to evaluate and assess 
the measures required to achieve this different result, which is VfM to the public sector with non-
excessive profits for the private partner at renegotiation. 
 OUTCOMES OF THE RENEGOTIATION 
The analysis reveals the respective values of the renegotiation outcomes, which are by the criteria 
of VfM. The results address the research Objective 5 and evaluate the relationship that exists 
between renegotiation and VfM. The responses received indicate that there is excellent evidence 
of an increase in the criteria of VfM followed by an indication that the VfM standards remain 
unchanged. Though, there are fewer instances of decrease and reduction in the criteria adopted to 
measure the outcome of renegotiation as shown in Table 7.7.     
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                 Table 7.7: Outcome of Renegotiation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Key: LR – Literature Review, CS – Case Studies 
 
S/N Outcome LR CS Upward Review/ 
Increase 
(+ve) 
Downward Review/ 
Decrease 
(-ve) 
No action taken 
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11 Outcome with respect to Construction Cost √  8 32 9 3 12 5 11 44 3 
12 Outcome with respect to Construction Duration √  9 36 8 2 8 7 10 40 4 
13 Outcome with respect to Operation and Maintenance 
Cost 
√  12 48 4 3 12 5 7 28 7 
14 Outcome with respect to Project Finance Cost  √ 11 44 6 1 4 8 10 40 4 
15 Outcome with respect to Cost of Risk Transferred  √ 10 40 7 2 8 7 9 36 6 
16 Outcome with respect to Users Satisfaction √ √ 16 64 1 0 0 9 6 24 9 
17 Profitability of the Road Concession to the SPV √ √ 6 24 11 12 48 1 3 12 10 
19 Outcome with respect to quality and performance √ √ 16 64 1 5 20 3 1 4 11 
20 Outcome with respect to Whole Life Cost √ √ 8 32 9 7 28 2 5 20  
21 Outcome with respect to Concession Duration √ √ 5 20 12 2 8 7 15 60 1 
24 Outcome with respect to Performance Based Payment 
Mechanism 
√ √ 12 48 4 4 16 4 14 56 2 
25 Outcome with respect to Private Sector Management 
Expertise and Skills 
√ √ 14 56 3 1 4 8 7 28 7 
 Total   127  42  98   
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Though, 14 criteria are identified as adopted in the evaluation of VfM achieved. However, eight 
out of the fourteen VfM criteria are been influenced by PFI (DBFO) road projects: cost, time, 
quality, whole life cost, duration, SPV profit and user’s satisfaction (See Table 7.7). Also, an 
evaluation of the data collected reveals that 64% of the respondents indicated that users are 
satisfied, while only 6% agree with the neutrality of the user’s satisfaction concerning the output 
of the renegotiated projects, as shown in Table 7.7. The quality and performance of the standards 
of output also increased by 64%, which indicates that the renegotiation has no real impact on the 
quality and performance of the DBFO road projects. 20% of the respondents show a decrease in 
the quality and performance, while another 4% indicated no variations in the quality and 
performance of the road outputs. 
The percentage of respondents that claimed non-extension of concession duration is 60%, which 
is higher than the percentages of respondents who indicated an extension and reduction of the 
concession duration of PFI (DBFO) road projects. These suggest that there is a low degree of 
changes in concession duration in PFI (DBFO) road projects. It also indicates that 44% of the PFI 
(DBFO) road projects are completed to cost and budget as detailed in the contract agreement. The 
completion of a project to the terms of the contract can create satisfaction for the procuring client 
and the users, with the pleasure of the users is by 88% of the respondents. 40% of the respondents 
attested to the upward review of the cost of risk associated with the project. However, 36% of 
respondents claim there is a neutral cost of risk included in the contract at inception, while 8% of 
respondents agree that there is a downward review of the cost of risk, totalling 44%.  These imply 
that the outcome of the renegotiation regarding the value of risk is not adverse.  
The cost of project finance shows a 44% increase in funding, with 40% of respondents indicating 
that no action was taken regarding project finance as shown in Table 7.7. Thus, the cost of project 
finance remains unchanged through the concession period to date; while only 4% of the 
respondents indicate a downward review and decrease in project finance costs. Moreover, the cost 
of construction and the whole life cost show no significant variance at renegotiation. 32% of 
respondents agree to the review of the cost of construction, while 44% of the respondents indicate 
that there is no review action required due to the cost neutrality condition included in the contract. 
12% of responses show a decrease in the cost of construction at the renegotiation stage. Overall, 
there is no indication that the value of the construction projects increases or are reviewed 
upwardly. These findings contrast the supporting literature, which identifies an increase in 
construction cost at the renegotiation stage of PPP road projects (Acerete et al. 2010). 
Table 7.7 further indicates that 32% of the respondents indicate that there is an increase in the 
whole life cost of the concession. Though all the projects are still in the operation stages and the 
overall lifetime cost of the projects cannot be estimated to date. Therefore, the estimation of the  
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whole life cost of the project should be taken as the whole cost of the road projects to date. 
However, the assumption is that the respondents provided information based on the cycle of the 
project to date rather than the whole life cycle of the project since no road concession project in 
the UK have completed their lifecycle. There are no adverse impacts on the VfM criteria 
concerning O &M cost, whole life cycle cost, the profitability of the road concession to the SPV 
and concession duration, all of which are found to be impacted by renegotiation, as discussed in 
subsection 7.6.2 of this chapter. Renegotiation can lead to neutral profit for the SPV of up to 20%, 
and there is evidence of an increase in profit to the tune of 24%. However, there is an indication 
that 48% of the respondents agree that the profit of the SPV was reviewed downward, as shown 
in Table 7.7. These findings indicate that the concessionaire profit review is in favour of the public 
up to 68%, while 8% of the respondents did not show any response.  
There is a suggestion that the renegotiation of the PFI (DBFO) road projects have not increased 
the profitability of the concession in favour of the concessionaire, but instead, there has been an 
increase in the satisfaction derived from the users (Acerete et al., 2009). The findings of this 
empirical study contrast the literature position, which identifies that over 54.7% of the 
renegotiated transport concession contracts in Latin America benefited the concessionaires to the 
detriment of the public sector procuring entity, and especially the users (Guasch, 2004). This 
affirms that the outcome of renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects can be satisfactory to the 
users and can achieve VfM for the public sector procuring agency. Hence, the outcomes of the 
renegotiation regarding the main VfM criteria are shown in Table 7.7.  
The ranks of the respective items in Table 7.7 indicate that the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects in the UK has succeeded in ensuring the achievement of users’ satisfaction and improving 
the quality and performance of the concession outputs and products amongst other things. The 
profitability of the concession contract to the SPV has not been increased to the detriment of the 
public sector or the users. Indeed, there is the evidence of no changes in the profit of the SPV, as 
well as the downward review of the concessionaire’s profit in some instances. Indeed, more 
respondents indicated that the renegotiation ensures that the SPV’s profit is on a cost-neutral 
basis. Also, the results of the outcomes regarding the main VfM criteria indicated in Table 7.7, 
shows that there is almost a 50:50 ratio regarding an increase and neutrality of the outcomes of 
the renegotiation. These are the criteria of construction cost, duration, O&M costs, project finance 
cost, whole life cost and the cost of risk transfer. 
Furthermore, these findings indicate that there is evidence of the achievement of VfM in the 
public sector, mainly the users. The accomplishment of VfM is because the outcomes suggest that 
there is a favourable renegotiation, based on the percentages obtained on the primary results 
regarding VfM criteria identified as the basis of measuring the level of success of infrastructure  
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projects in PPP road projects. There is a suggestion that renegotiation of the PFI (DBFO) road 
projects has not increased the profitability of the concession in favour of the concessionaire, but 
instead, there has been an increase in the satisfaction derived by the users (Acerete et al., 2009). 
The finding of the empirical study contrasts the literature, which identifies that over 54.7% of the 
renegotiated transport concession contracts in Latin America benefited the concessionaires to the 
detriment of the public sector procuring entity and especially the users (Guasch et al., 2004). The 
finding affirms that the outcome of renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects can be satisfactory 
to the users and achieve value for money for the public sector procuring agency. 
Evidence in the literature indicates that renegotiation of PPP road projects benefited the 
concessionaire to the detriment of the public-sector clients and the users (Sarmento, 2014a, 
Guasch et al., 2008a, Guasch et al., 2004). The results suggest that there has been the achievement 
of VfM for users, members of the public and the public clients or governments. Therefore, the 
outcomes of renegotiation of PPP road projects do not necessarily have to lead to non-
achievement of VfM for the main contracting parties, i.e. the private or public sector or any of 
the stakeholders. 
 Remedial Actions 
The findings also indicate that remedial actions could take place as outcomes of the renegotiation. 
Although the literature suggests the items listed in Table 7.8 as possible outcomes of the 
renegotiation process of PPP road projects. The findings of the case studies reveal that specific 
remedial actions can be taken to address the renegotiation results. Thus, the outcomes of the 
renegotiation may necessitate corrective actions from the primary stakeholders of the road 
concession projects. The outcomes of the renegotiation of the road concessions give credence to 
the results as indicated in Table 7.8. 
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Table 7.8: Other Outcomes of Renegotiation 
                        
S/N Other Outcomes LR CS 
F
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e
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1 Outcome with respect to Government Payment to the SPV      
i.  Government direct financial compensation to the SPV (e.g. direct 
financial reimbursement) 
√ 
 
√ 10 40 1 
ii. Redefining of the investment plans by the SPV √  7 28 2 
iii. No adjustments in the annual fee paid by the operator to the 
government 
√  4 16 3 
iv. Government subsidies to the SPV √  3 12 4 
v. Downward adjustments on the annual fee paid by the operator to the 
government 
√  3 12 4 
vi. Bonus points issued to the SPV as a penalty for non-performance √ √ 1 4 6 
vii Upward adjustments on the annual fee paid by the operator to the 
government 
√  1 4 6 
viii. Financial rescue of the project by government √  0 0 7 
2 Outcome with respect to Innovation using Output Specification      
i. Enhances innovation of bidders because of use of output specification   √   12 48 1 
ii. Use of output specification does not foster innovation or makes any 
significant difference 
√  6 24 2 
iii. No evidence of the adoption of output specification and consequently 
no record of innovation. 
√   3 12 3 
iv. Reduction of the concession duration of the road concession √ √ 1 4 4 
3 Outcome with respect to Fair Value of the Project Due to 
Competition 
     
i. Competition among bidders affords the attainment of a fair value for 
the public sector on the project 
√  15 60 1 
ii. No competition on the project at renegotiation or variation results in 
the achievement of a fair value for the public sector 
   3 12 2 
iii. Competition among bidders does not result into a fair value for the 
public sector on the project 
√  2 8 3 
iv. No competition on the project at renegotiation or variation results in no 
evidence of the achievement of a fair value for the public sector on the 
project 
  2 8 3 
4 Others      
i. Revised service delivery modalities √ √ 16 64 1 
ii. Raises questions about the credibility of the renegotiation process to 
deliver value for money for the public-sector modalities. 
√  5 20 2 
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There are other outcomes relating to the renegotiation of DBFO road projects regarding the VfM 
criteria, as shown in Table 7.8. These results indicate the outcomes of the renegotiation regarding 
the VfM criteria identified in the literature (Public PPP Malaysia, 2009). This section discusses 
Table 7.8 by presenting the percentage of the renegotiation outcomes based on other VfM criteria 
of the road concessions. The levels of the respective outcomes of the renegotiation regarding the 
rankings are shown in Table 7.8. 
64% of the respondents indicate revised delivery modalities as the outcome of renegotiation in 
DBFO road project renegotiation outcomes, which result in the highest-ranking criteria of VfM 
in this group. 60% of the respondents indicate that competition amongst bidders affords the 
attainment of fair value for the public sector. The third most highly ranked VfM criteria attracted 
56% agreement from the respondents, who indicated that there is no performance-based payment 
mechanism in place on the project and as a result prevents the evaluation of value for money 
achieved on the project. There is, therefore, a suggestion that a performance-based payment 
mechanism can facilitate the assessment of VfM made on the project. The 48% of responses 
received from the respondents substantiates this suggestion by identifying that payment is made 
on the DBFO road projects based on the performance of the output, which ensures the 
achievement of value for money. Also, 48% of the respondents identify that there is an 
enhancement of the innovation of bidders because of the use of output specification on the DBFO 
road projects. These indicate the critical outcomes of the PFI (DBFO) road projects regarding the 
VfM criteria.    
Government payment to the SPV in the form of direct financial expenditure is ranked 6th with a 
40% response rate, which indicates that there is a low percentage of responses recorded against 
the government payments, i.e. in the form of direct financial expense. This finding suggests that 
the disbursement of the funds may be required to facilitate the cost of changes at the technical 
stage of implementation, as well as other additional works necessitating renegotiation. However, 
the frequency of governments disbursement and payment to cushion the effect of renegotiation is 
not high.  
Table 7.8 also highlights that on no occasion does the public-sector client or government, 
financially rescue any PFI (DBFO) road projects from failure. Only 4% of questionnaire 
respondents identify evidence of upward adjustments on the annual fee paid by the operator to 
the government, as well as bonus points issued to the SPV. There is no evidence of improvements 
in the management expertise of the private sector, including a reduction in the concession duration 
of the road projects.  
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Moreover, 4% of the respondents show evidence of improvement in the management expertise 
and skills of the private sector, which are all considered to be of less importance and significance, 
as shown in Table 7.8. 
 MEASURES TO ENSURE VFM AT RENEGOTIATION 
Section F of the questionnaire elicits information regarding the measures, which may be used to 
foster the achievement of VfM in the PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation as follows (See 
Appendix 3). The reliability and ANOVA test statistics, based upon the responses analysed, 
reveal the values that justify the reliability of the data collected. A discussion of the findings 
regarding the measures to ensure the achievement of VfM at renegotiation is in detail in this 
section. 
The supporting literature has established measures, which can serve as solutions to the problem 
of VfM in the renegotiation of PPP infrastructure projects (Guasch et al., 2014). Indeed, the 
preliminary pilot interviews and the final interviews have also succeeded in identifying measures, 
which are peculiar to the case studies, some of which are distinct from the literature suggestions. 
These measures are considered capable of assisting the achievement of VfM during the 
renegotiation of road concessions. The measures are listed in their respective categories, as 
indicated in Table 7.9. Also, the mean values, the ranks of the individual nodes and the level of 
criticalness of each of the nodes obtained, based on the analysis of the forty-two measures, are 
coherently tabulated, evident from as Table 7.9. The measures are there mainly to address the 
problem of VfM achievement identified in PPP road project renegotiations.  
There is a need to ensure that specific measures are put in place at the design and planning stage 
of PPP road project implementation to ensure the achievement of VfM for the public sector. The 
prominent measures, agreed by the respondents at the design and planning stage, are there to 
develop a clear, concise and adequately written contract, e.g. specification of standards of 
materials, components and workmanship. The contract developed must contain a provision that 
states that the renegotiation of PPP road projects must be on VfM. There must also be a proper 
stipulation of the criteria and modalities for the achievement of VfM at the design and planning 
stage, including an accurate estimation of project requirements. Another critical measure 
suggested by the respondents at the design and planning stage is the definition of the performance 
indicators, which will guide the delivery of the project at the technical phase of project 
implementation. The client develops performance standards for the concessionaire during the 
contract inception as a requirement for initiating renegotiation request payment.  
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All the design and planning measures have mean values of no less than 3.00, which indicates that 
the measures for ensuring VfM renegotiation at the design and planning stage are all critical to 
the achievement of VfM for the public sector and other stakeholders in general. Adequate 
measures are also required at the tendering stage of PFI (DBFO) road project renegotiations to 
ensure the achievement of VfM. The tendering and bidding measures, which have the highest 
mean values of 3.73, are the requirement to cancel PPP road concessions, which are mainly 
characterised by aggressive and opportunistic bidding. The findings also indicate that there is a 
clear need to define adequate and strict criteria for contract awards and to discourage 
opportunistic and aggressive bids.    
There is a need to ensure that proper steps and measures during the technical implementation of 
the project to achieve stakeholders VfM objectives. A mean value of 3.86 indicates that the client, 
due to non-performance of the SPV’s, should intensify teamwork throughout the management of 
the project; while the lowest ranking measure can cause an outright contract takeover. The 
respondents also consider the establishment of a clear jurisdiction at a high level over the decision 
to renegotiate the contract as a critical measure adopted to ensure VfM. The least important 
measure is the need to provide a statement in the PPP regulation, which establishes the 
inalterability of the contract risk matrix. The appropriate constitution of a qualified and 
knowledgeable panel of experts to manage aggressive bids, renegotiation request and conflicts 
ranked highest in the administrative and managerial category, with a mean score of 3.59, followed 
by the need to ensure transparency of the renegotiation process.  The least critical regulatory 
factor is the need for the client or government, via an instruction to the concessionaire, to establish 
less or non-disposal to the renegotiation of the PFI (DBFO) road project.   
Regarding risk allocation, there is the need to ensure that renegotiation of the contract does not 
alter the VfM described or the risk allocation, which is the principal risk measure identified by 
the respondents. A mean value of 3.55 indicates another critical measure, which suggests the 
establishment of a clause in the contract agreement, which states that the modification of the 
contract must ensure a zero-net present value (NPV) and must preserve VfM defined at the 
contract formation. Other measures are moderately critical, and these are found in the regulatory, 
administrative and managerial as well as economic categories, with mean values of 2.75, 2.82 
and 2.91, as indicated in Table 7.9.
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                          Table 7.9: Details of the Measures to Ensure VfM at Renegotiation 
S/N Measures LR CS Category Freq. Mean Rank Criticality 
Index 
1 Develop a clear and concise written contract [e.g. specification of standards etc.] √  Design and 
Planning 
22 4.27 1 VC 
2 Define and establish a set of criteria and modalities for the identification, measurement and recording 
of the VfM achieved at strategic renegotiation points during the PFI road projects renegotiation 
√ √ Design and 
Planning 
22 4.23 2 VC 
3 Ensure accurate estimation of requirements [e.g. cost of materials, traffic level, finance cost, cost of 
risks and capital costs, etc.] 
√  Design and 
Planning 
22 4.18 2 VC 
4 Clearly state in the contract that renegotiation must be based on VfM √  Design and 
Planning 
22 4.18 4 VC 
5 Define performance indicators at the contract formation stage to ensure that more focus is placed on 
the delivery of the project with reference to these indicators 
√ √ Design and 
Planning 
22 4.09 5 VC 
6 Establish performance standards for SPVs at contract inception as a requirement for initiating 
renegotiation request payment 
√ √ Design and 
Planning 
22 4.00 6 VC 
7 Establish a clear platform showing the process and procedure for renegotiation at the inception of the 
contract 
√  Design and 
Planning 
22 3.86 7 C 
8 Fix penalty points for non-performance with applicable limits to SPVs before contract takeover by the 
client 
√  Design and 
Planning 
22 3.86 7 C 
9 Teamwork should be intensified throughout the management of the project √ √ Technical 22 3.86 7 C 
10 Clarify key contractual clauses and key biding documents at contract inception √  Design and 
Planning 
22 3.82 10 C 
11 Cancel PPP road concessions mainly characterised by aggressive and opportunistic bids. √  Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 3.77 11 C 
12 Develop an effective parameter or trust process during technical implementation that allows both 
parties to understand the impact of any renegotiation on the project objectives. 
√ √ Technical 22 3.77 11 C 
13 Stipulate the renegotiation approach, criteria and process prior to contract formation √  Design and 
Planning 
22 3.77 11 C 
14 Ensure a proactive, collaborative and analytical approach in the making and management of the 
contract to foster friendliness between and among the partners 
√ √ Technical 21 3.76 14 C 
15 Establish in the contract the right to evaluate and reject aggressive and reckless bids including 
submission of financial models for those bids or additional guarantees/financial bonds 
√ √ Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 3.73 15 C 
16 Define adequate and strict criteria for contract award to discourage opportunistic and aggressive 
bidding 
√  Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 3.73 15 C 
17 Establish contract review processes and requirements with the aim of affecting defined or allowable 
changes to the contract 
√ √ Design and 
Planning 
22 3.73 15 C 
18 Include in the contract agreement a contract award criterion which increase renegotiation request costs 
to the SPV’s and make exit from the contract expensive 
√  Design and 
Planning 
22 3.68 18 C 
19 Establish outright contract takeover by the client due to non-performance of the SPV’s √ √ Design and 
Planning 
22 3.64 19 C 
20 Constitution of qualified and knowledgeable panel of expert to manage aggressive bids, renegotiation 
request and conflicts 
√ √ Administrative 
and Managerial 
22 3.59 20 C 
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                              Table 7.9: Details of the Measures to Ensure VfM at Renegotiation (Contd.)
S/N Measures LR CS Category Freq. Mean Rank Criticality 
Index 
21 Include a clause in the contract agreement, which stipulates modalities for financial equilibrium √  Design and 
Planning 
22 3.57 21 C 
22 Establish that the modification of the contract must ensure zero net present value (NPV) and must 
preserve VfM defined at contract formation. 
√ √ Risk 22 3.55 22 C 
23 Establish in the contract that the modification of the contract, because of renegotiation, must not alter 
the VfM described or the risk allocation 
√  Risk 22 3.55 22 C 
24 Establish the renegotiation reasons during the project implementation, to assist in ascertaining the 
impact of the factors or reasons on VfM 
√ √ Technical 22 3.55 22 C 
25 Establish modalities for the submission of financial models required for evaluating bids or additional 
guarantees/financial bonds 
√  Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 3.50 25 C 
26 Include hand-back requirements by the public sector [i.e. salvage value/depreciation level allowed at 
delivery or handover] 
√ √ Design and 
Planning 
22 3.50 25 C 
27 Establish clear jurisdiction at high level over decision to renegotiate the contract √  Regulatory 22 3.50 25 C 
28 Control aggressive bids by inclusion of larger performance bonds in the contract √  Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 3.45 28 C 
29 Include project plan reviews [e.g. every 3 years to monitor the performance of the project and 
particularly of VfM] 
√ √ Design and 
Planning 
22 3.45 28 C 
30 Ensure transparency of the renegotiation process during implementation of road concessions √ √ Administrative & 
Managerial 
22 3.41 30 C 
31 Establish guidelines for levels of compensation applicable at strategic renegotiation points during 
project implementation 
√  Design and 
Planning 
22 3.41 30 C 
32 Request a mandatory bidding process for additional works or infrastructures including interest rate for 
PPP financing 
√  Tendering and 
Bidding 
22 3.36 32 C 
33 Prepare for contingent financing over time and throughout the implementation process because of 
viability gap funding 
√  Technical 22 3.27 33 C 
34 Outright contract takeover by the client due to non-performance of the SPV’s √  Technical 22 3.27 33 C 
35 Ensure that the contract risk matrix includes detailed risks identification and allocation √  Risk 21 3.24 35 C 
36 Establish greater role of the PPP unit and regulatory agency √  Design and 
Planning 
22 3.00 36 C 
37 Include a freeze period for renegotiations [e.g. 2-3 years after contract award through the placement of 
embargo on materials & work standards, etc.] 
√ √ Design and 
Planning 
22 3.00 36 C 
38 Impose on the SPV’s appropriate level of performance bonds [e.g. between 10-25% of the total PFI 
road project investment] 
√ √ Risk 22 3.00 36 C 
39 Implement a transparent framework through increase of political costs to accept renegotiation demands √  Political 22 2.95 39 MC 
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                       Table 7.9: Details of the Measures to Ensure VfM at Renegotiation (Contd.) 
 
 
 
                         Key: See List of abbreviations  
 
S/N Measures LR CS Category Freq Mean Rank Criticality 
Index 
40 Provide allowance for extension of concession contract in austere and adverse economic situations √ √ Economic 22 2.91 40 MC 
41 The client should establish a reputation of less or non-disposal to renegotiation at inception √  Administrative& 
Managerial 
22 2.82 41 MC 
42 Provide a statement in the PPP regulation establishing the inalterability of the contract risk matrix √  Regulatory 20 2.75 42 MC 
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The findings in Table 7.9 indicate that there is a need to take effective and efficient measures in 
the design and planning stage to ensure the achievement of VfM at renegotiation. The results of 
Table 7.9 confirm that most of the respondents identify that the measures are taken to address the 
renegotiations to ensure the achievement of VfM mostly occur at the design and planning stage. 
As a result, there is the suggestion that the measures are necessary at the inception of the contract 
to ensure the renegotiations, which characterise the intra-deal renegotiations, i.e. renegotiations 
that occur during the implementation of the road concessions (Salacuse, 2000).   
The findings also suggest that critical measures, which characterise the responses, fall in the 
tendering and bidding category. These imply that renegotiation measures are necessary at the 
tendering stage of PPP road concessions to ensure VfM achievement. This submission agrees 
with the literature, as most of the renegotiations leading to non-achievement of VfM have a poor 
evaluation of opportunistic and aggressive bids, as they are the leading factors responsible for 
such renegotiations (Menezes and Ryan, 2015b; Bi and Wang, 2011; Chan and Levitt, 2009). 
Thus, there is a need to adopt appropriate measures at the tendering and bidding stage to address 
the renegotiation problem of opportunistic and aggressive bids, which are considered the bane of 
road concession renegotiations. 
The results from Table 7.9 reveal that the first seven factors identified by the respondents as 
measures adopted in realising the VfM objectives of the projects, fall under the design and 
planning categories and are ranked according to their respective individual factors. Most 
unprofitable renegotiations for the public sector would not have occurred if the critical design and 
planning measures identified in Table 7.9 had been adopted to address the impact of the technical 
and additional works factors. On the other hand, other measures with lower levels of importance, 
as shown in Table 7.9, fall under the economic, political, regulatory, administrative and 
managerial respectively. 
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 APPROPRIATENESS OF THE RELIABILITY AND ANOVA TEST 
STATISTICS 
This section presents the statistical test on the respective sections of the questionnaire including 
the appropriateness of their use for analysis of the data collected from the sampled respondents. 
Though, there are limitations to having small and uneven sample sizes in the analysis of data. 
However, there is usually the question regarding the guideline to ascertain the minimum sample 
that is acceptable for a valid result.  
Numerous research studies in the social sciences have used small sample like the one used in this 
study due to difficulty in reaching the population, legal issues involved in the collection of data 
within the study population and sensitivity of the sphere of the research, which reduces the 
numbers of responses. Inequality of sample sizes or small sample sizes should not be an issue in 
achieving a valid result as observed in the previous quantitative study (Brockwell and Gordon, 
2001). However, a statistical appraisal which attempts to check the data distributions for 
normality has been proposed as a solution when ascertaining the possibility of having a valid 
analysis result in a quantitative study. 
 The more symmetric the distribution of the response values are, the more the possibility of 
acceptance of the smaller sample sizes. Though, the ANOVA as used in this study could be 
sensitive to statistical outliers. In a situation where there usually is distribution, and each group 
are independent, a 1-way ANOVA have been identified to be entirely suitable for analysis. The 
use of ANOVA has been recommended to be followed by statistical testing to compare each 
group against the other or the data within the group. Hence, the reason for the reliability testing 
within the group, which attempt to evaluate in comparison the “corrected item of the total 
correlation coefficients” in almost all the individual factors with the standard benchmark of 0.3. 
All the different elements are expected to be greater than (˃) 0.3. Thus, the Cronbach Alpha 
coefficient (If the item is deleted) was, therefore, evaluated in comparison with overall/ standard 
coefficient of Alpha as shown in Table 7.10 to ascertain the reliability and validity of responses 
from the small sample of the study. The result obtained using these tools for reliability testing 
indicates that there is no non-normality, which can necessitate the consideration of robust 
statistical solutions than the one used for analysis in the study. Hence, the conclusion is that the 
tools used for the statistical test of the study sample are appropriate to achieve a valid result.  
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 Reliability and ANOVA Test of the Factors Leading to Renegotiation 
The responses to the factors leading to the renegotiation have been tested for reliability and 
validity within the sample and have been collated accordingly (See Table 7.10).  
The “corrected item of the total correlation coefficients” in almost all the individual factors are 
greater than (˃) 0.3. Hence, the value is significant for those individual nodes of factors leading 
to the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects. Similarly, the standardised, or overall 
Cronbach’s coefficient of alpha, is equal to the “Cronbach’s alpha if the item is deleted”; although 
this value is expected to be greater than the “Cronbach’s alpha if the item is deleted” of all the 
individual items in most instances. Hence, the data collected in this section can be said to be 
reliable and valid. Therefore, 0.959 becomes the Alpha value when each of the factor items is 
deleted. 
Moreover, ANOVA (F-test) results proved significant, as well as all the individual values found 
to be < 0.05. Therefore, the results enumerated in (i) and (ii) above, suggest that there exist 
internal consistencies within the values of the data collected from the survey. Hence, the results 
obtained reveal that they are reliable, as the value of standardised Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
of the factors considered leading to the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects is 0.959. 
However, the Cronbach’s Alpha, if the item is deleted due to some of the factors, is 0.963, 0.961, 
0.969 and 0.962 respectively.  
These values are more significant than the overall Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient. However, if 
each of the renegotiation leading factor item is deleted, then there will be an improvement in the 
overall reliability of the system, and the value will be 0.959, as stated in Table 7.10. The results 
of the ANOVA test conducted on the data collected to establish the difference in the mean value 
of the samples revealed that there is a substantial agreement between the responses received and 
that there is a common trait shared to a significant level (sig. ≤0.05). The reliability of all the data 
collected is ascertained and respected. Based on the results, which show a substantial agreement 
between the responses provided by the questionnaire respondents, as indicated in Table 7.10. 
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                   Table 7.10: Reliability Test of Factors Leading to Renegotiation 
S/N Factors Category Corrected Item- 
Total Correlation 
Cronbach Alpha ANOVA 
   If Item is Deleted Overall Coefficient  
1 Change in the standards of works during the technical development Technical .640 0.963  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.959 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
2 Specification changes [e.g. change in the standard of technical skills, 
change in the type of technology] 
Technical .026 0.961 
3 Change in the scope of works Technical .315 0.963 
4 Additional works during construction [e.g. requirement for extension or 
widening of the road network] 
Contractual .554 0.959 
5 Additional works during operation & maintenance [e.g. removal and 
replacement of assets] 
Contractual .403 0.963 
6 Changes in infrastructure design, layout and programme during project 
execution 
Technical .596 0.969 
7 Environmental impacts Environmental .701 0.958 
8 Managerial initiatives to keep up with current contract standards Administrative and 
managerial 
.112 0.961 
9 Changes in pricing and service to be provided as stated in the tender Tendering and Bidding .303 0.960 
10 Social acceptability of user charges by the members of the public Social .771 0.951 
11 Inaccurate or defective project specifications Design .857 0.957 
12 Archaeological constraints Environmental .701 0.958 
13 Changes to general price level and transaction costs due to inflation  Economic .700 0.958 
14 Opposition to continuation of the project by the members of the public Social .909 0.958 
15 Inaccurate estimation of the traffic level forecasts or levels Contractual .913 0.957 
16 Poorly written contract [e.g. ambiguity of terms and contract details] Contractual .021 0.962 
17 Time overruns for bidding and contract negotiation Contractual .888 0.957 
18 Political instability occasioned by changes in government or changes in 
government priorities. 
Political .725 0.958 
19 Corporate social responsibility considerations Social .621 0.958 
20 Erroneous change in the basis for tender Tendering and Bidding .871 0.957 
21 In-accurate estimation of capital cost Design .877 0.957 
22 Political instability evidenced in contract award shortly before or after 
elections 
Political .770 0.957 
23 Changes in economic policy by government [e.g. high or incremental 
changes to corporate tax and levies] 
Economic .725 0.958 
24 Mismatch between the public and private partners objective [e.g. in terms 
of profit sharing] 
Others .743 0.958 
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               Table 7.10:  Reliability Test of Factors Leading to Renegotiation (Contd.) 
25 Inadequate contract management expertise or knowledge Contractual .850 0.957   
26 Management incompetence [e.g. administrative delays during project 
execution] 
Administrative and 
Managerial 
.626 0.958 
27 The need to respect and adopt the overriding interest of major political 
constituency in the parliament 
Political .775 0.957 
28 Defective contract awards criteria or incorrect contractual assumptions Contractual .746 0.958 
29 Ineffective governance and regulation of the renegotiation process 
necessitating specific statutory changes to the contract 
Regulatory/ 
Legal 
.890 0.957 
30 Inadequate feasibility studies and another ex-ante pre-tender analysis Tendering and Bidding .836 0.957 
31 Corruption at governance level e.g. awarding contract because of the 
nationality or affiliation of the concessionaire. 
Political .761 0.957 
32 Corruption at governance level evidenced in misappropriation of funds Political .704 0.958 
33 Ineffectiveness and inefficiency of contract enforcement Contractual .653 0.958 
34 Weak legal environment [i.e. in terms of effective litigation] Legal .843 0.957 
35 Lack of transparency in the discharge of managerial duties Administrative and 
managerial 
.633 0.958 
36 Bidding error during procurement e.g. poor evaluation of inflated/ 
aggressive bid 
Tendering and Bidding .614 0.958 
37 Opportunistic bidding [e.g. bid submission with the intent to increase 
prices at renegotiation] 
Tendering and Bidding .759 0.958 
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 Reliability and ANOVA Test of the Renegotiation Impacts on VfM 
Criteria 
This section also explains the analysis of the answers given by the respondents regarding the 
impacts of the renegotiation on VfM criteria. As previously described, the analysis of the 
responses received revealed the reliability and ANOVA test statistics, as discussed herein. 
The impact of renegotiation on the classified VfM criteria has been discussed in-depth. Table 
7.11 indicates the reliability tests of the samples obtained regarding the impact of the 
renegotiation on VfM criteria. The findings reveal the characteristics of the impacts based upon 
the mean values of the Cronbach Alpha and the ANOVA in relation to all the individual nodes of 
all the items. The “corrected item of the total correlation coefficients” in most of the individual 
factors ˃ is greater than 0.3, as in the case of Table 7.11. As previously described, the value is 
significant to those individual nodes and the impact it has on the renegotiation of VfM criteria. 
Also, the “Standardised or overall Cronbach’s coefficient of alpha” is equal to the “Cronbach’s 
alpha if the item is deleted.”  This value should be greater than ˃ the “Cronbach’s alpha if the 
item is deleted”, concerning all the individual items in most instances. The data collected in this 
section can be said to be reliable and valid. 0.964 can be taken to be the Alpha value when each 
of the factor items is deleted. 
Moreover, the ANOVA (F-test) results prove significant, as the individual value is found to be ≤ 
0.05. Hence, the results obtained reveal that they are reliable, as the value of the standardised 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the impact of the renegotiation on VfM criteria is 0.964. 
Although, the Cronbach’s Alpha, if the item is deleted for serial number 3 and 4, has an impact 
of 0.965 and 0.966 respectively, which is higher than the standardised Cronbach’s Alpha 
coefficient of 0.964. However, if each of the renegotiation impacts of the VfM criteria is deleted, 
then there will be an improvement in the overall reliability of the system, and the value will be 
0.964, as indicated in Table 7.11. The results of the ANOVA test conducted on the data collected 
to establish the difference in the mean value of the samples, further confirms the existence of a 
substantial agreement between the responses received. It also establishes that there is a common 
trait shared at a significance level of (sig. ≤0.001), as shown in Table 7.11. 
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Table 7.11: Reliability Test of the Impacts of Renegotiation on VfM Criteria 
S/N Impacts Category Corrected Item- 
Total Correlation 
Cronbach Alpha ANOVA 
    If Item is 
Deleted 
Standardised 
Coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
1 Construction cost Cost 0.851 0.960  
2 Project finance cost Cost 0.894 0.959  
3 Operation and Maintenance costs Cost 0.612 0.965  
4 Users satisfaction Client 
Objective 
0.561 0.966  
5 Private sector management 
expertise 
Others 0.735 0.963  
6 Whole Life Cycle Cost Cost 0.769 0.962  
7 Construction duration Duration 0.865 0.959  
8 Cost of risk transferred Cost 0.761 0.962 0.964 
9 Quality of Service Delivery Quality 0.914 0.959  
10 Competition that provides fair 
value of the project 
Others 0.823 0.961  
11 Performance based payment 
mechanism 
Others 0.800 0.961  
12 Innovation of bidders in the use 
of output specification 
Others 0.862 0.960  
13 Concession duration Duration 0.905 0.959  
14 Concessionaire’s profit SPV’s 
Objective 
0.790 0.962  
 
 Reliability and ANOVA Test of the VfM Measures at Renegotiation 
The individual measures in their respective categories, as identified by the respondents, give 
credence to the submissions of the literature that there are measures for ensuring the achievement 
of VfM within the purview of PFI (DBFO) road project renegotiations. Rankings identify the 
levels of the respective measures regarding the degree of their criticalness in Table 7.12. 
The “corrected item of the total correlation coefficients” in all the individual measures is greater 
than (˃) 0.3 in most cases, as shown in Table 7.12. The “corrected item of the total correlation 
coefficients” of most of the individual factors ˃ is higher than 0.3. However, some are not greater 
than 0.3 and raise minor questions about the reliability of the data on those affected nodes. 
However, the value can be regarded as significant in most of the individual nodes of the 
renegotiation measures required to ensure the achievement of VfM. 
The standardised Cronbach Alpha coefficient is 0.941, which is expected to be ˃greater than the 
Cronbach Alpha required to make the values significant in those individual nodes. The measures, 
in all the different nodes, show consistency with few exceptions, which raises questions about the 
reliability of the nodes of those measures. Therefore, the “Standardised Cronbach’s Coefficient 
of Alpha” is equal to the “Cronbach’s alpha if the item is deleted”. Though this value is expected 
to be greater than the (i.e., ˃) the “Cronbach’s alpha if the item is deleted” of all the individual 
items; the data collected here is considered reliable.  
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Therefore, to make it reliable, 0.941 becomes the Alpha value when each of the factor items is 
deleted. Also, the ANOVA (F-test) result proved significant, as the individual value is found to 
be < 0.05. Hence, there is consistency in the system. The reliability and validity analysis are as 
shown in Table 7.12. Most of the measures required in ensuring the achievement of VfM at the 
renegotiation stage fall under the design and planning categories. Indeed, the first seven factors 
identified by the respondents, as the measures adopted in realising the VfM objectives of the 
projects fall under the design and planning categories. There is, therefore, the suggestion that 
most of the unprofitable renegotiations recorded in the literature would not have occurred if all 
the identified measures were adopted. The measures with the lowest level of importance fall under 
the economic, political, regulatory, administrative and managerial respectively, as indicated in 
Table 7.12.
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                   Table 7.12: Reliability Test on Measures to ensure VfM at Renegotiation 
S/N Measures Category Corrected Item- 
Total Correlation 
Cronbach Alpha ANOVA 
   If Item is Deleted Overall Coefficient  
1 Develop a clear, concise and properly written contract [e.g. specification 
of standards etc.] 
Design & Planning .459 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Define and establish a set of criteria and modalities for the identification, 
measurement and recording of the VfM achieved at strategic renegotiation 
points during the PFI road projects renegotiation 
Design & Planning .120 2 
3 Ensure accurate estimation of requirements [e.g. materials cost, traffic 
level, finance cost, cost of risks and capital costs, etc.] 
Design & Planning .807 3 
4 Clearly state in the contract that renegotiation must be based on VfM Design & Planning .437 4 
5 Define performance indicators at the contract formation stage to ensure 
that more focus is placed on the delivery of the project with reference to 
these indicators 
Design & Planning .434 5 
6 Establish performance standards for SPVs at contract inception as a 
requirement for initiating renegotiation request payment 
Design & Planning .218 6 
7 Establish a clear platform showing the process and procedure for 
renegotiation at the inception of the contract 
Design & Planning .672 7 
8 Fix penalty points for non-performance with applicable limits to SPVs 
before contract takeover by the client 
Design & Planning .424 8 
9 Teamwork should be intensified throughout the management of the project Technical .713 9 
10 Clarify key contractual clauses and key biding documents at contract 
inception 
Design & Planning .563 10 
11 Cancel PPP road concessions mainly characterised by aggressive and 
opportunistic bids 
Tendering & Bidding .393 11 
12 Develop an effective parameter or trust process during technical 
implementation that allows both parties to understand the impact of any 
renegotiation on the project objectives 
Technical .579 12 
13 Stipulate the renegotiation approach, criteria and process prior to contract 
formation 
Design & Planning .488 13 
14 Ensure a proactive, collaborative and analytical approach in the making 
and management of the contract to foster friendliness between and among 
the partners 
Technical .419 14 
15 Establish in the contract the right to evaluate and reject aggressive and 
reckless bids including submission of financial models for those bids or 
additional guarantees/financial bonds 
Tendering & Bidding .425 15 
16 Define adequate and strict criteria for contract award to discourage 
opportunistic and aggressive bidding 
Tendering & Bidding .457 16 
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                        Table 7.12: Reliability Test on Measures to ensure VfM at Renegotiation (Contd.) 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
S/N Measures Category Corrected Item- 
Total Correlation 
Cronbach Alpha ANOVA 
   If Item is Deleted Overall Coefficient  
17 Establish contract review processes and requirements with the aim of 
affecting defined or allowable changes to the contract 
Design & Planning 0.193 0.941  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Include in the contract agreement a contract award criterion which increase 
renegotiation request costs to the SPV’s and make exit from the contract 
expensive 
Design & Planning 0.24 0.942 
19 Establish outright contract takeover by the client due to non-performance 
of the SPV’s 
Design & Planning 0.221 0.942 
20 Proper constitution of qualified and knowledgeable panel of expert to 
manage aggressive bids, renegotiation request and conflicts 
Administrative and 
Managerial 
0.803 0.937 
21 Include a renegotiation clause in the contract agreement to foster financial 
equilibrium 
Design & Planning 0.728 0.938 
22 Establish that the modification of the contract must ensure zero net present 
value (NPV) and must preserve VfM defined at contract formation. 
Risk 0.017 0.944 
23 Establish in the contract that the modification of the contract, because of 
renegotiation, must not alter the VfM described or the risk allocation 
Risk 0.399 0.94 
24 Establish the renegotiation reasons during the project implementation, to 
assist in ascertaining the impact of the factors or reasons on VfM 
Technical 0.484 0.94 
25 Establish modalities for the submission of financial models required for 
evaluating aggressive bids or additional guarantees/financial bonds 
Tendering & Bidding 0.508 0.939 
26 Include hand-back requirements by the public sector [i.e. salvage 
value/depreciation level allowed at delivery or handover] 
Design & Planning 0.467 0.94 
27 Establish clear jurisdiction at high level over decision to renegotiate the 
contract 
Regulatory 0.334 0.941 
28 Control aggressive bids by inclusion of larger performance bonds in the 
contract 
Tendering & Bidding 0.535 0.939 
29 Include project plan reviews [e.g. every 3 years to monitor the performance 
of the project and particularly of VfM] 
Design & Planning 0.593 0.939 
30 Ensure transparency of the renegotiation process Administrative & Managerial 0.775 0.937 
31 Establish guidelines for levels of compensation applicable at strategic 
renegotiation points during project implementation 
Design & Planning 0.695 0.938 
32 Request a mandatory bidding process for additional works or 
infrastructures including interest rate for PPP financing 
Tendering & Bidding 0.623 0.938 
33 Prepare for contingent financing over time and throughout the 
implementation process because of viability gap funding 
Technical 0.818 0.936 
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                         Table 7.12: Reliability Test on Measures to ensure VfM at Renegotiation (Contd.) 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S/N Measures Category Corrected Item- 
Total Correlation 
Cronbach Alpha ANOVA 
   If Item is Deleted Overall Coefficient  
34 Outright contract takeover by the client due to non-performance of the 
SPV’s 
Technical 0.563 0.939  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.941 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
35 Ensure that the contract risk matrix includes detailed risks identification 
and allocation 
Risk 0.83 0.936 
36 Establish greater role of the PPP unit and regulatory agency Design & Planning 0.614 0.939 
37 Include a freeze period for renegotiations [e.g. 2-3 years after contract 
award through the placement of embargo on materials & work standards, 
etc.] 
Design& Planning 0.246 0.941 
38 Impose on the SPV’s appropriate level of performance bonds [e.g. between 
10-25% of the total PFI road project investment] 
Risk 0.115 0.942 
39 Implement a transparent framework through increase of political costs to 
accept renegotiation demands 
Political 0.729 0.937 
40 Provide allowance for extension of concession contract in austere and 
adverse economic situations 
Economic 0.789 0.938 
41 Establish a reputation of less or non-disposal to renegotiation Administrative & Managerial 0.551 0.939 
42 Provide a statement in the PPP regulation establishing the inalterability of 
the contract risk matrix 
Regulatory 0.698 0.938 
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 DISCUSSION OF GENERAL FINDINGS 
The mean score of the survey reveals that the technical factors are the main factors leading to the 
renegotiation of the PFI (DBFO) road projects. This suggests that most of the renegotiation occurs 
at the technical implementation stage because the stakeholders mostly have good reasons at this 
point to renegotiate the contract. Factors leading to the renegotiation of the DBFO road projects 
at the technical stage mainly involve unexpected changes, as opposed to normal changes or 
events, which necessitates the renegotiation. The critical factors leading to the renegotiation are 
technical factors, followed by additional works during the implementation process. There is 
evidence of renegotiations occasioned by the impact of the environment and managerial action to 
comply with the current standards, which may be stated in the contract specification.  
Critical factors in the technical category that can be seen in Table 7.5 include changes in works 
standards and modifications in the scope of works at the technical stage of project 
implementation. The main critical factors leading to the renegotiation include a change in the 
standards of works during technical development, change in the scope of works during the 
technical development, specification changes (e.g. change in the level of technical skills) and 
changes in infrastructure design, layout and programme during project execution. Moreover, 
additional works during construction (e.g. the requirement for extension or widening of the road 
network) and additional works during operation and maintenance (e.g. removal and replacement 
of assets, i.e. CCTV, speed camera) constitute significant critical factors leading to PFI (DBFO) 
road projects renegotiation. 
This result is distinct from the non-critical factors leading to the renegotiation, which has 
inadequate transparency in the discharge of managerial duties, opportunistic bidding and bidding 
error during procurement. These findings contrast the supporting literature concerning the factors 
leading to renegotiation of PPP road projects in Latin American countries, Portugal and Spain, 
all of which include the non-critical factors identified in this research (Fatokun et al., 2015). The 
factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP road projects as identified in the literature include: 
regulatory, political, administration and managerial, design, contractual, economic and technical 
factors. These factors suggest the reasons why there are differing results regarding the outcomes 
of renegotiation in the literature and the empirical findings of this research.  
The renegotiation of road concessions is found to have a high impact on the cost of construction, 
road users’ satisfaction, project finance costs and operation and maintenance costs as shown in 
Table 7.6. These may be because of the changes and additional works that frequently occur at the 
technical stage.  
 
                                  Chapter 7 Renegotiation of Design-Build-Finance- Operate Road Projects                              
244 
 
These changes may be responsible for the variations in the cost at the insistence of those with 
renegotiation experience especially in the public client organisation. The least impacted VfM 
criteria are concession duration and concessionaires’ profit, which requires no upward or 
downward reviews. There is a slight variation in the profit of the SPV. However, the variations 
and changes have not affected the VfM of the project for the public sector, as indicated by the 
respondents.  
The primary outcomes of the renegotiation are increase in the user’s satisfaction and the quality 
and performance of the concession product respectively. The fimding imply that the renegotiation 
has not benefitted one party to the detriment of the other, neither has the public sector been 
disadvantaged because of the renegotiation. These contrast the position of the literature, which 
provides evidence that the public sector’s VfM objectives have not been realised (Ho and Tsui, 
2009; Bi and Wang, 2011; Ho, 2006). The findings further suggest that road concession 
renegotiations can achieve VfM for the public sector if the critical measures identified in Table 
7.9 are taken. There is a direct contrast to the findings of the literature, which show that the 
renegotiation incidences benefit the SPV and meet the profit maximisation objective of the private 
partner without achieving VfM for the public (Sarmento, 2014; Guasch et al., 2014).  
The highly critical measures identified in Table 7.9 are mainly there to ensure VfM renegotiation. 
All the design and planning measures are to be considered and included in the contract, as they 
can serve as solutions and address the problem of VfM achievement in PPP road projects (Guasch 
et al., 2014). Since there is a higher percentage of renegotiation of PFI road projects are at the 
technical level of implementation, where specific factors usually lead the stakeholders to 
renegotiate the contract.  VfM, therefore, needs to be conceived at the inception of the contract 
with terms and conditions incorporated into the contract as a clause for implementing its 
provisions at the technical stage of implementation prone to renegotiations. This is to ensure the 
achievement of VfM efficiently and more often. 
 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
There is clear evidence that PFI (DBFO) road project gives satisfaction to the user’s, which is the 
primary objective of the public client. Though, these finding is a direct contrast to classical 
renegotiation literature, which identifies non-achievement of VfM for the public sector. There is, 
however, evidence of an increase in construction cost, which suggest that the rise in the cost of 
construction may be because of the numerous changes and additional works necessitating 
renegotiations. VfM is usually ensured competitively, to foster the attainment of fair value for the 
client.  
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The chapter results indicate that design and planning measures are highly critical and essential at 
the inception of the contract as they tend to ensure the achievement of VfM at renegotiation, 
which mostly characterised the technical stage.  
The need to develop a clear, concise and adequately written contract (e.g. specification of 
standards of material and components) amongst other things are the critical measures that would 
assist the achievement of VfM at the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects. Appropriate 
measures, as identified in this chapter, should be taken to ensure the achievement of VfM for the 
users. Renegotiation should be free from opportunistic behaviours of both parties (i.e., the client 
or the concessionaire) and aggressive bidding should be discouraged by the client as they are the 
non-critical factors to renegotiation that yield VfM for the client and the road users. A conscious 
effort at the design and planning stage through the adoption of all the appropriate design and 
planning measures will also ensure the achievement of VfM for users. There is also a need for 
proper appreciation, evaluation and a clear understanding of all the factors that may lead to 
renegotiation and the impact that such factors could have on the VfM criteria. The knowledge of 
the renegotiation factors will help the contracting parties to appropriately respond to any changes 
or amendments, which could jeopardise the achievement of VfM regarding satisfaction for the 
users, profitable returns to the concessionaire and anticipated residual value to the client. 
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CHAPTER 8 DEVELOPMENT OF A 
VALUE FOR MONEY 
RENEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK 
 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a critical evaluation of the research objectives 3, 4 and 5, which embody 
the factors leading to renegotiation, impacts of the renegotiation on VfM criteria and the outcomes 
of the renegotiation towards the fulfilment of objective 6, which is: “to develop a VfM 
renegotiation framework for DBFO road projects.” The findings of the study inform the 
development of the framework. However, the gap identified in the literature and the results of the 
case studies serve as a guide and premise for the questionnaire design. The questionnaire, 
therefore, draws from the experiences and practices of PFI (DBFO) experts in the UK. The 
triangulation of the research methodological approaches, i.e. literature findings, case studies and 
the questionnaire ensure comprehensive and robust framework to guide the evaluation of 
renegotiation for value for money achievement. 
The cumulative findings of these chapters (i.e., Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6) in the questionnaire 
analysed, led to the VfM renegotiation framework developed and presented in this chapter. 
Therefore, quantitative research surveys conducted reveal the current state of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects renegotiation and provide extensive findings that are developed into a framework for the 
renegotiation of PPP road projects to ensure VfM achievement. The results suggest that there is 
a relationship between the factors leading to renegotiation and the outcomes. However, corrective 
actions can be taken to remedy observed deviations during the renegotiation process to ensure 
that renegotiation gives VfM for the project stakeholders, particularly the public sector. The 
chapter concludes with recommendations, including the need to adopt the framework principles 
and viewpoints, to ensure successful evaluation of road concession renegotiations for VfM 
achievement. 
 THE NEED FOR A VFM RENEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK  
Value for Money is critical because it is the principal objective of any government during PFI 
infrastructure project delivery. Procuring authorities are seeking to ensure that there is the 
provision of infrastructure services to members of the public and road users to meet the required 
level of satisfaction. 
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The achievement of VfM in PPP road projects should be given more attention in consideration of 
the level of financial requirements involved and the frequent renegotiations, which has generated 
VfM achievement questions as discussed in the literature review sections, especially Chapter 3 
of this thesis. Therefore, the need for a framework that will aid renegotiation of PPP road projects 
to foster VfM achievement because of the challenge of PPP renegotiation becomes imperative. 
Though the outcomes of the renegotiations in PPP road projects as recorded in the literature 
indicates poor or non-achievement of VfM, especially for the public sector, however, the 
empirical data of PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation in the UK reveals the innovations and 
practices, which have advanced the course of the industry regarding VfM achievement in the road 
sector. The gap in the literature and the findings based on the innovations and practices in the UK 
PFI (DBFO) road sector assisted in establishing justification for the necessity and feasibility of a 
VfM renegotiation framework. 
The following questions become pertinent in the development of a new framework to fulfil the 
objectives for the correct evaluation of renegotiation for VfM achievement. 
• What are the factors leading to the renegotiation and how can the assessment of their 
applicability to a specific project be done?  
• Can the renegotiating stakeholder ascertain the level of criticality of the factors leading 
to renegotiation? If so, how? 
• What are the renegotiation outcomes? How are they assessed to determine whether VfM 
is achieved or not for the primary stakeholders, especially the public-sector client? 
• Can we have a relationship between the factors leading to renegotiation and the 
renegotiation outcomes? 
• What are the remedial actions that can be taken to correct deviation from the achievement 
of VfM at the renegotiation of PPP road projects? 
• Are there measures that can be considered to ensure that there is the achievement of VfM 
during the renegotiation process?  
• Who are the primary renegotiating stakeholders in road concessions? 
 THE PROPOSED VALUE FOR MONEY RENEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK 
The research adopts the principle of the constructionist approach in the development of the 
framework. Thompson et al., (2014) justifies the use of constructivist grounded theory approach 
to develop the rationale for a continuum between two spheres of stakeholder’s opinion towards 
the achievement of a conclusion on conceptions of clinical practice in osteopathy through a 
constant comparative method of data analysis and coding.  
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Hence, the VfM renegotiation framework evolves through the sampling of the initially selected 
participants for both the interview and questionnaire survey. The theoretical sampling as dictated 
by the details of DBFO roads and highway maintenance projects in the UK collected from the 
PPI database informed the data collection and analysis, which allowed the sampling of specific 
participants. The data collection methods involved semi-structured interviews of a range of users 
in the public and private sector. The interviews were conducted face-to-face, via Skype and on 
the phone as it deemed convenient for the interviewees. These interviews were audio-recorded 
and later transcribed.  
The findings of the literature review, therefore, serve as the basis of the pilot interviews conducted 
at the initial stages of the research. The conclusions of the case studies and literature were adopted 
comparatively in the development of the questionnaire. Hence there is the triangulation of the 
findings of previous research and the case studies in the questionnaire survey towards the 
development of the VfM renegotiation framework. The developed VfM renegotiation framework 
was refined appropriately based on the suggestions of the participants that are involved in the 
initial stages of the study (i.e., internal participants) and those that are invited but did not 
participate in the initial stages of the study (i.e., external participants).  
The triangulated results of the research afford the opportunity for a robust conclusion regarding 
PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK and ultimately in the development of the framework. The 
framework was developed in the form of a flowchart because it gives a vivid picture of a system 
of evaluation, showing the flow of information. Arrows point from source to destination. The 
indexed rectangles at the top represent respective renegotiation sections, and each section 
indicates the individual progression to the making of decisions during the implementation of the 
project. Moreover, the flowchart is simple to understand and straight in the conceptualisation of 
high-level design. The diagram showing the framework describes the overall operation of the 
evaluation process and indicates the details of how the structure works. The validated framework 
proposed for the evaluation of PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation for VfM achievement is, 
therefore, shown in Figure 8.1. 
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 Figure 8.1: Value for Money Renegotiation Framework 
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The flexibility and practicability of the framework arise from its ability to ensure that the different 
innovative levels and perspectives of the respective component sections of the questionnaire are 
incorporated as reflected in the findings. Discussions about each of these component sections are 
in the succeeding subsections of this thesis, which are in the individual parts: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
These sections represent areas where the parties involved in renegotiation address value for 
money within the scope of renegotiation and outline points that are germane to the objectives of 
the projects as stipulated by the client. The identified sections of the framework, as shown in 
Figure 8.1 serves as the pedestal and guide for the stakeholders during the implementation of PFI 
(DBFO) road projects.  Each of the sections of the framework is explained in the succeeding sub-
sections as follows:  
 Section 1 – Establishment of Measures and Mechanisms for 
Payment 
The first section of the framework identifies the need for the stakeholders to define and establish 
at the inception of the contract the measures that the stakeholders will adopt in the event of 
renegotiation during the implementation of the agreement. In addition to the definition of 
standards for renegotiation, the findings of the case studies indicate that there are contract 
mechanisms used for payments that foster the achievement of VfM for road users (See Sub-
section 6.4.7). The need for the establishment of the applicable contract mechanisms for payments 
during the implementation of PFI (DBFO) road projects cannot be over-emphasised to ensure the 
achievement of VfM. The current practice indicates that the client is solely responsible for the 
definition of contract mechanisms used for payment. However, there is the need for the 
description of measures that will guide the primary stakeholders at renegotiations and serve as 
platforms to address any emerging issues at the point of renegotiation. The intention of the 
stakeholders for the inclusion of the measures and mechanisms at contract inception should be to 
facilitate the achievement of VfM during implementation and, especially, at the point of 
renegotiation. The contract mechanism for payment in DBFO roads are defined in the contract by 
the client, and it usually relates to shadow toll, availability payment, and active management 
payment mechanisms (See Figure 4.1 and Table 6.9).  
There should, therefore, be an appropriate definition at the contract inception of all the available 
measures (See Table 7.9) and payment mechanisms that can assist in the achievement of the 
client’s VfM objective. The measures and payment mechanisms are defined for significant 
adoption and evaluation of renegotiation and change negotiation during the execution of the 
project. The use of the framework for renegotiation purposes should follow the provisions of 
Section 1, which may be available for use in Section 5 as shown in Fig 8.1. The framework 
template for this aspect of the renegotiation process is shown in Table 8.1.  
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Table 8.1: Template for Section 1 of the VfM Renegotiation Framework 
 
Key: VC = Very Critical, C = Critical, MC = Moderately Critical, NC = Non-Critical,  
E = Effective, I = Ineffective, NEI = Neither Effective or Ineffective 
There is the need to check whether the measure identified at the inception of the contract for use 
during renegotiation is relevant and applicable to the project. The measure could be applied to the 
project if it is very critical or critical to the achievement of VfM for the primary stakeholders, 
especially the public sector at renegotiation. Some of the renegotiation measures may be non-
critical for the realisation of VfM objectives defined by the procuring authority. There is the need 
to ascertain the effectiveness level of the adopted measure towards the achievement of VfM at 
renegotiation. For instance, a renegotiation measure can be observed by the client’s representative 
as applicable in a renegotiation instance in such a way that it will enhance the prospect of  
S/N Measures & Mechanisms Are the measure 
and Mechanisms 
adopted on this 
project? 
Indicate the level of 
Criticality 
Evaluation 
Criteria 
Responsible 
Stakeholders 
  Yes No VC C MC NC E I NEI Client SPV 
A Measures            
1 Design and Planning            
2 Tendering and Bidding            
3 Technical            
4 Managerial and 
Administrative 
           
5 Economic            
6 Contractual             
7 Risk            
8 Regulatory and Legal            
10 Political            
B Mechanisms            
1 Shadow Toll             
2 Availability            
3 Active Management             
4 Others (Please specify)            
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achieving VfM for the client and ultimately the road users. Such measures can, therefore, be 
recommended for adoption by the appropriate stakeholder on a PPP road project towards ensuring 
the achievement of VfM. Moreover, a mechanism established in the contract, e.g. safety 
performance mechanisms may forestall safety of road users on the network while the lane closure 
charges may discourage closure of the road by the SPV by fostering the availability of the road 
users. The availability of the project output to users always results in users’ satisfaction, which is 
the primary objective of the client. Therefore, the measures and mechanisms for payment 
considered appropriate need to be stated and defined in the contract and ready for adoption in the 
event of renegotiation.  
Summarily, there is a need to specify the measures at the inception of PPP road projects to ensure 
that appropriate guidance notes are in place to address the problem of VfM inherent in PPP 
renegotiation. Since most of the measures to achieve VfM at renegotiation are observed to be 
design and planning related in the context of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects, there is a need for 
the design and planning measures to be stipulated to address renegotiations, which usually 
characterise the construction stage (See Table 7.5). The adoption of design and planning measures 
will ensure favourable renegotiations for all stakeholders, especially the public sector. Hence, this 
first step of the framework justifies the need for a motivated design and planning measure that 
promotes and fosters the achievement of VfM at the construction stage of the PFI (DBFO) road 
projects renegotiation in the UK. The reason for this submission is on the fact that most 
renegotiations in the context of UK occur at the technical development stage of the PFI (DBFO) 
road projects implementation. 
 Section 2 - Identification of Factors and their Criticality Level 
The emerging factors from the study are in Table 8.2. Altogether, there is the identification of 
thirty-seven factors in the context of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects, and they were accordingly 
categorised into twelve sections (See Table 7.5). In this empirical research, the category of the 
factors identified as leading to the renegotiation of road concession projects are technical, 
additional works, environmental, administrative and managerial, tendering and bidding factors, 
in their decreasing order of significance respectively.  
There is the need for the evaluation and assessment of the factors leading to renegotiation because 
of the importance of fostering an understanding of the renegotiation motivators and the reason 
why the primary stakeholders initiate the renegotiation request. An understanding of the answer 
to the question “Why renegotiate?” will benefit the stakeholders and assist in the knowledge of 
the renegotiation influence factors in the context of the project under investigation as established 
in the framework. 
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The framework operates based upon the need to identify the relevant factors from the list of thirty-
seven factors that may lead to the primary stakeholder's decision to renegotiate the contract. The 
reason for the identification of the respective renegotiation factors is on the comprehensive list in 
this study, most of which may not apply to some road concessions and may not represent the 
factors leading to the renegotiation in a specific project. For example, a cursory view of the factors 
influencing the renegotiation of the case studies indicates a maximum of eight, as stated by XY3-
Pub and XY8-Pub in CS2 and CS5 respectively, which leads to the renegotiation of the road 
concessions (See sub-section 6.4.2). These eight factors only represent a fraction of the thirty-
seven factors, which could lead to the renegotiation of road concessions. Hence, there is the need 
to identify the applicable factors, which are in the context of the PFI (DBFO) road projects under 
investigation.   
During the evaluation and assessment of the factors leading to renegotiation, specific reference 
to those factors, which are relevant to the project, from the list of possible factors that could lead 
to renegotiation as outlined in Table 7.5. The next step is to ascertain the critical levels of the 
identified factors leading to the renegotiation of road concessions after establishing the relevant 
factors influencing the renegotiations. The reason for the evaluation of the essential levels is to 
ensure the level of significance of these factors concerning the definition of their respective 
degree of influence on the road concession renegotiations. This evaluation, therefore, needs to 
proceed from the most critical to the non-critical factors, as shown in Table 7.5.  
The establishment of the respective critical levels will assist in defining a deeper understanding 
of the factors, which contribute to the results achieved in their respective degrees and criticality. 
The reason for this evaluation is based on the literature, which identifies that specific factors 
constrain successful implementation of PPP road projects, especially regarding VfM achieved at 
renegotiation (Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2015; Nikolaidis et al., 2013).  
The findings of CS2 further reveal that the client is the primary stakeholder’s responsible for 
making all the renegotiation requests that on the factors identified in Table 8.4. The renegotiation 
experience of this case study project reveals that the following are considered essential and 
necessary in the development of factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP road projects:  
• The assessment of the renegotiation factors applicable to the project (See Sub-section 
6.4.2). 
• The evaluation of the criticalness of the factors leading to renegotiation (See Table 7.5). 
• The stakeholders that are responsible for the renegotiation requests, which on the 
identified factors (See Sub-section 6.4.3) 
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The reason for the evaluation of the factors leading to renegotiation is to ensure that the correct 
factors inform the decision of the primary stakeholders to renegotiate the contract. The successful 
establishment of the chief factors influencing the renegotiations will help in the comparison of 
the factors leading to renegotiation with the VfM achieved at renegotiation. The evaluation of the 
factors leading to renegotiation according to Section 2 of the framework should, therefore, follow 
Figure 8.1 as expanded in the template shown in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2: Template for Section 2 of the VfM Renegotiation Framework 
S/N Category of Factors Is the factor applicable 
to your project? 
Indicate the level of 
criticality of the factors 
Responsible 
Stakeholders 
  Yes No VC C MC NC Client SPV 
1 Design and Planning         
2 Technical         
3 Economic Factors         
4 Contractual         
5 Tendering and Bidding         
6 Administrative and Managerial         
7 Institutional         
8 Regulatory and Legal         
9 Political         
10 Environmental         
11 Social         
12 Others (Please Specify)         
 
The stakeholder evaluating the factors leading to renegotiating should use Table 8.2 and consider 
the sub-factors under each of the categories of factors (See Table 7.5) to identify the factors 
applicable to the project and their respective level of criticality.  
 Section 3 - Establishment of Renegotiation Impacts on VfM Criteria 
The combined evidence of the literature and the interviews conducted identifies that the 
renegotiation of road concessions has an impact on the VfM criteria. One of the measures in 
Section 7.7 of this thesis is the definition of the criteria’s of VfM in the contract at inception. The 
evidence of this empirical study establishes fourteen (14) criteria's of VfM (See sub-section 7.5).  
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These criteria's can be used to assess the renegotiation of PPP projects for VfM achievement. 
Experiences of the PFI road concessions in the UK indicates that the renegotiations, which 
occurred on the project, are observed to impact all the fourteen identified VfM criteria, which 
include the construction cost, Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost, project finance cost, the 
cost of risk transferred and whole life cycle cost at different levels. The evaluation criteria used 
to measure the degree and level of impacts of the renegotiation on the VfM standards are 
considered to also be regarding their respective criticalness. The primary effects of the 
renegotiation are in comparison to the other impact of the renegotiation. Therefore, there is a 
comparative basis between the individual criteria of VfM and the VfM requirements of the 
project, which have the tendency to be impacted by the renegotiation. 
Based on the findings of the empirical research, there is a need for the identification and 
establishment of the impacts of the renegotiation by the primary stakeholders regarding each of 
the identified VfM criteria. The fourteen (14) VfM criteria can be used on an individual basis to 
evaluate the implications of the renegotiation. For instance, the cost is the most impacted VfM 
criteria during the renegotiation of road concessions. Therefore, the findings suggest that all the 
requirements related to cost needs to be evaluated and assessed as an essential VfM criterion that 
should be given due consideration and protected when renegotiating road concession contract for 
VfM achievement. Establishing the impacts of the renegotiation, mainly by the cost criterion, is 
paramount as most of the renegotiations from the empirical findings impact the cost components 
while the time criteria remain un-impacted in most instances. 
The principle of this framework in the evaluation of VfM at the renegotiation of PPP road 
concessions identifies the need for the identification and assessment of the respective impacts of 
the renegotiation. The renegotiation impacts should be about the individual criteria of VfM, which 
are necessary for the evaluations and assessments required in PPP road projects. The purpose is 
to assist in the assessment of the impact levels of the renegotiation regarding the VfM criteria to 
ensure that the renegotiating stakeholder's objectives including, profit, budget and cost 
perspectives are not affected or altered to the detriment of client objective and ultimate 
satisfaction of the users. The reason for the assessment of renegotiation impacts is to assist the 
understanding of the direction of the VfM achieved for the stakeholders. The establishment of the 
effect of the renegotiation on the individual VfM criteria can follow the flowchart shown in 
Section 3 of Figure 8.1, which is in Table 8.3. 
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Table 8.3: Template for Section 3 of the VfM Renegotiation Framework 
S/N Category of Factors Is the factor 
applicable to 
your project? 
Indicate the level of 
criticality of the 
factors 
Responsible 
Stakeholders 
  Yes No VC C MC NC Client SPV 
1 Construction cost         
2 Project finance cost         
3 Operation and Maintenance costs         
4 User satisfaction         
5 Private sector management expertise         
6 Whole Life Cycle Cost         
7 Construction duration         
8 Cost of risk transferred         
9 Quality of Service Delivery         
10 Competition that provides fair value of the project         
11 Performance based payment mechanism         
12 Innovation of bidders in the use of output specification         
13 Concession duration         
14 Concessionaire’s profit         
 
 Section 4 - Identification of the Outcomes and their Characteristics 
The fourth section in the evaluation of renegotiation of road concessions is the identification of 
the relevant outcomes that apply to the project from the list of possible outcomes of the 
renegotiations (See Sub-section 7.6). The appropriate assessment of the outcomes should focus 
on the specific road project(s) in context. These renegotiation outcomes as indicated by the 
stakeholders involved in the renegotiation of the road concessions in the particular case studies. 
Reference to the results of the renegotiation regarding variances in the respective VfM criteria. 
The evaluation of the outcomes of the renegotiation is, therefore, concerning the principle of 
establishing the positivity, negativity or neutrality of the renegotiation as shown in Figure 8.1. 
This assessment further applies to the process of verifying the result of the renegotiation based 
on the impact of the renegotiation on the VfM criteria.  
Thus, when evaluating the outcome of the renegotiation for VfM achievement, there is the need 
to have prior knowledge of the specific VfM standards that is impacted by the factor leading the 
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stakeholders to agree to the renegotiation of the project.  The VfM criteria are, therefore, adopted 
as the basis for establishing the positivity, negativity and neutrality of the renegotiation outcome. 
For instance, these evaluations entail the establishment of whether there is an increase or decrease 
in the cost variables (e.g. construction cost, whole life cycle cost, concession cost and cost of 
finance) at renegotiation. It is also crucial that the evaluation of the renegotiation outcome takes 
into consideration the possibility of achieving neutrality of cost (i.e., no change in the cost of 
construction, concession cost, and whole life cycle cost amongst others). For instance, there can 
be a review of the performance-based payment mechanisms, quality and performance of 
concession as well. 
One or both primary stakeholders can make renegotiation requests in road concession projects 
and carry out an estimation of an increase or decrease in costs criteria. The evaluation of costs 
ensures that the outcome of the renegotiation is measured to ascertain whether it is profitable for 
the stakeholders, especially the public sector, regarding the achievement of VfM in those criteria, 
as defined at contract inception. In other words, the renegotiation could affect the cost of the 
concession contract through an increase or decrease in price. Moreover, the findings on the 
renegotiation of road concession contracts indicate that there is an increase in concession costs 
because of the inclusion of additional works and cost savings premised upon the removal of 
assets, showing an increase and decrease in concession cost respectively. 
Despite the increase in construction costs, the overall concession cost and duration of the contract 
remain unchanged (i.e., there is the achievement of VfM for the public sector considering the 
outcomes), regarding the criteria, have been established by the client for measuring the 
successfulness of renegotiation. The submission of XY2-Pri in CS2 adds credibility to the 
findings of this empirical study as discussed in Sub-section 6.4.5: "There is an early completion 
of the construction, and on the budget and to date there have been some minor issues and some 
naggings about some defects rather than overall quality. No impact on the 30-year concession. 
Therefore, the concession contract remains for that 30-year period." This occurrence justifies the 
principle propounded in this framework, which establishes the need to develop the outcomes of 
the renegotiation of PPP road projects regarding the positive and negative values of the respective 
VfM criteria. The evaluation of the results of renegotiation can be done using the template shown 
in Table 8.4.  
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Table 8.4: Template for Section 4 of the VfM Renegotiation Framework 
S/N Outcome Is the outcome 
applicable to your 
project? 
Indicate the nature of the 
outcome 
Responsible 
Stakeholders 
  Yes No Positive Negative Neutral Client SPV 
1 Construction Cost         
2 Construction Duration        
3 Operation and Maintenance        
4 Project Finance Cost        
5 Cost of Risk Transfer        
6 Users Satisfaction        
7 SPV’s Profit        
8 Quality and Performance        
9 Whole Life Cost        
10 Concession Duration        
11 Performance Based Payment 
Mechanisms 
       
12 SPV Management Expertise 
and Skills 
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 Section 5 – Evaluation and Application of Remedial Actions 
There are specific actions that have been found necessary at the renegotiation stage to introduce 
equilibrium and ensure that deviations from the stakeholder’s objectives are minimised or 
corrected. These efforts serve to remedy the non-achievement of VfM, which may arise during 
the process of renegotiation of PPP road projects. The critical remedial actions regarding VfM 
criteria identified from the results of the questionnaire are in Table 8.6. There may be a need for 
corrective action to be taken based upon the experience of renegotiations, as clearly outlined in 
the findings of this study. Moreover, the literature reveals that there could be the need to rescue 
the project financially or rebalance the financial equilibrium of the project because of the outcome 
of renegotiations (Sarmento and Renneboog, 2016; Sarmento 2014). 
Therefore, remedial actions are necessary during the renegotiation of road concessions to make 
sure the road projects are on the track of VfM achievement for the procuring authority as well as 
the private concessionaire. Non-achievement of VfM during the renegotiation of PPP road 
projects can be avoided or reduced through remedial actions suggested in this sub-section, which 
ensures the satisfaction of stakeholders’ objectives regarding the achievement of VfM. However, 
other options, which include contract termination, buyout and refinancing are available in a 
situation where the stakeholders could not identify any appropriate actions that can address 
renegotiations to ensure the achievement VfM. These options are, however, outside the scope of 
this research, which seeks how to achieve VfM within the confine of road concession 
renegotiation. Thus, the findings of this empirical research on the variables grouped in their 
respective sections are incorporated and evident in Figure 8.1. All the individual tables (i.e., Table 
8.1, Table 8.2, Table 8.3, Table 8.4 and Table 8.5) serve as templates that can be used to enhance 
the practical application of the framework shown in Figure 8.1. However, the detail components 
of the framework regarding the format to follow in the evaluation of remedial actions to address 
deviation from VfM criteria are in Table 8.5. 
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                         Table 8.5: Template for Section 5 of the VfM Renegotiation Framework 
S/N Remedial Actions Is this the action taken on the 
project? 
What is the type of action taken? Responsible 
Stakeholders 
  Yes No Increase Evaluation Review Evaluation Client SPV 
  Increase Neutral Decrease Upward Neutral Downward   
1 Government direct compensation/ subsidies to the SPV           
2 Bonus point issued to the SPV as a penalty           
3 Redefining of investment plans by the SPV           
4 Financial rescue of the project by the government           
5 Adjustment in the annual fee paid by the operator to the 
government 
          
6 Innovation of bidders because of the use of output 
specifications 
          
7 Concession duration           
8 Competition among the bidders           
9 Revised service delivery modalities           
10 Question regarding the credibility of renegotiation process 
to deliver VfM for the public sector 
          
11 Others (Please Specify)           
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 THE USE OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RENEGOTIATION OF PPP 
ROAD PROJECTS 
The stakeholders involved in the renegotiation can use the framework for the practical assessment 
and evaluation of PPP road projects to ensure the achievement of VfM for the users and achieve 
the individual objectives of the stakeholders. The stakeholders can successfully use the 
framework during the renegotiation process by the definition and establishment of the measures 
and mechanisms for payment regarding the project under consideration. The defined rules can be 
used during the implementation of the plan and assessed for their level of effectiveness. The 
performance of the project during implementation by the criteria defined for VfM will not require 
renegotiation measures to be taken by the private and public partners. The reason why there may 
not be a need for renegotiation may be because the project aligns with the VfM requirements and 
achieves the intent of the stakeholders regarding the defined VfM criteria used to measure the 
project VfM success. Otherwise, there will be the need to use the VfM renegotiation framework 
for evaluation to align the project based on the defined requirements for VfM. 
The framework can also be used to establish the process of evaluating the relevant factors leading 
to renegotiation of PPP road projects. Every road concession project is unique. Therefore, there 
is the need for the stakeholders to identify the factors influencing renegotiation during 
implementation. For instance, the framework stipulates, as stated in Sections 2, that the 
stakeholders need to determine whether there are applicable reasons to commence a renegotiation 
process. If no justifiable factors are leading to renegotiation, renegotiation requests should be 
declined and stopped by the client. However, if it is satisfactory to the client that there are 
reasonable and genuine reasons for renegotiation, most of which could apply to the provisions of 
the contract, the client can agree and approve the renegotiation request. In this instance, 
renegotiation will be by the consent of the initiator and the second party to the contract including 
any other party to the process.   
The evaluation of the factors leading to renegotiation, therefore, requires the primary stakeholders 
to identify the applicable factors from the list of thirty-seven factors that can lead to the 
renegotiation of road concessions identified in Section 7.4 of this thesis. The reason for this is 
because all the factors cannot all constitute the factors leading to road concession renegotiations 
in the specific project. After determining the applicable factors, the next step is to ascertain the 
criticality of the factors by estimating the significance levels of each. 
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The estimation of the significant level of the factors will foster the understanding of the factors 
in their respective order of prominence, including the very critical and non-critical factors leading 
to the renegotiation. However, there is the need for the stakeholders to ensure that there are 
accurate identification and establishment of the level of criticality of each of the factors identified 
as responsible. 
The next thing after the evaluation and assessment of the factors leading to renegotiation is to 
establish the impact of the renegotiation on the VfM criteria defined for the specific road 
concession project. The effect of the renegotiation because of the factors identified in Section 2 
of the framework is significant for an understanding of the nature of the renegotiation. The reason 
for the impact assessment is on the knowledge that all the criteria listed in the VfM renegotiation 
framework may not apply to the specific PFI (DBFO) road projects. Hence, there is the need to 
identify the impacts of the renegotiation on defined VfM criteria outlined at the contract formation 
stage to establish whether there is the achievement of the threshold of VfM or performance 
indicator.  
The outcome of the renegotiation can also imply the result of the renegotiation. For instance, in a 
situation where there is the achievement of the threshold of the quantitative VfM indicator, the 
renegotiation is positive. However, in a case where there is no achievement of the limit of the 
quantitative VfM index, the renegotiation outcome is reckoned as negative. Positive renegotiation 
outcomes in PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation indicates that there are no problems 
regarding the achievement of VfM regarding the objective of the client. Also, the renegotiation 
outcome is positive if the SPV achieves the profit and revenue expected after the renegotiation or 
change negotiation. Hence, a positive renegotiation is one where both parties are happy at the end 
of the renegotiation. In this instance, the evaluation of the renegotiation for VfM achievement 
ends. However, if the outcome is adverse, there is a deviation from the quantitative or qualitative 
indicator of VfM, which indicates that there is a VfM achievement problem (See Section 4 of 
Figure 8.1). Though, the renegotiation outcomes, as outlined in Table 8.4, can come in any three 
forms: positive, neutral and negative. 
The deviation from the quantitative and qualitative VfM indicator, which is in the failure to meet 
the criteria set for VfM indicates that there is a need for the stakeholders involved at renegotiation 
to go to Section 5 of the framework to commence evaluation of relevant remedial actions. Having 
identified the appropriate steps that need to be taken to correct the deviation observed in the 
criteria defined for VfM, the next thing to do according to the provisions of the framework is to 
evaluate the implication of the remedial actions identified. The impact can either be evidenced in 
the increase, decrease or a neutral result of the specific VfM criteria defined in the contract. 
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If the public client is satisfied that there is the achievement of the quantitative VfM indicator after 
the corrective action, then it is assumed that the road users will be happy. Hence, there is the 
achievement of the VfM renegotiation framework targeted outcome in this instance after the 
adoption of suitable and necessary actions to remedy the deviation and foster project performance. 
In a situation where there is non-achievement of the quantitative indicator of VfM, there will be 
the need for the renegotiating stakeholders to go back to Section 1 of the framework to identify 
the applicable measures and payment mechanisms agreed at the contract formation stage to ensure 
that VfM is achieved for the public client (See Sub-section 8.3.1). The adoption of the applicable 
measures and payment mechanisms, which could include penalties and bonuses to the SPV are 
mainly to ensure that there is the achievement of VfM for the road users. VfM is obtained for the 
client and the procuring authority in PPP road project when the measures and payment 
mechanisms are found to be useful during the renegotiation and change negotiation of PFI 
(DBFO) road projects. Thus, the user’s satisfaction, which is the primary objective of the client 
is achieved at the end of the evaluation as shown in Figure 8.1. The framework is proposed for 
use by the client and the private concessionaire during road concession renegotiation, especially 
when there is the need for contract renegotiation and change negotiation. 
 VALIDATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE VFM RENEGOTIATION 
FRAMEWORK 
The validation of the developed framework was through interviews of a range of users in both 
public and private sectors after the modification of the developed framework as recommended. 
Feedbacks received on various issues that are pertinent to renegotiation and each of the sections 
of the framework through face-to-face interviews, Skype and phone calls as agreed with 
interviewees were used in the framework validation. Seven experts recognised as potential users 
of the framework indicated interest to participate in the semi-structured interviews out of the 
twenty-four public and private sector experts invited. Six of the experts are involved in PFI 
(DBFO) road projects in the UK. Ten pre-determined questions were asked to validate the 
framework. These questions aim to assess the framework regarding its relevance and ease of 
understanding, general comprehensiveness and level of coverage including the applicability and 
usefulness of the framework. The potential users provided more in-depth and insightful 
comments, which assisted in refining the proposed framework and helped in developing a 
modified framework, which incorporated salient user’s suggestions. 
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The experts’ opinion and feedback provided the basis for the internal and external validity of the 
developed framework. The potential users of the framework from both the public and private 
sector include those that participated in the interview surveys at the advanced stage of the 
research, (i.e., case study interviews). Also, experts external to the development of the framework, 
i.e., potential users of the framework that are not part of the initial study leading to the 
development of the framework. The aim was to identify, whether there is a significant difference 
between the views of those that have participated in the study and those that did not participate in 
the study. The feedback from the experts who participated in the study served the purpose of 
establishing the internal validity, while the input from experts that did not participate in the 
research confirm the external validity of the framework. 
In addition to the framework validation, the various presentations made at academic conferences 
and seminars that are peer-reviewed serve as opportunities for fair critique and scrutiny of the 
findings and methodology of the study by experts in PPP research. Valuable feedback and 
comments were received from reputable and international academic conferences attended (See 
Appendix 5). The suggestions received were evaluated and integrated into the study to improve 
the validity and comprehensiveness of the research findings. Before the conduct of the validation 
interviews, the developed framework and the validation questions were mailed electronically to 
the potential users in the public and private UK PFI (DBFO) road sectors. The essence was to 
introduce the validation exercise, the process and to solicit their consent.  
The validators are experts involved in PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK. The reason for the 
choice of these experts is to ensure that they have adequate knowledge in framework development 
including issues about renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects. The number of private sector 
potential users chosen was 12, and the number of public sector potential users was 12, which 
cumulated to a total of 24 potential users of the framework developed. There is an extensive 
consultation to allow for robust suggestions and useful feedbacks for incorporation into the 
initially developed framework. However, only seven potential users willingly indicated interest 
and gave their consent to participate in the validation process. The validation interview questions 
reflected semi-structured open and closed-ended questions (See Appendix 11) and covered a 
range of issues involving three aspects, which include|: 
• Section A - Preliminary questions. 
• Section B - Relevance and ease of understanding of the framework. 
• Section C- Applicability and usefulness of the framework. 
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The general responses received from the range of users interviewed during the validation exercise 
reflect positive feedback and comments on the overall framework and its respective sections 
including its applicability, usefulness in the evaluation of renegotiation for VfM achievement. 
The experts and potential users in both the public and private sectors identified the framework as 
new, innovative and a novel contribution with clear and thorough considerations of pertinent 
issues that usually emerge during the renegotiation and change negotiation of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects. The interviewees agreed that the framework has a high level of coverage of issues to be 
considered during the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects to ensure the achievement of 
VfM for the users. A general review of the overall responses of the interviewees regarding each 
of the sections of the framework reveals that the interviewees confirmed the relevance, ease of 
understanding, and the applicability and usefulness of the framework in the evaluation of 
renegotiation for VfM achievement. Though, there are suggestions from the interviewees, which 
are adapted to refine the structure and incorporated into the appropriate sections of the framework 
developed. Some of the critical comments of some of the interviewees, which assist in the 
refinement of the framework developed are: 
✓ VR1-Pri - “The lane occupation charges, have ensured the achievement of the client’s 
objectives of non-disruption to the road network including the performance of the 
standards specified in the contract. Few incidences of disruption to the road network 
have benefitted the users regarding journey time reliability. I feel that it would be useful 
to expand Section 1 of your flowchart to address how some flexibility could be built into 
the contract from the outset, to allow either party to introduce proposals that enhance 
VfM, with shared benefits”. 
✓ VR3-Pub - “As the focus of this framework is on renegotiation and as the two options 
highlighted in the framework are not the only options – it seems extreme to me. I am not 
sure if you can achieve a VfM by re-financing renegotiation or change negotiation. You 
are contractually allowed to terminate the agreement. As such termination should not be 
stated, in that extreme way in the framework, especially in a framework whose purpose 
is to devise a strategy to achieve VfM for the stakeholders”. 
✓ VR4-Pri - “I think the framework is useful; the only thing is just the definitions of the 
terms used in the sections of the framework. If you use this framework, it should develop 
from the parties to be involved in the renegotiation. The use of the framework should be 
such that it will be refined by the renegotiation stakeholders as renegotiation go on. It 
could be handy during the project implementation”. 
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✓  VR6-Pri “So, our payment mechanism is very much about VfM. It is about keeping the 
road open and keeping the traffic flowing up to the stipulated average speed and keep it 
going safely. It is already a built-in payment mechanism to ensure VfM achievement”. 
 
 Preliminary Questions of the Interviews 
The preliminary questions seek to elicit information regarding the experiences and background 
of the validation participants to establish the quality of the responses provided for the framework 
validation. There are two categories of participants adopted for the framework validation. The 
first category of participants is regarded as study participants because they participated in the 
interview and questionnaire survey and their opinions were used to establish the internal validity 
of the framework. The second category involves stakeholders that did not participate in either the 
interviews or the questionnaire, but their responses were used to establish the external validity of 
the framework. Hence, the opinion of the non-study participants serves as an objective basis to 
compare the reactions of the first category of interviewees. 
The details of the participants with regards to their respective categories, the code assigned to 
each participant, stakeholder sectors, the current position of the validation respondents, their years 
of experience and academic and professional qualification are in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6: Details of the Validation Respondents 
 
 
 
 
S/N Practitioners 
Category 
Participants 
Code  
Stakeholders 
Sector 
Current Position Years of 
Experience 
Qualification 
1 Practitioners 
(Study 
Participants) 
VR1-Pri Private General Manager 21 BSc, Civil 
Engr. FICE 
VR2-Pub Public Client Representative 13 Chartered 
Engr. 
VR3-Pub Public  Head of Operations 10 BA Bus. Mgt. 
VR4-Pri Private General Manager/Director 40 BSc Civil, 
FICE 
2 Practitioners (Non-
study participants) 
VR5- Pri Private Industry 
practitioner/Researcher 
20 Ph.D. 
VR6-Pri Private Operations Director 22 MICE. Engr. 
VR7-Pri Private Operations/Liaison Manager 40 BSc, Civil 
Engr MICE 
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Table 8.6 shows that all the respondents have broad academic/professional background and 
extensive experience in the industry, especially in the management of PFI (DBFO) road projects 
for the client and concessionaire. Participants currently working for the private sector 
concessionaires have, at some point in their careers, worked for the public client. For instance, 
VR7-Pri and VR4-Pri indicated regarding their experience in the public sector as follows: 
• “I am a Chartered Engineer and a Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers. I have 
three years of experience as Highways England’s Department’s Representative on the 
Newcastle to Carlisle DBFO road project. This role was working for the Client. I also 
have nine years of experience working as the Operations & Liaison Manager.” 
• “I have got 40 years’ experience in the design, construction, operation and maintenance 
of highways altogether. For 20 years, I have worked on PFI (DBFO) road contract in 
the UK.” 
The experiences and backgrounds of the respondents as indicated in Table 8.6, therefore, suggest 
that the responses are reliable for both public and private sectors application. 
 Relevance and Ease of Understanding of the Framework 
The interviewees agreed that the framework has a high coverage of issues relating to the measures 
that can ensure the achievement of VfM at the renegotiation of DBFO contracts, including actions 
that can be taken to remedy deviations from the VfM target, stipulated by the client. During the 
review of how the framework can assist in the assessment of renegotiation for VfM achievement, 
it was understood that the framework adopted considerations within the individual sections, which 
can be useful in the process of renegotiation. The participants also agree that the framework can 
serve as a guide for the stakeholders and ensure sustainable progress towards the achievement of 
the user’s satisfaction. Overall, the interviewees confirmed that the framework presented a useful 
flow chart that shows originality and novel contribution that can be used in practice by both the 
public and private sector stakeholders for the evaluation of renegotiation for VfM achievement in 
PFI (DBFO) road projects. Moreover, some of the comments of the interviewees regarding the 
relevance and ease of understanding of the framework are:  
✓ VR3-Pub - It was easy to understand, and there is a logical flow. As I said, there is a 
standard in the construction, and it is logical across the sections. 
✓ VR4-Pri - “I think it is going to be relevant for renegotiations.” 
✓ VR5-Pri “Yes, it is very applicable. It is well demonstrated, and it should be used in 
practice”. 
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The framework emphasises factors that can lead to renegotiations including remedial actions that 
can be taken to address variance in the project VfM criteria and performance indicators. 
Operations and liaison manager of one of the growing concession companies in the Northeast of 
England substantiate the achievement of VfM based on the payment mechanisms defined in the 
contract. According to the findings, the payment mechanisms are also used as the basis to measure 
project performance.  
The validation participant corroborates this submission as follows: “There are different types of 
indicators used to assess VfM for users, for instance, the A12 road DBFO uses the availability of 
road network, which measures VfM regarding the actual roads that are available to the users.  
So, the way they, i.e., the client ensures the achievement of VfM for the users is different from our 
contract.” Hence, based on this comment and other numerous comments and suggestions of the 
validation participants, it became clear that there is a need to include contract mechanisms for 
payment in the framework as shown in Section 1. Moreover, the findings of the validation 
interviews also suggest the need for the stakeholders, i.e., both client and the SPV to agree and 
define the contract mechanisms for payment at the inception of the contract to enhance the 
achievement of VfM for both parties. Also, the validation participants confirm their respective 
agreement for the definition and inclusion of renegotiation measures at the beginning of the 
contract to guide renegotiation and change negotiation during the implementation of the contract.  
The joint agreement by the primary stakeholders to the measures and contract mechanisms for 
payment will forestall the occurrence of disputes between the parties at renegotiation. Though the 
client usually defines the contract mechanisms for payment, there is also the need for the private 
partner (i.e., the SPV to agree its terms with the client before the commencement of the contract). 
The agreement of the terms of the contract mechanisms for payment by the stakeholders will also 
allow for ease and mutual adoption of the provisions of the contract during the implementation, 
especially at renegotiation. Summarily, the defined measures and payment mechanisms for VfM 
achievement can be adopted by the first renegotiating parties as stated in Sub-section 8.3.1 of this 
thesis. Furthermore, Section 1 of the framework incorporates the evaluation of appropriate VfM 
contract mechanisms for payment by both parties (i.e., client and SPV). 
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 Applicability and Usefulness of the Framework 
The validation interviews assess the applicability and usefulness of the framework for the 
evaluation of PFI (DBFO) road project renegotiation for VfM achievement. Some of the 
comments of the respondents regarding the applicability and use of the framework are enumerated 
below: 
✓ VR1-Pri – “Regarding DBFOs like ours that have been developed based on frozen 
standards where the SPVs are not allowed to make changes or modifications, I will say 
the framework is moderately applicable. However, in the most recent type of road 
DBFOs where the standards are not frozen (i.e., a contract where changes and 
modifications are allowed), the framework can be said to be applicable”. 
✓ VR3-Pub - “I will say the framework is useful. It indeed poses some right questions 
within the flow of the chart, which are pointers to what should be done during change 
negotiation. So, I think it is a useful tool in practice”. 
✓ VR5-Pri – “I will say it is moderately relevant and appropriate to concession company. 
The client will find it very suitable because it establishes the different part of their 
operations”. 
Based on the comments from all the experts working in both the public and private sectors, the 
framework is both applicable and suitable for the evaluation of DBFO road project renegotiation 
for VfM achievement. Hence, it is useful in the assessment of renegotiation during project 
implementation for VfM achievement. The responses of the selected interviewees regarding 
Section B and Section C of the validation interview questions shown in Appendix 11 in Table 
8.7.
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                          Table 8.7: Validation Interview Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
                      Key: See List of abbreviations in the preliminaries section  
       
                        
S/N Validation 
participants 
Participant 
code 
Framework 
awareness 
Ease  
of 
understanding 
Remedial actions 
coverage 
Payment 
Mechanism 
Adoption 
Mechanism for 
payment and 
VfM success 
Framework 
applicability 
Framework 
usefulness 
Usefulness to 
stakeholder 
1 Practitioners 
(Study 
Participants) 
         
  
VR1-Pri No = 0 High = 3 High = 3 Yes = 1 High = 3 Applicable = 3 Useful = 3 Client and SPV 
  
VR2-Pub No = 0 High = 3 Very High = 4 Yes = 1 Very High = 4 Applicable = 3 Useful = 3 Client 
  
VR3-Pub No = 0 High = 3 High = 3 Yes = 1 Very High = 4 Applicable = 3 Useful = 3 Client 
  
VR4-Pri No = 0 High = 3 High = 3 Yes = 1 Very High = 4 Applicable = 3 Useful = 3 Client and SPV 
Mean score 0.00 3.00 3.25 1.00 3.75 3.00 3.00  
2 Practitioners 
(Non-study 
participants) 
         
  
VR5- Pri No = 0 Very High = 4 - - - Applicable = 3 Useful = 3 SPV and Users 
  
VR6-Pri No = 0 High = 3 Moderately High = 2  Yes = 1 High = 3 Moderately 
Applicable = 2 
Moderately 
Useful = 2 
Client 
  
VR7-Pri No = 0 High = 3 High = 3 Yes = 1 Very High = 4 Applicable = 3 Useful = 3 Client and SPV 
Mean score 0.00 3.33 2.00 0.67 3.67 3.33 3.00  
Mean Score/ overall result 0.00 3.14 2.57 0.86 3.14 2.86 2.86  
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A cursory view of the validation result reveals the mean values of each of the responses received 
and indicates that most of the validation participants agree regarding the applicability, relevance 
and usefulness of the proposed framework. Statistical methods were, however, employed to 
ascertain the level of agreement between the responses of the study participants and the non-study 
participants. Kruskal Wallis and Mann Whitney tests were used comparatively. The Kruskal-
Wallis test is a non-parametric test, which does not assume that the data come from a normal 
distribution. The Mann–Whitney U-test (also known as the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test, the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, or the Wilcoxon two-sample test) is limited to nominal variables with 
only two values; it is the non-parametric analogue to the two-sample t-test. Though the Mann-
Whitney test uses a different test statistic (i.e., U instead of the H of the Kruskal–Wallis test), the 
P value is mathematically identical to that of a Kruskal–Wallis test. The assumption regarding 
the P value is that the values of Ucrit for α = 0.05 (two-tailed) as stated in the Mann-Whitney 
Tables (McDonald, 2014). Hence, there is a significant difference between the two sample in a 
situation where the p-values are less than or equal to 0.05. 
As shown in the Kruskal Wallis result illustrated in Table 8.8, all the p-values are more significant 
than 0.05, which indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the responses 
received from the all the participants. Mann-Whitney test results shown in Table 8.3 means that 
all the p-values are higher than 0.05. The results also indicate that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the responses of the study participants and the non-study 
participants. The homogeneity and consistency of the result are, therefore, established since no 
statistical difference among the seven participants involved in the framework validation. The 
finding strengthens the external validity of the framework as explained in (Roe and Just, 2009). 
Hence, the conclusions drawn from the study through the developed framework can be 
generalised for PPP road projects application as substantiated by the positive comments of the 
participants, which is in Table 8.7. Summarily, the results of the Kruskal Wallis test for the 
differences between the framework participants and the Mann-Whitney test, which compares 
variance between two samples are in Table 8.8 and Table 8.9. 
Table 8.8: Kruskal Wallis Test for Differences between the Framework Validation Participants 
 Framework 
awareness 
Ease of 
understanding 
Remedial 
actions 
coverage 
Payment 
Mechanism 
Adoption 
Payment 
mechanism 
& VfM 
success 
Framework 
applicability 
Framework 
usefulness 
Usefulness 
to 
stakeholders 
Chi 
Square 
0.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 0.000 
Df 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Asymp. 
Sig 
1.000 .423 .423 .423 .423 .423 .423 1.000 
Note: The grouping variable involves all the validation participants 
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Table 8.9: Mann Whitney Test for Differences Between Study Participants and Non-study Participants 
 Framework 
awareness 
Ease of 
understanding 
Remedial 
actions 
coverage 
Payment 
Mechanism 
Adoption 
Payment 
mechanism 
& VfM 
success 
Framework 
applicability 
Framework 
usefulness 
Usefulness 
to 
stakeholders 
Mann- 
Whitney U 
6.000 4.000 1.500 4.000 5.500 2.000 4.000 6.000 
Wilcoxon 
W 
12.000 14.000 7.500 10.000 11.500 12.000 10.000 12.000 
Z .000 -1.155 -1.755 -1.155 -.224 -.1.789 -1.155 .000 
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
1.000 .248 .079 .248 .823 .074 .248 1.000 
Note: The grouping variable involves the comparison between the study participants and the non-
study participants  
 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VALUE FOR MONEY RENEGOTIATION 
FRAMEWORK 
The framework developed is significant for application to the renegotiation of road concession 
projects. However, it can also be generalised for PPP road projects application. The VfM 
renegotiation framework proposes guidelines which can provide implication for policy and 
research significance in PPP. The importance of the framework is as follows: 
• Modalities for the establishment of the factors leading to renegotiation of PPP road 
projects. There is an indication that there is a relationship between the reasons for 
requesting renegotiation and the VfM achieved. The framework seeks to define 
procedural steps to identify and ascertain what motivates or prompts the renegotiating 
parties to make renegotiation decisions. Hence, the framework incorporates the need to 
establish all the factors leading to renegotiation in a specific instance and presents the 
evaluation procedure. The framework also suggests a mode of assessment for road 
concession renegotiation regarding the ascertaining of the impact of renegotiation on 
VfM criteria including how to establish and define the renegotiation outcomes.  
• The renegotiation outcomes could necessitate remedial actions that could correct 
deviation from the quantitative and qualitative indicators of VfM, which are indicators of 
project performance. Hence, the success of the road concession project regarding VfM 
achievement can be followed up during the implementation of the project. 
• The measures that can prevent the non-achievement of VfM at the renegotiation of DBFO 
road projects need to be defined and established as an essential part of the contract at the 
formative stage for adoption in the event of renegotiation. The measures can ensure the 
achievement of VfM for the client. 
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• The adoption of all the identified sections of the framework can lead to the effective 
implementation of the road concession projects by the responsible renegotiation 
stakeholders. It is, however, important that appropriate considerations and measures are, 
mainly taken at the design and planning stage to ensure the achievement of VfM for the 
public sector during the technical implementation stage. The reason for this is because 
the principal factors leading to the renegotiation of road concession projects in the UK 
are categorised into technical factors. Measures are, therefore, needed at the design stage 
before renegotiation occurrences to ensure that there is the achievement of VfM for the 
public sector at the development stage.  
• The VfM renegotiation framework is beneficial to both the public and private sectors as 
it clearly defines how to address ineffective and inefficient renegotiation observed in 
previous PPP road projects, which has resulted in adverse outcomes such as lengthy 
renegotiation with the resultant effect of weak quality, as well as overrunning concerning 
cost and time. The adoption of the developed VfM renegotiation framework will assist 
public agencies in employing proactive actions and measures for sustainable 
renegotiation in PPP road projects. The adoption of this framework by the intended 
stakeholders, (i.e., the public and private partners) will foster the achievement of value 
for money, something that has currently eluded PPP infrastructure renegotiations, 
especially in the water and transport sectors. The framework further serves to ensure that 
the public sector VfM objectives, users' needs and private investor's interest and motives 
are sustained and achieved. 
 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter has succeeded in presenting the developed and validated VfM renegotiation 
framework for PPP road projects as established in Objective 6 of this research. The framework 
has made a significant contribution and has attempted to resolve the lingering problems of VfM 
achievement in PPP concessions, particularly at the renegotiation stage. The comments of the 
validation respondents are evidence of the relevance, applicability and usefulness of the 
framework in the evaluation of renegotiation for VfM achievement. Taking into consideration the 
dearth of enough literature and empirical findings of renegotiation in the UK, the framework is 
not only original, but it is also innovative. One important consideration, which flows through the 
framework and cuts across the templates established as Table 8.2, Table 8.3, Table 8.4, Table 8.5 
and Table 8.6, is the inclusion of evaluation criteria for each section of the framework.  
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These afford the parties at renegotiation the opportunity to review and evaluate the respective 
parts for VfM achievement. Hence, the VfM renegotiation framework can serve as a benchmark 
for the evaluation of road concessions for the accomplishment of VfM.  
The framework, therefore, shows the flow of evaluation of road concessions from the definition 
of contract mechanisms for payment and the establishment of measures to ensure the achievement 
of VfM. The implementation of necessary actions to remedy any observed deviation from the 
defined VfM objectives is a paramount consideration during the execution of road concessions. 
The prospect of an assessment of renegotiation for VfM achievement through workable 
parameters that foster the success of the VfM objectives of the respective stakeholders, especially 
the public sector’s VfM goals. Conscientious use of the framework at renegotiation will serve as 
a guide to the primary stakeholders, (i.e., the public and private partners in the evaluation of PPP 
road projects renegotiation for VfM achievement).
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Renegotiation research in PPP infrastructure projects, primarily in the transport sector, is 
comprehensive and inexhaustible. The study has extensively addressed the principal issue 
surrounding renegotiation of PPP road projects, which is VfM. However, the resolution for the 
VfM problem during the renegotiation stage of PPP road projects is in the context of UK PFI 
(DBFO) road projects. There have been significant identifications of the factors leading to the 
renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects. The impacts of the renegotiation on the VfM criteria 
have been outlined, highlighting several outcomes of the renegotiation. Remedial actions may be 
necessary to align the results of the renegotiation based on the requirements defined for VfM at 
the planning and contract formation stage. Specific statements regarding appropriate measures 
should be in the contract to ensure the achievement of VfM at renegotiation.  
This chapter summarises the process of the research, the methodological approach taken and the 
main findings. Conclusions based on the principal findings and recommendations to ensure the 
achievement of VfM at the renegotiation of PPP road projects are enumerated. Suggestions, which 
include the need for the evaluation of other transport projects such as rail, sea and airport projects, 
with the aim of establishing their renegotiation experience and determining whether there is the 
achievement of VfM. 
 ACHIEVEMENT OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The empirical research study, which on objectives 3, 4 and 5 of the study, established the VfM 
renegotiation framework, which is objective 6 of this research and forms a unique and original 
concept. The framework emanates from the findings of both the qualitative and quantitative 
research including the literature and combines theory with practice. The uniqueness of this 
framework is on the results of the individual research objectives identified in chapter 1. These 
findings are discussed in this section as follows: 
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 Research Objective One – PPP Infrastructure Projects 
The PPP projects delivery and the surrounding issues form the basis of this research, which elicits 
secondary sources of data through literature sources to evaluate PPP and identify the inherent gap 
in knowledge. This objective seeks, through the literature: “to review PPP as a procurement 
method for the general delivery of public sector infrastructures including road projects."  
To foster efficiency and ensure VfM in the delivery of infrastructure projects, procuring 
authorities across the world are now adopting other procurement methods, such as PPP, for 
infrastructure projects delivery rather than the traditional procurement method; for example, the 
UK Government finance infrastructure projects, especially roads, in the model of PFI. 
Sustainability issues, a conflict between the private and public partners’ objectives, long periods 
of reaching a contractual agreement, the stability of agreements, stakeholders’ management, 
environmental constraints, along with political and economic changes including renegotiations 
are all challenges hindering the successful implementation of PPP (See section 2.10). Among 
these challenges, renegotiation stands out as impeding successful PPP implementation regarding 
VfM achieved for the stakeholders, particularly the procuring authority. This main deficiency and 
the resulting criticisms arising, as a result, reflect the lingering challenge to the attainment of VfM 
objectives for the public-sector client in infrastructure projects delivery, especially in the water 
and transport sectors of most countries.  
In the transport sector, the literature findings reveal that road projects account for the highest 
number of renegotiations with evidence of significant overrunning costs. Over the years the 
renegotiation of road projects has become very worrisome, due to the substantial financial 
implications of the investments for both the private investor and governments initiating the 
infrastructure projects. The high capital intensity attributed to road concession projects makes the 
implementation not only critical but necessary, especially during renegotiation, which has been 
found to erode the VfM objectives of the public sector in the road sector.  
Since the principal objective of a government during the initiation of a PPP project delivery is to 
ensure VfM for the public partner and satisfaction for the members of the public; it is necessary 
to address the VfM problem identified in PPP road projects, because of renegotiation, which has 
resulted in implementation issues and challenges. Although, the supporting literature indicates 
that the private concessionaire has, in most instances, achieved the VfM objective of maximum 
profits with money invested; there is still the need to develop modalities to address the problem 
of VfM achievement, especially for the public sector during the renegotiation of concession 
contracts.  
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This problem has been recognised as one of the most critical issues impeding successful VfM 
implementation, especially in water and transport sectors that are imperative and need expedient 
completion (Sarmento, 2014; Nikolaidis and Roumboutsos, 2013; Estache et al., 2009): this 
problem with PPP led to the second objective of the research. 
 Research Objective Two – Contract Renegotiation and Value for 
Money 
The second objective, as discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis seeks to "evaluate contract 
renegotiation and value for money criteria in the PPP environment, particularly in road 
projects." 
The chapter, through many reviews of the literature, discusses the concept of contract 
renegotiation and appraises renegotiation of PPP infrastructure projects regarding road projects. 
The research reveals that specific factors led to the renegotiation of PPP road projects. Some of 
the case studies respondents identify specific factors as the reasons why primary stakeholders 
renegotiate the concession road projects. These factors are found in the literature and grouped 
according to their respective stages of implementation. These phases range from the design and 
planning, technical, tendering and bidding, administrative and managerial and contractual stage 
amongst others. Renegotiation requests could be at the instance of the public client, private 
partner or both, depending on the situation and circumstances of the project. However, the 
operator or concessionaire initiates most renegotiations in road concession projects.  
Fourteen criteria of VfM from the PPP literature as being potentially impacted by renegotiation, 
as discussed in chapter 4 of the thesis (See section 4.6). The findings of the case studies and the 
questionnaire corroborate the findings of the literature, which state that renegotiations have an 
impact on the fourteen main VfM criteria in road concession projects (See section 4.7.1 and sub-
section 6.4.4). These impacts were identified to include the public-sector stakeholder's objectives 
regarding the VfM criteria of cost, duration, quality and performance and user's satisfaction. 
Renegotiation experiences discussed in the literature reveal that the outcomes of PPP 
renegotiation seem to be unfavourable to the public sector regarding VfM, including maximising 
the profit objective of the SPV. Chapter 4 critically reviews VfM in PPP environments, with 
specific reference to DBFO road project renegotiations in the UK. Consequently, this chapter 
highlights that VfM can be measured and assessed during the renegotiation stage through the 
criteria established in the contract, as outlined by the fourteen identified criteria of VfM. Thus, 
the findings based on objective 2 of chapter 1 establish that there exists a relationship between 
renegotiation and VfM in PPP infrastructure projects, including road projects (See section 1.4 of 
the thesis). 
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Having established that there exists a relationship between renegotiation and VfM, it is imperative 
that there is the need to conduct an extensive empirical study in the context of the UK PFI (DBFO) 
road projects. The reason for the conduct of the study is because of the observed gap in knowledge 
between renegotiation and VfM, as identified in the literature. Therefore, empirical data was 
collected in the UK PFI (DBFO) road projects to critically assess and evaluate renegotiations 
regarding the achievement of VfM for the public sector based on the fourteen criteria of VfM. 
The UK was chosen because of its long history of PPP adoption in the form of PFI for general 
infrastructure projects delivery including road projects and the few empirical studies that exist 
regarding PPP renegotiations, especially in road projects. Hence, chapters 2, 3 and 4 serves as the 
basis for the development of instruments for the empirical renegotiation studies in the UK. 
 Research Objective Three – Factors Leading to Renegotiation 
The third objective of the research and the first objective, which elicits empirical results to address 
the research objectives at the advanced stage of the research involves:  
"Investigating the incidence of renegotiations in PFI (DBFO) road projects to identify factors 
leading to renegotiation." 
The first aspect of the study during the data collection stage is to evaluate and assess the factors 
leading to the renegotiations of road concession projects. The renegotiations are occurring in the 
case studies, as identified by most of the respondents, are considered minor. Only CS2 
respondents (i.e., XY2 and XY3) discussed the occurrence of up to five instances of renegotiation, 
most of which have an impact on the contract. The renegotiations in this case study entail small 
improvements works. However, there is an instance of significant renegotiation. XY4 and XY8 
indicate minor variations and changes, rather than changes that can lead to amendments to the 
contract. Although the findings suggest that the contracts, in most instances, do not allow for 
renegotiation of the contract; most of the case studies agreed on minor renegotiations and changes 
that are on some factors. An evaluation of the responses provided by the respondents regarding 
this objective indicates that there is an agreement regarding the factors leading to the renegotiation 
of road concessions. The highly critical factors and critical factors leading to renegotiations, from 
the results of the qualitative interviews and questionnaire survey responses, focuses on technical, 
contractual and environmental related factors (See section 7.4). Some of the factors in these 
categories are as shown in Table 9.1. 
 
 
 
                                                                                  Chapter 9 Conclusion and Recommendations 
279 
 
 
Table 9.1: Interviews and Questionnaires Results on Renegotiation Leading Factors 
S/N Qualitative Interview Survey  Quantitative Interview Survey  
 Factors Identified Rank  Critical Factors Identified Rank 
1 Changes in standards of works 1 Change in the standards of works during the technical 
development                 
1 
2 Changes in specifications 2 Specification changes [e.g. change in the standard of 
technical skills, change in the type of technology etc.] 
2 
3 Addition of road assets 2 Change in the scope of works during the technical 
development of project 
2 
4 Change in scope of works 4 Additional works during construction [e.g. requirement 
for extension or widening of the road network] 
4 
5 Response to provisions of the original 
contract 
4 Additional works during operation & maintenance [e.g. 
removal and replacement of assets etc.] 
5 
6 Need to ensure a safer road for 
travelling public 
6 Changes in infrastructure design, layout and programme 
during project execution 
5 
7 Changes in technology 6 Environmental impacts 6 
 
Based on Table 9.1 above, the following deductions towards ascertaining the factors that can lead 
to renegotiation and the factors fostering the achievement of VfM at renegotiation: 
1. Technical and contractual related factors are all associated with the construction and 
contract formation phase of the PFI (DBFO) road project implementation. 
2. Renegotiations of road concession projects in the UK mostly occur during the 
implementation stage, especially during the construction, operation and maintenance 
stage (See Table 7.4).  
3. The factors leading to renegotiation are the reasons necessitating renegotiation. However, 
there can be factors that are not very critical or essential to the stakeholder(s) initiating 
renegotiation. 
4. The highly crucial factors are the principal reasons that necessitate renegotiations in the 
road concession projects. The findings, based on the extremely critical factors leading to 
renegotiations, reveal that there is a substantial achievement of the VfM objectives of 
both the public and private sector representatives. These suggests that renegotiations 
should be in a situation where one or more of these factors inform the primary 
stakeholder’s renegotiation request. The reason for this suggestion is the possibility of 
achieving VfM based upon the very critical renegotiation leading factors. 
5. The stakeholders should be wary to request renegotiation based on non-critical factors, 
this includes opportunistic bidding by the private concessionaire, bidding errors during 
procurement at the tendering and bidding stage and inadequate transparency in the 
discharge of managerial duties. These factors should not lead to renegotiation because of 
the tendency not to achieve VfM for the public sector.  
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Thus, the non-critical factors should be considered undesirable by the public sector 
procuring authority and should be avoided when discussing the available options towards 
reaching a renegotiation decision. 
The five deductions outlined are from the findings of objective 3 and enumerate the essential 
elements that foster the understanding of the factors that can lead to the achievement of VfM at 
renegotiation. Some factors have the potential to drive the success of the public client regarding 
VfM during renegotiation. However, some factors do not encourage VfM success in PFI (DBFO) 
road projects. 
 Research Objective Four – Impacts of the Renegotiation 
The fourth objective is "to ascertain the impacts of the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects 
on the VfM criteria." 
Regarding this objective in the context of UK PFI (DBFO) road projects, the study provides an 
avenue to evaluate and assess renegotiation from the perspectives of the VfM criteria of time, 
costs, quality and users or taxpayer's satisfaction. The literature provides comprehensive 
information on these VfM criteria (See section 4.6). Thus, the impacts of renegotiation can be 
assessed based on these criteria established in the literature for VfM evaluation. The case studies 
findings show that the primary effects of the renegotiation are around construction cost, and 
concession duration, in their respective order of significance (See subsection 6.4.4). The cost of 
construction is measured based on performance as indicated in CS1. Hence, the price is a good 
indicator used in the measurement of the performance of a concession project and VfM. Similarly, 
the questionnaire findings show that the impacts of the renegotiation, according to their 
decreasing order of importance, are construction cost, project finance cost, operation and 
maintenance costs, user's satisfaction, private sector management expertise and skills, whole life 
cycle cost (WLCC), construction duration and cost of risk transferred. These impacts reveal that 
cost is mostly affected by renegotiation and suggest that cost is the primary criteria for measuring 
or evaluating the achievement of VfM in road concession projects. 
Furthermore, the findings of the case studies and questionnaire vividly reveal that cost is the VfM 
criterion affected by renegotiation to a higher degree than other VfM standards. These suggest 
that costs criteria are a strong determinant and indicator of VfM achievement in PFI (DBFO) road 
projects. Several significant facts and deductions emerge from the findings relating to the impacts 
of renegotiation on road concession projects, these are:  
1. The paramount measure of VfM for the stakeholders’ centres on cost and covers 
construction cost, project finance cost; O&M cost, whole life cycle cost and the cost of 
risk. Stakeholders, therefore, mostly seeks to assess the impact of renegotiation on these 
criteria. 
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2.    The amount of money expended by the client on the road concessions regarding payment 
through the payment mechanism is a strong determinant and indicator of whether VfM is achieved 
or not. 
3.    The construction duration is also a significant measure of VfM for the public sector, which 
may be impacted by any changes and additional works introduced at the technical stage of project 
implementation. 
 Research Objective Five– Outcomes of the Renegotiation 
The fifth objective of this research study seeks “to evaluate and assess the outcomes of the 
renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects.”  
An evaluation of the case studies and the questionnaire reveal the principal outcomes of the 
renegotiation, which can also be the implication of the renegotiation. The results obtained for 
each of the criteria used to assess VfM is distinct from the nature of the impacts, i.e., positivity, 
negativity and neutrality of the renegotiation factors. Hence, the outcomes identified by the 
respective interviews and questionnaire respondents are in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2: Interviews and Questionnaires Results on the Outcomes of the Renegotiation 
S/N Qualitative Interview Survey Quantitative Interview Survey  
 Outcomes Identified Rank  Critical Outcomes Identified Rank 
1 Contract cost remain the same 1 Increase & Neutral Users Satisfaction 1 
2 Completion within contract duration 2 Quality and Performance 2 
3 Quality and performance achieved 3 Construction Duration 3 
4 Cost savings occasioned by assets removal 4 Project Finance Cost 3 
5 Neutral (same) profit by concessionaire 4 Operation & Maintenance Cost 5 
6 Timely completion of construction and on 
schedule 
4 Cost of Risk Transferred 6 
7 Good service delivery brings users 
complement 
7 Construction Cost 7 
8 Few complaints from users and members of 
the public 
7 Concession duration 8 
9 Increase in contract cost due to addition of 
assets 
9 Whole Life Cost 9 
10 Decrease in contract cost due to inclusion of 
new standards 
9 Profitability of the road concession to the SPV 10 
 
The results of the data collected reveal that contract cost and construction duration of the 
concession contract remain the same concerning other VfM criteria. However, there is evidence 
of the achievement of VfM regarding an increase in user's satisfaction and the quality and 
performance of the concession. The cases studies reveal that there is the completion of the projects 
within the contract duration, as shown in the 10th ranked outcome. Besides, the prominent result 
of the renegotiation, according to the findings of the questionnaire, is user's satisfaction; while 
the least listed result is the profitability of the road concession to the SPV. These questionnaire 
findings, which summarises the findings of the empirical data, indicate that there is evidence of 
VfM achievement for the public sector.  
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Though, the SPV achieve the VfM objectives; there is no evidence of unjustifiable benefits from 
the renegotiation, which detrimentally affect the public sector. Hence, the findings suggest that 
the renegotiation of the road concessions has not increased the profitability of the road PFI's in 
favour of the SPV.  
These findings conclude that renegotiation does not necessarily have to benefit the concessionaire 
to the detriment of the public sector and the users as outlined in the literature (Sarmento, 2014; 
Baeza and Vassallo, 2010; Acerete et al., 2010). Furthermore, the outcomes of the road 
concession renegotiations as indicated in Table 9.2 suggest that renegotiation can be beneficial to 
the public sector and all the renegotiating parties regarding the achievement of VfM. Indeed, there 
can be the delivery of the respective VfM objectives outlined by the parties at inception, especially 
the VfM aim of the procuring agency, which is around satisfaction for the users and members of 
the public. These unique findings constitute one of the primary results of this study and are the 
foundations for the philosophy of this research. 
 The Developed and Validated Framework for VfM Renegotiation 
This objective is the sixth and last objective of the research, which is "to develop and validate a 
value for money renegotiation framework for the PFI (DBFO) road projects." 
The findings of the empirical objectives 3, 4 and 5 indicate that it is necessary and practicable to 
develop a framework, which will assist and aid VfM achievement in future renegotiations in PPP 
road projects. The findings from the VfM renegotiation framework developed are presented in 
logical sequence as shown in Figure 8.1, Table 8.2, Table 8.3, Table 8.4 Table 8.5 and Table 8.6 
respectively, to demonstrate its applicability for adoption in road concessions. The framework 
developed has succeeded in establishing the principles of assessing renegotiations for VfM 
impacts. Other evaluation principles reflect modalities for the identification and assessment of 
the renegotiation leading factors, the outcomes of the renegotiation and the remedial actions that 
can be taken to address the result of the renegotiation, which could link to one another. These 
findings suggest that renegotiation factors, renegotiation impacts, and the renegotiation results 
are all essential in the evaluation of renegotiation for VfM achievement. 
Remedial actions identified in the framework can serve to correct any observed deviations from 
the VfM objectives of both the public-sector client and the concessionaire towards achieving VfM 
in the project. Moreover, the stakeholders may take appropriate measures, from the list identified, 
to forestall non-achievement of VfM during the implementation of PPP road projects (See 
subsection 7.7 and subsection 8.3.1). The proposals could be agreed upon and incorporated into 
the contract agreement during the design and planning stage or at the inception of the contract.  
 
                                                                                  Chapter 9 Conclusion and Recommendations 
283 
 
 
The VfM renegotiation framework has, therefore, succeed in developing modalities for assessing 
and checking renegotiation before renegotiation and during renegotiation, to ensure that VfM is 
achieved for the stakeholders, as clearly identified Figure 8.1. 
The initial framework developed was refined at the validation stage to incorporate into Section A 
the contract mechanisms for payment to either to the SPV or public client as necessary. The reason 
for the incorporation of these mechanisms is on the understanding that these mechanisms are 
usually defined by the client at the inception to ensure that there is the achievement of user's 
satisfaction on the road network. Also, the validation findings suggest that there is need to include 
the fundamental contract mechanisms that assure road users safety, lane availability, journey time 
reliability amongst others, which are usually factored into the contract by the client depending on 
the DBFO contract. Hence, the framework was refined and amended appropriately to reflect the 
need for both the public and private partners to establish and agree on the contract mechanisms 
that foster the achievement of VfM for users. 
The VfM renegotiation framework, therefore, emerges through suggestions from experienced 
professionals, practitioners and prominent academics in the construction industry. The principles 
set out in the framework, if rigorously adopted, will enhance and ensure the achievement of VfM 
at the renegotiation of PPP road projects. 
 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
There is the possibility of estimating of the success of renegotiation in PPP infrastructure projects, 
especially in road projects regarding the VfM achieved for the procuring entity and commensurate 
revenue generated by the concessionaire. The experience of renegotiation in other countries in 
Latin America including Portugal and Spain give credence that there are pieces of evidence of 
non-achievement of VfM for the public sector due to the impacts of renegotiation on several VfM 
criteria, particularly the cost criteria. Hence, there is the maximisation of profits by the 
concessionaire in PPP road projects in these countries, which hinders the achievement of VfM 
for the public sector procuring authority and consequently the users. The current school of thought 
in PPP infrastructure project procurements is the need to ensure that the subsisting challenge of 
achieving VfM for the procuring authority is resolved and addressed. The research has 
substantially addressed this current problem through the development of a VfM renegotiation 
framework that will guide the primary stakeholders to make informed decisions at the design and 
planning stage, construction stage, and operation and maintenance stage amongst other stages of 
PPP to deliver road projects that achieve VfM for the public sector. 
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During the development of the framework, the research evaluated road concessions by identifying 
and assessing the factors leading to renegotiation, the impacts of the renegotiation on VfM 
criteria’s, outcomes of the renegotiation and measures to ensure the achievement of VfM for the 
public sector. The reason for this evaluation is to ensure that the renegotiation of PPP road projects 
achieve VfM for the public sector and enhance commensurate profits for the concessionaire 
without compromising quality, concession performance and stakeholder’s satisfaction, amongst 
other VfM criteria. Solutions to address each of the research objectives, which fill the knowledge 
gaps in the literature. The solutions entail practical measures as well as remedial actions at the 
renegotiation stage of PPP road projects. Moreover, the case studies identify payment 
mechanisms that are used to ensure the achievement of VfM for the client and SPV. The findings 
of this study as reflected in the provisions of the developed framework for the evaluation of PPP 
road project renegotiation addresses the knowledge gap and research questions generated from 
the literature. 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The scope of the research is on PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK. However, the conclusions 
emanating from the research objectives, as discussed in this chapter, are significant and robust 
enough for global PPP road project renegotiations to ensure the achievement of VfM for the 
stakeholders, especially the public client. The reason for this is that PFI is a form of PPP used in 
the UK as a model for delivering road projects. Although the study investigated PFI (DBFO) road 
projects in the UK, the VfM renegotiation framework developed applies to PPP road projects 
procured through any of the available models where the public and private partners are the first 
renegotiation stakeholders. Hence, this study is limited to PPP road project renegotiations 
regarding its implications on VfM. In addition to this primary limitation, other notable limitations 
include: 
✓ The inputs of only public and private sector stakeholders involved in PFI (DBFO) road 
projects in the UK based on the understanding that renegotiations of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects are only within the purview of these stakeholders. Hence, there is a lack of the 
entire stakeholders involved in PFI DBFO road projects due to the sensitivity and 
peculiarities of the subject and research questions. 
✓ The responses received are low because of the limited number of questionnaires 
administered on the targeted respondents. 
✓ The geographical coverage of the research is limited to public and private sector 
stakeholders on PFI (DBFO) road projects in England, Scotland and Wales. Stakeholders 
of PFI (DBFO) road projects in Northern Ireland declined participation in the study due  
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to their busy schedule and workload. Hence, the study is limited to PFI road projects 
where the public and private sector stakeholders freely consent and indicates availability 
to participate in the study. 
 RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The overall success of any PPP road project should be viewed regarding the achievement of VfM 
for the users and taxpayers and should be the corporate objective of all the stakeholders at 
renegotiation. VfM objectives of the individual stakeholders should contribute to the collective 
aspirations of VfM achievement for the users of the road and more critical than the specific 
intentions of the renegotiating parties (i.e., the procuring authorities and the concessionaire). The 
achievement of individual VfM goals should not be detrimental to the collective objective of VfM 
achievement for the users and members of the public, which is the primary objective of the 
procuring authority. The VfM renegotiation framework can realise the performance of the 
primary goal for both the representatives of the public client and the private sector partners 
involved in the renegotiation process of PPP road projects. Irrespective of the criteria of the 
contract and the objectives of the renegotiating parties regarding VfM defined for 
implementation, the parties involved in the renegotiation must be determined to use the principles 
of the framework and cooperate as a team by creating a cordial and good working relationship to 
achieve VfM for all the stakeholders, especially the users. In addition to teamwork, synergy and 
warm relationships, stakeholders and future researchers of PPP road projects renegotiation will 
find the following recommendation and suggestions useful. 
 Recommendations for the Stakeholders 
The public and private partners can achieve their respective VfM objectives, especially 
satisfaction to the users using the principles outlined in the sections of the proposed VfM 
renegotiation framework. There is the need for the public and private partners who will be the 
primary beneficiary to be proactively involved in the use of the framework from contract 
inception to handing over of the project residual value. The proactiveness of the stakeholders will 
ensure the achievement of optimum renegotiation result for all parties. 
There is also the need for the client to ensure that there is flexibility incorporated into the 
agreement from contract inception regarding the contract mechanisms for payment as identified 
in the framework to allow either party to introduce proposals that can enhance the achievement 
of VfM at renegotiation or change negotiation. 
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 Suggestions for Future Research 
Despite the numerous remedial actions and measures identified in the framework, this study was 
considered critical towards its purpose of ensuring the achievement of VfM at the renegotiation 
of road concession projects, and there are still opportunities for research in many areas of PPP 
renegotiations. Further research suggestions in the following areas are:   
✓ The evaluation and assessment of other projects, especially in the transport and water 
sectors where high incidences of renegotiations have occurred would be a good area 
requiring investigation. 
✓ Many highly critical and critical factors leading to renegotiations are in this study. 
However, more studies that are empirical in other PPP infrastructure projects are needed 
to substantiate the findings of this study, and the conclusion that the extremely critical 
and critical factors are the desirable factors leading to VfM renegotiations and the non-
critical ones are the driving factors of non-achievement of VfM at renegotiations. 
✓ There is the need for studies in other areas of road concession projects, such as the role 
of stakeholders especially financiers, equity companies', sponsors and financial service 
providers at renegotiation. Other future research should aim to uncover the exact 
renegotiation timings and level of involvement of all the stakeholders at renegotiation. 
✓ The data collected in this research has succeeded in gathering relevant information 
regarding road concession renegotiations in UK PFI (DBFO) road projects for significant 
and robust application to PPP road projects. However, other countries efficiency and 
effectiveness in PPP road project renegotiations should be evaluated and objectively 
compared with the UK experience. These would ascertain the reliability of the framework 
developed and enhanced the validity of the feedback received from the stakeholders and 
the validation report. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 CASE STUDY INTERVIEWS COVERING LETTER 
        
 
21st January 2016. 
 
Dear Participant, 
Full Case studies Research: Integrated Value for Money Renegotiation for Public Private 
Partnership Road Projects 
(A)    Why have I been asked to take part in the study? 
This letter is to formally invite you to take part in the research study towards the award of Ph.D. at the 
University of Central Lancashire. The reason for seeking your audience is by your position as an 
acknowledge stakeholder of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) road projects in the UK. 
(B)    What is the aim of the study? 
The study aims to develop and validate a value for money (VfM) framework for renegotiation of PPP road 
projects. This will involve the evaluation and assessment of the impacts and implications of renegotiation 
on the value for money objectives of PPP road prod projects.  
The pilot study will be carried out to achieve the following objectives: 
• To investigate the incidence(s) of renegotiations in PPP road projects  
• To identify factors leading to renegotiation of PPP (DBFO) road projects 
• To assess implications of achievement of VfM because of renegotiation in PPP road projects 
• To evaluate and assess the impact of renegotiation of PPP road projects on VfM 
• To validate by expert interview VfM framework for renegotiation of PPP road projects 
(C)    What is the study timeline or programme? 
The full case studies are expected to run for a maximum period of twelve (12) weeks for data collection on 
each of the identified objectives.  
(D)    Why have I been asked to participate and who are my co-participants? 
You have been asked to participate because of your involvement in UK PPP road projects. Public agencies, 
private concessionaires and equity holders of DBFO road projects are your co-participants. 
(E)    Do I have to take part in the study? 
We will appreciate your decision to take part in this study. Participation is voluntary, and you are free to 
withdraw from the study at any time before the processing and analysis of the data that will be collected. If 
you decide to take part in the survey, you will be given all the relevant information for necessary action.  
(F)    What will happen to me if I take part? 
The study will involve the collection of data from you concerning the identified objectives through an 
interview, which will be digitally recorded following the receipts of your consent, or hand-written notes 
will be recorded.  
(G)    What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
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The study will provide appropriate renegotiation strategy, which will assist PPP road projects stakeholders 
in achieving their respective value for money objectives at the point of renegotiation. Headline results of 
the research findings are also available on request. 
(H)    What are the possible risks of taking part? 
There are no known risks in the execution or involvement of participants in the study. The data collection 
will take place in the UK and within the work environment of all the participants and will not involve 
projects site visit.  
(I)    Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
There will be confidentiality and strict privacy of data collected from the study. Personal data will not be 
used in the study and respondent details will be anonymised and unpublished. Also, I undertake and assure 
to the effect that all participants’ information will be coded in such a way that the participants are not 
identifiable from any comments that will appear in my Ph.D. thesis. 
(J)    What should I do if I want to take part? 
Please complete the attached consent form and return by e-mail or any other convenient mode. 
(K)    What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be reported in the Ph.D. thesis at the University of Central Lancashire, and a 
substantial part of the thesis will be published in conference and journal proceedings. 
(L)    Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am a self-funded Ph.D. student at the University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK.  
(M)    Who has reviewed the study? 
The supervisory team has reviewed the research, and the study has been approved by the University of 
Central Lancashire ethics committee. However, should you have any concerns requiring ethical 
clarification or have concerns in the future about the way the study has been conducted, please contact the 
University Officer for Ethics (email address - (OfficerforEthics@uclan.ac.uk).  
(N)    Any contact for further information. 
However, for any other queries, please contact any member of the supervisory team stated below: 
1.    Prof. Akin Akintoye (aakintoye@uclan.ac.uk) - Director of Ph.D. Studies 
2.    Dr Champika Liyanage (clliyanage@uclan.ac.uk) -2nd Supervisor 
 
 
Thank you for taking time to read the information sheet and many thanks in advance for freely consenting 
to participate in the study. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
Ajibola Fatokun (aofatokun@uclan.ac.uk)   
Postgraduate Research Student, 
University of Central Lancashire, 
Preston,  
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APPENDIX 2 CASE STUDIES GUIDE QUESTIONS 
PREAMBLE 
Purpose of the Interview 
The purpose of the interview is to probe the following: 
1. The implications of the achievement of VfM because of renegotiation in PPP road projects. 
2. To identify solutions to problems of VfM achievement during the renegotiation of PPP (DBFO) 
road projects. 
Target respondents 
Public sector stakeholders 
Private sector stakeholders 
INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS 
A.    Respondent’s Details: 
1. Can I have your position on the project, please? 
2. What sector are you, please? 
3. What is your academic/professional background, please? 
4. What is the location of this project?  
5. Do you have an idea of the estimated cost of the project? 
6. What is the current stage of the project? 
7. How many years has the project been on and what is the contract duration? 
B.    Assessment of the Implications of the Achievement of Value for Money (VfM) As a 
Result of Renegotiation in Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Road Projects 
8. What aspect of this project undergo renegotiation, please? 
9. At what point in the life of the project does this renegotiation occur? 
10. Why do you renegotiate this contract? 
11. Who makes the renegotiation request in this project instance? 
12. What are the results of the renegotiation, i.e., the outcomes of the renegotiation? For 
example, renegotiation result regarding cost, concession duration, quality, 
concessionaire’s profits, risks, revenue generated including stakeholder’s satisfaction etc. 
13. Is there any difference between the VfM achieved at the point of renegotiation and the 
VfM defined for implementation? 
14. Is there any evidence of achievement of VfM for your organisation on this project? 
15. How would you describe stakeholders (i.e. public sector, SPV and users) satisfaction 
regarding VfM achieved on this project? 
C.    Assessment of guidelines and measures to ensure the achievement of value for money 
at renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) Road Projects 
16. How do you define strategic VfM targets in PPP road project concession phases? Are 
there any targets set for VfM at the inception of the contract? 
17. What are the VfM targets that are usually defined and documented in PFI (DBFO) road 
projects? 
18. What are the primary procedures you take in measuring the success regarding VfM 
achievement? 
19. Do you think it is necessary to define criteria for renegotiation at the inception of PPP 
contract? 
20. What are the guidelines adopted for assessing PFI road projects renegotiation regarding 
VfM achievement? 
             Appendices 
324 
 
 
21. Has the guideline helped in achieving VfM or otherwise on this project? 
22. Please describe the criteria and modalities for the identification, measurement and 
recording of the VfM achieved at strategic renegotiation points during the PFI road 
projects renegotiation? 
23. What method or technique do you adopt in the evaluation or calculation of VfM variance 
occasioned by PPP road project renegotiation? 
24. What do you think could be the strategic actions that can be taken to address deviations 
from the VfM targets defined at inception and the VfM achieved at the end of the 
renegotiation process? 
25. Any other recommendation for achieving VfM at the point of renegotiation in PFI road 
projects, please? 
26. In terms of this project, so far, can you say the changes made have not affected the 
contract cost? 
27. In the next few years do you see any difference or changes in the contract cost and does 
the contract makes provision for that. 
28. When do you propose to complete this project? 
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APPENDIX 3 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
                                                                                                                                        
College of Science and Technology 
School of Engineering 
Preston 
PR1 2HE, U.K. 
 
Dear Respondent, 
I am currently a Ph.D. student at the University of Central Lancashire. To complete my doctoral 
studies, I have chosen “Integration of Value for Money into the Renegotiation of Private Finance 
Initiative (Design-Build-Finance-Operate) Road Projects in the U.K.” as my research topic. 
Renegotiation of road projects has been an important issue that has generated concerns in Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) projects over the last decades. The outcomes of the PPP road projects 
renegotiation instances have in most instances resulted in non-achievement of VfM for the public 
sector. Therefore, this doctoral research intends to contribute to knowledge through the inclusion 
of value for money considerations into the renegotiation of PPP road contracts.  
If you could please spare some of your time to respond to these questions, I will much appreciate 
it. To assist you in completing the questionnaire, you may find the following key definitions 
helpful:  
 
▪ Renegotiation is regarded as an incidence which necessitates the revision or amendment 
of the original contract (e.g. expected or unexpected change in project scope which may 
result in rebalancing the financial agreement) 
▪ Value for money implies achieving excellent and satisfactory product or service costs 
and quality (or fitness for purpose) within the whole life of the contract (contract 
duration) to meet the requirements of members of the public.  
 
Your responses will be in confidence, and respondents’ information will be anonymised and used 
for this study and quotes in publications.  
Thank you for taking your time to complete the survey. 
Ajibola Fatokun 
Doctoral Researcher 
E-mail: aofatokun@uclan.ac.uk 
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PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE (PFI) DESIGN-BUILD-FINANCE- OPERATE 
(DBFO) ROAD PROJECTS RENEGOTIATION STUDIES QUESTIONNAIRE 
Note: Most PPP road projects in the UK are procured in the form of PFI on DBFO basis. 
Based on this, please reflect on a U.K. PFI (DBFO) road project that you have been involved 
as a stakeholder and provide your responses by ticking the appropriate box in each section. 
Section A: Respondent’s Information 
 
1. What PPP stakeholder do you represent?  
[   ] Public Agency/Client Representative  [    ] Public Company Contracting               
[    ] Private Company Consulting              [    ] Private Company Contracting & Consulting 
[    ] Financier/Lender                                     [    ] Other (please specify) _________________ 
2. How many employees are in your organisation? 
[   ] Less than 10    [    ] Between 10 -50  [   ] Between 50-500 [     ] 500+ 
 
3. What is your current position?   
[   ] Managing Director/CEO            [    ] General Manager        [     ] Project Manager        
[   ] Contract Performance Manager [    ] Engineer                      [     ] Fund Manager 
[   ] Financier Representative            [    ] Quantity Surveyor 
[   ] Purchasing Manager                   [    ] Others (please specify) __________________ 
 
4. How many years of PFI (DBFO) road projects experience do you have in the 
construction industry?   
[     ]0-5      [      ]5-10      [     ]10-15      [     ]15-20        [      ]20+ 
 
Section B: Project Specific Renegotiation Characteristics 
Please provide information with regards to characteristics of the renegotiation experienced on 
the PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation you have been involved in the UK 
5. Renegotiation is an incidence, which necessitate the revision or amendment of the 
original contract. Based on the characteristics of ‘renegotiation’, can you think of a 
renegotiated PFI (DBFO) project that you were involved in? Yes [    ]              No [     ] 
 
6. If yes, what is the project (please specify, e.g. A19 Dishforth Road): 
……………………… 
7. If the answer is No, please submit the questionnaire.  
 
8. Regarding the project you mentioned in question (2) above, what kind of renegotiation 
did the project go through? Please tick all that apply.  
• 8_1. Unexpected incidence which necessitate the revision or amendment [    ]    
• 8_2. Expected changes which necessitate the amendment of the original contract [     ]    
• 8_3. Renegotiation, which occurs during the period of implementation of the contract as 
stated by a contractual clause. [     ]  
• 8_4. Renegotiation, which takes place at the expiration of the contract when the parties 
are free from all contractual obligations [     ]  
• 8_5. Renegotiation, which was undertaken in apparent violation of the contract or in the 
absence of a specific clause authorizing a renegotiation. [     ]  
• 8_6. Any others (please specify) 
…………………………………………………………………… 
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Section C: Factors Leading to PFI (DBFO) Road Projects Renegotiation 
9. It has been established that several factors lead to PFI (DBFO) road projects 
renegotiation. To what extent do you agree that the following factors might lead to PFI 
(DBFO) road projects renegotiation? 
Strongly Agree (5)      Agree (4)Indifferent (3)Disagree (2)Strongly Disagree (1) 
Factors leading to Renegotiation 5 4 3 2 1 
 
Additional Works 
9_1. During construction [e.g. requirement for extension or 
widening of the road network] 
     
9_2. During operation & maintenance [e.g. removal and 
replacement of assets (i.e. CCTV, speed camera, etc.)] 
     
 
Design Factors 
9_3. Inaccurate estimation of the traffic level      
9_ 4Inaccurate or defective project specification      
9_5. Inaccurate estimation of capital cost      
9_6. Poorly written contract [e.g. ambiguity of terms and contract 
details] 
     
 
Tendering and Bidding Factors      
9_7. Inadequate feasibility studies and other ex-ante pre-tendering 
analysis 
     
9_8. Erroneous change in the basis for tender        
9_9 Change in pricing and service      
9_10. Bidding error during procurement e.g. poor evaluation of 
inflated or aggressive bid 
     
9_11. Opportunistic bidding [e.g. bid submission with the intent 
to increase prices at renegotiation] 
     
 
Technical Factors 
9_12. Change in the scope of works during the technical 
development of project 
     
9_13. Change in the standards of works during the technical 
development of project 
     
9_14. Specification changes [e.g. change in the standard of 
technical skills, change in the type of technology such as IT 
specifications, changes in road network components and 
materials, etc.] 
     
9_15. Changes in infrastructure design, layout and programme 
during project execution 
     
 
Economic Factors 
9_16. Changes in economic policy by government [e.g. high or 
incremental changes to corporate tax and levies, currency 
devaluation etc.] 
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9_17. Changes in general price level and transaction cost due to 
inflation [external macroeconomic shock i.e. materials, 
workmanship, toll charges etc.] 
     
 
 
 Factors leading to Renegotiation(continued) 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
Contractual Factors 
9_18. Defective contract awards criteria or incorrect contractual 
assumptions 
     
9_19. Inadequate contract management expertise or knowledge      
9_20. Ineffectiveness and inefficiency of contract enforcement      
9_21. Time overruns for bidding and contract negotiation      
 
Administrative and Managerial Factors      
9_22. Managerial initiative and action to keep up with current 
contract standards 
     
9_23. Management incompetency [e.g. administrative delays 
during project execution] 
     
9_24. Inadequate transparency in the discharge of managerial 
duties, etc. 
     
 
Regulatory or Legal Factors 
9_25. Ineffective governance and regulation of the renegotiation 
process necessitating specific statutory changes to the contract 
     
9_26. Weak legal environment [i.e. in terms of litigation 
effectiveness] 
     
 
Political Factors      
9_27. Political instability occasioned by change in government or 
change in government priorities, awarding contract shortly before 
or after elections, overriding interest of major political 
constituency, etc.] 
     
9_28. Political instability evidenced in contract award shortly 
before or after elections 
     
9_29. The need to respect and adopt the overriding interest of 
major political constituency in the parliament 
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9_30. Corruption at governance level evidenced in 
misappropriation of funds. 
     
9_31. Corruption at governance level e.g. awarding contract 
because of the nationality or affiliation of the concessionaire 
     
 
Environmental Factors      
9_32. Environmental impacts      
9_33. Archaeological constraints      
 
Social Factors      
9_34. Social acceptability of user charges by the members of the 
public 
     
9_35. Corporate social responsibility considerations.      
9_36. Opposition to continuation of the project by the members 
of the public  
     
 
Other      
9_37. Mismatch between the public and private partners 
objectives [e.g. in terms of profit sharing] 
     
Others (please specify) ________________________________      
Other (please specify) ________________________________      
 
Section D: Impacts of the Renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) Road Projects on Value for Money 
(VfM) Criteria 
1. PFI (DBFO) road projects renegotiation has been found to impact value for money 
criteria defined into the contract. To what extent do you agree that PFI (DBFO) road 
project renegotiation impact the following value for money criteria defined into the 
contract. 
Strongly Agree (5)    Agree (4)       Indifferent (3)Disagree (2)Strongly Disagree (1) 
 
 Impacts of renegotiation on VfM Criteria 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
Cost Impacts:      
10_1. Construction cost      
10_2. Operation & Maintenance (O& M) costs      
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Section E: Assessment of the Outcome of the Renegotiation of the PFI (DBFO) Road 
Projects 
There are several outcomes of PPP road projects renegotiation. Please tick only one appropriate 
box ( ) to show the identified outcome of the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road project you have 
been involved.  
     11. Outcome with respect to Construction Cost 
[     ] Upward review of the cost of construction  
[     ] Downward review of the cost of construction  
[     ] No action required due to the cost neutrality condition included in the contract 
 
       12. Outcome with respect to Construction Duration 
[     ] Extension of the construction duration of the road concession  
[     ] Reduction of the construction duration of the road concession 
[     ] No action taken because of completion within the specified timescale 
 
       13. Outcome with respect to Operation and Maintenance Cost 
[     ] Upward review of the operation and maintenance costs  
[     ] Downward review of the operation and maintenance costs  
[] No action required due to the cost neutrality condition included in the contract 
        14. Outcome with respect to Project Finance Cost 
[     ] Upward review of the cost of project finance  
[     ] Downward review of the cost of project finance 
[     ] No action required due to the cost neutrality condition included in the contract. 
 
         15. Outcome with respect to Cost of Risk Transferred 
[     ] Upward review of the cost of risk associated with the project 
[     ] Downward review of the cost of risk associated with the project 
[      ] Neutral cost of risk included in the contract at the inception resulted to no difference 
in cost of risk 
10_3. Project finance cost      
10_4. Cost of risks transferred      
10_5. Whole life cost of the contract      
 
Other Impacts:       
10_6. Concessionaires profits      
10_7. Construction duration      
10_8. Concession duration      
10_9. Quality of service delivery      
10_10. Users satisfaction      
10_11. Innovation of bidders in the use of output specification      
10_12. Competition that provides fair value of the project      
10_13. Performance based payment mechanism      
10_14. Private sector management expertise and skills      
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         16. Outcome with respect to User Satisfaction  
[   ] Increase in user satisfaction[   ] Neutral in user satisfaction 
[   ] Decrease in user satisfaction 
 
        17. Profitability of the Road Concession to the SPV 
[   ] Increase in the profit of the SPV [    ] Neutral profit earned by the SPV  
[   ] Reduction in the profit of the SPV 
 
       18. Government Payment to the SPV 
[ ] Government direct financial compensation to the SPV (e.g. direct financial 
reimbursement) 
[   ] Government subsidies to the SPV 
[   ] Bonus points issued to the SPV as a penalty 
[   ] Redefining of the investment plans by the SPV 
[   ] Financial rescue of the project by government 
[   ] Upward adjustments on the annual fee paid by the operator to the government 
[   ] No adjustments in the annual fee paid by the operator to the government 
[   ] Downward adjustments on the annual fee paid by the operator to the government 
 
      19. Quality and Performance  
[   ] Increased quality and performance standards of outputs 
[   ] Neutral quality and performance standards of outputs 
[   ] Decreased quality and performance standards of outputs 
 
      20. Whole Life Cost 
[   ] Increased whole life cost of the concession contract    
[   ] Neutral whole life cost of the concession contract  
[   ] Decreased whole life cost of the concession contract 
 
      21. Concession Duration 
[   ] Extension of the concession duration of the road concession  
[   ] Reduction of the concession duration of the road concession 
[   ] No action taken because of completion of the concession contract within the defined 
time 
 
       22.  Innovation through the Use of Output Specification 
             [   ] Enhances innovation of bidders as a result of use of output specification   
[  ] Use of output specification does not foster innovation or makes any significant 
difference 
[   ] Reduction of the concession duration of the road concession 
[   ] No evidence of the adoption of output specification and consequently no record of 
innovation. 
 
         23.  Fair Value of the Project Due to Competition 
[    ] Competition among bidders affords the attainment of a fair value for the public sector 
on the project 
[   ] Competition among bidders does not result into a fair value for the public sector on 
the project 
[    ] No competition on the project at renegotiation or variation results in the achievement 
of a fair value for the public sector 
[    ] No competition on the project at renegotiation or variation results in no evidence of 
the achievement of a fair value for the public sector on the project 
 
         24. Performance Based Payment Mechanism 
[   ] Payment is made based on the performance of the output and ensures value for money 
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[  ] Payment based on performance measurement makes no difference in the value for 
money achieved for the public sector on the project 
[   ] No performance based payment mechanism in place on the project prevents 
evaluation of value for money achieved  
 
       25. Private Sector Management Expertise and Skills 
[   ] Evidence of improvement in the management expertise and skills of the private sector 
[   ] Management expertise and skills of the private sector remains neutral or the same 
[   ] No improvement in the management expertise and skills of the private sector 
 
      26. Other Outcomes 
[   ] Revised service delivery modalities 
[   ] Raises questions about the credibility of the renegotiation process to deliver value for 
money for the public sector 
 
       Section F: Value for Money (VfM) in PPP Road Project Renegotiation 
27. To what extent will the following measures be helpful to achieve value for money 
successfully in PPP road project renegotiations? 
          Strongly Agree (5)Agree (4)Indifferent (3)Disagree (2)Strongly Disagree (1) 
 
Measures to ensure VfM success 5 4 3 2 1 
 
Design and Planning Solution 
27_1. Define and establish a set of criteria and modalities for 
the identification, measurement and recording of the VfM 
achieved at strategic renegotiation points during the PFI road 
projects renegotiation 
     
27_2. Include in the contract agreement a contract award 
criteria which increase renegotiation request costs to the 
SPV’s and also make exit from the contract expensive 
     
27_3. Clearly state in the contract that renegotiation must be 
based on VfM 
     
27_4. Ensure accurate estimation of requirements [e.g. 
materials cost, traffic level, finance cost, cost of risks and 
capital costs, etc.] 
     
27_5. Define performance indicators at the contract 
formation stage to ensure that more focus is placed on the 
delivery of the project in reference to these indicators 
     
27_6. Develop a clear, concise and properly written contract 
[e.g. specification of standards  
of materials, components and workmanship] 
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27_7. Establish performance standards for SPVs at contract 
inception as a requirement for initiating renegotiation request 
payment 
     
27_8. Include a freeze period for renegotiations [e.g. 2-3 
years after contract award through the placement of embargo 
on materials & work standards, etc.] 
     
27_9. Establish contract review processes and requirements 
with the aim of affecting defined or allowable changes to the 
contract 
     
27_10. Include hand-back requirements by the public sector 
[i.e. salvage value/depreciation level allowed at delivery or 
handover] 
     
27_11. Include project plan reviews [e.g. every 3 years to 
monitor the performance of the project and particularly of 
VfM] 
     
27_12. Fix penalty points for non-performance with 
applicable limits to SPVs before contract takeover by the 
client 
     
27_13. Establish outright contract takeover by the client due 
to non-performance of the SPV’s 
     
27_14. Establish guidelines for levels of compensation 
applicable at strategic renegotiation points during project 
implementation 
     
27_15. Clarify key contractual clauses and key biding 
documents at contract inception 
     
27_16. Establish greater role of the PPP unit and regulatory 
agency 
     
27_17. Include a renegotiation clause in the contract 
agreement to foster financial equilibrium 
     
27_18. Establish a clear platform showing the process and 
procedure for renegotiation at the inception of the contract 
     
27_19. Stipulate the renegotiation approach, criteria and 
process prior to contract formation 
     
 
Tendering and Bidding Solution 
27_20. Define adequate and strict criteria for contract award 
to discourage opportunistic and aggressive bidding 
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27_21. Cancel PPP road concessions mainly characterised by 
aggressive and opportunistic bids 
     
27_22. Control aggressive bids by inclusion of larger 
performance bonds in the contract 
     
27_23. Establish in the contract the right to evaluate and 
reject aggressive and reckless bids including submission of 
financial models for those bids or additional 
guarantees/financial bonds 
     
27_24. Establish modalities for the submission of financial 
models required for evaluating aggressive bids or additional 
guarantees/financial bonds 
     
27_25. Request a mandatory bidding process for additional 
works or infrastructures including interest rate for PPP 
financing 
     
      
Technical Solution      
27_26. Develop an effective parameter or trust process 
during technical implementation that allows both parties to 
understand the impact of any renegotiation on the project 
objectives 
     
27_27. Outright contract takeover by the client due to non-
performance of the SPV’s 
     
27_28. Teamwork should be intensified throughout the 
management of the project 
     
27_29. Ensure a proactive, collaborative and analytical 
approach in the making and management of the contract to 
foster friendliness between and among the partners 
     
27_30. Establish the renegotiation reasons during the project 
implementation, to assist in ascertaining the impact of the 
influence factors or reasons on VfM 
     
27_31. Prepare for contingent financing over time and 
throughout the implementation process as a result of viability 
gap funding 
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Regulatory Solution 
27_32. Provide a statement in the PPP regulation 
establishing the inalterability of the contract risk matrix 
     
27_33. Establish clear jurisdiction at high level over 
decision to renegotiate the contract 
     
 
Administrative and Managerial Solution 
27_34. Ensure transparency of the renegotiation process      
27_35. Proper constitution of qualified and knowledgeable 
panel of expert to manage aggressive bids, renegotiation 
request and conflicts 
     
27_36. Establish a reputation of less or non-disposal to 
renegotiation 
     
 
Political Solution  
27_37. Implement a transparent framework through increase 
of political costs to accept renegotiation demands 
     
 
Risk Solution 
27_38. Ensure that the contract risk matrix includes detailed 
risks identification and allocation 
     
27_39. Establish in the contract that the modification of the 
contract, as a result of renegotiation, must not alter the VfM 
described or the risk allocation  
     
27_40. Establish that the modification of the contract must 
ensure zero net present value (NPV) and must preserve VfM 
defined at contract formation. 
     
27_41. Impose on the SPV’s appropriate level of 
performance bonds [e.g. between 10-25% of the total PFI 
road project investment] 
     
 
Economic Solution 
27_42. Provide allowance for extension of concession 
contract in austere and adverse economic situations 
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APPENDIX 4 DETAILED QUESTIONNAIRE DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
RESPONDENTS INFORMATION 
 
1. What PPP stakeholder do you represent? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 7 28.0 30.4 30.4 
2 2 8.0 8.7 39.1 
3 1 4.0 4.3 43.5 
4 13 52.0 56.5 100.0 
Total 23 92.0 100.0  
Missing System 2 8.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
2. How many employees are in your organisation? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 4 16.0 17.4 17.4 
2 3 12.0 13.0 30.4 
3 9 36.0 39.1 69.6 
4 7 28.0 30.4 100.0 
Total 23 92.0 100.0  
Missing System 2 8.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
 
3. What is your current position? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 1 4.0 4.5 4.5 
2 1 4.0 4.5 9.1 
3 9 36.0 40.9 50.0 
4 4 16.0 18.2 68.2 
5 4 16.0 18.2 86.4 
8 2 8.0 9.1 95.5 
10 1 4.0 4.5 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
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4. How many years of PFI (DBFO) road projects experience do you have in the construction 
industry? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 2 8.0 11.1 11.1 
0 5 20.0 27.8 38.9 
0 5 20.0 27.8 66.7 
0 6 24.0 33.3 100.0 
Total 18 72.0 100.0  
Missing System 7 28.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
RENEGOTIATION CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Q5 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 9 36.0 40.9 40.9 
1 13 52.0 59.1 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q6 
 Frequency Percent 
Missing System 13 100.0 
 
Q7 
 Frequency Percent 
Missing System 13 100.0 
 
Q8_1 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 4 30.8 30.8 30.8 
1 9 69.2 69.2 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 100.0  
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FACTORS LEADING TO RENEGOTIATION 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Mean 
9.13. Change in the standards of works during the technical development of project 22 4.14 
9.14. Specification changes [e.g. change in the standard of technical skills, change in the 
type of technology such as IT specifications, changes in road network components and 
materials, etc.] 
22 4.05 
9.12. Change in the scope of works during the technical development of project 22 4.05 
9.1. During construction [e.g. requirement for extension or widening of the road network 22 3.73 
9.2. During operation &amp; maintenance [e.g. removal and replacement of assets (i.e. 
CCTV, speed camera, etc.) 
22 3.68 
9.15. Changes in infrastructure design, layout and programme during project execution 22 3.68 
9.32. Environmental impacts 22 3.27 
9.22. Managerial initiative and action to keep up with current contract standards 22 2.95 
9.9. Change in pricing and service 21 2.95 
9.34. Social acceptability of user charges by the members of the public 22 2.73 
9.4. Inaccurate or defective project specification 22 2.73 
9.33. Archaeological constraints 21 2.71 
9.17. Changes in general price level and transaction cost due to inflation [external 
macroeconomic shock i.e. materials, workmanship, toll charges etc.] 
22 2.68 
9.36. Opposition to continuation of the project by the members of the public 22 2.59 
9.3. Inaccurate estimation of the traffic level 22 2.50 
9.6. Poorly written contract [e.g. ambiguity of terms and contract details] 22 2.45 
9.21. Time overruns for bidding and contract negotiation 22 2.41 
9.27. Political instability occasioned by change in government or change in government 
priorities, awarding contract shortly before or after elections, overriding interest of major 
political constituency, etc.] 
22 2.36 
9.35. Corporate social responsibility considerations 22 2.36 
9.8. Erroneous change in the basis for tender 22 2.32 
9.5. Inaccurate estimation of capital cost 22 2.32 
9.28. Political instability evidenced in contract award shortly before or after elections 22 2.32 
9.16. Changes in economic policy by government [e.g. high or incremental changes to 
corporate tax and levies, currency devaluation etc.] 
22 2.32 
9.37. Mismatch between the public and private partners objectives [e.g. in terms of profit 
sharing] 
22 2.27 
9.19. Inadequate contract management expertise or knowledge 22 2.23 
9.23. Management incompetence [e.g. administrative delays during project execution] 22 2.18 
9.29. The need to respect and adopt the overriding interest of major political constituency 
in the parliament 
22 2.18 
9.18. Defective contract awards criteria or incorrect contractual assumptions 22 2.14 
9.25. Ineffective governance and regulation of the renegotiation process necessitating 
specific statutory changes to the contract 
22 2.14 
9.7. Inadequate feasibility studies and other ex-ante pre-tendering analysis 22 2.14 
9.31. Corruption at governance level e.g. awarding contract because of the nationality or 
affiliation of the concessionaire 
22 2.14 
9.30. Corruption at governance level evidenced in misappropriation of funds. 21 2.10 
9.20. Ineffectiveness and inefficiency of contract enforcement 21 2.05 
9.26. Weak legal environment [i.e. in terms of litigation effectiveness] 22 2.00 
9.24. Inadequate transparency in the discharge of managerial duties, etc. 21 1.81 
9.10. Bidding error during procurement e.g. poor evaluation of inflated or aggressive bid 22 1.77 
9.11. Opportunistic bidding [e.g. bid submission with the intent to increase prices at 
renegotiation] 
22 1.77 
Valid N (listwise) 17  
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IMPACTS OF THE RENEGOTIATION ON VFM CRITERIA 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean 
10.1. Construction cost 21 3.67 
10.3. Project finance cost 21 3.62 
10.2. Operation & Maintenance (O&M) costs 21 3.48 
10.10. Users satisfaction 22 3.45 
10.14. Private sector management expertise and skills 22 3.18 
10.7. Construction duration 22 3.14 
10.5. Whole life cost of the contract 22 3.14 
10.4. Cost of risks transferred 22 3.09 
10.9. Quality of service delivery 22 2.95 
10.12. Competition that provides fair value of the project 21 2.95 
10.13. Performance based payment mechanism 22 2.91 
10.8. Concession duration 22 2.77 
10.11. Innovation of bidders in the use of output specification 22 2.77 
10.6. Concessionaires profits 22 2.73 
Valid N (listwise) 19  
 
OUTCOMES OF RENEGOTIATION 
Q11_1 UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 14 56.0 63.6 63.6 
1 8 32.0 36.4 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q11_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 18 72.0 85.7 85.7 
1 3 12.0 14.3 100.0 
Total 21 84.0 100.0  
Missing System 4 16.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q11_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 
11 44.0 50.0 50.0 
1 11 44.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 
3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
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Q12_1UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 
12 48.0 57.1 57.1 
1 9 36.0 42.9 100.0 
Total 21 84.0 100.0  
Missing System 
4 16.0   
Total 
25 100.0   
 
Q12_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 
20 80.0 90.9 90.9 
1 2 8.0 9.1 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 
3 12.0   
Total 
25 100.0   
 
Q12_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 12 48.0 54.5 54.5 
1 10 40.0 45.5 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q13_1UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 10 40.0 45.5 45.5 
1 12 48.0 54.5 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q13_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 19 76.0 86.4 86.4 
1 3 12.0 13.6 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
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Q13_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 15 60.0 68.2 68.2 
1 7 28.0 31.8 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
 
Q14_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 21 84.0 95.5 95.5 
1 1 4.0 4.5 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q14_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 12 48.0 54.5 54.5 
1 10 40.0 45.5 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q14_1UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 11 44.0 50.0 50.0 
1 11 44.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
Q15_1UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 12 48.0 54.5 54.5 
1 10 40.0 45.5 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
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Q15_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 20 80.0 90.9 90.9 
1 2 8.0 9.1 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q15_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 13 52.0 59.1 59.1 
1 9 36.0 40.9 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
 
Q16_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 22 88.0 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q16_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 16 64.0 72.7 72.7 
1 6 24.0 27.3 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q16_1UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 6 24.0 27.3 27.3 
1 16 64.0 72.7 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
Q17_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 10 40.0 45.5 45.5 
1 12 48.0 54.5 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
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Q19_1UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 6 24.0 27.3 27.3 
1 16 64.0 72.7 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                         Q17_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 19 76.0 86.4 86.4 
1 3 12.0 13.6 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
Q19_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 17 68.0 77.3 77.3 
1 5 20.0 22.7 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
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Q20_1UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 12 48.0 60.0 60.0 
1 8 32.0 40.0 100.0 
Total 20 80.0 100.0  
Missing System 5 20.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
 
Q20_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 13 52.0 65.0 65.0 
1 7 28.0 35.0 100.0 
Total 20 80.0 100.0  
Missing System 5 20.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q20_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 15 60.0 75.0 75.0 
1 5 20.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 20 80.0 100.0  
Missing System 5 20.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
 
Q19_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 21 84.0 95.5 95.5 
1 1 4.0 4.5 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
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Q21_1UR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 17 68.0 77.3 77.3 
1 5 20.0 22.7 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q21_2DR 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 20 80.0 90.9 90.9 
1 2 8.0 9.1 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
Q21_3NA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 7 28.0 31.8 31.8 
1 15 60.0 68.2 100.0 
Total 22 88.0 100.0  
Missing System 3 12.0   
Total 25 100.0   
 
MEASURES 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean 
27.6. Develop a clear, concise and properly written contract [e.g. specification of standards 
of materials, components and workmanship] 
22 4.27 
27.1. Define and establish a set of criteria and modalities for the identification, measurement 
and recording of the VfM achieved at strategic renegotiation points during the PFI road 
projects renegotiation 
22 4.23 
27.4. Ensure accurate estimation of requirements [e.g. materials cost, traffic level, finance 
cost, cost of risks and capital costs, etc.] 
22 4.18 
27.3. Clearly, state in the contract that renegotiation must be based on VfM 22 4.18 
27.5. Define performance indicators at the contract formation stage to ensure that more focus 
is placed on the delivery of the project with reference to these indicators 
22 4.09 
27.7. Establish performance standards for SPVs at contract inception as a requirement for 
initiating renegotiation request payment 
22 4.00 
27.18. Establish a clear platform showing the process and procedure for renegotiation at the 
inception of the contract 
22 3.86 
27.12. Fix penalty points for non-performance with applicable limits to SPVs before contract 
takeover by the client 
22 3.86 
27.28. Teamwork should be intensified throughout the management of the project 22 3.86 
27.15. Clarify key contractual clauses and key contract documents at the inception of the 
contract 
22 3.82 
27.21. Cancel PPP road concessions mainly characterised by aggressive and opportunistic 
bids 
22 3.77 
27.26. Develop an effective parameter or trust process during technical implementation that 
allows both parties to understand the impact of any renegotiation on the project objectives 
22 3.77 
27.19. Stipulate the renegotiation approach, criteria and process prior to contract formation 22 3.77 
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27.23. Establish in the contract the right to evaluate and reject aggressive and reckless bids 
including submission of financial models for those bids or additional guarantees/financial 
bonds 
22 3.73 
27.20. Define adequate and strict criteria for contract award to discourage opportunistic and 
aggressive bidding 
22 3.73 
27.9. Establish contract review processes and requirements with the aim of affecting defined 
or allowable changes to the contract 
22 3.73 
27.2. Include in the contract agreement a contract award criterion which increase 
renegotiation request costs to the SPV’s and make exit from the contract expensive 
22 3.68 
27.13. Establish outright contract takeover by the client due to non-performance of the 
SPV’s 
22 3.64 
27.35. Proper constitution of qualified and knowledgeable panel of expert to manage 
aggressive bids, renegotiation request and conflicts 
22 3.59 
27.17. Include a renegotiation clause in the contract agreement to foster financial 
equilibrium 
21 3.57 
27.40. Establish that the modification of the contract must ensure zero net present value 
(NPV) and must preserve VfM defined at contract formation. 
22 3.55 
27.39. Establish in the contract that the modification of the contract, because of 
renegotiation, must not alter the VfM described or the risk allocation 
22 3.55 
27.30. Establish the renegotiation reasons during the project implementation, to assist in 
ascertaining the impact of the influence factors or reasons on VfM 
22 3.55 
27.24. Establish modalities for the submission of financial models required for evaluating 
aggressive bids or additional guarantees/financial bonds 
22 3.50 
27.10. Include hand-back requirements by the public sector [i.e. salvage value/depreciation 
level allowed at delivery or handover] 
22 3.50 
27.33. Establish clear jurisdiction at high level over decision to renegotiate the contract 22 3.50 
27.22. Control aggressive bids by inclusion of larger performance bonds in the contract 22 3.45 
27.11. Include project plan reviews [e.g. every 3 years to monitor the performance of the 
project and particularly of VfM] 
22 3.45 
27.34. Ensure transparency of the renegotiation process 22 3.41 
27.14. Establish guidelines for levels of compensation applicable at strategic renegotiation 
points during project implementation 
22 3.41 
27.25. Request a mandatory bidding process for additional works or infrastructures 
including interest rate for PPP financing 
22 3.36 
27.31. Prepare for contingent financing over time and throughout the implementation 
process as a result of viability gap funding 
22 3.27 
27.27. Outright contract takeover by the client due to non-performance of the SPV’s 22 3.27 
27.38. Ensure that the contract risk matrix includes detailed risks identification and 
allocation 
21 3.24 
27.16. Establish greater role of the PPP unit and regulatory agency 22 3.00 
27.8. Include a freeze period for renegotiations [e.g. 2-3 years after contract award through 
the placement of embargo on materials &amp; work standards, etc.] 
22 3.00 
27.41. Impose on the SPV’s appropriate level of performance bonds [e.g. between 10-25% 
of the total PFI road project investment] 
22 3.00 
27.37. Implement a transparent framework through increase of political costs to accept 
renegotiation demands 
22 2.95 
27.42. Provide allowance for extension of concession contract in austere and adverse 
economic situations 
22 2.91 
27.36. Establish a reputation of less or non-disposal to renegotiation 22 2.82 
27.32. Provide a statement in the PPP regulation establishing the inalterability of the contract 
risk matrix 
20 2.75 
V1 0  
Valid N (listwise) 0  
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Reliability Test- Factors leading to Renegotiation 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.959 37 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between People 341.975 16 21.373   
Within People Between Items 290.016 36 8.056 9.302 .000 
Residual 498.849 576 .866   
Total 788.865 612 1.289   
Total 1130.839 628 1.801   
Grand Mean = 2.60 
 
Reliability Test- Impacts of the Renegotiation on VfM Criteria 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.964 14 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted 
Q1 41.05 250.497 .851 .960 
Q2 41.42 260.591 .612 .965 
Q3 41.26 247.649 .894 .959 
Q4 41.68 258.117 .761 .962 
Q5 41.58 253.146 .769 .962 
Q6 42.00 250.444 .790 .962 
Q7 41.58 244.035 .865 .960 
Q8 42.16 247.585 .905 .959 
Q9 41.79 239.953 .914 .959 
Q10 41.26 262.982 .561 .966 
Q11 42.11 249.655 .862 .960 
Q12 42.05 250.608 .823 .961 
Q13 41.89 251.877 .800 .961 
Q14 41.79 253.842 .735 .963 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between People 373.985 18 20.777   
Within People Between Items 29.417 13 2.263 3.039 .000 
Residual 174.226 234 .745   
Total 203.643 247 .824   
Total 577.628 265 2.180   
Grand Mean = 3.21 
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Reliability Test- Preventive Measures  
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.941 42 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig 
Between People 246.975 18 13.721   
Within People Between 
Items 
127.278 41 3.104 3.823 .000 
Residual 599.341 738 .812   
Total 726.619 779 .933   
Total 973.594 797 1.222   
Grand Mean = 3. 
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Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Q1 144.95 571.497 .120 .942 
Q2 145.47 561.596 .240 .942 
Q3 144.89 563.433 .437 .940 
Q4 145.00 541.222 .807 .938 
Q5 145.00 559.667 .434 .940 
Q6 144.79 556.620 .459 .940 
Q7 145.11 566.766 .218 .941 
Q8 146.16 563.696 .246 .941 
Q9 145.37 568.801 .193 .941 
Q10 145.53 554.152 .467 .940 
Q11 145.53 543.930 .593 .939 
Q12 145.11 557.211 .424 .940 
Q13 145.42 562.702 .221 .942 
Q14 145.79 533.398 .695 .938 
Q15 145.21 550.064 .563 .939 
Q16 146.11 537.211 .614 .939 
Q17 145.58 540.702 .728 .938 
Q18 145.16 544.140 .672 .938 
Q19 145.32 551.228 .488 .940 
Q20 145.26 558.649 .457 .940 
Q21 145.11 559.766 .393 .940 
Q22 145.47 549.708 .535 .939 
Q23 145.21 558.509 .399 .940 
Q24 145.58 548.257 .508 .939 
Q25 145.84 539.251 .623 .938 
Q26 145.32 551.784 .579 .939 
Q27 145.74 540.760 .563 .939 
Q28 145.11 537.655 .713 .938 
Q29 145.21 554.064 .419 .940 
Q30 145.42 550.924 .484 .940 
Q31 145.79 520.175 .818 .936 
Q32 146.26 535.094 .698 .938 
Q33 145.58 561.146 .334 .941 
Q34 145.63 531.357 .775 .937 
Q35 145.47 537.374 .803 .937 
Q36 146.32 546.784 .551 .939 
Q37 146.21 530.842 .729 .937 
Q38 145.95 522.386 .830 .936 
Q39 145.42 552.702 .425 .940 
Q40 145.58 573.813 .017 .944 
Q41 146.11 569.211 .115 .942 
Q42 146.11 539.766 .789 .938 
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APPENDIX 5 PUBLICATIONS AND RESEARCH POSTERS PRESENTED 
A. Papers in Conference Proceedings 
Conference Paper No 1: Fatokun, A., Akintoye, A., Liyanage, C. (2017) The Renegotiation of 
Private Finance Initiative Design-Build-Finance-Operate Road Projects in the UK. In 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Sustainable Futures 26-27 November 2017.  
THE RENEGOTIATION OF PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE DESIGN-BUILD-
FINANCE-OPERATE ROAD PROJECTS IN THE UK 
Ajibola Fatokun, Champika Liyanage 
(School of Engineering, University of Central Lancashire) 
Akintola Akintoye 
(School of Built Environment and Engineering, Leeds Beckett University) 
Abstract 
Government across the world have been procuring infrastructure projects through Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) because of its many advantages. The main advantage is the efficiency it offers 
regarding value for money (VfM). In spite of these advantages, the procuring authorities are faced 
with numerous VfM implementation challenges, which necessitate a swift shift to Private Finance 
2 (PF2) in the instance of the UK. One of the significant implementation challenges affecting 
value for money is contract renegotiation. Its effect is more pronounced in the water and transport 
sectors of numerous countries and has become a subject of concern for the stakeholders especially 
the public-sector stakeholders. This background prompts the evaluation of the renegotiation of 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) road projects in the UK. 
An exploratory research method based on literature review and qualitative interviews are adopted. 
The findings reveal that there are instances of changes and renegotiation in PFI (DBFO) road 
projects to varying degrees. The case studies further show that road DBFO’s are characterised by 
more changes to the contract than a renegotiation of the contract, and there is no evidence of 
adverse renegotiation impact on the VfM criteria identified by the respondents. Hence, 
renegotiation does not necessarily have to adversely affect the value for money criteria or result 
to non-achievement of VfM for the public sector as established by the literature. The ongoing 
research, therefore, advances and extend the findings of this preliminary research to other case 
studies towards proffering robust solutions to the problem of VfM achievement in PPP road 
projects renegotiations. 
Keywords: Renegotiation, Changes, Private Finance Initiative, Design-Build-Finance-Operate, 
Road Projects. 
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Conference Paper No 2: Fatokun A., Akintola A., Liyanage C. (2017) Factors Leading to the 
Renegotiation of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) Road 
Projects in the UK. In Proceedings of the 13th International Postgraduate Research Conference in 
the Built Conference 7-9 September 2017. 
FACTORS LEADING TO THE RENEGOTIATION OF PRIVATE FINANCE 
INITIATIVE (PFI) DESIGN-BUILD-FINANCE-OPERATE (DBFO) ROAD PROJECTS 
IN THE UK 
Ajibola Fatokun1, Champika Liyanage  
School of Engineering, University of Central Lancashire 
And 
Akintola Akintoye 
School of Built Environment and Engineering, Leeds Beckett University  
 Abstract 
The renegotiation of Public Private Partnership infrastructure projects has not received public 
sector recognition because of the outcomes recorded over the years. The stakeholders involved 
in the renegotiation of the PPP road projects have adduced numerous reasons. In some 
instances, the reason can also be the factor leading to the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects. Thus, several factors inform the decision of the primary stakeholders to renegotiate 
the contract. This paper, therefore, evaluates and assesses the factors leading to the 
renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects in the UK. Qualitative interviews involving both 
public and private stakeholders were extensively adopted on five PFI (DBFO) case study road 
projects to address the aim of this study. This serves to complement the findings of the 
literature concerning the factors leading to the renegotiation of PPP road projects. The findings 
of this research reveal the respective factors leading to the renegotiations of PFI (DBFO) road 
projects in the UK. However, the prominent factors are a change in scope of the works 
necessitating works removal and an addition of assets, change in standards and obsolete 
specification occasioned by the long duration of the PFI road project concession among others. 
Keywords: Renegotiation, Factors, Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Design-Build-Finance-
Operate and Road Projects. 
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Conference Paper No. 3: Fatokun, A., Akintoye, A., Liyanage, C. (2016) Factors Influencing 
the Renegotiation of Public- Private Partnership Road Projects. In the Proceedings: CIB World 
Building Congress in Tampere, Finland, 30th May to 5th June 2016. 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RENEGOTIATION OF PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP ROAD PROJECTS  
Ajibola Fatokun, Akin Akintoye and Champika Liyanage 
School of Engineering, College of Science and Technology,  
University of Central Lancashire, UK. 
(Corresponding e-mail: aofatokun@uclan.ac.uk) 
 
Abstract 
A critical evaluation of recent literature reveals that there is evidence of high incidences of 
renegotiation in public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects, particularly in the road 
sector. These high incidences of renegotiations in road projects can be attributable to a number 
of factors, which influence the decision of the primary stakeholders to renegotiate the contract. 
Based on the premise of this prevailing situation in PPP road projects, this paper evaluates and 
assess the factors influencing the renegotiation of PPP road projects. An exploratory research 
method, which adopts a comprehensive literature review of PPP road projects was conducted to 
achieve the above. The findings of the study indicate that the factors influencing PPP road projects 
fall under the economic, technical, institutional, regulatory, contractual, administrative & 
managerial, political, social and environmental categories. The paper concludes by identifying 
the critical factors, which have the profound influence on the renegotiation of PPP road projects 
in their respective category. These factors fall under the design, regulatory, administrative, and 
technical factors in their respective order of literature prominence. The need for the development 
of modalities to assess and ensure the credibility of PPP regulation and proper estimation or 
evaluation of PPP road projects at the design, technical and administrative/managerial level was 
recommended to mitigate the negative influence of renegotiation.  
 
Keywords: Critical factors, renegotiation, public private partnership, road projects. 
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Conference Paper No 4: Fatokun, A., Akintoye, A., Liyanage, C. (2015) Renegotiation of 
public-private partnership road contracts: issues and outcomes. In the Proceedings: 31st annual 
Association of Researchers in Construction Management (ARCOM) conference, 7-9 Sept. 2015, 
Lincoln, UK, Vol. 2, 1249-1258. 
 
RENEGOTIATION OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ROAD CONTRACTS: 
ISSUES AND OUTCOMES  
 
Ajibola Fatokun1, Akintola Akintoye and Champika Liyanage  
Grenfell Baines School of Architecture, Construction and Environment, University of Central 
Lancashire, Preston, UK  
 
Abstract 
The renegotiation of road projects has been an important issue that has generated concerns in PPP 
procurement over the last decade. This has had serious policy implications for public procurement 
policy across countries because of its implications for the achievement of the objectives defined 
at the inception of PPP road contracts. This paper assesses the renegotiation of Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects to identify the issues involved in renegotiation and its 
outcomes. Data were collected through a literature review of selected studies on PPP 
infrastructure projects on a sectoral basis with emphasis on Latin America, Portugal and Spain. It 
was revealed that a high proportion of PPP contracts in the transport sector are renegotiated: 
Indeed, in the transport sector, more PPP road projects are renegotiated than other forms of 
transport projects. The main factors surrounding the renegotiation of road contracts are: lack of 
an adequate contract design, frequent opportunistic behaviour on the part of both public and 
private partners during the implementation of  PPP road projects, changes in the conditions 
affecting revenue and costs beyond the reasonable assumptions accounted for in the original 
contract, corruption, and political and economic instability, all of which in most instances reduce 
the chance of the public partner in achieving its objective of value for money (VfM). The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the need to develop a framework for integrating considerations of 
value for money into the renegotiation process of PPP road contracts. Keywords: public-private 
partnership (PPP), renegotiation, road contracts, transport sector, value for money (VfM). 
 
B. Research Posters 
Poster No 1: Fatokun, A., Akintoye, A., Liyanage, C. (2016) Overview of a Study into 
Renegotiation of Private Finance Initiative Design-Build-Finance-Operate Road Projects in the 
UK presented at the Annual Research Student Conference 2016 on the 8th September 2016.  
Poster No 2: Fatokun, A., Akintoye, A., Liyanage, C. (2015) Integrated Value for Money 
Renegotiation for Public Private Partnership Road Projects presented at the Annual Grenfell 
Baines School of Architecture, Construction and Environment School of Postgraduate Student 
Research Event on 10th June 2015. 
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APPENDIX 6 EVIDENCE OF ETHICAL APPROVAL OF THE PROJECT 
                                                                                                                                     
21st January 2016  
Akintola Akintoye/Ajibola Oladipo Fatokun  
School of Engineering  
University of Central Lancashire 
 
Dear Akintola/Ajibola,  
Re: BAHSS Ethics Committee Application  
Unique Reference Number: BAHSS 320  
The BAHSS ethics committee has granted approval of your proposal application ‘‘Integrated 
Value for Money Renegotiation for Public Private Partnership Road Projects". Approval is 
granted up to the end of project date* or for 5 years from the date of this letter, whichever is the 
longer.  
It is your responsibility to ensure that:  
• the project is carried out in line with the information provided in the forms you have 
submitted. 
• you regularly re-consider the ethical issues that may be raised in generating and analysing 
your data. 
• any proposed amendments/changes to the project are raised with, and approved, by 
Committee. 
• you notify roffice@uclan.ac.uk if the end date changes or the project does not start. 
• serious adverse events that occur from the project are reported to Committee a closure 
report is submitted to complete the ethics governance procedures (Existing paperwork 
can be used for this purpose, e.g. funder’s end of grant report; abstract for student award 
or NRES final report. If none of these is available use e-Ethics Closure Report Proforma).  
 
 
Yours sincerely,  
Nick Palfreyman  
Deputy Vice chair  
BAHSS Ethics Committee  
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APPENDIX 7 GENERAL CONCESSION RENEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK 
(GCRF) 
 
Source: Xiong and Zhang (2014) 
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APPENDIX 8 COMPARISON OF RENEGOTIATION RULES IN SELECTED 
MARKETS 
 
      Source: Berkers et al., (2010) 
Frequent negotiation 
clauses. In some cases, 
options or tender 
requirements
Negotiation based on 
contractors cost estimate
Rules Differentiated 
according to value: 
• small (output oriented) 
option.
•  Medium (input 
oriented).
• Large: tender, expert, 
or benchmarking
Variation 
Rules
Clauses typically identical 
with model contracts
Three stage process
• Project advisory board 
by the parties
• Conciliation 
arbitration (typically 
no recourse to courts)
• No time limits for 
individual stages
Three stage process
• Negotiation within the 
project with higher 
hierarchy levels 
• Expert resolution or 
other form of non-
binding alternative 
dispute resolution
• Contractually defined 
time limits for 
individual stages
Typically no authority
• Voluntary termination 
right in the contracts 
• Sometimes, authority 
break points
No Authority
• Voluntary termination 
right in the contracts
• Recourse to (vague) 
contract law 
provisions
Authority 
• Voluntary termination 
with compensation 
based on market value 
or parameters  from 
financial model. 
• Authority break points 
with contractually 
defined compensation 
amounts as option
Dispute 
Resolution
Termination
UK Standardisation Of 
PFI Contracts Version 4 
(2007)
Germany- Model 
Contracts
Germany- Actual Project 
Contracts
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APPENDIX 9 AXIAL CODING OF THE PARENT AND CHILD NODES 
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APPENDIX 10 TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW ON RESPONDENT XY6-PRI 
ON CS4 
Date of the Interview: 21-09-16              Start Time: 13:23 Hrs - 14:39 Hrs 
Name of Respondents: XY6-Pri 
A.    Preliminary- Respondent’s Details 
Q1.  Me: Can I have your position on the project? 
XY6-Pri: There are two parts to the organisation. I think I told you the other time. We’ve got the 
concession company which is the auto link, and I am the General Manager, and there is a contract 
between the Autolink and A19 ROM contract which is the Routine Operation and Maintenance 
who is also Sir Robert McAlpine. There is a contract between the two, and I am the General 
Manager of the two arms. So, I am having an agreement with myself.  Me: So, you are acting on 
both spheres. XY6: Yes. So, that’s my position. I’m the general managers of the two companies.  
Q2. Me: What sector are you? 
XY6-Pri: Private sector.  
Q3. Me: What’s your academic/professional background, please? 
XY6-Pri: I have a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering, and I am a Chartered Civil Engineer 
with the Chartered Institution of Civil Engineers. 
Q4. Me: What’s the location of the project? 
XY10: Dishforth to Tyne Tune Tunnel is the full extent of the project. Ehm.  But we are here in 
Billingham. That’s the location.  
Q5.  Me: Do you have an idea of the estimated cost of the project? 
XY6-Pri: The project cost £935 million.  
Me: That’s the total contract sum.  
XY6-Pri: Yes 
Q6. Me: What’s the current stage of the project? 
XY6-Pri: We are 20 years into the 30 years concession. As the contract, we needed five core 
requirements, which we try to be completed within the first three years. We have completed four 
of those and the fifth one which is the T via duct structural refurbishment. We agreed that we 
could extend that. So, it will be completed in 2024. We’ve completed the first three stages, for 
stages 4 and 5, we’ve just combined the programme for that, and it will be completed by 2024. 
Me: What is the reason for the extension?  
XY6-Pri: Because the majority is the demolition and replacement of the piers and via a duct. 
When we assess the structure, we saw that the structure was in dangerous condition as was thought 
at the time of the tender.  So, we decided that we do demolition and replacement in a sort of 
phases along the period. That will enable to get the benefit of improvements in Technology, 
Basically, like I said a lot of things can happen in 24 years and the client the benefit that in a 30-
year concession. A lot of the work is signed and like I said they would get the renewal at the end 
of the job. 
 Q7. Me: How many years has the project been on and what’s the contract duration?  
Me: You answered the 7th question. “We are 20 years into the 30 years concession”. So, I don’t 
need to go into that.  
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XY6-Pri: Yes. 
B. Assessment of the Implications of the Achievement of Value for Money (VfM) As A 
Result of Renegotiation in Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Road Projects 
Q8.  Me: What aspect of this project undergoes some changes or renegotiation? 
XY6-Pri: When the contract was signed in 1996, the standards were locked in into 1996 standards. 
Ah once we did the five core requirements. We then took up the responsibility of maintaining the 
road as it is. We are not here to improve any further than the five core requirements. We will 
maintain as it is.  
Me: What are the core requirements, please? 
XY6-Pri: The core requirements were to build a new not on the pathway improvements which 
was £48 million improvements which were a widening of the north and south of T via a duct. 
Widening from Geo 2 lane to Geo 3 lane. That cost £48 million. We built that, and it was 
completed six months early and within budget.  The second core requirement was to carry out 
refurbishment unto a tilting bridge which was a major crossing at the river Sunderland. That work 
was completed, ahh, the T via duct refurbishment which I talked about earlier will be completed 
in 2024. Fortifying and assessment of structures and that was completed, and the other ones were 
to install two emergency telephones north of the T side area. At the south of the T side, there is 
already a telephone installed, and we installed them all.  That’s the five core requirements.  
Me: So out of all of them we have about three completed now, only one is still left to be 
completed? 
XY6-Pri: We’ve got one which is yet to be completed, and that is the T via a duct, and it is 
expected to be completed in 2024. The contract ends in February 2027. 
Me: Out of all the core requirements. How many core requirements do you renegotiate or change? 
XY6-Pri: As I said we are locked in the 1996 standards, what we said to Highways Agency right 
at the start of the contract was that if you lock with the contract deed the standards of the contract. 
If you continue maintaining that road, i.e. that section of the network to the 1996 standards. In 30 
years’, time, at the end of the concession, what effect will you have to be in place? Because of 
standard change. The contract allows you. There is a mechanism in the contract which can 
introduce change by additional works. There are two mechanisms in that. The client which is the 
Secretary of State for Transport can introduce change and renegotiate those changes if he wants 
to. And there is a mechanism for us to promote change and the secretary of state will pay for that 
change. And there is a mechanism for us to introduce change where if we promote the change we 
will identify what needs to be improved. We will put a business case forward for doing that, and 
as part of that improvements, we will be ahh ensuring targets which will be safety performance 
targets. When the DBFO was changed, if we built it at our expense and we didn’t achieve those 
targets, we won’t get paid. So basically, we don’t promote improvements. If we work on the roads 
and we identify issues, we will report all those issues to Highways England or the secretary of 
state for transport, and he will say what he wants to do with it because obviously, the risk for the 
DBFO contractor will be too high. So, as it is.  If you have a section of the road where you have 
a very bad junction that wasn’t performing very well, and you have a lot of accident that you 
could see that by minor improvements you could get positive benefits. Yes, we would. In this 
case, those opportunities were very few. 
Me: So, in this case, there are changes in standards. 
XY6-Pri: Yes, changes in standards and, we introduced those changes in 2009 and we negotiated 
it with Highways England to modify the contract to introduce the change in standards.  
Me: So, the request was made by you? 
XY6-Pri: So, as we said, it was in our interest to have those changes. Secretary of State for 
transport who works for Highways agency then. They recognised that. So, we sat down and  
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renegotiate those change which we called the “Enhanced service” That was instructed in 2010. 
So, we implemented that in 2010. Also, as I said as part of the operation, we monitor the 
performance of the road network. If we identify any problem areas, we will put a case to 
Highways England who represents the secretary of state. They will then consider these issues and 
apply for funding and come to us to tell us if it is something they want to do and ask us to do that 
and pay us to do it. We are now into 17 years into the concession, and there has been a total of 
200 changes to a value of about £70 million additional works that we have been instructed by the 
client, and we have successfully introduced those changes.  
Me: Thank you very much 
Q9. Me: At what point in the life of the project does this changes or renegotiation occur? 
XY6-Pri: It’s a 30-year contract, and we are now 20 years in. The contract will finish February 
2027.  
Me: And when do you affect the first changes and renegotiation.  
XY6-Pri: The first additional works notice that was issued, the contract started in February 1997 
and the 1st change Ahh will probably be in the year 2000. 
Me: And what does it border on? 
XY6-Pri: I can’t remember, it was just a small improvements scheme. I will find out a list of that, 
and I will show you what they involve. They are small improvements altogether. As I said, 
improvements. It can vary from few hundred pounds to few thousand pounds. As part of the 
renegotiation with Highways England, if the work we identify is less than a hundred thousand 
pounds, then they will ask us to do the work based on the rate that we have given them. Anything 
above a hundred thousand pounds can go out to the market place and get competitive tenders. 
And we will be invited to tender as well. Highways England says that now because we have been 
here for 20 years and because of the reputation we have. They are looking to increase that from 
£100, 000 to 1.5 million pounds. Anything up to 1.5 million, they automatically give us and ask 
us to price to do the job. Again, as I said over the 20 years, we have established a reputation where 
we can perform, work and provide VfM. 
Q10. Me: Why do you renegotiate this contract?  
XY6-Pri: Why we did it. Again, basically as I say it is because standards change.  
Neil: Ahh again we passively say practically regarding the signpost. So standards change now, 
and signpost has to be collapsible and exactly at the end of the contract we have to provide the 
same signpost regarding VfM deliverables. But they pay us extra money to provide the passively 
safe sign post. That’s just an example. Me: OK.  
XY6-Pri: So, regarding the change in standards. In 2010, when we included the enhanced service 
from 1997 to 2010, there have been 400 changes of standards. 
Me: On this project? 
XY6-Pri: Nationally.  
Neil: In the design manual, the Highways England have said a lot of things about that. They have 
spoken about the standards that superseded the previous standard as a result of the change.     
Me: So, the standard changes from time to time 
XY6-Pri: Yes, the standards for us are reviewed and new technology ahh and basically when they 
consider the standards they look at the new technology introduced and have a look whether they 
provide VfM. And the Highways England do that on behalf of the Secretary of State or 
Department of Transport. And they will review those standards and ascertain whether introducing 
those standards will produce a safer road for the travelling public and provide some sorts of VfM 
for the taxpayers.  That’s what is done.     
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Me: Okay. 
Q11. Me: Who makes the renegotiation request in this project instance?  
XY6-Pri: As I said there is a clause in the contract, as the DBFO contractor, we suggest the change 
and promote the change because to pay for the change, we don’t do that because it’s too much 
risk. What we do is that part of our contract is to do the routine operation and maintenance of the 
project road. The project roads consist of 20km. 585 link Kilometres and 197 bridges of 
structures. Now we monitor by various sort of inspection machines services undertaken on an 
annual basis. We monitor the condition of the road. We monitor the safety, we monitor the traffic, 
and we monitor the accidents, traffic incidents on the network. We report that. As part of that, we 
analyse what leads to road traffic incidents, and you identify problem areas, and we will make the 
point that out to Highways England. Ahh and then discuss with them about undertaken feasibility 
studies. So, we do the more detailed analysis of what the problem is and come up with a solution 
to solve that problem. So, it’s working as a team with the client. We are doing the operation and 
maintenance. We monitor the roads, and we report the incidences and suggesting ideas of how 
that situation can be improved.  
Me: Ok.  
Q12. Me: Regarding results of the renegotiation, what are the outcomes of this renegotiation 
instances regarding the cost and other deliverables etc.?  
XY6-Pri: Ehm, we would identify the problems, and the Highways England will do the study. 
We will identify the options to solve a problem. And you will then choose the option which 
produces or gives you the best VfM. We then provide Highways England with the price to 
undertake that work, and it’s a fixed price. So, as part of that price, we will include a risk element. 
Se we price. What we’ve done is that we have a list of things that could go wrong. We do it very 
much in an open book, and we show Highways England what the prices are before we do the 
detailed breakdown of that cost before they could instruct the work. They can come in and carry 
out the audit whenever they want. The checks that have been done because of our quality system 
and our management systems. We have all the steps in place, and we make sure that the work is 
done correctly. As we work very closely with Highways England as the client. Then since we 
started the contract, we promote very much collaborative working. As an organisation, we have 
certification to BS 11000 which is the collaborative working. Ehnn which foster good 
relationships, we got that three years ago and we had just received a renewal of the certificate last 
month. We very much work as a team with the client right from the start of the contract, we work 
very closely with them. 
Me: What’s your opinion on the cost of the concession so far? Are you on the budget?  
XY6-Pri: Ehn. I think DBFO provides VfM. Because saying that. If we want to carry out the 
maintenance strategy, we undertake the highway network. That highway network will wear out. 
It hasn’t got an infinite life. It has a finite life depending on the traffic and its usage and the wear 
and tear. If you develop the right maintenance strategy where you invest the money at the right 
time and you carry out maintenance at the right time. Then you get the VfM. DBFO contract 
allows you to do that over the 30-year contract period. So, we’ve invested strongly because it’s 
our money. We’ve been very proactive for example on bridges where a lot of problems caused 
by salt water attacks concrete. Ehn, we on our stretches, we’ve got a drainage system in place to 
stop the water getting into the concrete. We have got waterproof bearing shells, appropriate 
draining systems on the runway and that helps sort of stops the deterioration of bridges. So, our 
bridges all over the period. If you maintain and do the necessary, the standards are upheld, and 
the conditions are improved. Ah we are now 20 years in and the condition of our network is very 
good. That’s recognised by Highways England. And it’s recognised nationally because people 
are commenting on the condition of the road. Some said that the condition is best kept maintained 
throughout the country. Because we carry out the works at the right time. PFI allows you to do 
that because you have priced to do the job and it is your money. The problem with the traffic 
compared to the rest of the network is that their condition is monitored and each road you must  
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bid for money to carry out whatever works that are identified. And they don’t necessarily get the 
money. Now an example is the carriage way. If your carriageway is showing you signs of distress 
like wear. You go and do the work. It could cost you. You could get away with resurfacing and 
you must go 10 years or 8 years later resurfacing. If you don’t do that work, then the deterioration 
isn’t linear. So, let’s say it cost you X million pounds to maintain that road. If you wait and go 
beyond the period, you can end up doing the job three or four times what it would ordinarily cost 
you. And that’s what happens on roads which are financed by the public purse. Because they’ve 
got to bid nationally, and it cost a lot of money. And because we’ve got a thirty-year window. 
We’ve bid for that and we’ve made the decision that we are going to maintain that road properly 
and to the right standard and put it in a very good condition. The issue is that at the end of the 
concession. After the end of the thirty years. That goes back into the purse of the national body 
where you don’t have to start bidding for money. So, what’s going to happen on A19 is on our 
project road is that there will be a look at what the condition is i.e.  Eh look A19 is in an excellent 
condition where all the zones or routes are in proper condition and target the money to routes that 
are in poor condition. If the standard level of the wear and poor condition is, then there will be an 
assessment of where the national average wear condition is. And in a very short period, A19 is 
going to go down. And within five years it’s going to just be back to where it was thirty years 
ago. So, they’ve lost thirty years investment.  
Neil:    So, regarding how the country’s economy is performing, the secretary of state commits 
Autolink to pay the plan to allow them to get the money back on the investment for the 
responsibility of maintaining the road network. And the rest of the road network is safe if the 
economy dives. There will be cot cutting within the government because those are not getting 
their money at the right time. 
Me: Then, will that have an impact on the job regarding the time,  
XY6: We’ve decided at the early stage in person that the road should be maintained to the right 
quality. Do not serve the assets as it poses a significant risk. It’s like you are looking at the whole 
life costing and some DBFO contract will say I am going to do that work and I am not going to 
anything within ten years and 15 years. And they’ve done it. Indeed, we have a lot of DBFO 
contract that is not far from here, and they go to the same for construction. Ah, so 18, 16, 17 years. 
So, if we maintained that road at the right level and did the surfacing, etc. It would not mean the 
situation is worse. Apparently, he’s made that decision. In its whole life costing analysis. He's 
looking into the amount of big pot of money that we are going to spend now which will mean that 
in the next few years we are not going to spend another big pot of money. And at the end of the 
job, I might have paid another big pot of money. What we have said is that we are not going to 
do that because there is a significant risk in that. What we will do is that we will spend the money 
at the right time. So, you send that money out. So, we send that money out into those assets, but 
we discovered that we had incurred cost earlier on. So, you must start looking at the net present 
value by projecting your cost forward and earning them back, but I still think we will even need 
to show how our methodologies are better. 
XY10-Pri: You also get the efficiency in the way the work is done. We do our work at night 
because we get lane closure charges if we take the road out of operation during the busy period 
of the day. Now because the road is maintained regularly, interventions are less intrusive, so we 
can do the work at night and open the road network the next morning and it’s safe for the road 
users to use. If you go in full to use the road for construction, that increases the cost and ultimately 
reduces the VfM.  
XY6-Pri: If you don’t spend the money at the right time. I think a good analogy is that if you’ve 
got a house with a wooden window when completed. Ah you paint them, then you go in every 
five years bring those windows down and re-paint them, they last forever. You put a window in 
and leave them, in twenty years they will be fallen out. That’s the same. It’s carrying out the right 
maintenance at the right time. And that gives you a far better VfM.     
Q13. Me: Is there any difference between the VfM achieved at the point of renegotiation and the 
VfM defined for implementation? 
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XY6-Pri: Right at the start of the DBFO contract, there is quite an innovative form of contract 
which is something that has never been used before. We are in phase 1 and what was looked at 
was that there is quite a lot of risk. It was a significant risk, and that was priced in the contract. 
Ah, again what we looked at was that we priced that risk. We didn't know we will price the risk 
which allows us to win the contract. Again, by carrying out the maintenance, coming out with 
proper maintenance strategy and maintaining the road to that standard, then that risk will 
disappear very quickly. The more you reduce that risk and carry out the maintenance the more 
profit you make.  
Me: So, you experience that on this project. 
XY6-Pri: Yes, Yes. Because we carry out the work properly, we've got a road that is in good 
condition. We've made significant savings from what the original budget was. 
Q14. Me: Is there any evidence of achievement of VfM for your organisation on this project?  
XY6-Pri: Yes 
Me: So, you achieved VfM on the project. 
XY6-Pri: Obviously at the time of the contract, when the contract was awarded, it was seen by 
the department of transport that it was VfM because we have achieved what was in the tender. 
But we as an organisation because we maintained and managed the property. The tender that we 
predicted has improved. And again because of the efficient management and the efficient way in 
which we operate. 
Q15. How would you describe stakeholders (i.e. public sector, SPV and users) satisfaction 
regarding VfM achieved on this project? 
XY6-Pri: Highways England has changed their philosophy about how they maintained the 
network regarding the assets led and regarding developing the maintenance contracts. And they 
have a deal which runs for the rest of the network that they called the maintenance agent contract. 
That has been run for the duration that we have been in place. When DBFO first started, they saw 
that as risk as well. But in the seven years that it's been operational. But the way we work, the 
way we operate because it's thousands of pounds that we will be spending. Ah and we don't waste 
money, and we're are on a marked contract and are out to make as much money as we can. So, if 
its resurfacing that has been identified to be done, He doesn't want to go as twice as the length of 
the contract to do the resurfacing. And the experience of the last ten years. We make sure that the 
job is done correctly, and we make sure that the job is done at the right time of the year. And 
that's all that it all be. And the rest of the network has been done based on the way the money 
comes in. And we've got a situation during the year where the work does not necessarily give you 
value for money. Where we make sure that we do the work at the right time of the year. We make 
sure that the work that is undertaken is of the right quality and that gives you further than the 
whole life costs at the end of the period. 
Me: Regarding the users, do you have their opinion with regards to satisfaction. 
XY6-Pri: Ehn, again we get a lot of compliments from the way the road operates. We have 
customers request service which was set up to monitor customers service and complaints. But 
nowadays we have more compliments than complaints which reflect how we perform on the A19 
DBFO road project. Also, where nationally traffic growth is slow and gone down, ours has been 
increased because people recognised A19 has the primary north-south road parallel to the A1 and 
people know that if you go on the A19, you are not going to be held up by roadworks. We have 
an efficient incidence support unit so that if there is an incident on the network, we get there and 
clear it up quickly. People choose our network rather than going to experience the A1 and what I 
will tell you is that our traffic growth has increased over the years steadily and the rest of the road 
network has gone down. 
Me: And that's evidence of the satisfaction derived by users 
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XY6-Pri: We considered that person who makes that request will use the A19. As I said, we have 
got a customer request service which has provided a lot of complement which the Highways 
England has asked us to pass those complement to them because it is a significant boost for them  
Me: And to you as well equally. 
XY6-Pri: Yes, Yes. 
C. Assessment of guidelines and measures to ensure the achievement of value for 
money at renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) Road Projects 
Q16. How do you define strategic VfM targets in PPP road project concessions phases? Are there 
any targets set for VfM at the inception of the contract? 
XY6-Pri: All other DBFO contracts have, but we have not. They have got targets for payments. 
We get paid based on the level of traffic using the road. But another DBFO contract has objectives 
based on the speed of traffic, travelling on the network. We have a situation where if we take a 
lane out or get a road closed, we get charged. We get penalised for it. Now at the start of our 
contract, we have an allowance in our budget of about 26 million GBP for lane closure charges. 
Me: Is it per day or? 
XY6-Pri: For the duration of the contract, 26 million GBP. So, we set this out every year to take 
care of the possibility of what Highways England is going to charge us if we go out to close a 
lane for a single day. 
Me: Are the charges per day or year? 
XY6-Pri: It is per hour. For every time we take a lane out, we get charged per hour per kilometre 
per lane. So, it is tens of thousands of pounds per year. On the T viaduct. If we take any road out 
in a day, it will cost us 100,000 GBP for lane closure charges. Now as I say, we currently have 
nothing for lane closure charges because we have introduced a method of working where we don't 
ensure lane closure charges.  
XY10-Pri: What that means is that there will be benefits to road users. 
Me: I think the road users pay for using the roads. 
XY6-Pri: No highways England pays a shadow toll for every vehicle using the road. 
Me: Some other DBFO roads do not pay based on the number of vehicles using the roads. Why? 
XY6-Pri: It's just the way that contract is put together. Some of the charge on the average speed 
of the traffic. This is just to indicate that you are not causing any disruption. Well, ours is only 
lane closure charges. But at night we don't because there is no traffic. So, we develop techniques 
where we do the job at night. I think last year we got lane closure charges of about £30,000 which 
we deducted from the original budget for lane closure charges. 
Q17. Me: What are the VfM targets that are usually defined and documented in PFI (DBFO) road 
projects?  
XY6-Pri: Basically, in any business, you look to make sure profits. That's what we target. We 
have a target set by the company and organisation, and we achieve those targets. 
Me: What about other targets regarding cost, duration of the contract, quality etc. 
XY6-Pri: Again, all of our contract. We are now in the routine, operation and maintenance. All 
of the contracts like the resourcing contract, we will programme that. We will work 
collaboratively with our specialist sub-contractors who will help us in the planning of the works. 
We plan those works so that we don't incur a loss. What we will do is we will look at can we do 
it during the day. And we will look at if we do it during the day what lane closure charges will be 
incurred. So, we price that, and we price that which will be incurred during the night. So, if you 
are doing it during the night, it will cost you more to get materials. It will cost you more to get  
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labourers etc. So, you get the balance but 90% of the times you arrive at the fact that it pays to do 
the work at nights. We price the options, and we come up with what is the best option.  
Me: I think that answers that. And regarding other DBFO road projects in the UK, do you have 
an idea about the target that is set for VfM. 
XY6-Pri: No idea. As I said, some of them had got speed, average speed as the basis of payment 
to the concessionaire. Some also use the critical incidence on the network as the KPI, and they 
get charged in a situation where there is incidence on the network. So, every DBFO contract is 
different. Even the early contract. We have the contract that was priced. We had some contracts 
after the pricing that went down to the preferred bidder. And after that was announced, there was 
nearly a year negotiation between the clients and the concessionaire as certain things were brought 
in and certain things were taken out to achieve the objectives.  
Me; So, I see from all your explanation, VfM has been achieved on this project? 
Q18. Me: Ok. I see, then what are the main procedures you take in measuring the success 
regarding VfM achievement? 
XY6-Pri: We will measure as far as I am concerned and the contract aside, the level of profit we 
make. We will also look at the cost of collaborative effort we're making because without 
collaborative measures i.e. a fully integrated team. We work closely with the supply chain. We 
know from them again that the major ones we have what they called cost basis. So, we know what 
profit they are targeting.  
And so, the cost process is an open book. So, we see their cost to know that they are making their 
profit and so we work together as a team so that everyone comes out with what their objectives 
are. There is no right work as a partner, and then he is found losing money. And then if you are 
working with someone as a team and he is losing money. Then he has problems. Because he will 
be concentrating on the way he could do, cut corners and the way he can do to recoup the loss in 
every situation. So basically, it's short-sightedness to look for ways to screw money out of them. 
So that is to give them a fair reward for the fair money they have paid. And if you get that, you 
will get VfM because you make what you intended to make. So, if you've got a sub-contractor 
who is not performing. He's not making his money. Then you have got to make sure that there is 
extra management. And you guys are working seriously to make sure that the quality of the work 
is right. So, we very much work as a team when we work so tightly together as a team to make 
sure that all the objectives are met. Now as far as the programme is concerned. The measure is 
the level of disruption. Now we plan the programme that there is minimum disruption to the 
public.  We make sure that we don't earn lane closure charges as far as possible. Because the level 
of lane closure charges is being assessed on the impact, you are going to make on the travelling 
public. So, if you put a lane out and there are about 90,000 vehicles a day who use that. You put 
a road out then the queues will be 5 to 6 miles very quickly. Putting a lane closure at certain times 
during the day allows some traffic to flow through. So, when the charges are high, the charges 
reflect the level of disruption to the network. So, the measures that we have is that the lane closure 
charges that we pay are the minimum. Also, another measure for us is that within this contract, 
the client has the right to penalise, he can issue us with penalty points. If we don't perform, we 
can be given the penalty points. And if you get to certain level of penalty points, the client will 
try and bring their management team in to charge us the cost of doing that. There is certain level 
after that points after which he can terminate the contract. We have got no penalty points. The 
last penalty point was issued in 2001, and that's 16 years we have not had any penalty points. Me: 
That is a good one. 
Q19. Me: Do you think it is necessary to define criteria for renegotiation at the inception of PPP 
contract?  
XY6-Pri: I think you try and plan your contract, what you want to do and how you want to do it. 
If you want the job carried out, you put measures in place. Like I said, Lane closure charges and 
disruption. And getting the contracts and paying for the service required. The contract that is 
providing the service, you have an allowance for them with regards to them with regards to profit.  
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And performance to be merged against that level. So, you wouldn't necessarily tell the contractor 
or tell the clients the profits you are making. Now we do, any additional work that we do, we will 
show Highways England that we've priced a job, we'll give them a cost breakdown which will 
show the profit. So, they know what we are charging regarding benefit. 
 
XY10-Pri: When we do additional works per hour. They know the rate per hour that we charge 
per day for each member of staff in getting things done.  
XY6-Pri: In some contracts basically, they know the mark-up that we charge on the cost. If for 
example, it is £5,000 we put 20% on the sum and so on and so forth up to 10% profit on the 
contract sum. So, 10% is quite a low figure. Most organisations are working on at least 14% -
15%. 
Me: So, from all what you have said now, so there are criteria for renegotiating the contract? 
XY6-Pri: So, we can negotiate a change to the end of the contract, we can negotiate a change in 
extension of the contract. That's the current point in time we've been told it will not happen. 
Because of the original OJ notice that was published in 1995 did not say anything about an 
extension. Therefore, they say that to sit down and negotiate an extension wouldn't be legal.  
Me: So, it was not allowed in the contract? 
XY6-Pri: Yes. That was 20 years ago. That was not considered. And they are now saying they 
can't do it. They could do it because if they feel there are any objections from other contracts in 
any part of the industry. The way to do it is to announce now ten years out. That they are starting 
negotiations with us to extend the contract and if they do that they will get a feel if anyone is 
going to object.  
Me: Because it was not envisaged at the beginning of the contract. If we do the or if we now start 
because at the end of the day, it is a contract between two parties and both parties agree. Therefore, 
we could do whatever we want with the contract. So, If I announced it. I made an official 
announcement that they agree. So, you could do whatever you want with the contract. So, if I 
announced it. Made an official announcement that it will be in the taxpayer's interest or the public 
interest to negotiate or whatever it was, the contract completion or the management of the contract 
completion. The negotiation was to extend the contract by five years and see what reaction or 
outcome we get. And if nobody reacts. Then we can't just sit there and say it's too complicated. 
That's what happens when you have got a contract and are working with the government. Ah, it 
gets to the point where it's too complicated. 
Q20. Me: What are the guidelines adopted for assessing PFI road projects renegotiation regarding 
VfM achievement? 
XY6-Pri: Basically, the same. We have five core requirements for the contracts which have to be 
completed. That is set within the contract for the years and duration. It's still ongoing but that was 
negotiated with the client after that, it's just to carry out the operation and maintenance. Ah, we 
have hand-back requirements, and negotiations for achieving hand-back requirements begins five 
years from the end of the contract. That programme was set in, and you must sit down and 
negotiate that programme as well. Discussion about hand-back requirements started about ten 
years ago. It is not a primary concern because if you adopt the right maintenance strategy which 
we don't. Been proactive in carrying it out. All the titles and monies are there. The problem is you 
don't roll them over if you don't invest in it a year. Then you have got five years to fix it. And that 
was the reason because if you carry out the maintenance and you put maintenance strategy couple 
with 5- year hand-back requirements, the road will be in good condition. So, there is an 
arrangement to look at this at least five years from the end. As I said, we have been looking at it, 
planning it and tried to negotiate with them (the client) because some of the things in the contract 
were manageable.  We cannot do what the contract asks you to do. It's impossible. That was 
pointed out 15 years ago, and we submit a common ground on it. They have a problem  
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Me: So, this hand back requirement has helped in sustaining the value of the project? 
XY6-Pri: Ehn, Yes. 
Q21. Me: Has the guideline helped in achieving VfM or otherwise on this project? 
XY6-Pri: Ehn Yes. 
Q22. Me: Please describe the criteria and modalities for the identification, measurement and 
recording of the VfM achieved at strategic renegotiation points during the PFI road projects 
renegotiation?  
XY6-Pri: Like I said any improvements and additional works, we give a fixed cost eh. Fixed 
priced sorry. And Highways will pay us that. Ahh. Then we are paid no more than that. We priced 
that. With regards to the maintenance side of it, we have a maintenance strategy developed at the 
start of the concession which also established and provides the price of the job. That is reviewed 
every three years. Basically in 2004 when I did my first project plan.  For that three years, there 
is a fundamental review; you are looking at everything from the start again. Ahh, and on top of 
that, you should look at the annual programme, two-year programme and five-year rolling 
programme. We have a 30-year project plan which gives you what you want to spend for that 
period, and every three years you review that. But then you have also got at the end of every year; 
you look at what the work that was planned. What you have achieved. If you have deferred action, 
that goes back. If we have a five-year programme and that rolls. So schemes are brought forward, 
and schemes are extended. So, it's constantly monitored as you go through to ensure that you are 
achieving based on because you have a series of inspection and visual surveys and all that is 
increasing the data or providing the data of the condition of your assets. And that's done annually. 
So you are continually reviewing the state of your assets and then and you look at each scheme 
within that 30 years and one year and roll it.  
Me: So, we can call all these contractual mechanisms designed to control or ensure VfM. 
XY6-Pri: Yes 
Me: You have mentioned fixed cost. Is it measured in terms and against the financial model 
monthly? 
XY6-Pri: Ah, we have a financial model for the project that is constantly, and that is based on the 
price of the project plan and what we do is we work on that project plan. Ah again, we have the 
30-year project plan, and within that, you look at your income, your outgoings and your cover 
ratios. We should include that cover ratio in case anything goes wrong. So, you should look at the 
cost and that gap. So, you look at it so that you never overspend. So, if you manage the property, 
you should never be in a position where you are drawing down outside the project plan. So, we 
have never had to do that. Of course, we have always done it the other way. Or it was not just 
carrying out work. We don't think work needs to be done so that they put it on the structure. Then 
like a way year or before that. We don't take that money out of the plan, it stays in the plan, and 
it goes into the next year. Then the money will remain in the purse of the bank. So, we have 
significant reserves to cover any of the likely cost that makes that plan. 
Me: And do you have changes to the costing month because of the contractual criteria established 
for payment mechanisms? 
XY6-Pri: Ahh, Payment mechanisms is set at the start of the contract. So, we get paid for every 
vehicle that uses the road. Now the payment that you receive is a based year. So, for a car, this 
year you may get a penny, the next year you might get 2 pence. The way that structure works if 
you start the project, you look at you look at the overall maintenance strategy, what you are going 
to spend when you are going to spend it. You look at the whole cost profile. Then basically it 
ended up going down and down. The payment, the tolls that they are paying you will sort of put 
in place to shadow life. 
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XY10-Pri: So, to estimate the number of vehicles you have got to count your revenue over the 
next year. And that is what you get paid, and then there is a reconciliation at the end of the year 
against the actual traffic.  
XY6-Pri: So, that is how the model came and the final value. At the start and every year, we 
measure traffic. At the start of the year, we make a prediction based on last year’s traffic figures. 
What the next 12 months’ traffic is going to be. That enables the client to pay us money with 
shadow tolls throughout the year. And at the end of the year, you do reconciliation. So, if your 
traffic increases massively that year. At the end of the year, you negotiate what the actual traffic 
is to what you predicted at the beginning of the year. If it is over that year than what you 
anticipated, then they will pay you extra. And if it is less, they will expect you to spend that money 
back.  
Me: Do you have any payment condition bonus such as journey time reliability bonus, safety 
performance adjustment, critical incidence bonus on the road. A proactive management bonus 
and also investment decision approval process. 
XY6-Pri: No. 
Me: Okay 
Me: Some regard it as contractual mechanisms that are designed to measure VfM. 
XY6-Pri: Yes, they have safety measures. Like I said the only one we have got on this contract is 
lane closure charges. And again, we manage the network as lane closure charges could be massive 
and we could hit the profit. As I say, last year we don't incur it. In all our work, there is no 
disruption on the road network. 
Me: That is the reason why you experience a boost in profit in a bit 
XY6-Pri: The problem is safety measures. When we talk of safety measures, we look at 
comparing the roads. The expense is random events and that the problem we have got with trying 
to promote improvements as a DBFO company. Because you will say I will pay for this 
improvement and I will say if there are no accidents in the first year or the first three years 
whatever the contract said. We will say x number of accidents. So, if I invest X number of pounds 
on improvements. You are investing in something which is a very high risk. So, it implies that if 
there are six accidents or five. Then I have just lost a million pounds. 
XY10-Pri: So, there is a noticeable safety problem that could be fixed by specific measure. 
Highways England could do through additional works anyway. Because they will. Rather than 
pay us the bonus, that is quite an obvious solution. They will instruct the work, and they will pay 
us the cost of doing it.  They sane in themselves the safety bonus which they don't have to pay us. 
And something less than this, that will become a big risk, and we don't want to take that risk. 
Q23. Me: What method or technique do you adopt in the evaluation or calculation of VfM 
variance occasioned by PPP road project renegotiation? 
XY6-Pri: No variance. 
Q24. Me: What do you think could be the strategic actions that can be taken to address deviations 
from the VfM targets defined at inception and the VfM achieved at the end of the renegotiation 
process?  
XY6-Pri: I think it is working as a team, recognising that everyone has shared aims and the way 
the contract is formed. We have got lane closure charges, which ensures that there is minimum 
disruption on the network. One of those things that we have done and again as I said our traffic 
has grown. That to me is a sign that we are getting it right. I don't want to be there forcing traffic 
to use other roads. I want to be there doing what we call minimum disruption on the network. The 
other operators are causing mayhem and are transferring that to us. So basically, it is competent 
management, recognising what the aims and objectives are. 
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XY10-Pri. So, in our network, we rely on diverting traffic to other roads. We meet with well-
developed authorities regularly. We have a good working relationship.  They understand why and 
why we need to do it and they accept it. 
XY6-Pri: Yes. Neil's points are a very valid point. In another area in the MARK contracts outside 
the DBFO. Highways England set up what we called Network Boards, and the idea is that in the 
network board you have single management from the Highways Agency than to the main 
contractor who met on a regular basis to talk about the day to day running. It is more about the 
overall strategy. What could they do to provide a better level of service? What they could do of 
course is something like the minimum level of disruption to service provision. What happens 
could be what happens to all other contractual issues. It is a recognition of the fact that we have 
set up the network board which is not part of our contract and not part of things, but we try and 
take that strategic view. One other thing is that when Highways England set up the network Board, 
they are just looking at purely the network. You cannot operate that network without the local 
authorities. So, the network board should have representatives from the local authorities to take 
strategic views.  We will liaise with the local authorities. Now if we want to close the road, the 
best way to do the work is to cause minimum disruption to the public. Ah, they allow us to divert 
the traffic of the A19 onto the other network and vice versa. If they have a problem, they will 
come to us, and we will work with them or help them out to overcome their challenges. So, we 
work on a much more of a strategic view of the whole road network, and that's what the problem 
is and to make it up publicly you can't just look into your length of road in isolation. You have 
got to have an appreciation of the rest of the network which is all in the connects and you got to 
think about the overall management. How you manage them. That's VfM. 
Q25. Me: OK. Any other recommendation for achieving VfM at the point of renegotiation in PFI 
road projects, please? 
XY6-Pri: It's all about working relationships. Are we going down such that we have a proper 
partnering in force? Ehn, collaborative working such that we have partnered in force. If we choose 
correctly, there is going to be a benefit for everyone, and that is how we work. We have got a 
team now. We work as a team; we work together to the mutual benefits of everyone within the 
team. So, we keep this person as there is no difference between the guys working there and the 
ones doing here. We have got guys that have been there since 1996. We train our guys, we pay 
them well, and we look after them, and they get the best help, the best care and the best PP and 
the best training that anyone offers. And this guy understands that. If they want to go anywhere 
else. So, having that stable team is essential. Therefore, they become more committed to 
performing because they want to be here because of the motivators available. So, it's building up 
the whole team that may be able to work together maybe because they have the right reward for 
the effort. And if we go the award of a contract for the price. Then they become contractual. We 
have supervised another contractor working on the A19. But the contracts that were supposed to 
take six months now turn out to be one and a half. So, it's been an absolute nightmare, well you 
could do it in such phases on how not to manage a contract.  
Me: You have mentioned about hand-back requirements, you have spoken about project plan 
reviews etc. 
XY6-Pri: Yes. You have got to do that. By doing that is also the methodology of how you want 
to award the contract. The fifth edition is very adversarial, and there is a form of agreement that 
tries to take that out of the contract. So, some have better success than the other. So, you get the 
contract where everyone is the same name and the client recognise that the contract is going to 
make a profit. And the contractor knows that he has been paid to provide a service to deliver that. 
Once you get that, you start putting in every opportunity to screw in everybody, and they will 
ascertain if you are going to get VfM in the long term or not. We are in a day when you used to 
go out for the tender. Ah, we have a contract that will warrant the lowest price. Win it, and the 
first thing we did was two contractors and said we gave me a price for doing that work within ten 
percent reduction. Ah, his won the contract on any amount right at the at the start of the deal. So, 
everybody that is involved must look at how to optimise the cost that has been awarded for the  
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job. There is, therefore, contractual claims at one time when the department of transport look at 
the contract and they were saying that the out-turn of tenders is 22-23% higher than the bid. Now, 
that was the comparison that was made. What comparison they should have made was pretender 
estimate was and what the outturn cost was because the find out the public view will be 5%. So, 
if that were the correct contract estimate, contractors would come in there to getting here and 
going there. And that was what they did; they concentrated their effort in two years to get that 
price. Let me win the contract when I get in I then build up the cost through renegotiation. That 
was the opportunistic idea of some contractors. I will then put materials in and anything it could 
cost. 
XY10-Pri: They pay contractors on time because in some less scrupulous contracts. They pay 
contractors on time. It's part of their strategy to keep the money not to pay them at the initial stage. 
So that when they have got that money they will leave the project.  
XY6-Pri: The contract always works. They present the bill. Some contractor will sit on it for 
ninety days before anything happens and after ninety days the contractor says I have put my 
invoice on it and I have been paid. Alright, I cannot understand that. Why, when we have a look 
at that and on another five-six days. You give the theme phone calls. So, after three phone calls 
up to the third calls, they will look at it and process it. So, by then, it will be over 100 days whereas 
we pay within 28 days. So, on receiving the bill, we pay them on time. And now we achieve it 
within 20 days and again subcontractors that are with us because they know that they get paid. If 
you are in a business and you haven't got cash flow. Then you are not going to be in business for 
long. You could have a profitable business, and you may be making a lot of profit, if you have 
not gotten cash coming through the door, you may not be in business long. If you have not got 
cash coming through the door, you will not be in the business long. 
Q26. Me: OK. Regarding this project, so far, you can say the changes made haven’t affected the 
contract cost?  
XY6-Pri: Yes, Yes, As I said, we’ve crossed the risk. At the time of tender, there was a significant 
risk. That was reflected in the pricing of the contract. So, we put people in place to manage that. 
Therefore, those risks seem to reduce considerably. Ahh, that's one of the issues say where you 
talk about negotiations at the end of the contract, one of the options that the client could have. He 
could come and say rather than finishing in 2027 due to my overall national management. If you 
accept, I could turn this contract to 2025. OK, if they come and ask us that, it will cost them whole 
lots of money. Because we have had all the risks and now we are now in a position where we 
understand what the cost is going to be. And although we are not going to give them any money 
back, we are going to make a profit for those two years, and our income is going to add the 
earnings for those two years. So, in fact, it might cost you more. If we have done it at three years 
into the contract after the new build has finished, then they might be able to sell it back at a 
reasonable price 
Q27. Me: In the next few years do you see any difference or changes in the contract cost and does 
the contract makes provision for that? 
XY6-Pri: Ahh, primarily as I said there is a project plan which is renewed every three years. 
Those things do change. The geo-technologist is brought in; you will have an adverse winter. 
Then you can have a quick deterioration of parts of your assets. So, we look at that, and we review 
that every three years. And basically, that will consider anything that will change within that three 
years. Some of them are like the cost of bitumen. 
Me: So, because of that review there could be an amendment to the cost and time?   
XY6-Pri: Yes, there is provision for that 
Me: So that's part of the reason why you achieve VfM on the project?  
XY6-Pri: Yes, Yes.  It is. There is an indexation within the contract which guards you against 
some inflation, and there are increases. 
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Q28. Me: So, when do you propose to complete this project?  
XY6-Pri: February 2027. 
Me: Thank you very much for the audience. I am very grateful. Could we please have a 
photograph? 
XY6-Pri: Yes, Yes. You are welcome. Best regards. 
 
APPENDIX 11 VALIDATION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
A. Preliminary Question 
1. Please tell us your years of experience, qualifications, nature of work and company 
details.  
2. Are you aware of any framework/instrument that has been developed that will assist in 
the evaluation of the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects for VfM achievement? 
 
B. Evaluation of the Relevance and Ease of Understanding of the Framework 
Could you please rate the framework based on question 3 and 4 on the following 
scales? (4 = Very High, 3 = High, 2 = Average, 1 = Low) 
3. To what extent do you think the framework can be understood regarding the sections 
concepts flow from Section 1 to 5 and in terms of the construction logic?  
4 = Very High              3 = High              2 = Average              1 = Low 
4. To what extent do you think the framework has covered remedial actions that can be 
taken to address any observed deviation from the VfM defined at renegotiation? 
4 = Very High              3 = High              2 = Average              1 = Low 
5. Are any of the contract payment mechanisms, which has also been referred to as 
contract mechanisms for VfM achievement e.g., critical incidence bonus, lane closure 
charges etc. adopted as the measure (s) to ensure the achievement of VfM for users?  
 
Yes                                                       No. In the case of your project, which one is 
applicable? 
6. To what extent do you think the contract mechanisms for VfM achievement indicated in 
(5) above have assisted in VfM achievement for the users? 
 
C. Evaluation of Applicability and Usefulness of the Framework 
7. Can you please assess the applicability and viability of the framework for the evaluation 
of renegotiation in PFI (DBFO) road projects for VfM achievement? 
4 = Very Applicable, 3 = Applicable, 2= Moderately Applicable, 1 = Slightly 
Applicable 
8. To what extent do you think this framework would be needed and useful in the 
evaluation of VfM at the renegotiation of PFI (DBFO) road projects? 
4= Very Useful, 3 = Useful, 2 = Moderately Useful, 1 = Slightly Useful 
9. Which of the following stakeholders do you think will find the framework most useful?  
i. Public Clientii.                             ii. Private Concessionaire 
            iii. Both client and concessionaire             iv. Users 
10. Any conclusive suggestions or comments to improve this framework, please?  
